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424

EASTERN PAPERS.

PART IV*. B

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

March—August, 1854.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

(EASTERN QUESTION.)

PART IV.*

No. 1.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 27, 12·10 P.M.)

Vienna, March 27, 1854.

(Telegraphic).

THE "Austrian Correspondence" journal of this day publishes a telegraphic despatch from Bucharest of the 24th instant, stating that 18,000 Russians crossed the Danube on the 23rd, near Gedschid. It was expected that 30,000 would have passed before sunset.

The Turks retreated without offering opposition.

General Lüders was moving from Galatz towards Ibraila to support the passage of the river.

No. 2.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 28.)

(No. 388.)

Paris, March 27, 1854.

My Lord,

THE publication of the secret correspondence on the Eastern question between Her Majesty's Government and the Court of Russia, has had, as far as my observation goes, the happiest effect here; and, while recording the homage which is paid to the loyalty displayed by Her Majesty's Government, it gives me no less pleasure to bear testimony to the justice which is done on all sides to the ability and judgment displayed by Sir Hamilton Seymour.

I may relate, as a curious circumstance connected with this publication, that the Cardinal Archbishop of Bordeaux, with whom I had not the honour of being acquainted, called upon me, a few days ago, and informed me that the object of his visit was to express the admiration which he felt for the British nation on reading the secret correspondence. He had, he said, been previously suspicious of the real intention of Her Majesty's Government, and he desired to express his regret, at the same time that he offered his prayers for the prosperity of the Queen. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has informed me also that a deputation of merchants from Bordeaux had waited upon him, and had told him that their opinion of the war was quite changed since they had read the correspondence in question.

My private communications to your Lordship have long since made you aware that, hardly had the Emperor Nicholas failed in his overtures towards Great Britain, than he turned his attention to France, and that, both through

General Castelbajac and through M. de Kisseleff, he endeavoured to establish the same understanding, in respect to the Eastern question, with the Emperor of the French, that he had failed in cementing with Her Majesty's Government. It is so painful to allude to transactions of this nature, in which good faith has been sacrificed to intrigue, that I should certainly have avoided the subject altogether in a public despatch had I not wished to place on record the honourable conduct of the French Government. Not only have all the Russian proposals been met in the most straightforward and dignified manner, but in order that Her Majesty's Government might not be led away, by false rumours, to suppose that secret negotiations were going on between France and Russia, I have been constantly informed of every step taken, either at St. Petersburgh or Paris, to detach the Emperor of the French from his alliance with the Queen.

I need hardly add how little they have succeeded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 3.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 28.)

(No. 153.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 25, 1854.

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions I have this evening read to Baron Manteuffel your Lordship's despatch No. 74* of the 22nd instant, on the subject of Count Gröben's late mission to London.

His Excellency listened with the greatest attention to the observations which your Lordship had made to Count Gröben, but he said very little in return, though he appeared to admit the validity of the arguments used by your Lordship in combating those of the Prussian Envoy, and he was by no means surprised at the effect produced on Her Majesty's Government by this mission, for, as I have already informed your Lordship, he expected it would be a failure.

He was struck with your Lordship's remark that England and France had been compelled to accept war by the Emperor of Russia, and that it was incomprehensible that Prussia should expose itself to so many risks on account of the personal character of the Emperor, and that His Imperial Majesty would only become the more inflexible by finding friends to support him, whereas he might be disposed to make concessions to reason and truth; but the deepest impression made on Baron Manteuffel appeared to be that part of the despatch in which you allude to the position of a second or third-rate power which Prussia seemed disposed to occupy in the approaching struggle.

I did not fail to lay particular stress on your total ignorance of the quarter from whence the threatening language attributed to Her Majesty's Government had proceeded, and of the contrast of the tone which had been employed by England and France and that which had been adopted on many occasions by the Russian Government.

His Excellency promised to make known to the King the substance of these remarks, but he added that he believed Count Gröben had faithfully reported to His Majesty all your Lordship had said to him, and his Excellency appeared to expect that even at this late hour they might have a salutary effect, and assist in bringing about a better state of things.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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* See Part IV, p. 349.

No. 4.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 28).

(No. 157. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 25, 1854.

I HAVE made another and almost fruitless attempt to learn from Baron Manteuffel some details of the late communications which have been sent from this Court to Vienna.

His Excellency said that the communications which had been made emanated directly from the King, and that they consisted in assurances given by his Majesty that he had no object to influence in any way the policy of the Austrian Government on the Eastern question, that it was for them to decide on the course which it was most advisable to be adopted with a view to their own interests, but that Prussia desired to maintain her entire independence.

It is evident that Baron Manteuffel does not approve of these communications, which he considers can now only tend to lower Prussia in public estimation in Germany, and he observed that the King is so resolved to use every effort to retard if not to prevent the commencement of hostilities, that his mind is perpetually occupied in inventing new projects, and that he said to him the other day that matters were now beyond the pale of ordinary diplomatic arrangement, and that the only chance of success was to leave them to direct negotiation between the Sovereigns.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 5.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 131.)

My Lord *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch from Mr. Michele, Her Majesty's Consul at St. Petersburg, reporting his proceedings on the receipt of my letter to Count Nesselrode, and of his Excellency's reply that "l'Empereur ne juge pas convenable de donner aucune réponse à la lettre de Lord Clarendon." Your Lordship will immediately communicate this despatch to Count Buol, and you will invite his Excellency to carry out the proposals suggested by his Excellency and referred to in your Lordship's despatch No. 76 of the 8th instant,* and which I informed you in my despatch No. 122, of the 16th, were agreed to by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 6.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 133.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 29, 1854.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 115 of the 15th instant, inclosing a copy of a letter from General Baraguay d'Hilliers, respecting the course to be pursued in regard to the Treaty proposed to be concluded for regulating the military assistance to be given to the Porte by the Governments of England and of France.

It is hardly necessary for me to say, that the construction which you placed on the instructions given to you on this matter, was quite correct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* See Part IV, p. 310.

No. 7.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 29, 1854.

AS we are now at war with Russia, it is of the utmost importance to know whether Austria will sign the Convention, if Prussia refuses to sign a Protocol which would embody all the terms of the Convention; also, what course Austria proposes to adopt now that the Russians have crossed the Danube in force.

No. 8.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 128.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 29, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 100 of the 20th inst., reporting the assurances given by Count Buol to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, that in no case would Austrian troops enter Servia except to support the rights and authority of the Sultan, I have to instruct your Lordship to inform Count Buol of the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government learn the renewed assurances given by his Excellency on this subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 9.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30, 2 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March* 29, 1854.

THE "Austrian Correspondence" states, according to Russian reports, that, on the 23rd, a Russian corps under General Ouchakoff had forced the passage of the Danube about Tultscha. The Turks suffered great loss in killed, 150 prisoners, and 11 guns. On the same day General Ouchakoff occupied Tultscha. The Russian loss was also considerable.

No. 10.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 399.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 29, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me this morning that he had addressed despatches yesterday to London, Vienna, and Berlin, proposing that the Vienna Conference should be made officially acquainted with the communications which had lately taken place between the Government of the Emperor and that of Her Majesty on the one side, and the Russian Government on the other, and of the position in which France and Great Britain stood to Russia in consequence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 11.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 107. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, March* 24, 1854.

IT may not be uninteresting to your Lordship, on the eve of events which are about to take place in the North of Europe, to be made acquainted with the opinions and feelings of the people of this country, as far as I have been able to ascertain them, respecting the approaching war and the parties about to be engaged in it.

In the first place with regard to the Court, I may observe, that the opinions of the King are generally considered to be anti-Russian, and that the influence of Madame Danver will most undoubtedly be employed to increase any feelings of hostility which His Majesty may entertain towards the Emperor of Russia and his Government.

Unfortunately, however, from the weakness of His Majesty's character, his opinions have little or no influence upon those of the Government or of the nation, and I am even assured that on matters of domestic policy His Majesty's Ministers have not unfrequently received his support by exaggerating his apprehensions of the danger of following a course which would be displeasing to the Court of St. Petersburg.

It may, therefore, be assumed that His Majesty, whatever may be his personal feelings, is not likely to give an anti-Russian direction to the policy of the country; but it may be at the same time hoped that His Majesty would willingly avail himself of the services of ministers who would be willing to adopt such a policy, especially if circumstances should occur to diminish the exaggerated opinions which have lately prevailed in Denmark of the power and the resources of Russia.

The other members of the Royal Family may be all said to entertain, in a greater or less degree, Russian feelings and opinions.

This remark applies more particularly to the family of the Landgrave of Hesse, whose son-in-law, Prince Christian, considers himself to be mainly indebted to the Emperor Nicholas for his present position in Denmark, and whose son, Prince Frederick of Hesse, is son-in-law of His Imperial Majesty, and a pensioner of Russia. The Princess Anne of Hesse, and wife of the latter, a young and amiable princess, has brought with her from the Court of Berlin the strongest sympathies for Russia; and although these royal personages exercise no ostensible political power, their opinions have an unfavourable influence on those of many members of the higher classes of society.

The Government is of a less decided colour. Some of its members, more particularly Count Charles Moltke and M. de Crinnil, have a strong Russian bias,—the former especially so, in consequence of favours received at St. Petersburg, and probably also from a sympathy with strong governmental opinions. A newspaper, said to be supported by his Excellency and the reactionary party in Denmark, openly supports Russian views, and its columns not unfrequently contain violent articles against England.

If circumstances should, therefore, ever oblige the present Government to take an active part against Russia, it would do so against the wishes and inclinations of, I fear, the majority of its members. At present they profess that they are neutrals, not only physically but morally, and they pedantically decline to express an opinion on the merits of the question which is about to plunge Europe into war.

With regard to the nation, from what I have already said your Lordship will be prepared to learn that among the higher classes Russia has more well-wishers than Great Britain. The social changes effected in 1848, the abolition of the game laws, and other measures affecting the privileges of the aristocracy, are ascribed to the influence of English principles and ideas, and it is only from Russian support that any improvement is expected by such persons in a state of things which they look upon as little removed from anarchy and communism.

With the mass of the people generally also, England is not popular; 1807

is not quite forgotten, and an impression prevails almost universally that it was Russia alone that stood by Denmark in 1848. That while England held back, Russia espoused Denmark's cause, and that, finally, it was to Russia's menaces and influence that Denmark is indebted for the terms which she ultimately obtained from Prussia and Germany.

Although the extremes of society would thus appear to be unfriendly to England, she is fortunately, however, not entirely without a large and influential party among the Danish people. I feel assured that I do not err in considering the whole of the commercial and better educated portion of the middle classes as entirely devoted to English interests, so identical with their own. Every man who hopes to see constitutional liberty firmly established in the land, looks to England for countenance and support; every man who is engaged in commercial pursuits, knows that his interests connect him with England alone; and though many persons among this class of society may speak with bitterness of 1807, or draw comparisons in favour of Russia, with reference to the events of the Schleswig-Holstein war, they would all unanimously protest against any attempt on the part of the Government to assume a hostile attitude towards England, and would not hesitate to join her ranks if they were called upon to decide between the parties in the coming war.

There are, I also believe, men in this party who would rejoice in seeing their country engaged in hostilities with Russia, in the hope that thereby some new arrangement might be secured respecting the relations of Schleswig with Denmark. Such persons perhaps would not even object to England and France forcing the nation to a decision, in order to cover its future responsibility to Russia; and there is, I believe, little doubt that were a purely Danish policy to be adopted by the Western Powers with regard to Schleswig, and were the incorporation of that duchy into the kingdom guaranteed to Denmark, as the price of Danish support in an European war, the majority of the people would espouse with enthusiasm the cause of the Western Powers.

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured, my Lord, to lay before you a correct statement of the opinions and feelings of the people of this country, as far as they are known to me, on the subject of the war. The Dane is not of an expansive character; our officers must not therefore expect an enthusiastic reception, even from our well-wishers. Beloved we are not; but those who are disposed to give us their support will do so on better and surer grounds than an old grudge against Russia, or an ephemeral jealousy of Russian ambition. They will give it to us upon a well-considered and correct estimate of their own interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 12.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 110. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Copenhagen, March* 24, 1854.

I HAVE had some confidential conversation with Mr. de Bluhme, with reference to the subject of my despatch No. 107.

I said to him that when the officers of the "Hecla" were here, they had mentioned to me the marked difference of the reception which they met with in the Swedish and Danish harbours which they had visited.

His Excellency said, "That only proves that our people are more discreet than their neighbours;" and as I did not quite accept this explanation of the circumstance, he went on to say, that in Norway the great majority of the people loved England for herself; that in Sweden every rank of society detested Russia without having any particular affection for England, and that the feelings of both populations were too strong to be concealed. Whereas, said his Excellency, our lower orders, although they would be delighted to join France and England to-morrow in a war against Russia have accepted the position which the Government have assumed for the country; and as neutrality is synonymous with indifference, they show no predilection for either party in the impending conflict.

I said that I hoped his Excellency had correctly described the state of popular feeling, but that I had been assured the people of Denmark had not forgotten 1807, and that they also drew unfavourable comparisons between the conduct of England and Russia in the Holstein war. His Excellency assured me that I was entirely misinformed about 1807; and that if England and Russia had not done as much for Denmark as she had a right to look for in 1848, he fully appreciated the reasons which had prevented their doing so, and personally he was glad they had not done more, as Denmark in the events of that period had proved what she could do for herself, and that the arrangements which had resulted from the war were therefore more likely to be lasting. I said that I was glad to perceive that his Excellency applied his observation to Russia as well as to England, but that with regard to this question, I feared the two Powers were not generally looked upon in the same light throughout the country, for the Russian fleet having visited the Danish waters, had not only produced a favourable impression on the people, but that other means had evidently been employed to persuade them that Russia is the only power to which they owe any gratitude for her conduct in the Holstein question.

As his Excellency still maintained his own view of the popular feeling to be correct, I said I was rejoiced to find that he did so, adding that I had long since reported to your Lordship my belief that if ever it became necessary for Denmark to take an active part in the war about to commence between Russia and Western Europe, the commercial and enlightened part of the community would look to England as the only power by an alliance with which their material interests would be secured, and their constitutional liberties protected. It may be satisfactory to your Lordship to know that M. de Bluhme did not withhold his assent to this opinion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 13.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March* 30, 1854.

I HAVE received your Lordship's telegraphic message of yesterday.

Messenger Capel who was dispatched last night is bearer of the explanations given to me by Count Buol upon the subject of the Convention. He does not despair of getting Prussia to sign it or the protocol embodying its terms. If this should entirely fail, he appeals to you to allow some engagements to be taken under a different form.

The passage of the Danube took place in face of the strongest remonstrances lately made to Count Nesselrode by Count Esterhazy, and it has given this Government great annoyance. It is not yet known here with what intention this movement is made, whether as the opening of a campaign against Turkish armies in Bessarabia, or only for the occupation of the Dobrudscha. The Turks are concentrating upon Karasoul to support the troops in advance.

No news to-day from the seat of war.

No. 14.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 114.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March* 27, 1854.

I HAVE just had an interview with Count Buol, at which he stated to me that the Emperor's answer to the communication brought to His Majesty from the King of Prussia by Colonel Manteuffel, had been forwarded to Berlin by

Lieutenant-General Hesse, one of the Emperor's most distinguished officers, and the chief of his staff.

Count Buol then proceeded to add that it was a matter of vital importance at the present moment to ascertain clearly the views and intentions of Prussia, and that his present object was to discover whether the policy of that country, besides being, as the Prussian Government had declared it, *morally* identical with that of Austria, was of such a nature as to admit of the material co-operation of the two Governments in the crisis which seemed to be approaching. It was with this view that the Emperor had determined to entrust the delivery of his answer to the King of Prussia to so distinguished an officer as General Hesse, and in the meanwhile Count Buol thought it would be most desirable that no further declaration of the sentiments of the Imperial Government should be called for. He stated to me that his views with regard to all the questions and objects relating to the affairs of Turkey remained, and would remain, precisely the same as those he had hitherto declared. He did not retract in the slightest degree from any one of the engagements he had taken, but on the contrary, he most anxiously desired to carry them out and give entire effect to them. But he said that the importance of clearly ascertaining and defining the policy of Prussia at this moment was so great, that he did not think that any resolution as to any active co-operation in Eastern affairs could take place, before that object was secured.

Count Buol read to me a despatch from Count Valentine Esterhazy, reporting an interview that he had with Count Nesselrode. Nothing can have been stronger than the language he reports himself to have held both as to the protocol of the 5th of March refusing the preliminaries, and as to the support of the summons to evacuate the Principalities. Count Nesselrode appears to have been greatly irritated by this language, but at the same time to have been much disheartened by the line of policy which it indicated. Count Esterhazy reports that the Prussian Minister, General Rochow, made a similar communication to Count Nesselrode though couched in different terms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 15.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 413. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 30, 1854.*

I HAVE had more than one confidential conversation within the last two or three days with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as to the course which should be taken by Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor, if Austria eventually declined signing the proposed quadruple convention respecting the settlement of the Eastern question. I reminded M. Drouyn de Lhuys that there had been a period when Her Majesty's Government had been desirous of signing a convention with the French Government in order to regulate the future military action of the two Powers, but that the French Government having preferred an exchange of notes, in the hope that the cabinets of Austria and Prussia might at a later period be induced to sign a convention with France and England, Her Majesty's Government had deferred to that preference. It must be recollected further that, the terms in which those notes were drawn up, were no longer suited to present circumstances, since they had been purposely left vague, in order not to fetter discussion with the German Powers. M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted the truth of these observations, and he informed me this morning that he had taken the Emperor's orders, and that he should transmit to-night to Count Walewski the draft of a convention which he thought might be signed by the French and English Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 16.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 166.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 28, 1854.*

THE Austrian General Hesse arrived here last night on a special mission from Vienna, but has been indisposed since his arrival, and had not made any attempt up to four o'clock this afternoon to see Baron Manteuffel. He is charged, I am assured, with direct communications from the Emperor to the King of Prussia. His Majesty, though better, is still too unwell to see anybody, and some time may yet elapse before he recovers from the accident which he met with last week.

Baron Manteuffel, whom I have just seen, informs me that he has not received from Count Arnim any positive indications of the object of General Hesse's journey to Berlin, but he nevertheless believes that he is the bearer of some propositions for the joint military action of Austria and Prussia in the Eastern question, and that he is to suggest how far the co-operation of Prussia can be made useful at the present moment.

His Excellency said, however, that he only guessed what might be coming, for he had no positive intelligence as to the plans of Austria, and further that he did not think the King would consent to sign a military convention if one were proposed.

He told me that the feelings at Vienna were very anti-Russian, and the account of the passage of the Danube by the Russians, if true, might decide the Austrian Cabinet to take active measures without further delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 17.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 421.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 31, 1854.*

I INFORMED your Lordship in my despatch No. 413 of yesterday's date, that a draft of convention, regulating the future action of France and England in the affairs of the East, would be sent last night to Count Walewski for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. M. Drouyn de Lhuys read me this morning the text of this document. I regret that his Excellency did not show it me previously to its transmission to London, as I should have called his attention to an important difference between it and the notes exchanged between the two Governments, which it is intended to replace.

In the notes, the two Governments renounce beforehand the acquisition of any special advantage from events which may occur. No declaration of the kind is made in the draft of convention. Considering, however, the immense force which the disinterested conduct of the two Governments had given them in public opinion, was it not an unwise omission?

Such was the question I put to M. Drouyn de Lhuys. His Excellency replied at once that he was quite ready to introduce such a clause into the convention, if Her Majesty's Government desired it. That, or any other alteration suggested by Her Majesty's Government would be attended to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 18.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 422, Confidential.)

Paris, March 31, 1854.

My Lord,

MY private correspondence with your Lordship will have informed you that the Emperor was desirous some weeks ago of writing to the Emperor of Austria, in the hope of obtaining from His Majesty some explicit declaration as to the future policy of Austria in the Eastern question. A draft of the Emperor's letter was submitted for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and the idea having been discouraged by them as inopportune was abandoned by the Emperor.

His Majesty appears to have spoken subsequently to M. de Hübner of the intention which he had had, and to have been encouraged by Count Buol to persist in it. His Majesty accordingly addressed a letter last week to the Emperor of Austria, in which he begged the Emperor, in the most friendly manner, to explain what his future policy would be. His Majesty assured the Emperor that it was not from motives either of mistrust or curiosity, that he made the request, but that, as France and England were about to send an expedition to Turkey, it was most important to them to know the intentions of Austria, since their own plans would naturally depend in a great measure upon the attitude assumed by that Power. His Majesty promised at the same time the utmost secrecy should the Emperor of Austria require it.

M. de Bourqueney had an audience of the Emperor of Austria, on the 28th instant, in order to place this letter in His Majesty's hands. The Emperor did not read it at the time, but he entered into conversation with the French Minister. From the short summary of this conversation given by M. de Bourqueney in a telegraphic despatch, it would appear that the Emperor renewed his assurances that he would abide by the policy of France and England, though as usual his assurances went no further. He said that his position towards Russia was difficult and delicate, and that France and England must be indulgent. He seems to have hinted that the passage of the Danube at the distant point at which it had taken place, rendered it apparently less hostile towards Austria. In general, the Emperor's tone was friendly and courteous when speaking of France, very reserved with respect to Prussia, and very bitter when alluding to Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 19.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 21.)

Munich, March 29, 1854.

My Lord,

THE messenger Grattan arrived here on the 25th instant, and delivered to me your despatches to No. 16 inclusive.

I have reason to believe that some new intrigues, in reference to the expected declarations at the Diet at Frankfort on the part of Austria and Prussia relative to the neutrality of Germany at the present crisis, have been set on foot among the smaller States of the Confederation, though I am as yet but imperfectly acquainted with their object. What I have heard, however, is that the Wurtemberg Government has lately addressed a "circular" to those of the other second-rate Sates, calling upon them to come to an understanding as to the course which it will be for their common interest to pursue when the announcement of the policy of the two great German Powers shall be made to them in the Diet. I have been informed, though it is scarcely credible under existing circumstances, that one point upon which the South-Western States are disposed to insist, is the concentration of a federal force on the western frontiers of Germany; but such a step, if taken, or even seriously meditated,

would fall little short of a menace towards France, and might be attended with the gravest consequences, inasmuch as it must of necessity be followed by corresponding preparations on the French bank of the Rhine.

I seek in vain for any indication of hostility towards any member of the Confederation on the side of France which could in the least justify such an open demonstration of mistrust, and if, therefore, there be any foundation for the rumour to which I have alluded, I am compelled to trace the notion to the renewed efforts of Russia to hamper the action of the two great Powers which are now said to be perfectly agreed. Certain it is that the quarter in which the initiative has been taken lays the proposal open to suspicion; for Stuttgard has, ever since the arrival there of the Grand Duchess Olga, been generally considered to be the head-quarters of Russian influence and intrigue in Germany.

Something or other, which it is sought to keep secret, is unquestionably going on, for much activity is observable among the diplomacy of the small Courts. From what I am able to collect the declaration about to be made to the Diet by Austria is in substance an expression of her readiness to devote her power to the interests of Germany, which she thinks will be best secured by abstaining as long as possible from any active participation in the coming struggle. These views coincide exactly with those entertained here, and as is asserted with those of Prussia also. Such at least is the language reported to have been held by the Emperor of Austria during his late visit to Munich, but if I am correctly informed it was generally made to appear that in the event of those interests requiring him to turn his arms against his Northern ally he would consider that he made a sacrifice of his inclination to his duty to the Confederation.

If, which is, however, as yet by no means clear to me, Austria and Prussia are as cordially united as they are represented to be, the present movement amongst the smaller States would be easy to be accounted for on the grounds which I have explained in former despatches. Their suspicions that they are not even to be consulted in the arrangement have been aroused by the circumstance that not even a confidential overture has been made to them on the subject. This was admitted by M. de Pelkhoven in the course of a conversation which I had with him two days ago, and in which he made show of a reliance upon the two great Powers, which I do not believe this Government in reality feels, for he stated nearly at the same time to one of my colleagues that Bavaria was so little satisfied with the hesitation and concealment practised towards her by the Austrian Cabinet, that she had contemplated requiring some previous explanation of the policy which she would shortly be called upon to support in the Diet.

What effect the passage of the Danube by the Russian forces may have upon the decisions of Austria remains to be seen; here it is much feared that it will force her into more energetic measures than she has hitherto been disposed to take, or than will be at all palatable to the Confederation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 20.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 11.)

Frankfort, March 29, 1854.

My Lord,

THE passage of Messenger Grattan affords me an opportunity for reporting to your Lordship the substance of a conversation which I have had with M. de Bismark, who returned to Frankfort yesterday afternoon.

The first topic of any interest which we fell upon referred to the present posture of his own country, and M. de Bismark entered into explanations thereon, with the same frankness which I have always found in all previous intercourse which I have had with him.

He began by saying that he did not think our Government was well instructed as to the position of parties in Prussia, that what had recently happened seemed to be regarded in England as a triumph of the Russian

party, which does indeed exist, he observed, in Prussia; but is so little numerous and so uninfluential, that nothing of what had passed recently could justly be attributed to the part they had or had not taken.

The whole affair, said his Excellency, of the non-signature of the Convention, has been brought about by too much zeal on the part of certain persons who desired to attain that end, and also by the effect produced by the English press, which last, he said, had been very strong and very painful.

M. de Bismark cited to me some instances of menace held out by persons whom he could name, to the effect that if Prussia did not go heartily with the Western Powers, she would be hostilely dealt with both by England and France, that the Rhenish provinces would be attacked on her western frontier, and her ports blockaded, and descents made upon her northern coast.

M. de Bismark distinctly avowed the part he had himself taken in counselling the rejection of the proposed convention. "I was influenced," he said, "by the consideration that if such an instrument was signed under the influence of such threats as were used towards us, c'en était fait de notre indépendance, et pour moi-même j'aimerais mieux me faire brûler dans le dernier village de la Poméranie, que de céder à ce que je regardais comme une manière honteuse d'obtenir notre appui."

I told him that I thought he laid too much stress on the provocations of the English press, that neither had it any official character, nor could it be deemed to draw its inspirations from sources which should excite so much susceptibility as his remarks betrayed. M. de Bismark replied, that the language of the press had, however, produced a very strong effect on the public mind; for himself, knowing England as he did, he should have thought less of it if the insulting language of part of the press had not been coupled with that which he knew had been used in other quarters, the purport of which there was no possibility of mistaking.

I was enabled from the best possible authority to assure him that if the tone of menace of which he complained had been used by any servants of Her Majesty's Government, such language was in direct contradiction to the instructions I had had the honour to receive from your Lordship, and which I was quite ready to show him. (I alluded to the note your Lordship addressed to me just before I quitted London.) Neither could I understand how such a tone could have been adopted by any one desirous of inducing the Prussian Government to adopt the engagements stipulated in the Convention referred to. M. de Bismark again repeated the phrase he had used in the beginning of our conversation, "trop de zèle," and adduced such instances of the sort of language which had been used, both as reported to him, and had passed in conversation with himself, as leave it to be inferred that in his Excellency's judgment great indiscretions have taken place.

His Excellency spoke, among other things, of the King of Prussia's recent displeasure towards M. de Bunsen, and of His Majesty's disposition to have had him recalled, but as the circumstances must all be familiar to your Lordship, I do not further relate what his Excellency said in relation to them.

He further spoke of the difference which existed between Prussia's interest in the affairs of Turkey and that which must be felt by Austria, arising from geographical position, and even said, "Why, if Austria saw fit, did not she sign the convention? Why did she make her consent to do so depend upon ours?"

I drew his attention to one very serious objection, as it seemed to me, to such a course of proceeding, and remarked, that had Austria so acted, the division in Germany would have been more than ever apparent, and suggested that one of the greatest evils I foresaw as likely to arise from this want of coincidence in views was, that Austria must almost necessarily assume a corresponding attitude, and would feel, moreover, so much mistrust of Prussia, as would force her to be in observation not of Prussia alone, but of the rest of Germany, lest it should escape from her hands, instead of acting frankly and fearlessly against Russia, as she seemed disposed to have done in certain contingencies.

The view of things did not appear to have anything in it distasteful to M. de Bismark; he said, "Well, the Kings of Hungary have made war and peace ere now for objects quite foreign to German interests, and no argument can prove that Hungarian and Silesian interests are German interests."

The observation on my part had, in fact, elicited an almost involuntary avowal of the great principle of the party to which he himself belongs, of his belief in Prussia's destiny to dominate in Germany.

He went on, however, to say, that when an announcement was made to Lord Bloomfield that Prussia could not accede to the proposed convention, M. de Manteuffel expected that the communication would be received by his Lordship in a very different spirit from that in which it was accepted. In lieu of any strong expression or outbreak which was, it seems, fully expected by him, Lord Bloomfield only observed, with perfect coolness, "Well, then, we must endeavour to obtain our object by some other means."

His Excellency then proceeded to give me some details of what those other means are likely to be, and said, that if England only sought an assurance that Prussia would in no case assume an attitude hostile to us while we were prosecuting war with Russia, we might feel perfectly secure. "In no case," said M. de Bismark, "can we become the allies of Russia, but to incur the risks and expenses of a war with that Empire is quite another thing, especially when the possible advantages to Prussia, even of a successful issue to such a war, are fairly weighed."

There being no object for my entering on an argument with M. de Bismark, and wishing only to elicit such information on recent transactions, and such opinions on coming events as might prove of sufficient interest to report to your Lordship, I let the subject drop, and adverted to M. de Manteuffel's communication of the 18th of March to the Prussian Chambers.

I mentioned to his Excellency the two points which had chiefly struck me in that document, viz., that while Prussia was set forth as adhering strictly to the principles laid down in the Vienna conference; it was at the same time sought to establish that she had interests which might nevertheless compel her to take a course different from that taken by some of the Powers with which she had acted in those conferences. It would seem then to be M. de Manteuffel's argument that the separate interests of a State apparently concurring with others for a common object might at any time override such engagements as that State had contracted in concert with others.

The next point was the stress laid on Prussian leadership in Germany:—"Prussia, it was said, would secure to her confederates the blessings of peace.'

I hardly need point out to M. de Bismark in what light such a pretension would be regarded by Austria, or the risk of assuming such a position, if there was any wish to keep measures with the Imperial Government.

As regarded my first remark, M. de Bismark said the meaning of the sentence to which I referred was not intended to go the whole length I imagined, that Prussia had interests of her own so much at variance with those of England and France, that without differing from them on the principle laid down at Vienna, that Russia had made an unjust aggression on Turkey, she might still have diverging views as to the mode in which that aggression was to be dealt with, and also interests so apart from those of Austria that no one could argue on their being identical.

As to the offence which might be felt in Austria at Prussia's offer of securing peace to Germany, he did not think it would alter in any degree the sentiments with which the two States mutually regarded each other, and for his own part he believed that Austria would have been heartily glad to have been in a position to give a similar assurance.

Our interview ended with strong assurances on M. de Bismark's part that in no case was it possible for Prussia to become the ally of Russia, and that it was, as he affirmed, the national and not the Russian party which had rejected the Convention, but which nevertheless would use every effort to maintain good understanding with England, though their national pride and feelings of independence had been deeply wounded by the tone of menace adopted towards them in quarters where it had not been expected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 21.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 3, 6 P.M.)

Vienna, April 3, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

LES Russes passèrent le Danube à Galatz le 23 courant, au nombre de 30,000 hommes. Selon le rapport les garnisons de Toultcha et de Matchin se sont repliées au Carasou. Omer Pacha se trouvait encore à Silistrie le 26. Son intention était de concentrer ses forces à Shumla, qui semble être en sureté. La garnison de Varna aurait de la difficulté à tenir longtemps si les Russes se dirigeaient contre cette forteresse. Les flottes combinées se trouvent à Cavarna. Les relations diplomatiques entre la Turquie et la Grèce sont rompue. La Porte a pris la résolution de renvoyer les sujets Hellènes qui se trouvent en Turquie, et leurs bâtiments aussi.

No. 22.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 120.)

Copenhagen, March 31, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE BLUHME having spoken to me to-day of the probability of Austria and Prussia proposing that the German Confederation should assume a position of armed neutrality during the war between Russia and the Western Powers, I asked his Excellency what Denmark would do if called upon in such a case to furnish a contingent for the Duchy of Holstein. His Excellency said that the question which I had put to him had already given him cause for reflection, as a declaration of armed neutrality by the Confederation was likely to occasion considerable embarrassments to the Danish Government. He hoped, however, he said, to evade any demand which might be made on Holstein for troops, by representing to the Confederation that Denmark had already, in conjunction with Sweden, made a declaration of neutrality which had been acknowledged by all the belligerents, and which would in some degree prevent her entering into any further arrangements with Germany.

From another confidential source I have been informed that there is no probability of the Government being induced to send a single man to Germany in the event of their contingent being called for for the purpose referred to; the example of Holland in the Schleswig-Holstein war was quoted to me as a precedent which Denmark might claim to follow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 23.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 3, 12·18 *at night.*)

Vienna, April 3, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

I COMMUNICATED confidentially to Count Buol, your despatch No. 131.

In compliance with the instructions contained in it, his Excellency will call upon the Conference to assemble to-morrow, to take into consideration the signature of the Protest [Protocol].

Count Buol has also in the same way been invited to do so by the French Ambassador.

Count Buol having learnt from the Prussian Minister that he had not any instructions to sign the Protest [Protocol], has written to Berlin, earnestly to urge that the order to do so may be sent.

Count Buol considers that the passage of the Danube by Russia would sanction a declaration of war by Austria. He refers to a letter to Count

Colloredo, which is to be communicated to your Lordship, and to the account I have given of my last interview with him on the 29th, for his views on this subject.

No. 24.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 280.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I approve of the observation which you state in your despatch No. 421 of the 31st ultimo, that you made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in regard to the omission of a clause, in the French draft of Convention, renouncing selfish advantages from the war.

Her Majesty's Government think the reintroduction of such a clause, essential to the honour and dignity of France and England.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 25.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 4.)

Vienna, April 4, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

AT the Conference just closed, Count Arnim stated that he had been authorized by his Government to discuss the terms of the proposed Protocol, with the desire of being a party to it; but that before he signed, it must be transmitted to Berlin, for the approbation of the Government. The project of this Protocol, which had been drawn up by Count Buol and the French Ambassador, was then read and discussed, and its ultimate form unanimously approved.

It will be drawn up immediately in an official form, and will be transmitted by the post this day. I consider it so conformable to your Lordship's intentions, that I shall sign it, as will also the French Ambassador, as soon as the Prussian Minister receives his authorization to do so, unless by telegraph I should receive your Lordship's orders to wait till you have approved it.

The army in Hungary has been placed on a war footing.

No. 20.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 4.)

(No. 107. Confidential.)

Berlin, April 1, 1854.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 166 of the 28th ultimo, I reported to your Lordship the arrival of General Hess, on a special mission from the Emperor of Austria. That officer has had two interviews with Baron Manteuffel, but no arrangement has as yet been agreed on between the two Governments, on the subject of their military co-operation in the Eastern question.

I saw Baron Manteuffel to-day, when his Excellency told me that General Hess had not made any distinct proposition, or put anything on paper; but that he could inform me confidentially that the Austrian Government intended to move a considerable force from Bohemia and that neighbourhood, and they were desirous that 100,000 Prussian troops should be advanced to a position that would secure the eastern frontier of Austria from attack, and defend the left wing of the army of operation. This, said Baron Manteuffel, was the object, as far as he could learn, of General Hess's mission; and on my saying that I hoped the King would not hesitate to give the military assistance requested by Austria, his Excellency replied, that the organization of the

Prussian army rendered it extremely difficult to accede to this proposal without great inconvenience, that the time was scarcely come for so decisive a step, and that he thought a preferable arrangement would be, that a combined Austrian and Prussian army should occupy some position that might be selected as convenient for the object in view; that, however, nothing whatever was settled, and that he was ignorant whether General Hess might not have other propositions to make, that they were to meet again to-morrow, when the question would be more seriously discussed.

It appeared to me, from Baron Manteuffel's manner, and from the whole tone of his remarks, that since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship, a favourable change has taken place in the plans of this Government, and that it is at last beginning to contemplate the probability of war being brought near the frontiers, and is seriously considering the necessity of joining with Austria for mutual defence against the common enemy.

In reply to an inquiry which I addressed to Baron Manteuffel, as to the period when the Austrian army would be likely to commence active operations, he said that he had no precise information on this subject, but that he apprehended they would not begin until after the Anglo-French forces had taken up their position in Turkey and had actually been engaged with the Russians, for that the Austrians, who were greatly alarmed at the prospect of war, were not fully satisfied that we intended to do more than take possession of some strong positions, and leave them perhaps to bear the brunt of the battle.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 27.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 4.)

(No. 168. Most Confidential.)

Berlin, April 1, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that strange reports were current yesterday, as to the military Plenipotentiaries whom the King of Prussia had appointed to conduct the negotiations with General Hess. It was said that General Gerlach and Count Gröben had been selected for this purpose, and that these appointments had taken place without any reference to Baron Manteuffel, or to General Bonin, the Minister of War.

There is no doubt, I believe, that these nominations were in contemplation, and had been suggested by the Russian party at Court, but the impossibility of confiding so delicate a negotiation to General Gerlach was so apparent, and the selection so revolting to the army, who have no opinion of him as a military authority, that Baron Manteuffel and General Bonin represented the matter to the King to-day at the Council, and His Majesty has addressed a cabinet order to the Minister President, directing that he should be charged with the negotiation with General Hess, and that if any military opinions are required, His Majesty will select an officer for the purpose.

Baron Manteuffel mentioned this decision to me to-day, and said that the Minister of War, or General Reyher, would probably be the officer whom the King would associate with him in this negotiation if any were required.

These two generals are both good Prussians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 28.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 4.)

(No. 169.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April* 1, 1854.

THE publication and presentation to Parliament of Sir Hamilton Seymour's secret and confidential despatches has had a wonderful influence on public opinion here. They are read with great avidity by all those who are desirous of learning the truth as connected with the projects of Russia in the East, and I believe that I may safely assure your Lordship, that the effect produced by these despatches has been general throughout Germany. I cannot learn that they have as yet been seen by the King, and I, consequently, suggested to Baron Manteuffel to-day, that the knowledge of these documents by His Majesty might be attended with advantage, his Excellency said that he should speak to the King about these papers, and recommend that they should be read to His Majesty.

I have not failed to draw the attention of the Minister President to the declaration published in the "Gazette" of the 28th ultimo, upon the subject of the commerce of neutrals, and have been assured by his Excellency that the King and the Prussian Government are highly gratified at the generous forbearance of Her Majesty's Government in regard to this important question.

No country will perhaps be more benefited than Prussia by the concessions made in favour of neutrals, for her vessels will probably get a large portion of the carrying trade in the Baltic, whilst her merchants are already speculating largely on the prospect of a vast quantity of Russian produce being shipped in Prussian ports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 29.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 4.)

(No. 171.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April* 1, 1854.

M. LE MENSEBACH, the Prussian Consul-General in Wallachia, has lately written to his Government complaining of indignities to which he has been exposed by the Russian military authorities, and of the impossibility of obtaining any redress.

They have been carried to such an extent, that the Prussian Government has at last arrived at the conclusion, that their agent should be withdrawn, and as the only explanation offered is the existence of martial law in the Principalities, and as circumstances now preclude all chance of a return to a better state of things, Baron de Manteuffel has instructed M. de Mensebach to retire from Wallachia, if he should deem it desirable upon a repetition of any proceedings similar to those of which he has already had just reason to complain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 30.

The Earl of Westmorland to Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 4.)

(No. 116. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 28, 1854.

BARON BOURQUENEY received yesterday evening from his Government a letter from the Emperor Napoleon, addressed to the Emperor of Austria, which he was ordered to present, and he was informed this morning by Count Buol that His Imperial Majesty would receive him at two o'clock.

I learn from Baron Bourqueney that at the audience which ensued, he pointed out to the Emperor how great would be the advantage of obtaining some declaration from His Imperial Majesty as to the support which he would be able to afford to England and France at this moment, when they were about to engage their united forces against Russia.

M. de Bourqueney recapitulated the series of acts in which the Government of Austria had concurred with France, and which unfortunately had failed in attaining the great object of peace to which they had been directed. He represented also to His Majesty the natural course of continued amity of action which might be expected from Governments, who had pursued the same objects by negotiation when that negotiation had failed, and therefore he hoped the Emperor would maintain that union in the altered circumstances which must attend the commencement of hostilities. He pointed out the necessity of an understanding as to the manner in which the armies of Austria would be employed towards carrying out the course which he had thus advocated, so that the character of the operations to be undertaken by the expeditionary forces of France and England might, with relation to the movement of Austrian troops, be decided upon.

The Emperor stated, in reply, that he had hitherto acted in entire accordance with the Government of France, in pursuing the great object of the re-establishment of peace between Russia and the Turkish Empire; that in so doing, he had not hesitated to unite himself to every appeal which had been made to the Emperor of Russia to accept the different arrangements which had been proposed to him, and, on the late occasion, to call upon him to evacuate the Turkish Principalities, the occupation of which, as an infraction of the treaties by which the integrity of the dominions of the Sultan was secured, he had protested against from the moment of their invasion by the Russian forces. But, in the pursuit of these objects, he had, as yet, laid himself under no obligation to engage in war, or to commence hostilities; he had reserved his entire liberty of action upon this subject, and his decision, while upholding every principle he had subscribed to, and every engagement he had taken, would be grounded upon the interests of his people, and the maintenance of the rights and independence of the Turkish Empire.

At the present moment, it was of paramount interest to him to arrive at a clear understanding with the Government of Prussia as to the line of policy they would adopt both towards Russia as towards the German Confederation, and he was therefore making every exertion to secure this object, upon the attainment of which he looked forward with the greatest hope for the establishment of a concert not only with Prussia, but with the whole of Germany, which would secure their united action with France and England for the maintenance of those great principles by which their policy had hitherto been directed.

March 29.

Since writing the above, I have seen Count Buol, who stated that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor had received with the greatest satisfaction the letter of the Emperor Napoleon, which he looked upon as a mark of confidence on his part, and to which he should correspond with the most perfect reciprocity. Count Buol stated that His Majesty looked with the greatest anxiety for the replies he should receive from the Government of Prussia, but in the full determination of acting up to, and of scrupulously maintaining every engagement he had taken, and every declaration he had been a party to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 31.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 4.)

(No. 120.) *Vienna, March* 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE communicated to your Lordship by my telegraphic messages of yesterday and of this afternoon the intelligence which has been received here by the Government of the passage of the Danube by a considerable detachment of the Russian army above Toultcha, and between Ibrailn and Matchin. The reports which have been received from Bucharest speculate upon the intended advance of these troops to the position extending from Czernavado on the Danube to Kustandjie, which would be in the direction of the so-called "retrenchments" of Trajan.

The Turkish corps, at present in this district of the Dobrudscha, is under the command of Mustapha Pasha, whose head-quarters are in Karassu, and amounts to about 30,000 men, besides the garrisons of Toultcha, Matchin, Hirsowa, and Bazardschin.

Supposing the Russian force to amount, as it is reported, to more than 60,000 men, it might operate, from the position of Kustandjie, upon Varna or Shumla, but no information has been received here upon which to form any opinion as to the intentions of the Russian commanders.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 32.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 4.)

(No. 121.) *Vienna, March* 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 122,* which, while alluding to the serious obstacles which have arisen to the signature of the Convention, which had been proposed for adoption by the Four Powers, yet refers to the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had learnt that Count Buol withdraws from none of its stipulations, and is perfectly willing to confirm them.

Count Buol received this assurance with great satisfaction, as well as your Lordship's agreement to the feeling he had expressed, that if a document, drawn up with the object of cementing more closely the alliance between the Four Powers, was only signed by three of those Powers, the impression would be most unfavourable.

To avoid such a result, Count Buol stated that, in his last communications to the Prussian Government, he had again urged upon them the importance of their being parties to this document; but if they still objected to become so, he had hopes that they would not refuse their assent to the adoption of a protocol, in which the engagements contained in the proposed Convention might be inserted.

In case neither of these recommendations should be adopted by the Prussian Government, Count Buol stated that he must still continue to entertain the views he has already expressed to your Lordship, of the disastrous effects which might be produced, particularly in Germany, by the adoption of the Convention by only three of the Powers instead of the four, for which it was originally intended.

He states that your Lordship may rely with confidence upon his decided opinion upon this subject, he would therefore anxiously desire that some other form might be adopted, by which the same mutual guarantee between the Governments would be obtained, and to which he would most willingly adhere.

In making this appeal to your Lordship, Count Buol again assured me that he had the best hopes that the Prussian Government would not withdraw from the principles which were embodied in the convention.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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* See Part IV, p. 313.

No. 33.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 134.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 114 of the 27th ultimo, reporting the substance of your conversation with Count Buol, on the policy of Prussia at the present crisis, I have to inform you, that Her Majesty's Government fully concur with his Excellency upon the importance of securing the co-operation of Prussia; but they must again express their earnest hope, that the policy of Austria, the true interests of Germany, and, possibly, the future destinies of Europe, should not be made to depend upon the fears and vacillation of the Cabinet of Berlin.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 34.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 137.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch, No. 116 of the 28th ultimo, I have to instruct you to inform Count Buol of the sincere satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government have derived from his renewed assurance that the Emperor of Austria is fully determined to act up to and scrupulously to maintain every engagement taken, and every declaration to which His Imperial Majesty has been a party.

I am, &c

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 35.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 138.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 121 of the 29th ultimo, reporting the objections entertained by Count Buol to the signature by Three Powers only of the Convention which has been proposed for the adoption of the Four Powers, I have to instruct you to inform Count Buol that after the reiterated assurances given by his Excellency, Her Majesty's Government cannot but feel confidence in the intentions of Austria, and the course she will ultimately pursue; nor do they doubt that but for the obstacles raised by the Cabinet of Berlin, the Convention would long since have been signed. Her Majesty's Government admit the embarrassments of the position in which the Austrian Government now finds itself placed, and are anxious not to increase them; but if neither a Convention nor a Protocol are agreed to by Prussia, and that they are not to be signed without her, Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to discover by what other form the same mutual guarantee between the Four Governments can be obtained. But Count Buol may be assured that any proposal of his for securing this desirable object will have the immediate consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 36.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 127.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 25, 1854.*

I AVAILED myself of General Sir John Burgoyne's return from Gallipoli, to put him in personal communication with Omer Pasha, conceiving that an officer of his ability and experience would be able in a few days to form a correct judgment of the condition and prospects of the Turkish army in Bulgaria, and to afford important information as to the character and intentions of its commander.

Sir John returned from Varna on the 21st instant, and having at my request committed to paper the result of his observations, I offer no excuse for transmitting to your Lordship herewith in copy two memorandums, which contain not only an account of what he saw and heard in the course of his visit to Shumla, but also some notes of the opinions which he had formed in consequence.

I hold the latter to be worthy of the Porte's attention, and therefore make a point of communicating them to Reshid Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 36.

Memorandum.

Constantinople, March 22, 1854.

I ARRIVED at Shumla on the evening of the 12th of March, and waited on Omer Pasha by appointment the next morning. Nothing could have been more courteous than his behaviour, and he has been full of attentions to myself and the party with me ever since our arrival; one of his aides-de-camp almost constantly in attendance to provide for any wants we might have; horses for the whole party, mounted orderlies, and dinners sent to us to the bare walls, in which, according to the custom of the country, we were lodged. We were not less than an hour with him, without any pressure on our part on his time, and he returned the visit the same evening at 8 P.M., and remained as long. His conversation was cheerful, frank, and, I believe, quite honest, as far as he chose to communicate, but not very full as to his intentions. He set out for the Danube on the 14th, I was, therefore, only just in time to catch him. He calls his excursion a tour of inspection, adding, however, with a smile, that if he found an opportunity, he might perhaps strike some little coup—implying rather the making some little attempt upon the enemy, if circumstances seemed favourable, than having any fixed plan of advance in much force; and yet the preparations seemed to be extensive. Some regiments have been moved to the front from Schumla, and the force from Adrianople (and perhaps other parts) are moving forward. One regiment arrived at Shumla on the 14th, consisting of a very fine body of men, armed with percussion muskets; but there appear to be large forces still remaining on the two extreme flanks at Kalafat and the Dobruscha; and from a remark made by the Pasha incidentally, I imagine his project is to support a principal advance from the centre by a diversion from Kalafat, or, vice versâ, to draw the Russian forces to the centre, while an attempt is made from Kalafat to take possession of the Lesser Wallachia, where the inhabitants are said to be particularly indisposed to the Russians, and where a new line along the river Aluta is said to be very strong. There is, moreover, manifestly some danger in those wide movements, or in these greatly dispersed positions, with an enemy concentrated in the midst of them, from whence he can attack any one he pleases, with nearly his whole force.

Omer Pasha is vigorous in body, and full of information and intelligence. He knows all this country thoroughly; he is evidently very sanguine and confident; but he holds strong opinions, and a considerable bias towards points

he would wish to be established. I never knew so low an opinion given of the value of Russian troops as he entertains, while he is enthusiastic on the merits of the Turks. He says the difficulty is to restrain his soldiers from moving forward, while those of the Russians have to be urged on by their officers. After descanting in this way for some time, I said to him, lightly, "It would appear that your Highness would have no hesitation on any day to pit a regiment of Turks against one of equal force of Russians," to which he answered, emphatically, that he would readily attack three Russian regiments with two of Turks; and I am persuaded that he fully believes their value to be in that proportion. There is no difference of opinion anywhere as to the courage of the Turkish soldier; and I can believe another of Omer Pasha's opinions, that he has more natural intelligence than the Russians, whom he describes as mere machines. There is a Prussian officer at Shumla in the Turkish service, who gives a much better account of the Russians. As a Prussian, however, he will naturally approve of a system that is worked precisely like that of his own country. He mentions in favour of the Russian officers what might appear, but not correctly, to justify the Pasha's judgment of the demerit of the soldier —that the officers were very forward in coming to the front in action, to encourage the men to advance. If these judgments were formed at Oltenitza, it must be recollected that the position of the Russians was most trying; on a dead flat, of great extent, subjected to a very heavy cross fire of a powerful commanding artillery, during an advance to a well-manned entrenchment. Of the Russian artillery the Pasha describes the practice as bad, while it is said that the Turkish field-pieces are well served, and, according to the Pasha, well horsed and equipped, and, if so, the capability of movements, quick and continued, is of even more consequence than accuracy of practice. I inquired of him about the provision of reserve ammunition. He said that he had in the different depôts in the garrisons as much as 1,000 rounds for every effective field-piece; but did not give a clear account how the spare musket ammunition was conveyed.

He acknowledges that in cavalry the Russians have a complete superiority, but rather surprised me by considering that the most important of that force were the Cossacks. This country, that is everywhere excepting the higher ridges of the Balkan consists of vast open plains, the cavalry ought therefore to be of great service, and in trying contests, when the infantry becomes loose in order, must be very influential. It is said, however, that in ordinary cases the Turkish infantry put themselves readily into compact masses, and repel the charges of cavalry—a great proof of courage and mutual self-confidence. The Prussian officer, and indeed general report, considers the Turkish officer as very inferior; he says that from the corporal upwards they are of descending order in merit as they ascend in rank.

Omer Pasha estimates the Russian forces in the Principalities at 150,000 men in all; but he says that they have a large number of sick, a great many irregulars, many scattered posts and depôts to protect, so that he does not consider that their effective manœuvring force can be valued at more than 100,000, which does not appear unreasonable. It is probable that thus far he may have tolerably good information, but he does not seem to know what they are doing in the rear, although he is inclined to believe that reinforcements to any amount are as far back as Kieff. It is very difficult to obtain information from within the Russian outposts at any time, and more particularly with such an impediment as the Danube in their front; on the other hand, the Russian system of espionage in their favour seems to be carried to a great extent. Omer Pasha not only cautioned us to secrecy in all our projects for the disposition of our troops or proceedings, but he evidently in his own manner shows a distrust of any of his proceedings being divulged. He was comparatively very open to us, but we could observe the difference in his conversation the instant any servants or officers came into the room, and I really believe that part of his reserve to us may be owing to this caution, not a distrust of our honour, but perhaps of our discretion. This distrust of even their own followers and of one another seems to be quite common to all the Turks in authority.

Omer Pasha must be sensible of knowing so much more than we can of the state of affairs here, he is so decided in his opinions, has so well considered a proposed course of action, and is now so high in position and power, that to

presume to offer him direct advice, or to recommend caution to him, would appear obtrusive if not impertinent, and unless we had had several interviews, when such ideas might have come out incidentally, was too much to be attempted on a first and only day's acquaintance. He certainly appears by far too confident in the courage of his troops, his own arrangements, and in an erroneous depreciation of the Russians. He cannot take into sufficient account the many defects and wants in the Turkish system and organization. How much his own views may be obstructed by the want of conduct or intelligence of the commanders of distant corps, these the numerical superiority of the enemy and the dissemination of his forces will probably lead to his meeting some check if he has an opportunity of trying any very favoured movement, but I should hope that it may not amount to any severe reverse. He has apparently a great deal of art in his conduct and proceedings: he worked to great advantage at Oltenitza by masked batteries, and I should expect that he is in the habit of working metaphorically as well as literally by masked batteries. If the Russians gain an advantage over him on the present occasion, unless it should be very heavy in the first instance, the season is not yet very favourable, and perhaps their preparations not quite sufficiently advanced for them to take full advantage of it by any rapid powerful forward movements. The Turks will then have a little more caution instilled into them by experience, they will look with more reliance to support from our troops, and will still, it is to be hoped, have a large force of gallant and tolerably organized troops remaining for further efforts. Even Omer himself, if he still retain the confidence of his troops, which he has now in an eminent degree, will improve by it, and then may become an admirable general and commander for a Turkish army. At all events the case is irremediable; the chances, whatever they may be, must now be incurred, for Omer Pasha is in a position that, like the lion in a recent "Punch," cannot be held in.

From the sample of his proceedings at Oltenitza, and from his conversation on military matters, I assume that he will at starting, if he crosses the Danube, entrench a position on its left bank as a depôt and base of operations. This the Turks do rapidly, and defend to perfection. That position will be available to cover his retreat, if required, and may tend to prevent any very serious disaster. In taking these views I should be truly happy to find myself so far mistaken that he comes triumphantly out of some brilliant enterprize. Whatever may be his confidence, he is manifestly prepared for the possibility of having at some time to retire, because I understand that every pass of the Balkan has field-works of recent construction to assist in their defence.

With regard to any advance that he may contemplate across the Danube, the Turks have no bridges that would be available; but they hold islands within which are collections of boats large and small; at one he stated sufficient to carry over 6,000 men at once, and at another, if I understood him right, as many as 14,000: this affords a valuable facility for advance or retreat.

Altogether there cannot be a doubt but that Omer Pasha is a very superior man for a Turkish General; he understands German, Italian, and French, and with Europeans is as one of them, and would be considered an able officer among all these nations, while he has a commanding influence over the Turks. In spite therefore of his assumed erroneous judgment in some particulars, if he were removed neither observation nor information would lead to believe but that he must be replaced by some very inferior character.

Major Dickson, Lieutenant Burke, and Mr. Wellesley are gone to the front to make notes on the state of the troops and positions there, and should any operations take place early they will witness them. They go with the entire approbation of the Pasha, who promises them every assistance. They will in returning act upon the directions of the Duke of Newcastle in examining one of the passes over the Balkan, and one of the routes from thence to Constantinople.

In the course of conversation I adverted several times to what course Omer Pasha might consider would be most advantageously taken for the common cause by any British and French land forces that might be sent out, intimating that I could not say how many the two Governments might determine upon, but that I thought the minimum force would be 20,000, and the maximum 70,000, in the first instance. He had told Major Dickson, before I saw him, that he thought he could manage the direct attack without our

actually joining him, and when he entered upon the subject with me, he more than once recommended that we should take post at Varna. He described it as a healthy country, that it would be easy to obtain there any amount of supplies, that there were already defences there for a large force or a moderate one, that it would threaten in flank or front any Russian advance in Bulgaria, and, at the same time, by our command in the Black Sea, would also threaten an attack upon the whole Russian north and north-eastern coast, Odessa or the Crimea. An attack on the latter is a very favourite project with him; he said the inhabitants of the Crimea (Tartars and Mahomedans) were peculiarly adverse to the Russians, that, on account of the narrow neck connecting it with the main, we could retain it, and that it would act powerfully in endangering the possessions of the Russians in Georgia and Circassia, but did not advert much to what we should consider most valuable, the fall of Sebastopol and the fleet there. All this is very sensible, but there are several difficulties to be considered. I told him that Varna, though a fine bay, was quite open to some winds and no port, to which he said, that it was well sheltered from the prevailing winds, and in summer was always considered an excellent roadstead. I then mentioned that the conquest of the Crimea would be most advantageous, but would be most extremely difficult, by a landing from the sea against such a force as the Russians no doubt had within reach. He estimated that force at, perhaps, 20,000 men. I told him that our Government believed there were there as much more, perhaps 30,000 or 40,000. He made light of any difficulty in his confident manner, and said you had only to land and entrench yourselves near the shore, so as to maintain a footing until you put in the necessary amount of force, a very natural idea for a Turk, as it is very much in their mode of warfare, but too hazardous to be attempted by us, and especially without ascertaining the nature of the country and of the position itself previously, and would be considered a wild project. The force of the argument relative to the Bay of Varna as a roadstead for the purpose, would be decided by the navy after more knowledge of the Black Sea; but there would be another considerable objection. It would not be thought right probably to send an army thus early into the Black Sea, with the Bosphorus and Dardanelles unsecured in its rear.

The presence of a respectable force of British and French troops at Varna during the summer is well worthy of consideration. It would, no doubt, greatly embarrass the enemy by its central position, from whence it might be directed to the Danube or any part of Bulgaria, or by Aidos into Roumelia on the one side, while on the other it would be more ready to make an attack upon the Crimea, and all the northern and eastern coasts of the Black Sea, than from the Bosphorus, and oblige him to maintain large forces in those parts, or risk the suffering of some heavy disasters there, but will probably, be considered, be too forward a movement to be determined upon until events shall more completely justify it. Any previous footing, however, made at the Dardanelles or Constantinople will be all in the way for such an advance into the Black Sea, should circumstances render it desirable, and will no doubt be so esteemed by the enemy.

With regard to the capabilities of the Bay of Varna, Colonel Neale, the British Consul, states that during the seven years that he has been stationed there, he has only known of the loss of six or seven vessels in it, and those ill-found Turks and Greeks, although an open bay well frequented for trade. It is little more than 4,000 yards wide,—vessels in it would be within range of heavy guns on either shore; within the place there is a barrack for full 3,000 men, and a fine military hospital.

Whether in effecting a landing on the enemy's coast, or in retiring from it, the co-operation of a Turkish force would be extremely valuable for covering the advance or retreat in entrenchments, for which they are peculiarly well adapted, and they would be more particularly desirable in any enterprise in the Crimea, or other part, where the inhabitants are Mahomedans, and of friendly disposition towards the allies.

(Signed) J. F. BURGOYNE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 36.

Memorandum.

Constantinople, March 22, 1854.

THE prospect of affairs on the frontier of Turkey is extremely discouraging.

The Russians have not less than 100,000 men in Wallachia for a manœuvring army after deducting for sick, inefficient, and various other posts; they are known to be good troops, well appointed and commanded, and under every approved principle of organization and arrangement.

The Turks have, perhaps, about as many, including garrisons of numerous fortified places; their really available force to take the field is, therefore, much less: in their composition they are far inferior to their enemy; the recent improvements in their army have only reached the equipment and exercises of their infantry and artillery. Their infantry consisting of fine men, full of courage and well armed, serviceably clothed, and, moreover, with a degree of correctness and steadiness which does not fail them even in action; the artillery is well served and well horsed; the cavalry is in small force and inefficient; the officers of all arms, taken in the mass, know nothing of their business.

Omer Pasha is a man of energy and intelligence, on a par with men of the most civilized nations, but, from his extreme over-confidence in his troops and himself, and from his arrangements, appears to me to be wanting in judgment in some respects. All other pashas or generals that I have seen are evidently without any professional knowledge, although, very probably, of much personal courage. The engineering of the Turks is beneath criticism, and there is every appearance that their arrangements for depôts of provisions, ammunition, &c. are quite defective, partly from want of knowledge; thus, as an army, they are not to be compared to their enemy, nor fit for campaigning operations.

To this inferiority is to be added the injudicious principles of a vague idea of defending the line of the Danube, which cannot be deemed practicable.

A line of river of hundreds of miles in extent affords no more defence than the Wall of China; it is merely an obstacle for the passing of which means can always be readily obtained. In the civilized Christian countries a river frontier may be of importance when fortresses are judiciously established on its banks (with têtes-de-pont) at the bridges and passages of the great leading roads of communication, because it is by those roads that the movements of armies are directed; but in Wallachia and Bulgaria there are no made roads, one part of the country is as easily traversed as another, and any part of the banks can be reached. A few towns on the right bank are particularly fortified, but without têtes-de-pont, or any lodgment on the left bank, except at Widdin. There can be no very great difficulty, therefore, in forcing the passage, when all the scattered batteries and defences will fall into the hands of the enemy: moreover, the line is between 300 and 400 miles in extent from Kalafat to the mouth of the river, and most disadvantageously circumstanced in presenting a concave line to be defended instead of the most favourable, which is convex; thus the two flanks, Kalafat and the Dobrudscha, particularly the latter, which is on the right, are considerably advanced, while the centre is re-entering.

To all these natural disadvantages must be added a vicious disposition of the troops; on each of these two advanced flanks are collected about 25,000 men, which disposes of one-half of the whole army; the Russians occupying the central position, at about an equal distance between the flanks, and more approached to the centre, can concentrate their main force to attack the latter, while they merely hold in check the flanks: thus it is presumed that they will cross somewhere between Silistria and Rustchuk, or between the latter and Nicopolis, with 60,000 men, to oppose which the Turks will not have above 30,000 available, with the presumption that they will not happen to be collected in the right place; a rapid advance will probably then be made on Shumla, and possession obtained of it, and perhaps at the same time the rear of the Turkish force in the Dobrudscha may be gained, which will then be seriously compromised; some 10,000 or 15,000 men will be sufficient then to follow the retiring corps from Kalafat and the Dobrudscha, who may be expected, from the moral effect of their first failure, to get into great disorder, and be driven back in confusion by inferior forces.

Schumla is in a fine strategical site for concentration, either for attack or defence, but, under the circumstances here assumed, cannot, it is conceived, be retained to advantage; it is not a fortress, but merely an intrenched camp, that would require 25,000 or 30,000 men to defend, and, even if such a corps could be collected there, which is hardly to be expected, it would be improvident to have them shut up in it, when the next line, that of the Balkan, would require all the forces that can be collected on it.

The fall of Shumla will have a serious effect on the morale of the Turkish army and nation on account of a strong prevalent prestige and boast that Shumla has never been taken. It is to be hoped that after all these events on the Danube and in Bulgaria, the Russians will have been so detained by detailed operations, the collecting provisions, bringing up depôts, subduing fortified posts, and other arrangements as not to be able to prevent the remains of the Turkish army from occupying Varna in strength, and taking up positions for the defence of the passes of the Balkan; it is then that the energetic defence of the country may be attempted with a prospect of success.

The measures that it would seem desirable to adopt to meet these anticipated evils would appear to be:—

1. To put it seriously to the consideration of Omer Pasha, if it is not now too late, the probable passage of the Russian main body to an amount of perhaps 60,000 men, and the want of men on his side to prevent it, with his inferior forces, also to submit to his better judgment the policy of retaining such a large force on each of the extreme flanks, while the enemy occupies a central position, from whence he can attack the centre or either of them; in short, whether he can consider it possible to prevent being forced by very superior numbers, somewhere, in so very extensive a line as that of the Danube.

2. To submit to that general whether the passes of the Balkan would not present a more suitable field of battle for his army, acting on the defensive, with such places as Shumla, &c., occupied in his front, if he thought proper; on the Balkan the enemy would be at once deprived of one great source of their superiority, namely, that of their cavalry.

3. That the Turkish forces should defend the line of the Danube lightly, and avoid any general or serious action in Bulgaria, but rather retire under previously regulated arrangements for an orderly retreat, each corps to its destined position on the Balkan, as soon as the enemy shall be firmly established on the right bank of the river, with arrangements for a due supply of provisions and other necessaries for the troops in their new position, and the least available resources left for the enemy.

4. To provide Varna in due time with a good garrison, and the necessary provisions and ammunition to withstand a siege.

5. That the combined fleets, if the admirals approved, should take station temporarily, but early, in the Bay of Kavarna, where they would be able to co-operate to many useful purposes with the Turkish right, and would threaten all the Russian coasts, and where their presence would lead to an expectation that they might be followed by the land forces of the allies.

6. That the position of Boulabar, and one in front of Constantinople, between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea, be thoroughly entrenched for places of last retreat.

7. The troops of French and British now under orders for this service to be collected at the Dardanelles, and in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, where they could act as a nucleus for the last defence of these positions, or advance up the country, or even into the Black Sea, as the coming events shall seem to be most proper.

It is presumed that after the present force, which the Russians have in the Principalities, and the 6th Corps (supposed, perhaps, 45,000) shall have joined, they would have much difficulty, and require a considerable time to bring forward more, and that by the above measures, and, if necessary, further reinforcements from France and England, such force, or whatever they could add, it may be confidently presumed would be quite insufficient to succeed in their enterprise.

(Signed) J. F. BURGOYNE.

No. 37.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 129.)

Constantinople, March 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information are copies and extracts of despatches lately received by me from Varna and Galatz, with respect to the movements of Russian troops in the two Principalities preparatory in appearance to their attempting a passage of the Danube.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Galatz, March 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I ADDRESSED your Lordship on the 23rd ultimo, but as the opportunity of forwarding the letter was missed, I now forward it herewith. The two copies inclosed of letters addressed to the the Earl of Clarendon, No. 17 of 27th ultimo, and No. 20 of the 2nd instant, will show all that has been passing here down to the latter date.

Two days ago, eight heavy guns and two mortars arrived here from Reni, and proceeded on to Ibraila. Nothing has taken place at Ibraila during the last two days.

General Budberg, the Commissioner for the two provinces, and General Schilder, the chief of the engineers, were here yesterday, and have gone to Ibraila.

Preparations are going forward to throw the bridge across the Danube at Galatz, it consists of rafts of five pine-masts, put close together, and joined by beams strongly to other five masts, about ten feet apart from the first five; a sufficient number of these rafts will be anchored all across the river, and beams laid from one raft to another and strong planks laid across the beams. I have consulted some persons as to the weight this bridge will be able to bear or float, and the conclusion I have come to is, that it will not bear more than one ton for every six feet measuring across the river.

A person informed me to-day that according to the register kept by the Moldavian authorities at Jassy, 210,000 Russian troops had entered the Provinces down to this time. The number is roughly stated in this manner. The whole of the corps of Dannenberg, 70 regiments; the corps of Lüders, 80 regiments, were less 16 regiments, 64 regiments; the half of Sacken's 80 regiments, 40 regiments; the remainder Cossacks, &c., 30 regiments.

I consider, however, that from this at least 20 per cent. must be deducted to find the true number which has entered; this will reduce it to 170 regiments entered, from which deduct killed and wounded and dead of sickness in the hospitals, and sick, and it may be fairly assumed that the Russians could not put over 120 regiments of men under arms at this time. The same person informed me that more of the corps of General Sacken are at present entering by Leova, and that the sixth corps had begun to enter Bessarabia.

From the state the bridge is in, I do not think it can be thrown over and rendered fit for passage for fourteen days yet, certainly not in ten days. The Russians also are building eight or ten flat-bottomed boats here, for the transport of troops and which will probably carry 250 or 300 men each.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, March 16, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that his Highness, Omer Pasha, left Shumla on the 13th instant, for the Danube, accompanied by Ismail Pahsa, late second in command at Kalafat, and most of the troops who were at Shumla.

The troops now remaining in Shumla do not exceed between 3,000 and 4,000 men. With the exception of about 14,000 men stationed at Varna, Shumla and Ternova, the whole of the Turkish army of Bulgaria are now on the Danube, or within a day's march of that river.

I am informed, however, that there is a reserve of about 10,000 men at Sofia, who are also advancing towards the Danube.

The Russian force hitherto assembled in Little Wallachia, with its head-quarters at Craiova, is now known to be effecting a retrograde movement. The villages round Kalafat are abandoned by the Russian troops, and a reconnaissance had been made by some Turkish cavalry nearly to Craiova.

It would certainly appear that the Russian army is about being concentrated round Bucharest, or opposite the centre of the Turkish line. A move of the Turkish troops out of Kalafat would tend to delay the accomplishment of such an object.

Should there be no forward movement out of Kalafat, I humbly conceive it probable that the Russians would be in a condition to pass the Danube with 70,000 or 80,000 men, still leaving a force of 20,000 or 30,000 men opposite Matchin. It is probable that his Highness, Omer Pacha, could concentrate 50,000 or 60,000 to oppose to a Russian invading army; but such a concentration, I fear, would occupy a week, and the means of transport for the necessary provisions and munitions of the army, I am informed, are very deficient and inadequate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 37.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, March 21, 1854.

My Lord,

NO intelligence of serious importance has reached Varna from the Danube since the Generalissimo, Omer Psaha, left Shumla on the 14th instant.

I have, however, received accounts of heavy cannonading having occurred at Silistria and at Turtukai, and on the part of the Russians from the opposite side of the river. The Russians would appear to have established several batteries, and had twenty-four guns engaged against Turtukai. These events are reported to have taken place between the 12th and 15th instant.

At this juncture, I beg leave to lay before your Lordship, in the enclosed paper, the result of the best and most recent information I can obtain respecting the force and distribution of the Turkish army on the Danube.

This distribution, which I have every reason to believe to be the present one, will doubtless be changed, and especially as regards the large body of troops in the Dobrudscha, which certainly appears to be exposed to some risk, should the Russians succeed in passing the river in force towards the centre. The troops in the Dobrudscha will, I therefore presume, be in great part concentrated towards Silistria and Rustchuk.

Your Lordship will observe that the Turkish force in Kalafat is not so considerable as hitherto stated in the reports from all quarters, a portion of the

previous garrison has been detached to the frontiers of Servia, and appears under that head.

The Russian force in the vicinity of Kalafat was reported on the 8th instant, by a Polish deserter to the Turks, to amount to about 12,000 men, with their head-quarters at the villages of Maglovitz and Poyoni. At Craiova the deserter stated that there were only two Russian battalions. These details, I am informed, have been perfectly confirmed by the statement in a recent German paper.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Statements of the present distribution of the Turkish army on the Danube, taking the course of the river from the extreme left of the line to the extreme right:—

	MEN.
Frontier of Servia	4,800
Kalafat and Widdin	20,000
Rahova, Nicopolis and Sistowa	8,000
Rustchuk	10,000
Turtukai	15,000
Silistria	10,000
In the Dobrudscha	35,000
Total	102,800

Varna, March 21, 1854.

No. 38.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 25, 1854.

THE combined fleets returned into the Black Sea yesterday, or early this morning. The "Magellan," a French steam-frigate, grounded in Beikos Bay; but she has been floated again, without any serious injury. The "Retribution," "Niger," "Sampson," "Caradoc," and "Spitfire," remain here for the moment; the last two, if not the "Sampson" also, being under orders for departure.

As there is still reason to suppose that the Russians are preparing to cross the Danube, some advantage may be derived from the appearance of a powerful naval force in the neighbourhood of Varna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 39.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 134.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 26, 1854.

THE time appears to have arrived for the Ottoman Government to take into their military service on a larger scale than they have hitherto ventured to do those emigrants from various countries, but principally from Hungary, Poland, and Italy, whom political circumstances or the want of employment have brought into the Sultan's dominions. Your Lordship is aware that a small body of Lancers, bearing the name of Cossacks, and now amounting to

several hundred men, has been formed by a Polish officer, who embraced Islamism a few years ago. The idea of forming a Polish Legion is now in contemplation. No decision has yet been taken by the Government respecting it, but Count Zamoyski has had communications on this subject with Reshid Pasha, and the plans which he has formed to meet the views of the Porte according, as a more contracted or comprehensive policy may prevail, are herewith inclosed confidentially for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 39.

Memorandum respecting the Formation of a Polish Auxiliary Corps to the Turkish Army.

UN projet avait été présenté pour le développement de l'organisation Cosaque. Le Gouvernement Ottoman ayant résolu de créer un Corps Polonais, le projet en question ne suffirait plus, en y changeant simplement le nom. Il n'y était question, en effet, que d'ajouter à un corps existant et ayant son chef, des noyaux d'organisation et pour mieux dire de recrutement, disséminés sur la ligne de bataille.

Dans la création d'un Corps Polonais au service de Sa Majesté le Sultan, l'objet principal et premier est, moins d'ajouter à la force de l'armée Ottomane, que d'affaiblir et d'ébranler l'armée ennemie par l'effet que produira la mesure, sur les nombreux Polonais forcés de servir dans cette armée. Il faut donc songer d'abord à lui donner du retentissement; il faut un firman du Sultan, que les journaux répètent et qui devienne le fond d'une proclamation jetée dans les rangs Russes.

Un simple appel aux Polonais pour venir combattre dans les rangs Ottomans les ennemis de leur patrie, peut déjà en attirer un bon nombre. Toutefois ce nombre ne saurait être considérable et l'effet de la mesure n'atteindra sa portée entière, que si l'on fait comprendre aux Polonais que la Puissance qui les appelle, voit en eux une force nationale, un Corps Auxiliaire, et non pas seulement une cohorte de soldats.

Pour cela il ne suffit pas de proclamer qu'un corps Polonais sera formé, ni de désigner le chef auquel en sera confié le commandement. Il est infiniment désirable que le décret du Sultan mentionne dans son préambule le nom du Prince Czartoryski, soit comme ayant offert à la Turquie le concours de la Pologne, soit comme répondant au Gouvernement Ottoman du dévouement des Polonais. En premier lieu la garantie du Prince Czartoryski sera donnée au Général que, sur la présentation du Prince, le décret nommera Chef du Corps Polonais.

Le nom de Corps Auxiliaire Polonais paraît le mieux approprié. Il aura ses couleurs nationales.

Le Général Commandant désignera à la nomination du Ministère de la Guerre tous les officiers. Il en formera des cadres composées d'un petit nombre d'officiers et de sous-officiers envoyés aussitôt sur la ligne de bataille et mis à la disposition des commandants de corps d'armée pour organiser le recrutement.

Le recrutement se fera, pour commencer, parmi les anciens soldats Polonais présents en Turquie, et parmi les volontaires Chrétiens de toute nation. Bientôt la désertion et les prisonniers faits à l'ennemi rempliront ces cadres.

Mais dès le début, les cadres eux-mêmes accompagneront les troupes Ottomanes dans toute rencontre avec l'ennemi, afin d'y être vus au plutôt, afin d'y faire, de vive voix, appel à leurs compatriotes. Si, comme il y a lieu de l'espérer, cet appel produit son effet, les détachements répartis ainsi auprès des corps d'armées Ottomans, se compléteront promptement et comme ils se compléteront de vieux soldats. Cette organisation pourra, contrairement à l'habitude, s'effectuer non sur les derrières de l'armée, mais en première ligne, en présence de l'ennemi. Il faudra simplement tenir prêts au quartier-général de chaque corps d'armée les armes, uniformes et effets d'équipement nécessaires pour les détachements Polonais, à mesure qu'ils se compléteront. Ces détachements seront d'une utilité immédiate en jetant une véritable perturbation dans

les rangs ennemis. Au fur et à mesure que des compagnies ou des escadrons se formeront, ou les réunira en bataillons ou en régiments, laissant toujours aux corps d'armées Ottomans les cadres nécessaires pour continuer le recrutement.

Le Général Commandant du Corps Auxiliaire Polonais recevra du Ministre de la Guerre les fonds nécessaires pour l'équipement et l'entretien de tous les détachements et son Etat Major. Ses fonctions se borneront dans le principe, à provoquer au Ministère de la Guerre les ordres nécessaires pour expédier et faire admettre, par les commandants des corps d'armées Ottomans, les cadres de détachements Polonais. Après cela, il inspectera en personne tous ces détachements, leur fera parvenir leurs effets d'armement et d'équipement et leur solde. Les vivres leur seront fournis au corps.

Lorsque plusieurs bataillons et escadrons pourront être réunis le Général Chef du Corps Polonais en prendra le commandement; cette division prendra alors le nom de Corps Auxiliaire Polonais.

Le 22 Mars, 1854.

Inclosure 2 in No. 39.

Memorandum respecting the Formation of a Polish Auxiliary Corps to the Turkish Army.

Le 22 Mars, 1854.

SA Majesté Impériale l'Empereur des Ottomans, profondément touché, comme ses prédécesseurs de glorieuse mémoire, des malheurs de la Pologne, cette vieille et fidèle alliée de la Turquie, a vu avec satisfaction, depuis nombres d'années, les réfugiés de la nation Polonaise chercher dans ses états, en même temps qu'un abri, l'occasion de se rendre utiles à son Gouvernement. Inspirés et dirigés par son Altesse le Prince Czartoryski, ils ont compris l'union intime des intérêts de leur patrie avec ceux de la Turquie, désolée longtemps par de sourdes intrigues et attaquée en fin ouvertement par la Puissance qui a fait le malheur de la Pologne, qui l'a animée d'abord et ensuite asservie.

Forcé de défendre des possessions contre l'agression du Czar de la Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans répondant à la proposition qui lui en est faite par le Prince Czartoryski, a résolu de recevoir dans les rangs de son armée, d'armer, d'équiper et d'entretenir, aux mêmes conditions que les troupes Ottomanes, un corps de troupes Polonaises.

Ce corps sera qualifié, Corps Auxiliaire Polonais. Il sera composé d'Infanterie, de Cavalerie, et d'Artillerie, et aura sa compagnie de Sapeurs. Il aura son organisation distincte et séparée et son drapeau national.

La création du corps Polonais au service du Gouvernement Ottoman a pour but non seulement d'utiliser le dévouement et l'aptitude militaire des Polonais qui se trouvent actuellement hors de leur pays, mais aussi de recevoir et de réunir dans ses rangs, au fur et à mesure qu'ils se présenteront, les nombreux soldats et officiers Polonais que la contrainte oblige à servir dans l'armée Russe en faisant violence à tous leurs sentiments, tant à l'égard d'un régime qu'ils détestent que de la Turquie qu'ils savent animée de bienveillance pour leur patrie.

Les volontaires Chrétiens de toute nation seront admis dans les rangs du Corps Auxiliaire Polonais.

Sur la présentation du Prince Czartoryski, le Général Comte Ladislas Zamoyski est chargé de recruter, d'organiser et de commander le Corps Auxiliaire Polonais, sous les ordres du Ministère de la Guerre et du Généralissime Ottoman.

Les officiers du Corps Auxiliaire Polonais seront nommés par Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans sur la présentation du Général commandant le corps. Ce dernier nommera les sous-officiers.

Les officiers, sous-officiers et soldats admis au Corps Auxiliaire Polonais prêteront le serment suivant:—

"Je jure, au nom de Dieu le Père, le Fils et le Saint Esprit, de servir avec un entier dévouement et une parfaite obéissance Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans comme soldat (officier ou sous-officier) du Corps Auxiliaire Polonais.

Je m'engage à servir ainsi pendant la durée de la présente guerre, aussi longtemps que je ne serai pas appelé à une autre destination par le Gouvernement National de la Pologne."

L'uniforme de l'Infanterie du Corps Auxiliaire Polonais sera bleu foncé, collet jaune, coupe à la Turque boutons blanc, galons de sous-officiers blancs. bonnet Polonais portant un aigle blanc (carré, en drap amarante avec galon en mouton noir), pantalon gris, souliers et guêtres de cuir à la Française.

L'uniforme de Cavalerie sera bleu, collet amarante (ou blanc), coupe Turque, pantalon gris, bonnet semblable à celui de l'Infanterie, cordons blancs, boutons et galons blanc, bottines, éperons, sabre et lance.

L'uniforme de l'Artillerie sera bleu, passe-poile amarante, collet de velou noir, boutons jaunes, galons jaunes, pantalons gris, souliers et guêtres de cuir, même bonnet.

Inclosure 3 in No. 39.

Memorandum respecting Slavic Additions to the Turkish Army.

Péra, 28 Février, 1854.

UN grand nombre d'officiers Européens offre aujourd'hui ses services à la Porte Ottomane. Quel serait le moyen de les utiliser?

Jusqu'à ce jour, sauf de rares exceptions, ceux qui ont été admis, ont été répartis dans les États-Majors. L'ignorance de la langue Turque les a naturellement fait juger peu propres à exercer le commandement, et d'autant moins l'administration de la troupe. Ils peuvent cependant, en présence de l'ennemi, s'ils ont déjà fait la guerre, ou s'ils connaissent l'armée ennemie et sa langue, rendre des services dont le Gouvernement Ottoman a quelquefois semblé comprendre l'importance.

Quelques personnes ont été d'avis que ces officiers ne sauraient être utilisés qu'en les employant à créer une Légion Etrangère. C'est se méprendre sur les éléments qui ont rendu effectif ce genre d'organisation. On a vu des légions ou des régiments étrangers dans différentes armées. La France, surtout, en a eu de tous temps. Ces légions et ces régiments se composaient de soldats de toute nation; mais, sauf exceptions, ils étaient commandés par des officiers Français. Les régiments Suisses avaient seuls, comme aussi les légions Polonaises sous la République et sous l'Empire, une organisation distincte et nationale; ils formaient une troupe à part, et avaient le caractère de corps auxiliaires. La France ne pouvait recruter en Suisse que moyennant capitulation avec la Confédération Helvétique. En Turquie, au contraire, les volontaires étrangers sont tous des officiers. Il n'y a donc pas d'élémens pour une Légion Etrangère.

Dans les Etats-Majors, des officiers étrangers d'armes spéciales peuvent être utiles, mais en petit nombre. Un bon nombre d'officiers d'Infanterie, et de Cavalerie pourraient être utilisés dans les régiments Turcs et voici comment.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman a créé une organisation de Cosaques Réguliers de Roumélie et d'Anatolie sous le commandement supérieur de Saadyn Pacha, et il a permis d'enrôler dans les cadres de cette organisation des Chrétiens de toute nation. On n'a formé jusqu'ici que des Cosaques à cheval; il faudrait en former à pied. Mais pour leur donner dès le début un esprit et une organisation régulière conforme à celle des régiments Ottomans, il faudrait adopter pour règle, que dans un certain nombre de régiments des officiers étrangers adjoints seraient autorisés à enrôler et puis à commander un peloton ou une compagnie de Cosaques (c'est-à-dire de Chrétiens) qui viendraient s'y engager volontairement. Les premiers volontaires Chrétiens seraient d'abord admis dans les rangs Turcs; mais dès qu'il y en aurait trente, ils formeraient aussitôt le peloton Cosaque du bataillon (ou de l'escadron) et seraient commandés par un lieutenant étranger ou Chrétien sujet Ottoman. Leur nombre ayant augmenté jusqu'à former une compagnie, cette compagnie serait commandée par un capitaine et deux lieutenants Chrétiens; mais dès le début, l'officier supérieur Chrétien adjoint au régiment, ou à son défaut le plus ancien officier Chrétien, aurait un droit de commandement spécial sur tous les officiers et le détachement de Chrétiens adjoints au régiment pour la formation Cosaque. Il y aurait avantage à créer

le plus grand nombre possible de noyaux semblables de formation Cosaque, et à les répartir sur toute la ligne de bataille, afin qu'il y eut partout des détachements prêts à incorporer les volontaires, prisonniers de guerre ou déserteurs. Tout régiment, je dirais presque, tout bataillon de l'armée régulière Ottomane pourrait sans inconvénient et avec tout avantage en recevoir un. Mais il suffirait pour commencer d'en avoir un par brigade. Ce serait accélérer le développement de cette organisation que de la commencer sur un plus grand nombre de points; ce serait l'activer par l'émulation entre les officiers chargés de commander ces diverses compagnies, et ce serait la pénétrer plus complétement de l'esprit et de l'organisation de l'armée Ottomane.

On pourrait considérer comme unité de formation Cosaque (Chrétienne) un officier supérieur ou capitaine en premier (Colassi), un capitaine, et deux lieutenants ou sous lieutenants. Tant que ces quatre officiers ne trouveraient point de volontaires Chrétiens à commander, ils demeureraient attachés chacun à un officier de son grade, pour partager avec lui tous les travaux du service. L'officier supérieur ou le capitaine en premier (Colassi) recevrait du Gouvernement un drogman pour la langue Turque. Ils seraient tous surnuméraires et n'occuperaient aucune des places assignées dans les cadres aux officiers Ottomans. Ils seraient là pour l'organisation Cosaque (Chrétienne), et en attendant qu'ils eussent des soldats, ils partageraient avec les officiers Ottomans leurs travaux et leurs dangers. L'expérience de la guerre, la connaissance des habitudes et de la langue de l'armée ennemie, le désir naturel de se distinguer, leur fourniront des occasions nombreuses de se rendre utiles. Disséminés au milieu des officiers Turcs ils se familiariseront promptement avec le commandement et les détails du service selon le réglement adopté dans l'armée Ottomane avec les habitudes et bientôt même avec la langue du pays; et lorsqu'ils en viendront à commander le détachement Cosaque, ces pelotons ou ces compagnies ne se distingueront en rien du reste de la troupe, à moins que le Gouvernement Ottoman ne veuille qu'ils portent un signe distinctif, ce qui serait avantageux pour attirer les volontaires.

Lorsque plusieurs compagnies auront été ainsi formées et complétées, on pourra les former en bataillons. Ces bataillons continueront à être répartis auprès des régiments Ottomans et porteront le nom de "bataillon Cosaque du N. N. régiment." Dans la Cavalerie, ils arriveront à former des escadrons, puis des régiments, et pourront alors soit demeurer attachés à la Division de Cavalerie dans laquelle ils se seront formés, soit être réunis sous le commandement de Saadyk Pacha. Ces bataillons se recruteront principalement de Slaves, à savoir de Cosaques sujets de la Porte et de Bulgares d'abord; lorsqu'on aura fait des prisonniers à l'armée Russe, tout ce qui parmi ces prisonniers n'est pas Moscovite, c'est-à-dire les Polonais et les Ruthéniens ou Cosaques, formant aujourd'hui un tiers de l'armée Russe, et les nombreux déserteurs qui arriveront, si on sait les appeler, prendront volontiers service dans cette organisation. C'est pour ces derniers, surtout, qu'il importerait d'adopter d'avance un signe distinctif dans l'uniforme. Il sera utile aussi, tout en conservant le commandement en Turc, d'introduire au plûtot dans les compagnies et les bataillons Cosaques (Chrétiens) des livrets de soldat, des listes de contrôle, et des livres d'administration en langue Slave; et comme le plus grand nombre des officiers Slaves seront Polonais, la langue Polonaise, suffisamment comprise de tous les Slaves, devra avoir la préférence.

Un motif particulier recommande cette préférence. De tous les étrangers et de tous les Slaves, les Polonais sont ceux qui sont le plus profondément et le plus unanimement hostiles à la Russie; ils sont ceux qui présentent au Gouvernement Ottoman les plus solides garanties de fidélité. Ils sont prouvé, en plus d'une occasion, que leur dévouement pour une cause qui s'allie à celle de leur patrie ne connaît point de bornes.

Si l'orgueil du Gouvernement Russe oblige l'Europe et lui fournit l'occasion de pousser la guerre jusqu'à relever une barrière que l'imprévoyance a laissé renverser, le jour viendra où les Gouvernements coalisés reconnaîtront la nécessité de prononcer le nom de Pologne. A ce moment les bataillons et les escadrons Cosaques, tous ou partie d'entr'eux, deviendront d'un seul coup un corps séparé qui recevra le nom et le drapeau Polonais.

Résumé.—L'organisation régulière des Cosaques de Roumélie et d'Anatolie sous le commandement supérieur de Saadyk Pacha est ordonnée par firman de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Un simple ordre du jour du Ministre de la

Guerre suffit pour ordonner que cette organisation, indépendamment de celle qui se fait sous les ordres immédiats de Saadyk Pacha lui-même, soit entreprise sur plusieurs points en même temps et sous la direction d'un certain nombre de commandants de régiments Ottomans d'Infanterie et de Cavalerie. Le Ministre de la Guerre ayant choisi ceux d'entre ces commandants qu'il jugera plus habiles, leur enverra à chacun quatre officiers étrangers parlant au moins une langue Slave, à savoir ;—

1. Officier supérieur ou capitaine en premier (Colassi.)
2. Un capitaine.
3, 4. Deux lieutenants, ou sous-lieutenants.

Ces officiers surnuméraires seront qualifiés officiers Cosaques, mais prendront l'uniforme du régiment auquel ils seront annexés.

Le Ministre tracera une instruction pour l'enrôlement des volontaires Chrétiens (Cosaques) par les officiers étrangers adjoints à des régiments Ottomans. Les premiers volontaires seront incorporés avec les soldats Turcs. Dès que leur nombre aura atteint le chiffre de trente, ils formeront sous le commandement d'un lieutenant une section (ou dans la Cavalerie, un peloton) de Cosaques. Dès ce moment l'officier supérieur Cosaque établira un contrôle en langue Polonaise, et aura l'œil sur ce détachement, dont il présentera les rapports à son commandant immédiat. Il en enverra le double au Commandant supérieur des Cosaques, Saadyk Pacha. Il nommera parmi ces trente hommes les sous-officiers et les caporaux, ou brigadiers. Soixante hommes formeront deux pelotons de Cavalerie ; soixante à quatre-vingt-dix hommes une compagnie d'Infanterie. Ils seront commandée par un capitaine et deux lieutenants.

Les déserteurs et prisonniers de l'armée Russe fourniront d'excellents sous-officiers et même des officiers pour le développement de cette organisation. Les pelotons et la compagnie seront traités en tout et participeront à tous les services comme le reste du régiment dont il feront partie.

Comme, parmi les officiers Polonais désireux de servir en Turquie, il y en a plusieurs qui sont d'excellents officiers d'Artillerie, ils pouvaient être employés d'après le même principe dans quelques batteries Ottomanes, à former des sections d'Artillerie Cosaque ; et pareillement aussi dans les Sapeurs du Génie.

Pera, le 28 Février, 1854.

Se sont présentés pour servir dans l'armée Ottomane les officiers Polonais suivants, présents à Constantinople :

	Officiers supér.	Colassi.	Capitaines.	Lieuts.	Sous-Lieuts.
Infanterie . .	2	1	3	3	1
Cavalerie. . .	2	...	2	2	1
Artillerie. . .	1	1	...	1	...
Génie	1	2	1	...	...
Total—24	6	4	6	6	2

Il y a en France et en Belgique des officiers Polonais de toutes armes qui sont prêts à venir au premier appel. Il en a qui appartiennent à l'armée Française et à l'armée Belge. Il y en a, ici même, qui n'ont tardé à offrir leurs services que par ce que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan n'a encore annoncé aucun parti pris sur leur compte.

On pourrait compter sur plus de cinquante officiers Polonais, pour entrer immédiatement dans l'armée Ottomane aux conditions ci-dessus énoncées. Il y aurait donc de quoi former 10 à 12 noyaux de formation Cosaque dans divers régiments Ottomans.

Les officiers présents à Constantinople suffiraient pour former à l'instant :

Deux noyaux d'organisation Cosaque d'Infanterie.
Deux „ „ „ de Cavalerie.
Un „ „ „ d'Artillerie.
Un „ „ „ de Sapeurs du Génie.

No. 40.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 177. Confidential.)

Berlin, April 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD some conversation this morning with Baron Manteuffel respecting his negotiations with General Hess, when his Excellency informed me that they had not yet come to any definite understanding, though they had entered into discussion on the following points. He said that it was proposed that the Convention between Prussia and Austria should be made for the whole duration of the war between Russia and the Western Powers, that it was intended especially for the protection of German interests, and that there was to be a mutual guarantee of the whole of the territory belonging to the two States. That Austria had proposed that Prussia should place a force near the Austrian frontier, and that when the arrangements were made, Austria and Prussia were to address a summons to Russia to withdraw her armies from the Turkish territory. I told his Excellency that I was glad to hear that such proposals had come from Vienna, and that I hoped there would be no hesitation in agreeing to them, for it was essential that no more time should be lost in determining the position of the two German Powers at the commencemont of the war, that we had seen the rapidity with which the Russians were advancing, and that as they had now taken up a position south of the Danube, important duties devolved on the allies to arrest their further progress.

Baron Manteuffel replied that he hoped the King might be brought to agree to the arrangements that had been proposed, but he feared His Majesty would raise serious objections, and that he would not easily be brought to mobilise his army unless the interests of Germany were actually menaced, and that His Majesty did not consider that the moment was come for making the sacrifices which this step would entail on the country: that he should, however, use his best endeavours and advise the King to adopt the proposed measures, and that, at all events, I might depend on his doing all in his power to ensure the joint action of Austria and Prussia at the present crisis.

This was the substance of Baron Manteuffel's conversation.

I wish I could add that I thought there was a prospect of his Excellency's hopes being realized, but since my interview this morning I have heard that the King has declared that he will not agree to anything that compels him to take an active part in the war, and that His Majesty proposes that there shall be a clause in the Convention that neither party shall act without previous consultation and agreement with the other, which stipulation, proposed by a Sovereign of the timid and vacillating character of the King of Prussia, whose disposition seems to be all in favour of Russia, though he is afraid openly to avow it, would completely tie the hands of Austria, and prevent her from taking the course which appears indicated by all her late communications.

Thus Prussia is again impeding the realisation of an alliance with Austria, and it appears that we can count on her for no useful purpose: her object seems to be to endeavour to defeat all our projects for joint action against Russia: such has been too clearly the drift of her policy during the last six weeks, and Baron Manteuffel's influence on the King is as evidently declining as that of General Gerlach and the Court party, from being more congenial to the King's feelings, is gradually advancing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 41.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 178. Confidential.)

Berlin, April 3, 1854.

My Lord,

DUKE GEORGE of Mecklenburgh-Strelitz arrived here yesterday from St. Petersburgh, with a letter from the Emperor of Russia to the King of Prussia, in answer to the one of which General Lindheim was the bearer to His Imperial Majesty.

Baron Manteuffel has told me that this letter is written in the most friendly and affectionate terms, and that it has again roused the King's hopes that peace may be restored.

The Emperor appears to have stated that the late concessions made by the Sultan to his Christian subjects of all denominations did away with the main object of the war with Turkey, and that he only required some guarantees for the future, and that he did not see why negotiations for peace should not be renewed; that, however, he should no longer agree to their being carried on at Vienna, and that he thought Berlin would now be the proper place for them.

The Emperor seems to have added that though he was always ready to negotiate, the march of his armies would not be stopped, and that the first step by way of negotiation must be the evacuation of the Black Sea by the British and French fleets, after which his troops would be ordered to retire from the Turkish territory.

I said to Baron Manteuffel that the proposals of the Emperor, as he described them to me, were nothing more than a repetition of what had been rejected by the Conference at Vienna, and that of course there could be no question of their being entertained for a moment, and that I presumed the King must view them in this light. His Excellency replied that this was the impression he had himself received on reading the Emperor's letter, but that his Royal Master was not of the same opinion, and thought that some such communications might be based on the letter.

I rejoined that I hoped he would not encourage His Majesty in any suppositions of the kind, for that the object of this mission of Duke George of Mecklenburgh-Strelitz was none other than to play with the King's fancies for peace-making, and to endeavour to retard the conclusion of any Convention or arrangement that might be under negotiation at Berlin or elsewhere, and that he had been encouraged by the success which had attended his former attempts to make this new effort, and that it would be deplorable if the King listened to these last suggestions, or allowed himself to be biassed by them, or to suppose that England, France, or Austria would entertain them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 42.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 443.)
Paris, April 5, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT HATZFELDT made the day before yesterday a communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the part of the Prussian Government, having for its object to recommend the adoption, by the French Government, of a proposition which had been sent from St. Petersburgh to Berlin. M. de Nesselrode proposes to establish Conferences of the Five Powers in the latter town, to settle the guarantees which shall be given by the Porte for the amelioration of the state of its Christian subjects.

As the same communication was to be made to your Lordship, I am relieved from the necessity of going into further details. M. Drouyn de Lhuys informs me that he declined at once to entertain the proposition made to him, though he reserved the Emperor's right of decision, and that, having obtained His Majesty's acquiescence in his views, he yesterday addressed despatches to London and Vienna, explaining the reasons why the French Government thought this new proposal to be inadmissible.

The principal arguments recapitulated to me in the course of conversation, were that the Four Powers would be indirectly acknowledging the right of Russia to interfere between the Sultan and his Christian subjects, by exercising an interference themselves, and that they would be settling matters concerning the internal administration of Turkey, in Conferences from which the Ottoman Government itself would be excluded. M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarked further, that when the King of Prussia professed so much interest for the Christian religion in Turkey, His Majesty seemed to forget that, while France and England had centuries ago shed their best blood in its defence, and had in later years contributed, both by their arms and their money to establish the Christian Kingdom of Greece, the voice of Prussia was now heard for the first time, and that too at a moment when every day was giving fresh proofs of the Sultan's solicitude for his Rajah subjects.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys is not blind to the apparent object of Russia to implant, by means of this proposition, disunion between the two great German Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 43.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 444.)
Paris, April 5, 1854.

My Lord,

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch from M. de Bourqueney reached M. Drouyn de Lhuys late yesterday evening, stating that a Conference had taken place yesterday at Count Buol's house between the Ministers of the Four Powers. The Ministers of Great Britain and France having declared that their attitude had become changed since the last Conference, and that the Queen and the Emperor of the French were now at war with the Emperor of Russia, the other members stated that this did not affect the position or intention of their Governments, which was to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire with the evacuation of the Principalities; that the Four Powers would remain firmly united in the double intention of preserving this integrity and ameliorating the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte; that they were ready to come to an understanding on this point; and that neither would sign singly an arrangement with Russia.

Count Arnim had taken the Protocol embodying these declarations ad referendum, expressing the hope of obtaining permission to sign it to-morrow. M. de Bourqueney adds that unless he received orders to the contrary, he shall affix his signature.

I observed to Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys that this Protocol seemed to me to contain an expression which was not in unison with the language which he described himself as having held to Count Hatzfeldt in regard to the proposition last sent from Berlin, or with the Convention about to be signed between Great Britain and France. The Protocol, according to the wording of the telegraphic despatch, would appear to sanction the interference of the Four Powers to ameliorate the condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects, while M. Drouyn de Lhuys had himself repudiated all idea of the kind in his conversation with Count Hatzfeldt, and the Convention had been so worded as to secure the Sultan's complete independence in this respect.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted the justice of this observation. He was at first disposed to endeavour to alter the wording of the Protocol by telegraph, but upon my remarking that it would be difficult to do this until we know the exact text of the Protocol (stated by M. de Bourqueney to be on its road), and that it would be better to consult Her Majesty's Government, he determined on directing M. de Bourqueney to withhold his signature until further orders.

In making these observations to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I trust that I shall have acted in accordance with your Lordship's wishes.

Her Majesty's Government appear to me to be so anxious to avoid having the appearance of interfering in any way during the present struggle in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, that I thought it better to incur the danger of a slight delay in the signature of the Protocol, than that its provisions should appear to be in contradiction with the doctrine laid down by Her Majesty's Government, and openly expressed in Parliament.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY

No. 44.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 445.)

Paris, April 5, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me this morning the Convention to be signed between Great Britain and France with your Lordship's proposed amendments, and he said that he could have no manner of objection to adopt them. Count Walewski's full powers to sign this Convention will be forwarded to him to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 45.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 446.)

Paris, April 5, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER has read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a despatch from his Government commenting on the expressions used in regard to Austria in Count Nesselrode's memorandum of 1844, published in the secret correspondence between Great Britain and Russia relative to the Turkish question, lately laid before Parliament. No doubt a similar despatch has been communicated to your Lordship by Count Colloredo. Its object is to establish that the policy of Austria in regard to Turkey has always been the same, namely, to preserve intact the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 46.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, April 6, 1854.

THE draft of Protocol arrived here this morning from Vienna; it has received the sanction of the King of Prussia; orders have been despatched to Count Arnim to sign. A draft of Treaty has been agreed to by General Hess, who sends it to Vienna this evening for approval.

No. 47.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 314.)

Foreign Office, April 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information, a paper containing the substance of a despatch which was read to me by the Chevalier Bunsen, and which was addressed by Baron Manteuffel to General Rochow, in reply to a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron de Budberg, stating that Russia would be prepared to take part in a Conference having for its object to claim from the Porte guarantees for the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

I expressed to the Chevalier Bunsen my regret that such an answer should

have been sent to a proposal which could have no other object than to create disunion between Prussia and Austria; and Baron Manteuffel, I added, could not suppose that it would for one moment be seriously entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 47.

Baron Manteuffel to General Rochow.

Berlin, ce 29 Mars, 1854.

Monsieur,

LE Baron de Budberg m'a communiqué la dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode du 7/19, que votre Excellence m'avait annoncée par sa lettre du 18. Je n'ai pas tardé de la soumettre au Roi notre auguste Maître. Sa Majesté y a trouvé, à sa vive et sincère satisfaction, une idée qui l'avait déjà préoccupé, et qui peut se résumer en peu de mots. Elle se fonde sur la conviction que les droits fort étendus que le Sultan est à la veille d'accorder à tous ses sujets Chrétiens, en les assimilant sous tous les rapports essentiels à ses sujets Musulmans, absorbent en quelque sorte, en les dépassant, les priviléges pour lesquels le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg avait réclamé des garanties particulières en faveur du rit Grec, et offrent par cela même l'élément le plus naturel pour la solution du différend dont les complications actuelles ont surgi. En partant également de ce point de vue, la dépêche du Comte de Nesselrode, tout en déclarant que la Russie accepte la lutte qui va s'engager, propose de ne point au moins subordonner à son issue le sort et la condition des populations Chrétiennes qui habitent le territoire Ottoman. Elle ajoute que si une entente, ou même une Conférence pourrait s'établir dans le but de s'occuper des droits et garanties à réclamer de la Porte en faveur de ses sujets Chrétiens, la Russie serait prête à s'y associer, et que le Baron de Budberg serait informé avec plus de précision des idées de l'Empereur, dès qu'on connaîtrait à St. Pétersbourg l'accueil que le Cabinet du Roi aurait fait à cette ouverture.

Vous avez déjà pressenti, Monsieur, que notre auguste Maître apprécie pleinement la portée de la preuve de confiance que son auguste Beau-frère vient de donner à son Cabinet par cette communication. Elle coïncide avec la nouvelle qui, tant directement que par Londres et Paris nous parvient de Constantinople qu'en effet les firmans destinés à consacrer les droits que sur les instances de la France et de l'Angleterre, la Porte s'est décidée à accorder à tous les rayahs Chrétiens, allaient être publiés. Nous n'en connaissons pas encore la teneur, mais il paraît hors de doute qu'ils offrent à nos coreligionnaires des améliorations réelles et fort étendues qui, on ne saurait le contester, semblent appelées à exercer une grande et salutaire influence sur les destinées de ces populations ainsi que sur le degré d'une sollicitude efficace et pratique dont elles auront besoin de la part de toutes les Puissances Européennes. Nous aimons à croire, que cette considération se rencontrera avec les intentions des Cabinets de Vienne, de Paris, et de Londres, auxquels nous n'hésitons pas à donner confidentiellement connaissance des ouvertures Russes, en les invitant à leur vouer, dans l'intérêt de l'humanité et de la religion du Christ que nous professons tous, l'attention qu'elles méritent à un si haut degré. C'est assez vous dire, Monsieur, que les informations plus précises sur les vues de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, que M. le Chancelier de l'Empire annonce au Baron de Budberg, nous offriront un vif intérêt et formeront le complément nécessaire de celles que cet Envoyé a été dans le cas de nous fournir et qui, conformément à la nature de sa communication, ne pourraient avoir qu'un caractère général et préalable.

D'ordre du Roi, je vous invite, Monsieur, à porter la présente dépêche à la connaissance de M. le Comte de Nesselrode et de l'Empereur lui-même aussitôt que vous aurez l'honneur d'approcher Sa Majesté. Vous remplirez les intentions de notre auguste Maître, en relevant à cette occasion, conformément à ce que j'ai été, à plusieurs reprises, dans le cas de faire observer à votre Excellence, qu'en s'attachant à l'espoir de voir donner suite aux négociations

sus indiquées, le Roi part toujours, avec une ferme confiance dans les sentiments élevés et les résolutions généreuses de son auguste Beau-frère, de la supposition qu'elles impliqueront la prompte évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes par les troupes Russes, mesure que sa Majesté continue à regarder comme corollaire de tout essai d'un arrangement satisfaisant et durable.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 48.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 315.)

Foreign Office, April 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I APPROVE of the suggestion which your Excellency states in your despatch No. 444 of the 5th instant, that you made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and which led to orders being given to M. de Bourqueney not to sign the Vienna Protocol, until the text had reached Paris and London, and had been approved by the British and French Governments.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 49.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 145.)

Foreign Office, April 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED on the 6th instant, and I have laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches from No. 124 to No. 134, both inclusive, the last of the 26th of March.

I have to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 127 of the 25th of March, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having placed Major-General Sir John Burgoyne in personal communication with Omer Pasha, and of your having communicated to Reshid Pasha the observations made by that officer on his visit to the head-quarters of the Turkish Army.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 50.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8, 9·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, April 8, 1854.

PRUSSIAN Minister here having received the order from his Government to sign the Protocol, Count Buol called the Conference together this day for the purpose of complimenting it. The French Ambassador, however, brought to our meeting a telegraphic message from Paris, directing him not to sign the Protocol till it has been sanctioned by his Government. In consequence Count Buol with regret, adjourned the Conference till the French Ambassador should receive the authority he expected.

Count Buol proposed a trifling alteration in the last paragraph of the Protocol which I send in an uncyphered message.

The French Ambassador agreed to these alterations as they coincided with what he had originally proposed.

I beg your Lordship's answer by telegraph as to whether you agree to these changes.

No. 51.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8, 10·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, April 8, 1854.

CHANGES proposed in last paragraph of Protocol:—For the words "est d'amener," read "ne peut être atteint que par;" from the words "ci-dessus," erase to the end, and substitute "sans en avoir préalablement délibéré en commun."

Zusatz "est d'amener;" dann "ne peut être atteint que par;" ferner "ci-dessus" und "sans en bis commun;" "sind zu unterstreichen und diese stellen anfuehrungszeichen zu versehen."

No. 52.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(Télégraphique.)

Vienne, le 8 Avril, 1854.

M. DE BOURQUENEY vient de recevoir la dépêche suivante du Consul de France à Bucharest, en date du 5 Avril:

"Le Commissaire Plénipotentiaire Russe m'a signifié aujourd'hui, ainsi que je l'avais prévu et annoncé à votre Excellence par ma dépêche d'hier, que j'aie à quitter la Valachie dans un délai de huit jours. Il m'a d'ailleurs donné les assurances les plus formelles que les Français seraient respectés et traités comme par le passé là, pourvu qu'ils ne se mêlent pas de politique. Il a ajouté que je pouvais au surplus en confier la protection à un Consulat d'une Puissance neutre. Je remettrai la protection de nationaux, ainsi que les archives, à M. Pournay, Consul de Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges. Je compte partir Dimanche 9 Avril, pour Hermanstadt, où j'attendrai les ordres de votre Excellence à la demande de M. Grant, à l'égard de qui la même mesure a été prise. Je prie votre Excellence de communiquer la présente dépêche à M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

No. 53.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 123.)

Vienna, April 3, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 131, I waited upon Count Buol, according to appointment, this day, and placed that despatch in his hands, together with its inclosures. Count Buol, after taking cognizance of these documents, expressed his approval of the manner in which Mr. Micheli, Her Majesty's Consul-General in St. Petersburgh, had executed his commission, and his regret that it had not been attended with a more favourable result.

I then communicated to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 122, which was in reply to mine addressed to your Lordship, No. 76, and read to him your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 29th ultimo, together with my reply to it of the 30th; and I invited his Excellency to carry out the proposals which he had suggested under the circumstances which had now arisen, and to which Her Majesty's Government attached the most intense importance. Count Buol stated that he had received a letter from Baron Bourqueney, in which the same desire on the part of his Government was expressed, he should

therefore call together the Conference to-morrow, when he would submit the documents which I had communicated to him, and would propose that a Protocol should be drawn up acknowledging their receipt and expressing the opinions which he hoped might unanimously be come to with regard to them.

Count Buol stated that having been informed by Count Arnim that he was not at present instructed by his Government to take part in any further Protocol upon the Eastern question, he should have waited before calling the Conference together till he had received the answers to the representations in favour of adopting the measure now proposed, which he had made to the Cabinet of Berlin; but as he was called upon at once to submit the documents presented to him to that Conference by the Representatives of England and France, he did not hesitate to do so, and he had addressed by telegraph to the Prussian Government, renewed representations calling upon them to authorize their Representative to take part in the measure which was now proposed, and he was in hopes that before the meeting of the Conference this authorization might be received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 54.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 8.)

(No. 125.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 4, 1854.

THE official copies of the Projet de Protocole, drawn up at the Conference this day not having arrived, and as I wish to lose no time in bringing it before your Lordship, I inclose herewith a rough copy, which I have been able to procure by sending to the Imperial Chancery of State, begging your Lordship to excuse the haste with which it has necessarily been written.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 54.

Draft of Protocol.

SOUS la demande des Royaumes de France et de Grande Bretagne, la Conférence s'est réunie pour entendre la lecture des pièces qui établissent que l'invitation adressée au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, d'évacuer les Principautés Moldo-Valaques dans un délai fixe, étant resté sans réponse, l'état de guerre déjà déclarée entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte existe également de fait entre la Russie d'une part, et la Grande Bretagne et la France de l'autre.

Ce changement opéré dans l'attitude de deux des Puissances représentées dans la Conférence de Vienne, en conséquence d'une démarche tentée directement par la France et l'Angleterre, et appuyée par l'Autriche et la Prusse, comme fondée en droit, a été jugée par les Puissances d'Autriche et de Prusse comme impliquant la nécessité de constater de nouveau l'union des quatre Gouvernements sur le terrain des principes posées dans les Protocols des 5 Décembre, 1853, et 13 Janvier, 1854. En conséquence les Soussignés ont à ce moment solennel déclaré que leurs Gouvernements restent unis dans le double but de maintenir l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, dont le fait de l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes est, et restera, une des conditions essentielles, et de consolider dans un intérêt si conforme aux sentiments du Sultan, et par tous les moyens compatibles avec son indépendance et sa souveraineté, les droits, civils et religieux, des Chrétiens sujets de la Porte.

L'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman est, et demeure, la condition *sine qua non* de toute transaction destinée à rétablir la paix entre les Puissances belligérants, et les Gouvernements représentés par les Soussignés s'engagent à rechercher en commun les garanties les plus propres à rattacher l'existence de cet Empire à l'équilibre général de l'Europe, comme ils se déclarent prêts

à délibérer et à s'entendre sur l'emploi des moyens les plus convenables pour atteindre l'objet de leur concert.

Quelqu'événement qui se produise par suite de cet accord fondé uniquement sur les intérêts généraux de l'Europe et dont le but est d'amener le retour d'une paix solide et durable, les Gouvernements représentés par les Soussignés s'engagent réciproquement à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement définitif avec la Cour Impériale de Russie, ou avec toute autre Puissance, qui serait contraire aux principes énoncés ci-dessus, et qui n'impliquerait pas la rétablissement de la paix générale.

No. 55.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 8.)

(No. 461.)

My Lord, *Paris, April 7,* 1854.

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch received this morning by the French Government from Berlin, states that instructions were sent last night to Count Arnim at Vienna to sign the Protocol, which was the subject of my despatch No. 443.

I have, &c,
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 56.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1854.

WE approve the Protocol. Sign it.

No. 57.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir Alexander Malet.

(No. 4.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you to M. de Bismark, as reported by you in your despatch No. 11 of the 29th ultimo, on the subject of the policy of Prussia in the present crisis, and I have to instruct you to state to his Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government are entirely without control over the English press, and have regretted the unbecoming terms in which it has occasionally re-echoed the opinions expressed by some of the Continental journals upon that policy. Her Majesty's Government know nothing of the indiscretions alluded to by M. de Bismark, and unless such indiscretions are officially brought to their knowledge, and they can only be responsible for the language they themselves hold, and the instructions they give. But it is quite impossible that the Prussian Government should be under any mistake upon the subject, because in various despatches which have been read to Baron Manteuffel by Lord Bloomfield, and of some of which copies have been given to him, Her Majesty's Government have not only disclaimed all right as well as disposition to hold a menacing language, but have constantly declared, that in seeking to ascertain the course that would be pursued by Prussia, they had no desire unduly to press the declaration of it upon the Prussian Government. That course seems now to be determined upon, and Her Majesty's Government fear that Prussia, when too late, may discover that it will extend the theatre, and lengthen the duration of the war, and that it will favour the cause of revolution. But Her Majesty's Government must protest against its adoption being in any way attributable to the cause alleged by M. de Bismark, who may be assured that Her Majesty's Government have too much respect for the independence of Prussia, and are too desirous of seeing

her occupy the position in Germany she is entitled to hold, to have used language towards her which they would have resented, if addressed to this country.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 58.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Magenis.

(No 16. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1854.

INFORMATION has reached Her Majesty's Government that intrigues are going on amongst the smaller States of the Confederation, with reference to the expected declarations to be made to the Diet by Austria and Prussia, as regards the neutrality of Germany in the impending war, and that the Wurtemberg Government has recently addressed a circular to the other second-rate States of Germany, calling upon them to come to an understanding as to the course which it will be their common interest to pursue, when the announcement of the policy of the two great German Powers shall be made to them in the Diet.

Her Majesty's Government have been further informed that one point upon which the south-western States of Germany are disposed to insist is the concentration of a federal force on the western frontiers of Germany; and I have to instruct you to report to me, whether you are possessed of such information, and how far credit is to be attached to these reports.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 59.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 9, 1854.

YOUR despatch (8th) is nearly unintelligible. You may concur in the changes in Protocol, if agreed to by French Government.

No. 60.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 472.)
My Lord, *Paris, April* 9, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received yesterday morning the text of the Protocol which it is proposed to the Four Powers to sign in Conference at Vienna, and as he found that the Sultan's sovereign rights were completely guaranteed under it, and that the Conference did not assume a power to interfere between His Highness and his Christian subjects, he sees no objection to its immediate signature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 61.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna April* 9, 1854.

THE French Ambassador received last night the authority of his Government to sign the Protocol. Buol summoned the Conference this morning; I have just left it. We have signed the Protocol.

The text is such as I sent it to your Lordship on the 4th instant, with the changes announced in my telegraphic despatch yesterday; as they were approved by the Prussian Minister and the French Ambassador, who had received orders to adopt them from their Governments, I did not hesitate to do the same. I have received your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of last night.

No. 62.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 478. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, April* 10, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS was good enough to read me this morning a despatch, dated the 6th instant, which he had just received from M. de Bourqueney.

Count Buol appears to have viewed in the same light as do your Lordship and M. Drouyn de Lhuys the mission of the Duke of Mecklenburgh to Berlin, namely, that it had no other object than to endeavour to sow dissension between the Maritime Powers and the Powers of Germany. He declared to M. de Bourqueney that the time had gone bye when such overtures on the part of Russia could be accepted, and that, although the future condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects might with propriety form part of any arrangement to be concluded, there were other questions of still greater importance to be settled with Russia, which the loyalty of Austria could not permit her to lose sight of. Count Buol added, that he had reason to believe that the King of Prussia was coming round to this way of thinking.

M. de Bourqueney said, that without pressing Count Buol indiscreetly, he should be glad to know whether, if the negotiations with Berlin failed, Austria would come of them as free an agent as she had entered them, to which question Count Buol eagerly replied in the affirmative. The Count then showed M. de Bourqueney, in confidence, a despatch from Count Esterhazy, dated St. Petersburgh the 30th ultimo, mentioning the alarm which was beginning to be entertained in that capital now that war was so near. The attitude of Austria, Count Esterhazy asserted, had contributed much to this depression, which caused Count Buol to exclaim with some satisfaction, "You see what I told is true, and that the arming of Austria is almost equivalent to active co-operation."

"How then," said M. de Bourqueney, "do you account for the passage of the Danube and the occupation of the Dobrudscha?"

"Oh," replied Count Buol, "none of our military authorities consider the present movements of the Russian army as the commencement of a general plan of campaign."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 63.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 10.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 26, 1854.*

THE letter inclosed herewith from Omer Pasha to Lieutenant-Colonel Neale, may be read by your Lordship with a considerable degree of interest. Colonel Neale sent it on to me under an impression that such was the Pasha's wish. I present it to your Lordship for private perusal, and I have not time to accompany it with any remarks.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Omer Pasha to Consul Neale.

(Literal Copy.)

Stimatissimo Signore, *Villaggio Lipnick, gli $\frac{8}{20}$ Marzo Greco.*

MI presso a ringraziarli per le due letere ultimamente speditemi, delle quali la ultima fu ricevuta nella note dal 7, al 8, alla Greca, le notizie che per la sua bontà vengo informato si verificano dai molti movimenti che i Russi fano in quelle parti, e una reserva di 11 battaglioni d'Infanteria con quattro batterie e mezzo di Artiglieria sono già in marcia per quelle parti, che in pochi giorni la nostra forza di là sarra in 7 giorni in avanti di 38 battaglioni d'Infanteria, 71 canone e circa 3,000 Cavali; la Infanteria Irregulata non è compresa, quale è di numero 2,500 uomini.

Se il passaggio dei Russi si verifica si presenteranno due casi: il primo è, se la nostra reserva arivera avanti il passaggio, allora i Russi non potrano passare, e in caso se passar forzarebero il passaggio siguramente avrano una granda perdita; e il secondo caso sarebbe, se i Russi passano il Danubio avanti l'arivo di nostre reserve, allora avra luogo una bataglia decisiva in quele parti, e se noi avremo la fortuna di guadagnarla la perdita Russa sarà completa, e in caso contrario noi saremo obligati a ritirarsi sul Carisu.

Un altra colona Russa faceva le preparazioni di passare il Danubio sotto Rustchuk, ma furono trovati i mezzi per rimetere il passaggio.

Il nostro Ministero di Guera dorme le trupe che dovevano venire sul Danubio restano a Costantinopoli, due mezzi [? mesi] sono che un battaglione di Cacciatori doveva portarsi qui, e quattro settimane fà, il battaglione deto era per imbarcharsi, e nel stesso giorno fù sospeso, per un ogeto assai ridiculo, quale è, si vuole fare vedere ai militari Europei, che arivano a Costantinopoli, senza pensare che il deto battaglione dorrebbe farsi vedere sul Danubio, là è il suo luogo di merito, altri 27 battaglioni d'Infanteria restano a Costantinopoli, perche io non posso intendere, e non volevano mandare una reserva, che siamo obligati dal centro dare delle reserve ai punti necessari, per indebolire il centro stesso, tuti i mie raporti non hanno potuto riuscire a movere il Ministero di mandare le trupe già di lontano destinate per queste parti.

Di più la uomina di Zarif Pasha al Comandante della armata di Asia fà vedere che il nostro Governo ha persso [? perso] la testa; il deto Pasha è il fatore del malore di quelle trupe, e con tutto ciò per viste personali, l'armata demoralizata col Zarif Pasha per Commandante, e veramente un gran ridiculo, cosi che il corpo che per sua natura è destinato di agire ofensivamente è totalmente anulato; la Russia è una Potenza che sapra profitare di questa mancanza, e già si vede il progresso che il 2do corpo di armata marcia verso i principati che di avanti si è concentrato presso Kiev, vedendo che da la parte Asiatica non vi è niente a temere, si getta con tutta la forza sul Danubio, la Russia conozce molto

bene Zarif Pasha, che non è il uomo capace a portare spirito in un corpo demoralizato.

Io mi porto per Matchin per dirigere gli afari in persona.

Il suo, &c.

(Firmato) OMER.

No. 64.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.— (Received April 11.)

(No. 128.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 5, 1854.*

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 128, expressing the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at learning that the Austrian troops will not enter Servia except to support the Sultan's authority, and his Excellency begged me to convey to your Lordship his acknowledgments for the terms in which you express yourself in that despatch.

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that Mr. Monchine, the Russian agent, has arrived here from Belgrade.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 65.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 333.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 11, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 472 of the 9th instant, that Her Majesty's Government have taken the same view as that stated by your Excellency, to be entertained by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of the text of the Vienna Protocol of the 4th instant, and have directed the Earl of Westmorland to sign it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 66.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 153.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 11, 1854.*

I HAVE read with deep concern Mr. Consul Brant's report to your Excellency, No. 8 of the 24th of February, giving an account of the state to which the Turkish army has been reduced by the rapacity, ignorance, and neglect of Ahmed Pasha. If the Turkish Government has not the will or the power to punish this man, and to make him refund the wealth which he has amassed by defrauding the soldiers, others will follow his criminal example, and the allied armies will look in vain for that support from the Turkish troops that they have a right to expect while engaged in defending the Sultan's cause.

Your Excellency will communicate this despatch to Reshid Pasha.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 67.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 154.)

Foreign Office, April 11, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 134 of the 26th of March last, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government consider the Porte to have adopted a proper resolution with respect to the employment in her military service of a body of Cossack Lancers under the command of a Polish officer.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 68.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 184.)

Berlin, April 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 87 of the 5th instant, enclosing a copy of Sir Alexander Malet's, No. 11, reporting the substance of a conversation which he had held with the Prussian Minister at the Germanic Diet.

The opinions expressed on that occasion by M. de Bismark appear to me so divergent from the impression entertained here, and the statements which he made to Sir Alexander Malet are so little in accordance with the facts to which they relate, that I feel it it incumbent on me to offer to your Lordship the following observations, with a view to correct any false impression which they might occasion.

It is scarcely necessary for me, in the first place, to repel the insinuation that Her Majesty's Government are not well informed as to the position of parties in Prussia. It would indeed require great ingenuity and sophistry to disprove the recent ascendancy of the Russian party at this Court. The language of the Kreuz Zeitung, their acknowledged organ, gives daily proofs of their satisfaction, and their late success is even a matter of public notoriety. Nor can it be supposed that M. de Misnark, who was the constant guest of the Russian minister during his stay here, was so unconscious of the favourable turn, in a Russian sense, which the Prussian policy had taken.

M. de Bismark is correct in stating that the Russian Party in Prussia is "little numerous," for it is merely composed of the Court Party, a few generals, and some of the officers of the Guards, while the great mass of the nation and the army, and more especially the population in the Rhenish provinces, are entirely anti-Russian. But, on the other hand, he is not correct in saying that it is "uninfluential." On the contrary, it forms the atmosphere of the Court; it is entirely supported by Court favour; and has every means of influencing the policy of the country. These are facts on which I believe Her Majesty's Government are perfectly informed.

I may here relate in proof of my statement that when General Gerlach was named by the King to confer with General Hess, as reported in my despatch No. 168 of the 1st instant, the latter was so well aware of his political bias that he is reported to have said, "That he would as soon draw up a treaty with Prince Paskiewitch."

M. de Bismark then goes on to state that the refusal to sign the Convention was caused by the effect produced by the English press, which had been very strong and painful, as well as by too much zeal on the part of certain persons. This latter assumption must refer to the influence exerted by the Bethmann Hollweg party, of which your Lordship has likewise been informed. It may or it may not be true, and I will not take upon myself to say whether that influence was exerted judiciously or not. But the former hypothesis is perfectly incorrect, for the English press only assumed the tone to which he alluded after the rejection of the Convention, and M. de Bismark, in seeking thereby to

excuse the extraordinary vacillation of his Government, falls into a lamentable error. But M. de Bismark, not content with the egregious mistake of dates, would fain plead excuse for this indecision of his Government on the grounds of "menaces" which had been held out; entirely forgetting that when the Convention had been previously submitted to the King before it had been altered at Vienna, His Majesty had equally declined to accede to it. The excuse, therefore, alleged for its rejection is faulty and unfounded.

With respect to "menaces," none that I am aware of have been used, though your Lordship is aware of the imprudent language held by Chevalier Bunsen just before the rejection of the proposed Convention. The idle gossip of political intriguers, or the wilful fabrication of language placed in the mouths of innocent persons to suit the designs of an unscrupulous party, must not be converted into reasons to excuse and palliate a weak and timorous policy. The "menaces" alluded to might indeed more justly refer to the numerous addresses which have reached the Prussian Government from different towns and corporate bodies of their own country, imploring them to pursue a policy in accordance with the Western Powers; but I am confident that during M. de Bismark's stay here he never assigned any menace as a reason for his counselling the rejection of the Convention. Whilst on this topic I may report to your Lordship that, previous to his arrival at Berlin, M. de Bismark stated his opinion in a private letter to Baron Manteuffel, part of which his Excellency read to me at the time, for the purpose of showing to me how erroneous were M. de Bismark's views, "that the moment had arrived for establishing Prussian supremacy in Germany, and that Prussia should now ally herself with Russia to attain this end." Shortly after M. de Bismark arrived here he saw how hopeless and impossible an alliance with Russia was, and he confessed his conversion from a Russian alliance to the policy of strict neutrality. I am surprised that in conversing on these topics he never opened on a subject which more immediately related to Frankfort, and which was a principal cause of his visit here, I refer to the question of "Parity" at the Diet; his desire to sit before that august assembly in a chair of the same height and dimensions as that occupied by the President.

M. de Bismark seems to have expressed to Sir Alexander Malet his surprise that, on learning from Baron Manteuffel the refusal of the King of Prussia to sign the Convention, I had not given vent to some strong expression or outbreak. His Excellency is, perhaps, ignorant that outbursts of passion and anger in an official conference with a Minister for Foreign Affairs are not the practice of Her Majesty's Representatives, though Prussian Ministers may sometimes forget themselves on like occasions.

The idea expressed by M. de Bismark that Prussia should give an assurance to England that, during the war, she would in no case assume an attitude hostile to us, is one which I have reason to believe was concerted by him with the Russian Minister at this Court, as being entirely in accordance with Russian policy; for in this event a similar assurance would probably have been given to Russia, and thus a perfect neutrality would have been secured by her.

M. de Bismark further, in seeking to exculpate the Russian, and to accuse the National party, of having caused the rejection of the Convention, seems to identify himself with the latter; and he may possibly have reasons for endeavouring to assume colours which he had not hitherto borne, for it is perfectly well known that the political party to which he belongs is styled the "Tienker" Party, and is closely united with the Kreuz Zeitung Party; and that during his presence here they addressed a petition to the King, signed by about thirty members of the Second Chamber, requesting His Majesty, in directing his foreign policy, not to consider any sacrifices which they, as Pomeranians, might be called upon to make in the event of a war, and expressing a wish for alliance with Russia.

The impression which I have received from M. de Bismark's conversation with Sir Alexander Malet is, that it has been his object to excuse his Government and himself for the non-acceptance of the Convention, to give a false colouring to the state of parties here, and to endeavour to convey to Her Majesty's Government, through Sir Alexander Malet, a more favourable impression than exists here of his own political views and opinions.

His ambition, aided by the intrigues of party, may imbue him with hopes fo presiding over a future ministry at Berlin, and he may thus have availed

himself of the opportunity offered, through Sir Alexander Malet, of gaining the good-will and confidence of Her Majesty's Government. For my own part, I candidly confess that should events call him to the head of the Government in Prussia, I should regard his accession to power as a complete triumph of the Kreuz Zeitung Party, and as a successful result of Russian intrigues.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 69.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 186. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin April 8, 1854.*

IN my despatch No. 178 of the 3rd instant, I informed your Lordship of the arrival of Duke George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz at Berlin with a letter from the Emperor of Russia, containing some fresh expressions of his desire for the maintenance of peace and some unacceptable proposals. Baron Manteuffel has been obliged by the King to address communications to London, Paris, and Vienna on this subject, but he is aware of the reception they must meet with, and he has already received an answer to them from Paris.

His Excellency has just told me that he intends writing to-morrow to St. Petersburgh for the purpose of informing the Russian Government that these proposals have not been successful, and that if the Emperor seriously wishes to enter upon negotiations which will prevent the extension of the war, His Imperial Majesty must devise some other means of proving to the Western Powers the reality of his peaceful intentions, and order the withdrawal of his troops from the Principalities without loss of time, and direct that they shall not make any further advance across the Danube.

Baron Manteuffel said also that he should address a confidential despatch to General Rochow, pointing out to that Minister the necessity of the Emperor of Russia taking some step of this kind if he wished the present relations of the two Governments to continue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 70.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 189. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April 8, 1854.*

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship on the 6th instant by telegraph that General Hess had forwarded to Vienna the draft of a Treaty, to be signed between Austria and Prussia respecting the Eastern question.

I have this evening had some conversation on the subject of this proposed Treaty with Baron Manteuffel, when I endeavoured to learn some particulars as to its contents, but his Excellency said little else than was reported in my despatch No. 177 of the 3rd instant.

He told me that it contained mutual guarantees of the territory of the two States, that Austria would take that course which she might deem advisable in her own interests, and that Prussia would not be called on to interfere for other than German interests. I inquired of his Excellency what engagements would be made with regard to military co-operation. He replied that the Prussian Government could not go to the extent that had been desired by General Hess, and that he had declined to enter into a perpetual mutual guarantee of territory as proposed by him, and he had therefore proposed that the Treaty should only remain in force for the duration of the war; that as to the employment of troops it had been so far arranged that Prussia should make arrangements to have three corps-d'armée, upwards of one hundred thousand men, placed in the Duchy of Posen, from whence they could be marched

eastwards if necessary, and that it would only require twenty-six days to concentrate them, and that, if not required for hostile purposes, manœuvres of those troops would take place in that district.

I asked if this was intended to menace Poland, and if the King would consent to any such movement. His answer was that he thought the King would agree to it if affairs became serious, of which there was every appearance at the present moment.

This is all the information on this subject which I was able to extract from Baron Manteuffel, and it is so far satisfactory that it tends to prove that the Prussian Government, though unwilling to go the whole length desired by Austria, are nevertheless disposed to give a feeble support to the alliance, whilst the step is certainly in the right direction.

His Excellency added that when the Treaty was concluded it would be communicated to the Diet, and that the German Powers would be requested to accede to it, but that their agreeing to it or not would have no influence in preventing the fulfilment by Austria and Prussia of the stipulations which it contained, or in any way impede the carrying its provisions into effect.

In reply to another question which I put, he said that there was not a word in the Convention that implied neutrality, and it appears to me that he expects Prussia will be impelled by the force of circumstances to take an active part in the approaching struggle.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 71.

Sir John Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Munich, April 6, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 18 inclusive, and two marked "circular," of the 29th and 30th ultimo.

My French colleague has been good enough to allow me to peruse a despatch from his Government, containing instructions to urge upon the Bavarian Government the expediency of avoiding any step at the Diet which might have a tendency to increase the difficulties with which the Austrian Cabinet has already to struggle in the Eastern question, or to embarrass it in the defence of the interests of Germany on the Danube, which the geographical position of Austria specially assigns to her. The French Government seems to presume, and I entirely concur in that opinion, that the only object of the secondary Powers in evincing impatience for a declaration of the policy of the two great German Powers, is simply to claim their share of influence in the deliberations which may closely affect their interests.

France, the despatch says, will assuredly not contest their right so to do; but she expects from their intelligence and patriotism that they will not multiply the difficulties which Austria already has to overcome, and which would be greatly complicated if she were deprived of the aid and sympathy of her natural and legal allies; for, at all events, whether she makes an appeal to the Confederation for its military aid or not, it is clear, that previously to employing her own forces, she has need to assure herself not only of the adhesion of the Diet to the cause she supports by arms, in concert with England and France, but also of the effective assistance in all cases in which the the chances of the war might force her to invoke the clauses of the Act of Confederation.

The despatch contains a warning against the dangers which might arise from hesitation or differences of opinion, as well within as between themselves, adding that the fall of the Ottoman Empire could not take place without bringing about a territorial dislocation, the effects of which the second-rate States of Germany would be the first to feel. After remarking that the loyal conduct of the Emperor Louis Napoleon had dispelled many preventions, it proceeds to state, that there is one federal Government to whose intentions the Emperor is averse to attach suspicion; but the despatch gives clearly to be understood, that France could never allow the other great Powers to add to their possessions

without claiming an indemnity which is only to be found in her own neighbourhood. The secondary States have now to choose between the hesitation of the Cabinet of Berlin and the fixed resolutions of that of Vienna. To encourage the first, argues M. Drouyn de Lhuys, would be to paralyze the second; whilst, on the contrary, to give to Austria the support she solicits, is to meet the necessities of the present, and to provide against the perils of the future. Even more, it will render impossible the division of Germany into two camps, since Prussia could not separate herself from a cause which had become national, and Austria, reassured in respect to her alliances, will unite with the Western Powers to re-establish peace on a solid foundation, even at the expense of war. The above, with the exception of some observations on the justice of the war in which England and France are about to engage, constitutes the chief points of the French despatch, which although M. Von der Pfordten has not yet resumed the direction of the affairs of his department, the Baron de Menneval lost no time in communicating to him.

Your Lordship will readily comprehend from the tenour of my preceding despatches, that he did not find much difficulty in persuading M. Von der Pfordten of the prudence of the course indicated by the French Cabinet, and the Bavarian Government has, I believe, just as little intention of originating at the Diet any embarrassments, as of supporting them if attempted by others, which, however, is now scarcely to be anticipated, for the Representatives of the smaller States here are beginning to comprehend that the affair is getting to be too serious to allow of anything at all approaching to difference of opinion among the States of the Confederation, such as was hinted at in my despatch No. 21, and for which, I have now reason to believe, there was no other ground than the intense anxiety of the second-rate States to learn what is to be the part they will be call upon to take in the impending crisis. The vacillating conduct of Prussia, and the delay which is thereby occasioned in the expected communication to the Diet, is consequently viewed with no small dissatisfaction, as well here as in other parts of Germany, and the notion seems to be general that it is entirely owing to the uncertainty which this hesitation causes in the mind of the Emperor of Austria, that a more decided course has not yet been adopted by his Cabinet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 72.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 141.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 12, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, in which, after mentioning the sensation created in Austria by the publication of the confidential correspondence recently laid before Parliament on the affairs of Turkey, his Excellency alludes to the memorandum from Count Nesselrode to Her Majesty's Government, founded on the communications received from the Emperor of Russia, subsequently to His Imperial Majesty's visit to this country in 1844, in which it is stated, that there exists already a perfect conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey, in a common interest of Conservatism and Peace.

Count Buol states, that this is in effect the sole basis of the understanding which had been established between Austria and Russia, with respect to the Ottoman Empire

After the interview which took place at Munchengrätz, between the Emperor of Austria and Russia, the Cabinet of Vienna, in a despatch dated the 27th of October, 1853, instructed their Representative at this Court, to inform Her Majesty's Government that the situation of the Ottoman Empire had, amongst others, formed the subject of a frank and complete explanation between the two Sovereigns, from which Count Buol quotes a passage as clearly defining the attitude constantly preserved by Austria on the Eastern question.

The passage is to the following effect: that "the Austrian Government has no new information to give as to the principles which guide the policy of Austria in the East. In all the phases of the Eastern question, that policy has been

constantly the same: its object has invariably been to ensure, as far as possible, the duration and independence of the Ottoman Empire. In pursuing this line of conduct, Austria has simply attended to her own vital interests; it must be obvious to every one what those interests require, and every Power has a right to expect belief in the sincerity of its declarations, when they are in conformity with its interests and its actions."

This, Count Buol declares, has been the language invariably held by the Austrian Government to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg on every occasion that a discussion has arisen with regard to the probable fall of the Ottoman Empire. The Austrian Government have always considered that the present territorial arrangement of that country is better than any other arrangement that could be substituted, and Count Colloredo is authorized to deny any supposition to the contrary.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 73.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 142.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 12, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron de Meyendorff, in reply to the communication which the Austrian Government forwarded to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, supporting the summons of the British and French Governments to Russia to evacuate the Principalities.

In alluding to the advice given by the Austrian Government to that of Russia, to accede to this summons, and to arrange the differences with the Porte by negotiation, Count Nesselrode observes, that if on a more attentive examination of the letters which were addressed to his Excellency by M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself, the Cabinet of Vienna were not struck by the insulting tone of these communications, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh can only regret that Austria has not taken a different view of a demand such as Russia never received at any time, even when the conqueror of Europe menaced her with an invasion at the head of an army of six hundred thousand men.

Count Nesselrode proceeds to say, that the most painful effect which was produced on the Russian Cabinet, was to see it asserted that it was impossible to contest the right and the equity of this demand. Such a point might have been still matter for consideration, if the relations of Russia with the Porte were still (as at the period when the temporary occupation of the Principalities took place) not actually hostile. But the Porte having declared war against Russia; having attacked Russia on her own territories, of which she occupies a point up to the present moment, in a word Russia being in open war with the Porte both on the Danube and in Asia, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh must be permitted to differ in opinion from that of Vienna on the equity of a demand which exacted everything from one of the two belligerent parties, without being addressed equally to the other.

The Austrian Government, observes Count Nesselrode, considered that the submission of Russia to the imperious ultimatum sent to her, would be a proof of generous moderation which the world would applaud, and which would detract nothing from the glory and moral power of Russia.

The Emperor of Russia, however, had judged otherwise, and Count Nesselrode had been instructed to notify verbally to the Consuls of England and France, that His Imperial Majesty had no reply to make to the letters transmitted to Count Nesselrode, and that they were at liberty to dispatch the messengers who were the bearers of these letters.

After the silence which Russia had maintained as to the summons addressed to her, the Two Powers could of course take such measures as they

should think advisable. That which it was not in their power to do was to cast upon Russia the initiative in hostilities, and arbitrarily to give to the rejection of their ultimatum the title of a declaration of war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 74.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 143.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 12, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch which he has received from Count Buol, referring to the importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to a knowledge of whether the Maritime Powers can, and to what extent, count upon the active co-operation of Austria in the impending war.

Count Buol alludes to the language which you have held to his Excellency, in which you have dwelt upon the influence which would naturally be exercised on the plan of operations under the consideration of the Western Powers, by a knowledge of the decision of the Austrian Government on this subject.

Count Buol proceeds to observe that the moral attitude assumed by Austria in the Eastern question, and which is identical with that of the other Three Powers represented at the Vienna Conference, has not been modified. The Austrian Government declared themselves ready to sign a Convention of Four, calculated to render binding the principles recorded in the Protocols of the Conference. The Cabinet of Berlin having, however, declined to affix its signature to the projected act, the Austrian Government have considered it their duty, in the interest of the object in view, to point out the inconveniences attached to a signature of Three.

But the Austrian Government have all the more felt the absolute necessity of being first of all completely informed of the definitive resolution taken at Berlin; and Count Buol is convinced that Her Majesty's Government will understand, that before taking a decisive step, of which the inevitable consequences would be a rupture with Russia, it is of the highest importance to Austria to ascertain whether she can, in certain contingencies, count upon the material support of Prussia and the German Confederation.

Such is the object of the mission of General Hesse, whose high position in the Austrian army is in itself an indication that the military combinations which the events of the war may render necessary, have not been kept out of sight. At all events the Austrian Cabinet have made known to the Cabinet of Berlin that they will not depart from the principles traced out in the Vienna Protocols, and they have expressed their confident expectation that the Prussian Government will act in a similar manner.

Before the whole result of General Hess's mission is known, the Austrian Government cannot, even under the seal of secrecy, give eventual assurances which would in fact amount to a formal engagement; and they desire, that under these circumstances the Maritime Powers will not prematurely insist upon more positive explanations.

On the other hand, the Austrian Government, appreciating the relative positions of the several Powers, will feel no surprise if, in consequence of the reserve imposed upon Austria by the force of circumstances, the French and English Governments are obliged to decide upon their plan of operations with reference only to military considerations.

In short, Count Buol observes, it is absolutely necessary that the Austrian Government should have a clear knowledge of the attitude which Prussia will assume. This knowledge, when obtained, will form one of the most essential elements in determining the nature and extent of the military measures to be taken by Austria, and which, when determined upon, will be communicated without delay to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

I requested Count Colloredo to thank Count Buol for this frank and explicit communication. I admitted that the views of the Austrian Government were

reasonable, and that the difficulties of their position were great; but, I said, there must be a limit to the deference shewn to Prussia, or the power of Austria would be neutralised, and she would expose herself to far greater difficulties and dangers by permitting Russia to pursue her aggressive policy unchecked, than by acting independently of Prussia, supported as Austria would then be by the unanimous public opinion of Germany.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 75.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 97.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 12, 1854.*

THE Chevalier Bunsen has communicated to me a despatch which has been addressed by Baron Manteuffel to the Prussian Representative at St. Petersburgh, in reply to the letter from the Emperor of Russia to the King of Prussia, of which Prince George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz was the bearer.

In this despatch Baron Manteuffel, after referring to the accident which befel the King of Prussia as a reason for preventing His Majesty from answering himself the Emperor of Russia's letter, submits for communication to His Imperial Majesty and to Count Nesselrode the following considerations.

The Emperor has declared in his letter that His Imperial Majesty might consider himself satisfied as soon as he shall have been officially informed by England, France, and Turkey, of the conclusion of a Treaty between the Three Powers for the amelioration of the condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects, and that the new concessions accorded to them are more liberal than those which on the demand of Russia have been refused to the Christians of the Greek Church.

On this subject two observations suggest themselves: first, that the extent of the new concessions destined to assimilate the Christian rayahs to the Mussulman subjects of the Porte is not yet fixed; the firmans by which they will be promulgated are not yet published, except one, which has for its object the reorganization of tribunals; and it appears evident that such ameliorations can only be introduced in succession. Moreover, it is not by a "synallagmatique" form that the innovations relative to the rights of rayahs have been, or will be, stipulated for with the Porte by the Maritime Powers. It is principally this form which at the first brunt had been judged of a nature to attack the independence and sovereign rights of the Sultan, and the Governments which had been the first to avert the danger at the time of the mission of Prince Menschikoff would avoid even the appearance on their part of exposing the Ottoman Porte to it. If in consequence there has not been, and will not be, a Treaty concluded which could be brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, this want of an international form does not appear to be prejudicial to the condition of the Christians themselves. The history of the East and this very complication is a sufficient proof that the letter of Treaties does not furnish in such matters the necessary guarantees. These are to be found rather in the continual and effectual solicitude of the Powers of Europe, and this efficacy can only increase in proportion to the union which manifests itself in the practical efforts of Governments to ensure the execution of laws emanating from the Porte in favour of its Christian subjects. It is on these grounds, above all, that Prussia considers an understanding of the Five Powers as procuring the most salutary results, and as offering perhaps in itself the chances of arranging on the basis of negotiations a difference which unhappily has led to an appeal to arms.

The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has already pointed out Berlin as the proper seat for eventual negotiations, and although Count Nesselrode has been informed confidentially of the reasons which induce the King of Prussia to prefer Vienna still as the Emperor of Russia has again expressed his desire for the former place, the Prussian Government will communicate with the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Vienna, and if the wishes of Russia are acceded to by these Cabinets, the King of Prussia will receive this agreement

as a fresh motive for making every effort for the amelioration of the condition of our Christian brethren in the East.

I expressed to the Chevalier Bunsen my satisfaction that Baron Manteuffel in this despatch should have correctly stated, for the information of the Emperor of Russia, the course that had been pursued by the Four Powers, and the reasons which must still guide their policy respecting the Christian subjects of the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 76.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 12.)

(No. 136.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 30, 1854.

I HAVE already informed you by telegraph that the Russians crossed the Danube at Galatz on the 23rd instant, in numbers varying from fifteen to thirty thousand.

Inclosed herewith in copy are the reports addressed to me, and also to Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, by Captain Simmons, of the Royal Engineers, who went, at my request, to be near Omer Pasha under the present most interesting and important circumstances. Together with them I forward a copy of Vice-Admiral Dundas's accompanying despatch.

We are not yet sufficiently informed to determine the character of this operation. It may have been undertaken with the sole view of occupying the Dobrudscha, or with that of engaging the main body of the Turkish army, and perhaps even attempting the possession of Shumla. In the former case Varna may possibly come within the range of attack, and the weakness of its garrison is a just motive for apprehension. The fleets, however, are close at hand, and their presence, exclusive of any actual succour which they might eventually afford, may be expected to retard the advance of the Russian army.

It is much to be desired that reinforcements should be sent from Constantinople; but the garrison of the capital is so much reduced by the detachments of troops to Volo and Prevesa, that until the regiments expected from Alexandria, or some brigades of the allied armies arrive, it would not be prudent to reduce it much lower at a moment when the Greeks are about to be sent out of the Sultan's dominions, and a dangerous excitement is likely to prevail in consequence.

I have, nevertheless, exhorted the Turkish Ministers to hazard the consequences of sending a couple of thousand men to Varna; and by way of encouragement I have written, in compliance with their wishes, a letter apprizing the commander of any troops already arrived at Malta, of the state of things both here and in Bulgaria, expressing at the same time a hope that he may find himself at liberty to move the troops in this direction, without further delay. I have the honour to inclose a copy of my letter to the officer in command, together with a covering despatch, also in copy, addressed to Sir William Reid. I venture to reckon upon your Lordship's indulgent consideration of the unauthorized step, which a strong sense of duty, under circumstances of unusual embarrassment, has impelled me to take.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Silistria, March* 25, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that upon my arrival at Varna, I immediately proceeded to Shumla, and, Omer Pasha having left with the main body of his forces for the neighbourhood of Rustchuk, leaving eight battalions (probably about 4,000 effective) at Shumla, I proceeded to

Rustchuk, and, finding that he had moved from the Danube, I followed him, and joined him this morning at this place.

No movement has taken place on the part of the Russians since the demonstration which was made before Turtukai on the 12th and 13th instant. On the 12th, the Russians having previously taken possession of and thrown a bridge across to a small island opposite Turtukai, commenced to throw a bridge across to a larger island, more in advance towards the right bank of the river. The Turks upon the larger island opened a fire upon them, which stopped their operations for that day. On the following morning the Russians opened a heavy cannonade upon the larger island occupied by the Turks, and recommenced their bridge, the head of which was advanced some distance into the stream; but the fire of the Turks being too severe, they ceased their operations, and in the night withdrew altogether, removing their bridge. In this operation a force of about one brigade (six battalions) of the enemy was engaged.

After my arrival at his Highness's head-quarters, orders were sent this morning to the troops in the Dobrudscha to retire, and concentrate upon Karasu; and the troops with his Highness were ordered to halt, and will probably fall back upon Shumla, it being his Highness's intention, at all hazards, to cover that place.

Since writing the above, while out with his Highness, inspecting the fortifications of this place, an aide-de-camp arrived from the Dobrudscha, with a despatch to the effect that on the 23rd the Russians made a demonstration with about 5,000 men, opposite Pothashi, which was repulsed; but that about the same time they crossed at Galatz with a force of 30,000 men, and that the troops from Matchin and Toultcha are in retreat. I think it probable that the strength of the enemy has been exaggerated; but there can be no doubt that they have passed the Danube in considerable force—probably a division of 15,000 men may have crossed. As, however, the Russian army in the Principalities is in greatest force at Bucharest and in front of it, it is not improbable that a more serious attack may be made shortly towards the centre, at Rustchuk or Matchin.

His Highness had determined to fall back upon Shumla, if necessary, being fully impressed with the necessity of preserving that place. The troops in the Dobrudscha will also, in all probability, in consequence of this movement at Galatz, have time to gain that place, or, at any rate, Varna; so that I think Shumla will be secured against all accidents.

In the communication I had with his Highness this morning, he informed me that the Government at Constantinople had promised a month ago to reinforce him immediately with 12 battalions of infantry (two of which Chasseurs), and a corresponding force of artillery.

Their non-arrival at Shumla has caused him much embarrassment, and will, no doubt, have the effect of preventing him from forming those combinations which he otherwise might have been enabled to make, to check the advance of the enemy.

Your Lordship will, however, perceive that it is of very great consequence that in the present state of affairs they should be forwarded without loss of time by sea to Varna, as that garrison is weak, not exceeding about 3,000 men; and it is of the utmost importance that it should be held. If the troops in the Dobrudscha retire on Shumla and not on Varna, Varna without reinforcements will not be in a position to resist many days.

His Highness is about to dispatch a courier immediately by land to Constantinople, who will convey this, and if anything of importance occurs, I will not fail to send your Lordship immediate information, if necessary, by Varna, to go by the steamer, which, according to the information I received from your Lordship, before leaving Constantinople, may be expected to be there. A duplicate shall, however, be forwarded by land.

I have only time to add that the country is now in a very good condition for the movement of troops of all kinds, and that the Danube has not yet commenced to rise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, March 26, 1854, 6, P.M.*

I HAVE this moment received the inclosed despatches, addressed to your Excellency by Captain Simmons. I have the honour also to transmit the copy of an official letter, which Captain Simmons has addressed to me by the same occasion.

I propose delivering these despatches to Captain Popplewell, of Her Majesty's ship "Inflexible," now in port. Captain Popplewell will, I anticipate, first proceed to Kavarna, to communicate with the Admiral, as I am informed that the fleets are now at that anchorage.

I purpose suggesting to his Highness, Omer Pasha, the necessity of sending squadrons of cavalry to Varna, to act as scouts in the neighbourhood, and give timely warning to the garrison here of the approach of any body of the enemy. The present effective strength of the garrison of Varna does not exceed 3,200 or 3,400 men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 76.

Captain Simmons to Consul Neale.

Sir, *Silistria, March 25, 1854.*

YOU will see by the enclosed letter that the Russians have crossed the Danube at Galatz.

Since writing it I have had an interview with Omer Pasha, and a courier has arrived from Varna bringing intelligence that a steamer is now stationed at Varna to carry any important information to Constantinople. I have, therefore, to request that you will transmit the enclosed with his Highness's despatches. His Highness has informed me that the garrison of Matchin are retiring by the route of Heishova, and that of Toultcha by Karasu, where all the troops now in the Dobrudscha are to be concentrated. He is also very confident, from the information he has received, that the Russians have been for some time concentrating towards Galatz, and that the Dobrudscha will be their line of operations. The two battalions of Chasseurs which he has just been informed have arrived at Varna are ordered to move on Shumla, so that with the other troops that will fall back from the Danube between this and Rustchuk upon Shumla, the garrison of that place will amount to 28 battalions. His Highness himself intends to return to Shumla, so that with the troops which will fall back from Karasau towards Shumla that place may be considered secure.

His Highness, however, thinks it of the utmost importance that Varna should be placed in the same state, and to effect this the presence of part of the fleet would be most advantageous. As I have not sufficient time to write another despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, may I request you will be so good to forward a copy of this?

The advance of the Russians to the line between the Danube and Kustenjee must occupy at least seven days, and thence upon Varna, if they should receive no check for three days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN SIMMONS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 76.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Fury," at Sea, between Varna and Baljik, March 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to address your Lordship on the 26th instant, by Her Majesty's ship "Inflexible," Vice-Admiral Dundas, to whom I communicated at the same time the intelligence of the passage of the Danube by the Russians, wrote to me yesterday in reply that Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, and the French Rear-Admiral Jaquinot would come this day to Varna in Her Majesty's ship "Fury." The "Fury" accordingly arrived this morning with the Rear-Admirals, whom I had the honour to accompany to the Military and Civil Governors. Sir Edmund Lyons and the French Rear-Admiral assured the Pashas on the part of the Admirals commanding in chief of the cordial co-operation of the two fleets in any way in which they might be of service in case of any emergency. The Admirals at the same time impressed upon the Pashas the necessity for keeping the Admirals well and quickly informed of all passing events of interest, and a courier, it has been decided, will leave Varna every evening at eight o'clock, to arrive before daylight in the morning at Baljik. I shall, therefore, avail myself of that opportunity, and not fail to keep his Excellency the Vice-Admiral informed of every event respecting the movements of the armies which come to my knowledge. Admiral Dundas has done me the honour to express a wish that I should visit him at Baljik for a few days; I have therefore thought it to be my duty to pay my respects to his Excellency, but I shall return to Varna either by sea or by land in less than twenty-four hours.

I am not up to this moment in the receipt of any further intelligence than that communicated to your Excellency by Captain Simmons. I beg, however, to transmit to your Excellency the accompanying packet addressed to your Lordship by Mr. Vice-Consul Cunningham. Mr. Cunningham writes to me by the same occasion, but his letters being dated the 13th and 15th instant, do not contain any intelligence of urgent interest, excepting when he states that the Russians' force, then preparing to pass at Galatz, amounted to between 50,000 and 60,000 men. This number of men, therefore, I presume it may be supposed, have by this time entered the Dobrudscha.

At my request the Pasha of Varna has written to the Nudir of Kustenjee informing him of the close vicinity of the combined fleets, and directing him to communicate this fact to the commanders of any Turkish force which may approach the coast in that neighbourhood.

The garrison of Varna, as I have already had the honour to acquaint your Excellency, does not exceed from 3,200 to 3,400 men, and, from the tenour of his Highness Omer Pasha's letters, it cannot, I think, be expected that any reinforcements will arrive here from the army. The probability of Varna being sufficiently garrisoned, therefore, depends upon such reinforcements as can be spared from Constantinople. In the meantime, in case of any immediate and urgent necessity, no doubt the fleets would render most material assistance by sea and possibly by land in strengthening the garrison, as I understand, to the extent of about 4,000 men, but this is a contingency of which it would be well if Varna could be rendered independent. Although the fortress of Varna, even with its feeble garrison, may, in my humble belief, be considered safe from a coup-de-main, still, the outworks with insufficient garrisons would doubtless fall at once, unless the garrison be strongly reinforced, and the fact of guns of large calibre being placed in these outworks would render their capture by the Russians most dangerous to the safety of Varna. I believe that this inadvertency was pointed out by Sir John Burgoyne. I have now to report to your Excellency that I have received information from Toultcha to the 20th instant, and my correspondent states that a day or two previously the steamboat under British colours, called the "Crescent," had been fired upon by the Russian batteries between Galatz and Toultcha, and had been disabled. By the same letter I am informed that a British merchant vessel, laden with grain, was fired at by the Russian batteries and sunk. The master and crew are stated to have

gone over to the Russian shore; they were expected at Toultchia. At this period, however, the Russians had not passed the Danube.

His Excellency Vice-Admiral Dundas informs me that he has sent three steamers towards Kustenjee to inform his Excellency of what events may occur in that quarter. I venture respectfully to state my belief that if the whole of the combined fleets appeared off the mouths of the Danube, that the onward movement of the Russians would be retarded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

P.S. In respect to the last paragraph of this despatch Admiral Dundas informs me that if the Turkish army of the Dobrudscha approached the coast the combined fleets would embark it if necessary. E. N.

Inclosure 5 in No. 76.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," at Kavarna, March 27, 1854, 1 A.M.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to send your Excellency the accompanying despatches I have just received from Varna, and to assure you that every assistance shall be rendered by the combined squadrons for the defence of Varna and the coasts of the Ottoman territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 76.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir William Reid.

Constantinople, March 29, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, under flying seal, a letter which I have thought it my duty to address to the commander of Her Majesty's land forces at Malta, destined for Turkey, and I have to request that after taking cognizance of its contents, your Excellency will be so good as to deliver or transmit it to him with the least practicable delay.

In case of his acting on my representation, I have to request that three or four days' notice of the approach of the troops may, if possible, be given to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 76.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Commander of the Forces at Malta.

Constantinople, March 29, 1854.

Sir,

THE Russians having crossed the Danube in force, and the Ottoman Commander-in-Chief having applied to his Government for reinforcements, which cannot under present circumstances be safely detached from Constantinople, I conceive that the early, and if possible, the immediate arrival here of some portion at least of the auxiliary forces destined for Turkey is most desirable.

I know not how far you are at liberty, or whether you have yet the means of proceeding to Constantinople with the troops under your command. But I deem it an indispensable duty to inform you without delay of the reasons which make me desire that you should hasten your arrival. On the presumption of your being enabled to comply, every exertion will be made, and I have reason

to expect with success, in order to have proper accommodation and a sufficient supply of provisions ready for the troops on their arrival either here or at Gallipoli.

I am informed that the first brigade of the French army amounting to about three thousand men may be expected to arrive in three or four days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 77.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 30, 1854.

IN sequel to one of my preceding despatches respecting the enlistment of Poles in the service of the Porte, I have the honour to inclose herewith a memorial addressed to me by General Wysowski, together with other papers relating to the same subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 77.

Memorial presented by General Wysocki to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as to Formation of a Polish Legion.

DANS la première visite que j'ai eu l'honneur de rendre à votre Excellence je n'ai pas osé abuser de votre complaisance et vos précieux moments pour expliquer et le but de mon arrivée en Turquie et de mes espérances; je prends donc la liberté de soumettre mes idées par écrit à l'appréciation de votre Excellence.

Je suis venu pour reconnaitre sur les lieux le véritable état des affaires en Orient, et voir pour moi-même si, en offrant nos services à la Turquie dans la présente guerre comme Polonais, nous pouvons avoir quelques espérances pour notre malheureuse patrie. Dans ce cas j'étais autorisé de proposer à la Porte les moyens que dans notre conscience nous croyons les plus utiles et pour la Turquie et pour la Pologne; mais bientôt je me suis aperçu que tant qu'il y aura une chance quelconque pour la paix toutes nos démarches seraient inutiles et toutes nos propositions resteraient sans réponse. C'est pourquoi je me suis borné à expliquer à qui de droit le but de ma mission en général et sans insister pour une réponse définitive; et c'est encore avec le plus grand ménagement, car ce n'est pas notre intention d'ajouter de nouvelles difficultés dans les relations diplomatiques de la Sublime Porte. Tout ce qu'on a fait jusqu'à présent auprès du Gouvernement Ottoman respectivement à notre cause je le regarde comme insignifiant et sans aucun profit, et pour nous et pour la Turquie. Les Cosaques formés de gens de toutes nationalités pris sur le pavé de Constantinople, ou quelques individus placés dans les armées Turques, qui ne connaissent pas même la langue du pays, ne peuvent pas rendre de grands services à la Turquie, et exposent seulement la Porte à des frais inutiles. Cette conviction m'a décidé à attendre tranquillement le développement définitif des événements qui décideront de la paix ou de la guerre.

Connaissant parfaitement le machiavelisme de la politique Russe, je suis profondément convaincu que la paix, même avec des conditions les plus favorables, sans des garanties matérielles contre les entreprises ultérieures du Czar, serait extrêmement dangéreuse pour l'avenir de la Turquie. La Russie n'abandonnera jamais le projet nourri depuis tant de siècles, et forcée de reculer pour le moment elle cherchera par les intrigues, l'argent et les émissaires, fomenter des conspirations parmi les Bulgares, Grecs, Serbes, Bosniaques et Montenégrins; dans une ou deux années elle tâchera de provoquer quelques soulèvements partiels, et entrera de nouveau en Turquie, peut-être même, suivant son habitude, comme

protectrice du Sultan. La Turquie, épuisée par ses derniers efforts, sans argent, avec une population mécontente qui a été trompée dans ses espérances, ne pourra jamais réveiller une seconde fois le patriotisme qui l'anime dans ce moment, ni la réunir de nouveau sous les armes. Et qui sait si le même accord pour la défense de l'Empire Ottoman existera toujours parmi ses alliés? Alors la ruine de la Turquie est inévitable, et les Russes obtiendront facilement ce qu'ils convoitent en secret depuis si longtemps. Quelles en seront les conséquences immédiates pour l'Europe, votre Excellence le sait mieux que moi. Quant à la crainte des idées révolutionnaires, je puis assurer votre Excellence que les Polonais cherchent avant tout le rétablissement de leur patrie, sans préjuger d'avance la forme du Gouvernement; cela dépendra des circonstances et de la volonté du pays. La guerre, donc, et la guerre à outrance, dont le but serait d'élever à l'avenir une barrière infranchissable aux envahissements des Russes, c'est l'unique salut pour la Turquie et la garantie la plus certaine pour l'Europe. C'est pourquoi nous désirons et nous espérons que la guerre aura lieu, car nous croyons qu'alors la question de l'indépendance de la Pologne trouvera une solution nécessaire, et surtout si l'Autriche se déclare définitivement pour la Russie, et il me semble que c'est probable, car on ne peut pas douter de la sympathie du Gouvernement Autrichien pour le Czarat. Alors la France et l'Angleterre jugeront peut-être de leur intérêt de mettre en avant la question de l'indépendance de la Pologne, pour élever précisément cette barrière infranchissable contre l'envahissement de la Russie, ou au moins ils laisseront la Turquie libre d'employer tous les moyens qu'elle jugera efficaces pour sa propre défense. Alors pour nous viendra le moment d'action comme Polonais, et c'est pour ce moment que je propose la Légion Polonaise; mais une Légion véritable, avec l'étendard Polonais et les insignes de la foi de nos ancêtres. Ce moment arrivé, l'émigration viendrait en masse se grouper sous un tel étendard, et je suis autorisé par un millier de signatures de m'entendre avec la Turquie pour la formation d'une pareille légion. Cette Légion, destinée à agir sur le Danube, pourrait rendre de véritables services à la Turquie et à la Pologne, car—1. L'émigration peut fournir à mon appel un millier d'officiers et sous-officiers capables et expérimentés, et autant de jeunes soldats qui connaissent déjà l'odeur de la poudre et ont donné des preuves de leur bravoure. Avec un tel noyau, on aura des cadres solides pour un corps d'armée dans lequel on pourrait avec avantage introduire d'autres éléments, comme les Ruthènes de Tultche et Silistrie et des volontaires de la jeunesse Bulgare, dont on fera de bon soldats en peu de temps.

2. Nous sommes sûrs qu'à la vue de l'étendard Polonais, la plupart des Polonais forcés de servir dans l'armée Russe viendraient grossir nos rangs, et en augmentant nos propres forces pourraient jeter la désorganization dans les rangs de l'ennemi. En effet, entre les soldats Polonais incorporés dans les armées Russes, qu'on peut compter par milliers, il y a aussi un si grand nombre d'officiers Polonais que dernièrement l'Empereur avait défendu par un ukase de garder plus qu'un tiers de Polonais dans le nombre total des officiers de chaque régiment—une preuve palpable que le danger le menace de ce côté-ci.

3. Enfin, et ce qui est le plus important, une pareille Légion aurait retentissement dans toute la Pologne, et il serait très-facile pour nous de faire un soulèvement dans le pays dans un moment donné. Ce serait un coup terrible pour la Russie, dont elle ne pourrait plus se relever.

Si la formation d'une Légion Polonaise sur de telles bases était admise, alors les frais de sa formation et de son entretien pourraient être considérablement diminués. Chaque Polonais, mû par le patriotisme, se contenterait de ce qui est absolument nécessaire pour la vie; on pourrait espérer des offrandes considérables de la part des riches Polonais, tant de ceux qui ont emporté leur fortune à l'étranger, comme les habitants du pays quand ils pourront le faire. Nous tâcherions de transporter l'émigration de la France et de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique à nos propres frais, aidés par les habitants de ces pays respectifs, pourvu que la Turquie donne les casernes et s'oblige à fournir la nourriture dur at l'organisation. De plus, on pourrait se procurer des armes en France et le crédit nécessaire pour les habiller, pourvu que le Gouvernement Turque garantisse le paiement dans le terme fixé. Quoiqu'il se trouve dans l'émigration plus d'officiers que de soldats, cela n'augmenterait nullement les frais; car, quand il s'agit de la patrie, chaque Polonais servirait volontiers avec un grade inférieur, même comme le simple soldat, en attendant le développement de la Légion sur une plus grande échelle. Durant la guerre les officiers supérieurs n'auront que la demie solde, et, une fois en Pologne, non seulement nous ne demanderons rien de la Turquie, mais nous pouvons garantir que le pays rembourserait avec reconnaissance les frais antérieurs. Et dans le cas d'une issue malheureuse de notre dévouement, nous ne demanderons aucune garantie ni aucune rémuneration de la part de la Turquie. En perdant l'espoir de reconquérir la patrie, le sort individuel nous serait indifférent—chacun chercherait à vivre en travaillant, comme la plus grande partie fait jusqu'à présent; et si au contraire nous réussissons à reconquérir notre patrie, nous conserverons pour toujours la plus grande réconnaissance et pour la Turquie et pour les Gouvernements qui nous auraient aidé dans notre sainte entreprise.

Il serait superflu de parler à votre Excellence des avantages qui pourraient résulter pour l'Europe du rétablissement de la Pologne, même en considérant seulement sous le rapport de commerce. La Pologne a été et sera toujours un pays uniquement agricole. Je sais que peut-être le moment n'est pas encore arrivé de parler même de la Pologne et des Légions Polonaises; je sais que tout dépend des événements ultérieurs, et qu'autant seulement nous pouvons avoir quelqu'espérance que la France et l'Angleterre jugeront à propos de soulever cette question. Pourtant je croyais de mon devoir dans l'intérêt de notre cause de prévenir votre Excellence, comme Représentant de la Grande Bretagne, de nos projets et de nos espérances. Je sais que votre Excellence, par sa position et son influence personnelle si bien méritée, peut avoir une voix décisive dans les conseils des Ministres de la Porte et de la diplomatie; je sais aussi que plaçant notre sainte cause sous la protection de votre Excellence je pourais bien servi.

(Signé) T. WYSOCKI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 77.

Memorandum.

UN projet avait été présenté pour le développement de l'organisation Cosaque. Le Gouvernement Ottoman ayant résolu de créer un corps Polonais le projet en question ne suffirait plus, en y changeant simplement le nom. Il n'y était question, en effet, que d'ajouter à un corps existant et ayant son chef, des noyaux d'organisation et pour mieux dire de recrutement disséminés sur la ligne de bataille.

Dans la création d'un corps Polonais au service de Sa Majesté le Sultan, l'objet principal et premier est, moins d'ajouter à la force de l'armée Ottomane, que d'affaiblir et d'ébranler l'armée ennemie par l'effet que produira la mesure sur les nombreux Polonais forcés de servir dans cette armée. Il faut donc songer, d'abord, à lui donner du retentissement. Il faut un firman du Sultan, que les journaux répètent et qui devienne le fond d'une proclamation jetée dans les rangs Russes.

Un simple appel aux Polonais, pour venir combattre dans les rangs Ottomans les ennemis de leur patrie, peut déjà en attirer un bon nombre. Toutefois, ce nombre ne saurait être considérable et l'effet de la mesure n'atteindra sa portée entière que si l'on fait comprendre aux Polonais que la Puissance qui les appelle, voit en eux une force nationale, un corps auxiliaire, et non pas seulement une cohorte de soldats.

Pour cela, il ne suffit pas de proclamer qu'un Corps Auxiliaire Polonais sera formé et qu'il portera ses couleurs nationales, ni de désigner le chef auquel en sera confié le commandement. Il est infiniment désirable que le décret du Sultan mentionne dans son préambule le nom du Prince Czartoryski, soit comme ayant offert à la Turquie ce concours de la Pologne, soit comme répondant au Gouvernement Ottoman du dévouement des Polonais. En premier lieu, la garantie du Prince Czartoryski sera donnée au Général que, sur la présentation du Prince, le décret nommera chef du corps Polonais.

Le Général Commandant désignera à la nomination du Ministre de la Guerre tous les officiers. Il en formera des cadres composés d'une petit nombre d'officiers et de sous-officiers, envoyés aussitôt sur la ligne de bataille et mis à la disposition des commandants de corps d'armées pour organiser le recrutement.

Le recrutement se fera, pour commencer, parmi les anciens soldats

Polonais présents en Turquie, et parmi les volontaires Chrétiens de toute nation. Bientôt la désertion et les prisonniers faits à l'ennemis rempliront ces cadres.

Mais dès le début, les cadres eux-mêmes accompagneront les troupes Ottomanes dans toute rencontre avec l'ennemi, pour y être vus au plutôt, et pour y faire, de vive voix, appel à leur compatriotes. Si, comme il y a lieu de l'espérer, cet appel produit son effet, les détachements répartis ainsi auprès des corps d'armées Ottomans se compléteront promptement, et comme ils se compléteront de vieux soldats, cette organisation pourra, contrairement à l'habitude, s'effectuer non sur les derrières de l'armée, mais en première ligne, en présence de l'ennemi. Il faudra simplement tenir prêts au quartier-général de chaque corps d'armée les armes, uniformes et effets d'équipement nécessaires pour les détachements Polonais, à mesure qu'ils se compléteront.

Ces détachements seront d'une utilité immédiate en jetant une véritable perturbation dans les rangs ennemis. Au fur et à mesure que des compagnies ou des escadrons se formeront, on les réunira en bataillons ou en régiments, laissant toujours aux corps d'armées Ottomans les cadres nécessaires pour continuer le recrutement.

Le Général Commandant du Corps Auxiliaire Polonais recevra du Ministère de la Guerre les fonds nécessaires pour l'équipement et l'entretien de tous les détachements et de son Etat-Major. Ses fonctions se borneront, dans le principe, à provoquer au Ministère de la Guerre les ordres nécessaires pour expédier et faire admettre, par les commandants de corps d'armées Ottomans, les cadres des détachements Polonais. Après cela, il inspectera en personne tous ces détachements, leur fera parvenir leurs effets d'armement et d'équipement et leur solde. Les vivres leur seront fournis au corps.

Lorsque plusieurs bataillons et escadrons pourront être réunis, le Général, chef du corps Polonais, en prendra le commandement; cette division prendra alors le nom de "Corps Auxiliaire Polonais."

Inclosure 3 in No. 77.

Memorandum.

1. Décret (firman) de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans qui ordonne la création de ce corps, et en nomme le chef:
2. Nomination des 24 officiers proposés:
3. Autorisation du Ministre de la Guerre, d'appeler de France et d'Angleterre 50 officiers Polonais:
4. Avance des fonds pour habillement et équipement des officiers:
5. Designation du dépôt du corps:
6. Recrutement de volontaires Polonais et Chrétiens:
7. Confection d'uniformes et autres objets d'équipement pour 2,000 hommes d'Infanterie, 500 de Cavalerie, 150 d'Artillerie:
8. Désignation des corps d'armées Ottomans et des commandants de ces corps, auxquels seront envoyés des officiers Polonais comme cadres de compagnies de recrutement:
9. Nomination de dragomans, un pour chaque cadre:

Le cadre composé de 1 officier supérieur; 1 capitaine; 2 lieutenants; 4 sous-officiers:

10. Adjonction au Général commandant le corps:—d'un employé de l'administration de la guerre comme son payeur et intermédiaire d'office avec les bureaux de la guerre, d'un dragoman pouvant écrire le Turc.

Ce 22 Mars, 1854.

No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 12.)

(No. 140.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 30, 1854.

I AVAIL myself of this opportunity to forward to your Lordship the further despatches which have passed between Vice-Admiral Dundas and myself since the transmission of our preceding correspondence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 16, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your information copy of a report from Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General, and of its inclosures, stating that a Russian squadron was seen at sea on Friday, 10th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Acting Consul-General Hardy to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 16, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a report that has been made to me by our harbour master, showing that he had been told by Captain W. P. Payeken, of the Bremen ship "Daimont," (arrived from Eupatoria,) that he saw fifteen Russian ships of war on the 10th instant, cruizing between that place and Sebastopol.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HARDY.

Report.

Galata, March 16, 1854.

THE Bremen bark "Daimont," Captain W. P. Payeken, loaded at Eupatoria, on the coast of the Crimea, arrived this morning, and now performing his quarantine, reported to me at the "Parlatorio" that on Friday last, on the coast of the Crimea, he saw fifteen sail of Russian ships of war, all of them large ships; they were cruizing between Eupatoria and Sebastopol.

(Signed) CHAS. SILLY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 78.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in Beicos Bay, March* 16, 1854.

AS the very great difficulty now experienced in obtaining coal in quantities sufficient for the ordinary service of the steam squadron under my orders would be seriously increased in the event of active and extensive operations in the Black Sea, or elsewhere, and as the success of such operations and the utility even of the steam vessels would be endangered by a deficiency in the supply of coal, it has become imperatively necessary for me to use every

endeavour to provide for the possible wants of the squadron, as well as to use every precautionary measure of strict economy in the consumption of that most important article.

As one of those precautionary measures, I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency, for your information, that after the approaching departure of the "Caradoc" for Marseilles, with Sir John Burgoyne, it is not my intention to send any of the steam vessels under my orders with despatches for Marseilles, or even to Malta, but to forward them by the French packets, English screw vessels, and the "Cyclops" (a vessel to be employed in provisioning the squadron), as opportunities may offer, and I am glad to hear the number of French packets between this and France is to be increased.

With the same view, it is also my intention, when engaged in the Black Sea, that all communications for the squadron shall be conveyed by the Austrian boats to Varna or Sinope, as circumstances may demand, and thereby effect a considerable saving in this most valuable munition of war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

British Embassy, Constantinople, March 17, 1854.

Sir,

IN acknowledging your despatches No. 63 and No. 67, dated respectively the 15th and 16th instant, I understand, as to the former, that besides objecting generally to the reception of Turkish troops on board any vessel under your command, you have no steamers to spare for the service which I recommended to your special attention, and that you are of opinion that the Porte has plenty of sailing vessels at its command, which, notwithstanding that the main object is expedition, you think sufficient for the purpose.

With respect to your second despatch on the subject, principally of coal, I fully appreciate the resolution which you have declared, to use that "most important article" and valuable "munition of war" with economy, and I have the satisfaction to inform you that the Porte is prepared to afford every facility for your obtaining supplies from the mines at Heraclea, at the Government price, if not gratuitously, and, at all events, in common with both squadrons, which I am sure will be agreeable to you.

With reference to the last two paragraphs of the same despatch, I beg to be informed whether, in case of emergency, I am no longer to rely upon you for an express conveyance of my despatches, and whether Austrian vessels are to be exclusively employed in conveying the communications between Constantinople and your squadron whenever it may be in the Black Sea.

I beg to draw your attention to the importance of establishing some speedy means of communication between Varna and this capital, at a period when the Russians may hazard an attempt at passing the Danube before the annual inundation of that river, towards the middle of April, shall render the passage for a time impracticable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 78.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," in Beicos Bay, March 18, 1854.

My Lord,

ON the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 16th instant, enclosing a report made by the master of a Bremen merchant vessel, that fifteen sail of large Russian ships of war were seen off Sebastopol on the 10th instant, Admiral Hamelin and I immediately sent officers to Constantinople to inquire of the master of the vessel into all the particulars of the statement; and I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that they found the report to be so vague and contradictory, that we have countermanded the orders we had given for the squadron to put to sea.

The return of the "Retribution" and "Caton" from the Danube and Varna (hourly expected), and the "Sampson" and "Cacique" from off Sebastopol, will bring correct and late intelligence from those quarters.

Should your Excellency in future receive reports relative to the movements of vessels in the Black Sea, I would venture to suggest their being referred immediately for investigation to the senior naval officer off Tophana, by which means much valuable time might be saved.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

British Embassy, Pera, March 18, 1854.

Sir,

IN acknowledging the receipt of your despatch, No. 68 of this day's date, I must remind you that the report of the Russian fleet being at sea was sent to me by Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General on the authority of the British Harbour Master: that the master of the merchant vessel who gave the intelligence, was not in a position to be brought up to the Consulate for a more particular examination; and that I communicated to you, without comment, Mr. Hardy's letter and the accompanying letter, exactly as I had received them.

With respect to your suggestion that I should communicate such reports in future to your officer on station here, Mr. Silly, the harbour master, shall be directed to convey them immediately to him; but I beg to suggest, as a still greater economy of time, that you should direct all vessels coming in from the Black Sea under British or foreign colours, to be questioned on their down passage near your squadron.

It may interest you to know that advices received from Bucharest, Vienna, and Varna, warranting an expectation that about this time the Russian troops will attempt to cross the Danube in force. I grieve to add that those from the latter place are by no means encouraging for the Sultan's army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 78.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," March 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive at two o'clock this morning your Excellency's letter of yesterday's date, No. 40, (marked immediate,) acknowledging my despatches Nos. 63 and 67, dated respectively the 15th and 16th instant, and with reference to your observations on the former letter, I beg to state that your Excellency is right in supposing that I object generally to the employment of Her Majesty's ships as transports for the conveyance of Turkish soldiers, and that I have no steam vessels to spare to carry Turkish troops to Volo and Prevesa, as I have fully explained in my letter No. 63. I am also of opinion that the Porte has plenty of sailing vessels at its command, which, with the prevailing winds and strong currents, could convey their soldiers to Volo as speedily, and with greater comfort and security to the health of the men, than by steam vessel.

The voyage to Prevesa might be performed in a shorter period by steam

than by sailing vessels, but the men conveyed by steam would not at this season be fit for service on arriving at their destination; and I have here to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that the Pasha in charge of the Turkish troops, lately sent from Constantinople to Volo by steam vessel, was obliged to stop at Gallipoli for twenty-six hours to land and recover his men from the effects of exposure to the cold, although the wind and weather was otherwise favourable.

With reference to my second letter No. 67, on the subject of coals, your Excellency acquaints me that the Porte is prepared to afford every facility for my obtaining supplies from the mines at Heraclea at the Government price, if not gratuitously, and at all events in common to both squadrons. I beg to call to your recollection my letter of the 29th December last, in which I informed you that there were no coals then at Heraclea, nor any probability of any being collected there until the month of April. It is my intention (with the permission of the proper department), to send two or three engineers, acquainted with mining and coals, to inspect the capabilities of the mines near Heraclea, and Vice-Admiral Hamelin and I would be very glad to pay a fair remunerating price for such coals as we could obtain (without which our exertions would be paralysed), but I am inclined to believe that, were working people properly paid, much greater quantities could be procured than at present, which are not supposed to exceed 2,200 tons per month, for about seven months of the year.

In reply to your Excellency's questions, whether in case of urgency you are any longer to rely upon me for an express conveyance of your despatches, and whether Austrian vessels are to be exclusively employed in conveying the communications between Constantinople and my squadron whenever it may be in the Black Sea, I have to acquaint your Excellency, first, that as the French Government packets are to run every five days between Constantinople and France, and that other means of communication exist, and are daily increasing, I imagine an express vessel will be seldom required in such an emergency, however, I shall be glad to afford every assistance in my power, although to the loss of the services of the vessel from the scene of operations, must be added the consumption of 700 tons of coals, and an expense of nearly £1,500.

Secondly, the requirements of the service will naturally draw steam vessels of the squadron from time to time to and from Constantinople; these vessels would carry intermediate dispatches, but the Austrian Lloyd's boat would be considered as the fixed and regular mode of communication. And with reference to the concluding paragraph of your Excellency's letter, I will endeavour to arrange with Vice-Admiral Hamelin a constant communication with Varna; in which, however, I am strongly of opinion that the Turkish Government might materially assist, by appointing a small steamer or two to run between that port and Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 7 in No. 78.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in Beicos Bay, March* 18, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Excellency despatches just brought from Varna by the "Retribution," and to acquaint you that the "Caradoc" will proceed to Varna either to-morrow or Monday evening, as your Excellency may determine, but I shall be obliged by your sending to me at Therapia any letters you may wish to send to Varna by 5 P.M. on the day you may select.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 8 in No. 78.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," March* 19, 1854.

IT appears from what Captain the Honourable J. Drummond could learn at Varna on the 17th instant, that a report prevails there also that the Russians are making preparations for passing the Danube in force before the annual inundations commence.

Under these circumstances, I shall feel obliged by any information your Excellency may be able to give me from time to time on this subject, so that the combined squadrons may put to sea, if that measure should appear to Admiral Hamelin and to me to be desirable and practicable.

With respect to the letter I had the honour yesterday to address to your Excellency, explaining that the captain of the port had not clearly comprehended the statement made by the master of the Bremen vessel, I now beg to acquaint you that I learnt this morning from a Duteh galliot, four days from Eupatoria, that she had neither met with nor heard of any Russian vessels of war being at sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

P.S.—I have this moment received your Excellency's letter of yesterday, No. 41, and hasten to acquaint you, in reply to your suggestion, that every vessel that enters the Bosphorus is, if possible, spoken with by the guard-boats of the squadron, in order to obtain all the information I can, but unfortunately they generally know so little, that I am the more obliged for the intelligence your Excellency has sent to me to-day relative to the expected movements of the Russian troops, and I again express my earnest desire to be made acquainted with any information your Excellency may receive that may assist Admiral Hamelin and me in regulating the movements of the squadrons.

Inclosure 9 in No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir *Constantinople, March* 20, 1854.

THE Porte being very desirous of sending a rifle regiment to Varna with the utmost expedition, and not having sufficient steam conveyance at his disposal, though taking up a British commercial steamer for the purpose, requests the assistance of the squadrons, hoping that each will appoint a steam frigate to receive a portion of the troops.

Notwithstanding the inconvenience of transporting Turkish troops in Her Majesty's vessels, I earnestly hope that you will comply with the Porte's request.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers writes to Vice-Admiral Hamelin in the same sense.

I avail myself of this opportunity to send you copies of two papers which I have just received from the Porte: one, confidential, announcing the intention of the Russians to attempt an early passage of the Danube; the other, a report from Omer Pasha, describing the success with which a part of the troops under his command had resisted an actual attempt of the Russians to cross at Turtukai.

It is difficult to believe that the attempt described was the only one in contemplation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 10 in No. 78.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *in Beicos Bay, March* 20, 1854.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of this day, No. 42, I have the honour to acquaint you that the "Inflexible" is ready, in conjunction with the French steam frigate "Sané," to convey the Turkish rifle regiment to Varna, as requested by your Excellency.

It will be necessary that a competent officer should arrange with Admiral Hamelin and me as to the number of men to be embarked, and the hour, recollecting that if the steam vessels leave the Bosphorus in the evening, they will arrive at Varna the next morning; it will also be necessary that a naval officer of superior rank, who can speak English, should accompany the troops sent on board the "Inflexible."

I take this opportunity of observing to your Excellency that Admiral Hamelin and I am of opinion, that as the combined squadrons appear subject from time to time to requisitions from the Ottoman Government for convoy, or for transport of troops, we should be made acquainted with the proposed movements of the Turkish naval forces, which at least would prevent great inconvenience, if not serious difficulty, to our combined operations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 11 in No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, March 21, 1854.

Sir,

CERTAIN statements in referring to your despatch No. 69 of the 18th instant, and knowing the importance which you very justly attach to the correctness of data as grounds of judgment in matters of official business, I beg to inform you, as the result of special inquiries at the Porte, that 500,000 quintals—equal, I believe, to about 27,000 tons—of coal are actually in a state of readiness at Heraclea.

I have further the honour to state that, according to information derived from the same quarter, the cause of delay at Gallipoli, when the Turkish steamers, having troops on board for Prevesa and Volos, stopped, there was damage done to one of the vessels.

With respect to another point in your despatch, I would submit whether there was not some mistake in the figures, when the quantity of coal consumed by a despatch steam vessel from Constantinople to Marseilles and back was put down at 700 tons. I believe I am not wrong in stating that the average quantity of coal consumed by the "Caradoc" in her occasional voyages to and fro on that line, has not exceeded 500.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 12 in No. 78.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Radcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *Bosphorus, March* 25, 1854.

My Lord,

IN acknowledging the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 21st instant, No. 43, I have the honour to acquaint you that I shall be very glad upon inquiry to find that the quantity of coals reported to your Excellency as being at Heraclea is actually there, although the quality is very unsuitable for the boilers of Her Majesty's ships under my command.

With reference to the second paragraph of your Excellency's letter, I beg to enclose a copy of a letter I have received from Commander Heath, of the "Niger," who accompanied the Turkish steamer to Volo; and lastly, I have

to observe to your Excellency that I have now before me a return of the expenditure of coals during two voyages made to Marseilles by one of Her Majesty's steam vessels, and the average quantity expended amounted to 692½ tons.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 13 in No. 78.

Commander Heath to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

"*Niger*," *Beicos Bay, March* 22, 1854.

Sir,

IN answer to your inquiry on the subject of a statement which appears to have been made to the British Ambassador as to the cause of delay by the Turkish steamer conveying troops to Volo, I have the honour to inform you that I went on board the steamer after anchoring, and was told by her captain, in the presence of the officer in command of the troops, that the vessel had anchored because the troops were cold, that they were landing, and would be re-embarked the next morning.

As the chief engineer, an Englishman, was acting as interpreter, and as, out of curiosity, I made some inquiries of him respecting her engineers, I think he would probably have mentioned it had any accident happened to them.

I presume, therefore, his Excellency has been misinformed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. HEATH.

Inclosure 14 in No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, March 29, 185 .

Sir,

I AVAIL myself of the earliest occasion to forward herewith for your information a letter which I received yesterday from Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General, Mr. Hardy, inclosing a report from the British Harbour Master here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

Inclosure 15 in No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, March 30, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatch No. 82 of the 27th instant.

I quite agree with you and Vice-Admiral Hamelin that an expedition to clear the coast of Circassia of every Russian military establishment would be a measure attended with advantage, and I propose to communicate upon the subject with his Excellency the French Ambassador, and also with the Sultan's ministers.

In the meantime I must express a doubt whether the Turkish Government has any steamer at its disposal, in the absence of those which are employed in bringing up troops from Alexandria or in assisting to convey others to Prevesa. If such were the case it would, however, operate only as a cause of delay, the less important as the declaration of war between Russia and the allied Governments, though expected from day to day, has not yet been brought to our knowledge.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 79.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 197.)

Berlin, April 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that General Lindheim returned yesterday from his mission to St. Petersburgh.

I am not aware that he has brought any data that are likely to encourage the King to make further communications on the subject of peace, but the General nevertheless says that the Emperor of Russia declares that he continues to be animated with most pacific intentions. His impressions as to the future military operations are that the Russians will attack Silistria, but will not go beyond the Danube and the Dobrudscha.

A "Te Deum" was celebrated at St. Petersburgh for the successful passage of the Danube. Neither the Austrian nor the Prussian Missions attended the invitation of the Court to this ceremony.

The marked attention shown by the Emperor to Mr. Seymour, the newly arrived Minister of the United States, appears to have been much commented on by the diplomatic body, and given rise to various rumours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 80.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 198.)

Berlin, April 10, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has received intelligence to-day from Vienna by telegraph that the draft of Treaty between Prussia and Austria relating to the Eastern question had not been approved of, and that it was already on its way back, and would become the subject of further communication between the two Governments. I am not aware of the point upon which objections have been raised by the Austrian Government, but apprehend that it is one said to have been introduced by the Prussian Plenipotentiary, which would bind the two Powers not to act without previous communication with each other.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 81.

Mr. Grey to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 76. Secret and Confidential.)

Stockholm, April 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour of being received yesterday evening by their Majesties the King and Queen of Sweden and Norway, Her Majesty the Queen Dowager, and Their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess Royal, for the presentation of Mr. Adams.

Before Mr. Adams was introduced, I was received by the King alone, and His Majesty desired that I would write to your Lordship, and state the extreme satisfaction with which he had read the declaration relative to neutrals, published in the "Gazette" of the 29th ultimo, which he felt was all that he could desire. His Majesty further expressed to me his sense of the friendly course pursued by Her Majesty's Government towards Sweden, and said that he fully appreciated the manner in which anything which could cause embarrassment to Sweden, or throw obstacles in the way of the neutral policy he had adopted, had been avoided on the part of England.

Immediately before my interview with the King, the French Minister had had an audience, in order to present the new French Secretary, M. de Frézals, and he availed himself of that opportunity to read to His Majesty a despatch which he had received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and which he was instructed to read to Baron Stjerneld, without leaving a copy with his Excellency. The

despatch in question expresses the hope of the French Government that Sweden will take an active part in the approaching struggle, and side with England and France against Russia. It appeared to M. Lobstein that the news of the recognition of the Swedish neutrality by Russia had not officially reached the French Government at the time this despatch was written, and, after consulting with me, he accordingly determined not to carry out his instructions till after the arrival of another post. Nothing further having however arrived, and the King having somewhat unexpectedly fixed yesterday for our reception, M. Lobstein resolved to submit his instructions to His Majesty in person, first asking whether he would wish to receive them without their previously having been communicated to Baron Stjerneld. The King having expressed his willingness to receive the communication, M. Lobstein placed the despatch in his hands. His Majesty was considerably moved (fortement ému) by the nature of the communication, but appears to have taken it exceedingly well, and to have thanked M. Lobstein for the straightforward and friendly course which he had adopted. His Majesty then entered into a conversation of some length, and concluded by desiring M. Lobstein to communicate with Baron Stjerneld. A council has been held to-day at the Palace, and as it is an unusual day, it may be presumed that the French Minister's communication was the cause of it.

Various interruptions have prevented my learning more from M. Lobstein to-day, and I fear that I shall not be able to obtain further details before the departure of the steamer to-morrow morning, nor has M. Lobstein yet had his interview with Baron Stjerneld. I may perhaps add, however, that His Royal Highness the Crown Prince said to me this evening he thought the step had been taken somewhat too soon. The Prince's own wishes and feelings appear to me to be entirely in favour of the course proposed by France, but he seems to fear that the premature communication of the plan may cause delay in its being carried into effect. That it will be ultimately carried into effect His Royal Highness does not appear to doubt.

In his subsequent interview with me, the King did not in any way touch upon the subject, and I thought, on the contrary, that his expressions of gratitude to England for not having caused embarrassment to Sweden were somewhat marked. This may, however, very possibly have been caused by my being aware of His Majesty just having received the communication above mentioned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. GREY

No. 82.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 156.)

Foreign Office, April 13, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch to your Excellency, No. 50 of the 25th of February last, respecting Kotoor, I have now to state that Mr. Thomson, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, has reported to me in his No. 17 of the 23rd of January, the intention of the Shah of Persia to remain neutral in the contest between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and that the Persian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople has been instructed to abstain during the war from bringing forward the claims of Persia against Turkey with regard to Kerbella, Mohemmera, Kotoor, and the other grievances of which she complains.

It appears from Mr. Thomson's above-named report that the Persian Government has lately issued orders to Iskender Khan not to presume to interfere with the district of Kotoor, even if it were completely evacuated by the Sultan's troops.

The Shah has, moreover, evinced much sympathy and friendly feeling for the Porte; and I have to instruct your Excellency, under these circumstances, to point out to Reshid Pasha that the moment is opportune for the Turkish Government generously to do an act of justice, and to restore Kotoor to Persia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 83.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 170.)

Foreign Office, April 15, 1854.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch, No 136 of the 30th March, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the advice which you gave to the Porte to increase the garrison of Varna, and of your having written to the Commander of the British Expeditionary troops at Malta to move those troops towards Constantinople without further delay.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 84.

Mr. Grey to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 84. Secret and Confidential.)

Stockholm, April 8, 1854.

My Lord,

THE French Minister, M. Lobstein, has this day read to me the despatch in which he reports to M. Drouyn de Lhuys what passed between himself and the King at the interview which I alluded to, in my despatch No. 76 of the 6th instant.

M. Lobstein, upon being introduced to the King's apartment, said, after a few introductory phrases, that he had a communication of an extremely delicate nature to make to the Swedish Government, that he had not had an opportunity of making that communication to Baron Stjerneld, but, as His Majesty had always treated him with confidence, he thought he might venture to submit the despatch to His Majesty himself in the first instance.

The contents of the despatch in question are, doubtless, well known to your Lordship; I will, therefore, content myself with repeating that it expresses the hope of the French Government that Sweden would take an active part in the present war, and seize the opportunity of recovering those territories which she had been deprived of by the House of Holstein, and thus add fresh lustre (éclat) to the present dynasty.

The King took the despatch and read it from beginning to end without making any observation, but shewing signs of considerable emotion. On returning the despatch to M. Lobstein, His Majesty said that he had made a declaration of neutrality in the face of the world, and of the Swedish nation, and that he was bound in honour to maintain that neutrality. England and France had announced that they sought no territorial advantage for themselves in prosecuting this war; still less could he engage in it for the purpose of retrieving the losses which Sweden had suffered in former times; but His Majesty at the same time expressed to M. Lobstein that he only spoke with reference to the present state of things; he could not presume to say what the course of events would be, nor could he direct them, and His Majesty, giving way to this train of ideas, said: "If Sweden should be obliged to take part in the war, we can raise a force of about 120,000 men, of whom from 60 to 70,000 could be employed upon foreign service.

His Majesty then thanked M. Lobstein for the manner in which he had made this communication, and also for the proofs of friendship he had received from the French Government in their offers of support, and concluded by desiring M. Lobstein to make the communication to Baron Stjerneld.

This was done by the French Minister yesterday, after the matter had, no doubt, been fully considered in Council. And it appears that Baron Stjerneld's reply was entirely in accordance with that given by His Majesty on the evening before.

I am bound to add a few observations to your Lordship on the subject, though I do so with the utmost deference. The step which I have reported above appears to me to have been taken somewhat too soon, and, if the French Minister had been consulted upon it, I believe he would have expressed the same opinion. What has already been done, however, cannot be recalled, and

I have very high authority for adding that, now the ice has been once broken, this step ought to be followed by others of the same nature. The King has admitted that his refusal to act in the manner suggested by the French Government was given with reference to the present moment only, and I venture to repeat to your Lordship that there is a feeling growing up very rapidly in the country that Sweden ought not to allow the present crisis to pass by without taking advantage of it. I have been informed this very day that the editor of the evening paper, the "Aftonblad," states that he has reason to expect that a demonstration in favour of war with Russia is preparing, and I know that the Russian Mission here entertain extreme alarm as to the intentions of Sweden. It can hardly be doubted that Russia will scrupulously avoid giving Sweden a pretext for taking up arms against her, though, when the winter comes, she may hold another language, if the war should not, ere that time, have been brought to a conclusion. It is, on the other hand, an undoubted fact that the people generally, and, I believe, the great majority of the upper classes, would desire nothing more than to see Finland remitted to Sweden upon an independent footing like Norway, and the Aland Islands restored to her absolutely. But unless Finland is independent (and, on other terms I do not believe the Fins would wish to renounce their present allegiance,) the Aland Islands would, perhaps, be untenable for Sweden, as they are in severe winters completely joined by the ice to the mainland of Finland.

Under these circumstances I cannot help believing that if it is desired that Sweden should be enlisted in the war against Russia, it would be well not to let the question drop, now that it has once been broached, and I would venture to observe that the answer given by the King in the present instance need not exclude all hope of another result on a future occasion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. GREY.

No. 85.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Grey.

(No. 49.)

Foreign Office, April 17, 1854.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 76 of the 6th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with the King of Sweden on the occasion of an audience which you had with His Majesty on the 5th instant, I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of stating to His Majesty and to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince the great satisfaction with which your report has been received by Her Majesty's Government, and you will at the same time renew the assurance you have already given, that it will be the constant desire of Her Majesty's Government to consult the interests of Sweden, and to avoid, as far as possible, all cause of embarrassment to the King.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 86.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 130.)

Vienna, April 11, 1854.

My Lord,

I COMMUNICATED your Lordship's despatch No. 138, to Count Buol, who begged me to express to your Lordship the satisfaction he had received from the assurances contained in it, that any proposal of his for securing the objects which have now been obtained by the signature of the Protocol, would have the immediate consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

Count Buol stated that the necessity for any proposal which he might have had in view, was now entirely done away with.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 87.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 18.)

(No 133.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 12, 1854.

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 134, from which he was happy to learn that Her Majesty's Government concurred with him upon the importance of securing the co-operation of Prussia with England, France and Austria, in the measures to be adopted in the present posture of the Eastern affairs; and he hoped that vacillation upon that subject in the Cabinet of Berlin may, since the signature of the Protocol of the 9th instant, be looked upon as no longer existing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 88.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 18.)

(No. 134.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 12, 1854.

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 137, I communicated to Count Buol the sincere satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government had derived from his renewed assurance of the determination of the Austrian Government to maintain every engagement and every declaration to which His Imperial Majesty the Emperor has been a party

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 89.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 18.)

(No. 136.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 12, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the Protocol, signed in Conference on the 9th instant, the certified copy of the same being retained in the archives of the Mission.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 89.

Protocol (No. 5) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 9, 1854.

Présens: Les Répresentans d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse.

SUR la demande des Plénipotentiaires de France, et de Grande Bretagne, la Conférence s'est réunie pour entendre la lecture des pièces qui établissent que l'invitation adressée au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, d'évacuer les Principautés Moldo-Valaques, dans un délai fixe, étant restée sans réponse, l'état de guerre déjà déclarée entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte existe également de fait entre la Russie, d'une part, et la France et la Grande Bretagne, de l'autre.

Ce changement opéré dans l'attitude de deux des Puissances représentées dans la Conférence de Vienne, en conséquence d'une démarche tentée directement par la France et l'Angleterre, et appuyée par l'Autriche et la Prusse comme fondée en droit, a été jugé par les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche et de Prusse comme impliquant la nécessité de constater de nouveau l'union des quatre

Gouvernements sur le terrain des principes posés dans les Protocoles des 5 Decembre, 1853, et 13 Janvier, 1854.

En conséquence les Soussignées ont à ce moment solennel déclaré que leurs Gouvernements restent unis dans le double but de maintenir l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, dont le fait de l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes est et restera une des conditions essentielles, et de consolider dans un intérêt conforme aux sentiments du Sultan, et par tous les moyens compatible avec son indépendance et sa Souveraineté les droits civils et religieux des Chrétiens sujets de la Porte.

L'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman est et demeure la condition *sine qua non* de toute transaction destinée à rétablir la paix entre les Puissances belligérantes, et les Gouvernements représentés par les Soussignés s'engagent à rechercher en commun les garanties les plus propres à rattacher l'existence de cet empire à l'équilibre général de l'Europe, comme ils se déclarent prêts à délibérer et à s'entendre sur l'emploi des moyens les plus convenables pour atteindre l'objet de leur concert.

Quelqu'événement qui se produise par suite de cet accord, fondé uniquement sur les intérêts généraux de l'Europe, et dont le but ne peut être atteint que par le retour d'une paix solide et durable, les Gouvernements représentés par les Soussignés s'engagent réciproquement à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement définitif avec la Cour Impériale de Russie, ou avec toute autre Puissance, qui serait contraire aux principes énoncés ci-dessus, sans en avoir préalablement délibéré en commun.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORLAND.
ARNIM.

No. 90.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 18.)

(No. 138.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 12, 1854.

BY my telegraphic despatch to your Lordship of the 8th instant, you will have been aware that Count Arnim had received instructions to agree to the Protocol in the form in which it had been drawn up in the Conference of the 4th instant. M. de Bourqueney, however, not having received on the 8th instant from his Government the authorisation to sign that document, the Conference was adjourned to the following day, when the French Minister having received the necessary instructions, the signature took place.

I cannot but congratulate your Lordship upon the completion of a document by which the Four Powers have united to carry out in concert the great principle of the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, conjoined with the benevolent desire of seconding the views of His Majesty the Sultan, towards the amelioration of the condition of the Christian population subject to his rule.

These great principles being those by which the policy of the allied Governments will now be directed, it must be a matter of no small congratulation to Her Majesty's Government, which, through periods of great difficulty, have steadily upheld and pursued those principles, to find that a first step has thus been taken to secure the important objects for which they have laboured, all the Great Powers being now formally associated for the attainment of a common end, by which the future security and interests of Europe can alone be preserved.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 91.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 18.)

(No. 209.)

Berlin, April 15, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has gone to his country seat for a few days, but is expected back to-morrow.

The negotiation of the Treaty with Austria has consequently not made as much progress as might have been expected, but the military portion of it has been undergoing discussions between General Hess and Generals Bonin and Reyher, and I am assured that it is likely to be concluded next week. Great mystery continues to be observed respecting the contents of this document, and Baron Manteuffel, when I saw him the night before he left Berlin, told me he could not say anything further as to the details of the Treaty, but that he could assure me Her Majesty's Government would not be dissatisfied with it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 92.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 100.)

Foreign Office, April 18, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Chevalier Bunsen has communicated to me a despatch which was addressed by Baron Manteuffel to General de Rochow on the 8th instant, stating, with reference to the last Russian propositions, that although the Prussian Government in its desire to avail itself of every chance, however feeble, for a reconciliation of the belligerent Powers, did not delay to bring the substance of these last overtures to the knowledge of the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Vienna, yet they could not conceal from themselves the great difficulties which those overtures would meet with, particularly in London and at Paris. The information which the Prussian Government have subsequently received has confirmed these apprehensions.

It could be matter of no surprise to that Government that, after the events which have led to the present attitude of Great Britain and France towards Russia, the Maritime Powers, before entertaining the negotiations proposed by Russia, and even before receiving without suspicion, and in a manner likely to lead to practical results, the mediation of Prussia, should ask themselves whether the military movements of Russia are in harmony with the pacific intentions which she manifests, and whether the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh is prepared to take such engagements as would ensure the evacuation of the Principalities within a reasonable time.

For these reasons, and with the desire that the offers of the Emperor of Russia may not remain unproductive of any result, the King of Prussia urges in the most solemn manner upon his Imperial Majesty, to give orders to his armies not to advance any further beyond the Danube. Such an order would paralyze the impression which the intelligence of the passage of the Danube by the Russian army, arriving simultaneously with the new propositions of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, must have necessarily produced on the several Cabinets as well as on public opinion. It would destroy the seeds of mistrust, which without this would oppose themselves at the outset to the establishment of an understanding. It would furnish to the mediatory efforts of the King of Prussia the indispensable basis of a reciprocal confidence, on such a basis the ulterior declarations of the Emperor of Russia would meet with an entirely different reception from other Governments, and Prussia might hope to recommend them with success. The resolution of His Imperial Majesty to withdraw his troops from the Turkish provinces within a fixed term, for example, the 1st of May, would, in the opinion of the Prussian Government, most effectually contribute to this end, and if they were authorised to communicate this decision to the other Powers, an arrangement might possibly be effected for the gradual and simultaneous withdrawal of the troops of Russia and the fleets of England and France.

These considerations, which M. de Rochow is instructed to bring to the knowledge of the Emperor of Russia, are dictated as well by the desire to give effect to the last Russian communication, as by an appreciation of the difficulties which must continue to oppose themselves to these propositions so long as the occupation of the Principalities threatens to be indefinitely prolonged, and a permanent injury to be thereby inflicted upon those interests which Prussia, in common with Austria, is peremptorily called upon to preserve.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 93.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir John Milbanke.

(No. 21.)

Foreign Office, April 18, 1854.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government entirely concur in the views of the French Government on the Eastern question, as stated in M. Drouyn de Lhuys's despatch to the French Minister at Munich, the substance of which you have reported to me in your despatch No. 23 of the 6th instant. You will hold the same language, and will omit no opportunity of representing that the adoption by Germany of the vacillating policy of Prussia must protract the duration and extend the theatre of the war; that it would be ascribed to fear by Russia, and would be regarded as an acknowledgment of that omnipotence in which throughout Germany she has laboured to create a belief; that the success of Russia in the present struggle must, as an inevitable consequence, lead to further aggression westwards, and that the danger which now threatens the future independence of Germany, can alone be averted by the united policy, and the vigorous and decided action of all the German Powers.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 94.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 147.)

Foreign Office, April 19, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that there is a point in the recent proposals sent from St. Petersburgh to Berlin which seems to merit the attention of the Four Powers, viz., that as Russia had declared herself ready to make the amelioration of the condition of the rayahs the object of a common deliberation, in which the Porte must necessarily have taken part, she would appear to have made a first step towards abandoning those pretensions to an exclusive protectorate which she had hitherto endeavoured to enforce in her relations with the Porte.

I told Count Colloredo that these proposals, adapted as they were to the peculiar notions of the King of Prussia, and having for their object to sow dissension between Austria and Prussia, and to prevent the signature of the Protocol, did not appear worthy of serious consideration.

If Her Majesty's Government believed that the Emperor of Russia was sincere in his desire that the condition of the rayahs should be ameliorated, we might hope, as Count Buol says, that His Imperial Majesty was taking a first step towards abandoning his exclusive claims; but as his real object could not be doubted, it was impossible that the Four Powers should now be deceived by his proposals. Those Powers, I said, would betray their own most important interests, if they did not turn to account the present conjuncture of circumstances for securing the future independance of Europe, or if, by simply re-establishing the status quo, they gave an immediate triumph to Russia, and left her free to carry out her own policy of aggrandizement at the time and in the manner that might best suit her purpose.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 95.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 148.)

Foreign Office, April 19, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 136 of the 12th instant, inclosing a copy of the Protocol which was signed in Conference, on the 9th instant, by the Representatives of the Four Powers, I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your proceedings throughout this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 96.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 19, 10¼ P.M.)

Vienna, April 19, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL announces [unnecessary? unreserved] consent of the Emperor of Austria to the proposals, as reported in my telegraphic message and private letter of the 17th, and if desired, he will dispatch a ship of war to co-operate with England and France for the maintenance of order in the Turkish provinces. He would wish these measures should be announced to the Porte, in conjunction with England and France. He will write to Count Colloredo upon the subject. He has given instructions to the Chargé d'Affaires, as reported in my private letter of the 17th.

Count Buol's last communications from Berlin are so satisfactory as to lead him to expect that the arrangement with Prussia is on the point of being settled.

No. 97.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 19.)

(No. 149.)

Constantinople, April 4, 1854.

My Lord,

WE have no further news of military transactions along the Danube or in the Dobrudscha. It would appear that the Russians are preparing either to fortify some position on the right bank of the river within that district, or to undertac the siege of Silistria. Omer Pasha, on the other hand, continues to concentrate his army at Shumla, without any apparent intention of giving battle elsewhere. Varna is exposed by this plan of operations to an attack. Its garrison is weak, its outworks extensive, and its store of provisions anything but abundant.

These circumstances I have repeatedly urged on the attention of the Turkish Ministers, and it is settled that 5,000 of the troops, now coming in from Egypt, shall be sent to Varna without delay. I had obtained steam conveyance for a small reinforcement, from the senior officer on this station, and a portion of the troops were sent alongside for embarkation, but owing to some unaccountable mistake, they were not received on board, and, shortly after, the Turkish steam-frigates from Alexandria began to arrive. Provisions are also to be sent; and there is question of stationing a part of the Ottoman squadron before Varna, with the double view of covering, in part, the land approaches to that fortress, and affording to the combined squadrons a greater liberty of action elsewhere.

I am happy to learn from the latest report addressed to me from Shumla by Captain Simmons, that the Turkish Generalissimo manifests every disposition to act with prudence and self-denial. Copy of the despatch to which I refer, is inclosed herewith, and I wish to draw your Lordship's particular attention to that portion of it which touches the question of command, in the event of combined operations in Bulgaria.

As far as I can learn, the best military authorities within reach, French or English, approve of a defensive plan of operations for the present, and such is also the opinion of those whose judgment is soundest at the Porte.

Information of a plausible aspect has reached me from Mr. Wyse, to the effect that a considerable portion of the Russian army is to be detached from the main body, crossing the Danube above Rustchuk, and marching round by Sophia, so as to turn the defiles of the Balkan, and to open communications with the Christian insurgents in Macedonia and Epirus.

I have taken a military opinion as to the practicability of such a scheme, supposing an amount of Russian force equal to what our advices warrant; and I am led to believe that the plan might be tried with a fair prospect of success, in the event of the insurrection extending, and of the Turks not having any considerable army at Adrianople, or in its neighbourhood. No such army is now in existence, the reserves which had been stationed there in consequence of my early representations on the subject, having been withdrawn to supply the wants of Omer Pasha in Bulgaria.

The Porte, however, is in possession of the intelligence transmitted to me from Athens, and whenever the auxiliary troops arrive here, I hope that some more effectual and comprehensive arrangement may be made. At present the garrison of Constantinople does not exceed 14,000 men, exclusive of the Egyptians, who are not to stay here; and to meet any danger arising from excitement amongst the Greeks, it has been thought prudent to place several ships-of-war in position near the city.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, March 29, 1854.

My Lord,

IN my letter of the 25th instant, No. 1, I had the honour to inform your Lordship that the Russians had passed the Danube in force at Galatz on the 23rd instant.

I have now the honour to inform your Lordship that at the same time that the Russians crossed they made demonstrations at Potbashi, Matchin, and Toultcha, and that the Ottoman troops in those places, after having opposed a serious resistance, retired, having suffered considerable loss.

A colonel, however, having been taken prisoner by the Russians, informed that his Highness Omer Pasha was concentrating a considerable force in the Dobrudscha to oppose them, which caused the enemy to halt and strengthen his position, probably to make an efficient tête-de-pont to secure the passage at Galatz in case of being forced to retreat.

This and the destruction of a bridge by the Turkish forces has enabled Mustapha Pasha, who commands in the Dobrudscha, to retire in good order, bringing with him all his guns, on Karasu, where and at Bogarkeni, near Chernavoda, the Ottoman forces from the Dobrudscha will be collected to the number of 28 battalions of infantry, 2,000 irregulars, 3 regiments of regulars, and 2500 irregular cavalry with 50 guns.

All the heavy baggage and reserve ammunition, &c., of this force will be retired forthwith upon Shumla, and his Highness Omer Pasha has given orders for the troops to follow, and not to risk a combat at Karasu unless he should find it unavoidable in order to secure his ammunition, &c.

His Highness Omer Pasha has moved up 1,200 irregular cavalry to Hadji Oglou Bazar to the support of Mustapha Pasha.

The troops at Turtukai, except some irregular cavalry who remain to observe the enemy on the opposite side of the Danube, have been directed to fall back upon Shumla, where his Highness is concentrating the main body of his forces, and those at Sistova upon Ternova, so that the position of the Turkish army under his Highness's orders will be nearly as follows, that is after the troops in the Dobrudscha shall have reached Shumla:—

At Shumla, Infantry, 60 battalions; Cavalry, 8 regiments; Artillery, 80 guns, with horses, without including the heavy guns already mounted in the batteries and works.

At Ternova, 4 battalions.

At Rustchuk, 7 battalions and 6 guns horsed.

At Silistria, 5 battalions and 800 gunners.

At Kalafat and Widdin, 32 battalions, 4 regiments, 42 guns horsed, besides the garrison at Varna.

This place is provisioned for 50,000 men for some months: the details shall be forwarded in my next despatch, as I have not time to send them at present, the courier being about to leave immediately.

Silistria is in a very fair condition, and well provisioned.

In the interview I had with his Highness Omer Pasha to-day, I was authorized to convey to your Lordship his Highness's views on the subject of the war now commencing.

His Highness is of opinion that the Russian army being strong in numbers and well conditioned, it is necessary that the utmost energy as well as unity of action and combination of strength should be displayed in the war now opening.

He thinks therefore that it is absolutely necessary, in order to secure success, that the allied forces should be combined, and act against the enemy here in Bulgaria, where the attack has been made, and that the command of the whole allied force should be confided to one person, who should be the most capable and experienced of the several commanders, without reference to nationality or any other consideration.

His Highness will be content to command the Ottoman army under the direction of an officer of either nation, whichever may be considered most able, his most anxious desire being that the enemy should be beaten; that he is even willing to serve in an inferior position, such as chief of the Etat-Major of the allied forces, in order to accomplish this great object, for which he is ready to lay down his life.

This patriotic and noble abnegation of himself will no doubt be appreciated by your Lordship as conferring the greatest honour upon his Highness, who does not doubt that a like sentiment will prevail with each of the commanders of the allied forces.

His Highness after having thus expressed himself, added that judging from the careers of the commanders of the English and French forces, he was inclined to be of opinion that Lord Raglan, as having more experience than either Marshal St. Arnaud or himself, having taken part in the great wars at the commencement of the present century, was the most fitting person to command.

I have further to inform your Lordship that his Highness is most actively engaged in strengthening the position of Shumla, and making arrangements for its defence, which I have no doubt will be perfectly secured until the allied forces can arrive on the theatre of operation.

The concentration of forces under his Highness's command is proceeding with rapidity, and it is his intention to encamp the troops as they arrive within the position of Shumla, but outside the town, so as to provide in the best manner for their health.

According to the information his Highness has received, the Russians continue to cross the Danube by the bridge at Galatz, and he is of opinion that a great part of their force has been withdrawn from Wallachia, and is now in course of concentration in the Dobrudscha.

On this point I would observe to your Lordship that I fear that the information received at the Turkish head-quarters is not of the most perfect and reliable nature, and that I think it still doubtful whether the principal invasion of Bulgaria may not take place towards the centre, in front of Bucharest.

Now that the Russians have crossed the Danube, I am inclined to believe that it would not be impossible to establish three or four reliable persons at points on the Russian lines of operation, such as Karasu, Chernavoda near Silistria, Turtukai, and Rustchuk, who would observe and give immediate and accurate information of the numbers which may pass those various points.

I have already spoken to his Highness on this subject, but he appears satisfied with his present means of obtaining information.

I would therefore suggest to your Lordship, whether, considering the probabilities of English troops having to act against the Russians, it would not be advisable for the English Government to authorize the expenditure necessary for obtaining this information. Such an expenditure may amount to a considerable sum, but in the large operations which must take place, depending so much upon the movements of the enemy, I venture to hope that this suggestion will meet with your Lordship's approval. If duly authorized by your Lordship I believe I could find persons who if well placed and properly instructed could obtain much valuable information respecting the enemy, and probably Her Majesty's Consul at Varna could, from his knowledge of the country, find capable persons more readily.

I beg to inform your Lordship that in the present circumstances I have considered it my duty to place my professional knowledge at the disposition of his Highness so long as Her Majesty's Government may allow me to remain at his head-quarters.

In doing this I hope I shall meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. A. SIMMONS.

No. 98.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 19.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 4, 1854.

WITH reference to the military operations in progress along the Danube and in Bulgaria, I have the honour to inclose herewith an official report from Omer Pasha to his Government, communicated to me by Reschid Pasha, and several extracts of despatches addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consuls and Vice-Consuls at Varna, Galatz, and Ismail.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 98.

Extracts of Reports from Omer Pasha, dated March 29, 1854.

(Translation.)

THE Russians, with the aid of their flotilla at Galatz, passed a whole division of their army over to the right bank of the Danube. As the enemy was in great force in that direction, and our troops are stationed at seven different places, Mustapha Pasha was ordered to fall back on Karasu (in the Dobrudscha). The troops, therefore, at Toultcha, Matchin, and Hirsova were withdrawn to Karasu, and those at Isagtchi likewise. It is asserted, on good information, that the Russians have marched the forces which they had in Bessarabia in the Principalities, in addition to the two divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry which they already had there. Another division, the 6th, had also arrived, so that their forces were considerably increased. Shumla being centre of the imperial army, and the most important place to defend, the troops in position have not been separated, but rendered compact, according to military practice. If the troops at Karasu were to be reinforced and a battle were to be fought, it would draw off the troops from the centre, which would not do. Neither would it be prudent to attack a powerful enemy with the forces only at Karasu. Those forces assembling at Karasu will be therefore directed upon the centre, and we will accept battle here. Mustapha Pasha has received orders to march on Shumla with his forces. A large force is being assembled at Shumla to meet the enemy successfully.

The troops have all assembled at Karasu from the different positions. The Russians came on from three different directions all at once, so that the troops in position had not time to succour each other. The troops in the battery at Tchatal Bournou beat the Russians off very courageously. At Toultcha, also, upon which the Russians marched eighteen battalions, there was a smart action. The Russians lost a great many men, and if our forces had been succoured the Russians would have been prevented from crossing the river.

Mustapha Pasha writes that the Sultan's orders are that the troops are not to engage until the English and French forces arrive, in order to justify his retreat. After making the necessary dispositions he had, therefore, retreated. He reports also that Colonel Selim Pasha, at Babadag, was about to arrive.

Selim Pasha writes that a severe action took place on Friday morning. The battery at Tchatal was destroyed and lost, but he does not know how, as the communications were cut off. We had a great many wounded in this action, and about two hundred men escaped from the battery. The Russians came on between Tchatal and Toultcha, on the other side of Gazla, with 15 battalions of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry, and 15 guns. The action was resumed at the head of the bridge, but our troops were too few to oppose to them, so they fell back on Babadag. The Russians had entered Toultcha with 15 battalions of infantry, about 12 guns, and a large body of cavalry. They had a large force and many guns on the opposite bank, likewise, and had commenced throwing over a bridge and sending on troops and ammunition.

Inclosure 2 in No. 98.

Declaration.

Bucarest, $\frac{\text{N. Style}}{\text{Feb.}}$, 1854.

(Copie.)

PAR la déclaration du $\frac{2}{14}$ Novembre de l'année passée, le Commandant-en-chef des troupes Impériales a fait connaître les dispositions prises, d'ordre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, au sujet du commerce et de la navigation des bâtiments neutres sur le Danube.

Actuellement, prenant en considération que la libre exportation des céréales, telle qu'elle a été pratiquée jusqu'ici, pourrait devenir préjudiciable, vu les besoins de l'armée et l'incertitude des prochaines récoltes, il a été jugé nécessaire de prendre les mesures suivantes:

1. L'exportation par mer, des ports de Valachie et de Moldavie, des céréales et de la viande est prohibée, à dater du $\frac{1}{13}$ Mars.

2. L'exportation des céréales et de la viande en amont du Danube, et par les frontières de la Transylvanie et de la Bucovine, étant moins importante et ne pouvant avoir les mêmes conséquences que celle par mer, est permise et ne subira aucune entrave.

3. Les régles établies par la déclaration du $\frac{5}{17}$ Novembre, 1853, sur l'obligation des capitaines de s'abstenir de toute communication avec la rive droite, sous peine de séquestre des bâtiments, devront être observées et maintenues dans toute leur étendue.

(Signed) PRINCE MICHEL GORTSCHAKOFF.

Inclosure 3 in No. 98.

Return of the Troops under the command of Omer Pasha on the Danube, exclusive of those in Bosnia.

(Translation.)

ONE HUNDRED and twenty-five battalions of Infantry of 800 men each, 100,000 men; 12 regiments of Cavalry (Regular and Redif) of 800 men each, 9,600 men; Irregular Cavalry and Infantry, 25,000; Field Artillery, 300 guns; Heavy Artillery, 60 guns; Gunners, 12,000.

The Artillerymen in the Imperial fortresses are not included in the foregoing number, constituting the Horse and Foot Artillery.

Inclosure 4 in No. 98.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

April 3, 1854.

(Extract.)

I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship, that three battalions of Infantry entered Varna about an hour ago. The total garrison is now 6,500; 700 are, however, detached in the outworks.

No. 99.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 152.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 5, 1854.*

ACCORDING to our latest advices from the seat of the Hellenic insurrection, the movement languishes in Epirus, and gathers strength in Thessaly. It appears that in both provinces the Turkish troops have fought with spirit, and, on the whole, with fair success, that the inhabitants are not of themselves prepared to raise the standard of rebellion, that without the invasion from Greece, they would be unable to make any stand against the Turks, and that, whichever party gains the ascendant, they are condemned to suffer most grievously both in property and in person.

I have called the Porte's attention to the importance of sending a further reinforcement of regulars into Thessaly, and its intention is to detach 3,000 men into that province with the least practicable delay.

For your Lordship's more complete information, I forward herewith either copies or extracts of all such despatches, bearing on the progress of the insurrection, as have reached me since the date of my last report on that subject, with the exception of those from Prevesa and Corfu, containing intelligence which must naturally arrive in England by a more direct route.

I cannot rest my thoughts for a moment on the embarrassing question to which they relate, without entertaining an anxious desire that Her Majesty's Government should enter without hesitation on the measures necessary for its settlement. Judging from the facts which have been brought to my knowledge, I conceive that nothing short of the most peremptory language, seconded by steps of a comminatory, if not coercive character, can restrain the Court of Athens and its unprincipled followers. Your Lordship knows best whether France is disposed to go the requisite lengths for that purpose; but the interests of the great contest, in which both Powers are engaged, appear to prescribe a decided course.

With respect to the proceedings in Thessaly and Epirus, the Porte is doing as much as can be expected, under the pressure of other and greater demands upon its resources. Its exertions may possibly succeed in preventing a further extension of the mischief, especially if a strong hand were to be placed on the fountain head from which it flows. But there are chances in favour of the adventurers who are throwing the country into confusion, and bringing down a weight of ruin upon its inhabitants; and these chances will increase and brighten in their imagination with every hour that yields them a continuance of impunity and a hope of ultimate success. It comes to me from every quarter that France and England are studiously declared by the leaders of the Hellenic enterprise to be favourable at heart to its progress; and certain expressions of sympathy, proceeding from the European press, have awakened misgivings at the Porte. It is highly important that such illusions should be extinguished; and nothing would more conduce to that effect than a decided interference at Athens, and a military co-operation with the Sultan's troops in the disturbed provinces. Such measures would contribute no less powerfully to the advantage of the Greeks themselves than to the preservation of Turkey, and the discomfiture of Russia. They would strengthen the title of Europe to demand an improved condition for the Sultan's Christian subjects, and they would tend to secure for England and France the twofold glory of successful war and practical humanity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 99.

Consul Blunt to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Larissa, March 28, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the new Governor of Larissa, his Excellency Ally Riza Pasha, has arrived, and most fortunately too, for he is a man of intelligence and energy. When all the boys and

members of the Council went to compliment him upon his arrival, he said to them:—

"I am surprised to learn that you are all so much alarmed; for my part, having found my old friend, the English Consul, at Larissa, I know there is nothing to fear, for he represents the nation, the Government of which is making every effort for the protection of the Sultan against a more powerful enemy; we must therefore meet present difficulties with calm resignation, till we receive reinforcements."

His Excellency also said:—"I must inform you that I admit of no distinction between Mahometans and Christians, and that any insult, however slight, to any of the latter, will be most severely punished; and I trust that you are all aware, that it is as much our duty, as it is to our interest, to protect the Christians from both injury and insult."

His Excellency's arrival has made a most favourable impression, and his measures fully confirm my reports of him upon my reaching this place, for some persons had led the inhabitants to believe that he was a tyrannical anti-Christian.

When I called upon his Excellency, he requested me to inform him as to the state of things in this town, but was most particular in his inquiries respecting the feelings of the Christians. I told him that they had no sympathy whatever for the insurgents, and that in all cases where they had joined them it had been under compulsion. His Excellency proposed sending persons to advise all the Christians who had joined the insurgents, that they were at liberty to return without fear of their being in any way molested. His Excellency complains loudly of the manner in which affairs have been conducted by Vassiff Pasha; and attributes the present unfortunate state of Thessaly to his bad system of administration. And I must say that his Excellency, in that respect, does not express erroneous opinions. His Excellency particularly requested me to delay my departure till the arrival of reinforcements, for my presence, and the influence which I have with both the Turkish and Christian inhabitants of these districts, insures a better feeling with both parties, which, unsupported as he is for want of troops, is of the greatest assistance to him. He frequently sends for me when there are meetings of the Council, and I invariably support his measures, all of which I have as yet found to be as sound in sense as good in policy. On one of these occasions, I availed myself of the opportunity to induce his Excellency to release all Christians from prison who had been confined by Vassiff Pasha under the plea that they had been giving bread to the Klefti. Many of these poor creatures had been confined four months, without any proof of the accusation being well-founded!

On Sunday last, the 26th instant, I was called in haste to the Konak, where I found all the Beys assembled with the Pasha, for a Tartar had arrived with the intelligence that Ally Agha, a Lalliott chief, with eighty men, had been made prisoners by Pappa Costa, in the vicinity of Armero. This chief had been ordered by Mehemet Bey, Miralie, to attack the insurgents at Platana, though it was certain they would be defeated. The Beys were in a perfect panic; but the Pasha did all he could to tranquillize them, and I supported his Excellency, by telling them to bear in mind, that if Her Majesty's Government, with that of France, sent such imposing forces to support the Sultan against the unjust demands of Russia, it was ridiculous to suppose that those two Governments would allow Thessaly to be taken by a band of Klepti, whilst we were sitting at this meeting. Another Tartar arrived form Calafoni, bringing intelligence that Abbass Agha had again defeated the insurgents. The attack was ordered by Zemil Pasha, who was to have supported Abbass Agha. The latter gave his opinion that it was better policy to keep on the defensive, owing to the deficiency of their forces; but his opinion was not heeded, therefore as ordered he commenced the attack with his irregulars when, instead of being supported by Zemil Pasha and Mouridin Bey, both the latter withdrew their troops, leaving the brave old Lalliott with his men and a few Nizams, to defend themselves as they could. Abbass Agha lost three of his best officers and several of his men. It was well that the insurgents retreated to the mountains, for nearly all the supply of the cartridges of the irregulars was expended, and the Agha sent direct for a fresh supply, for Zeimel Pasha sends him such as are not suited to the Albanian guns,

I hope that your Lordship will allow me to recommend Abbass Agha for

favourable mention to the Porte, for as yet he has with his men kept the insurgents in check at Calafoni, and really merits a distinctive mark of the Sultan's approbation; but I fear that he will not be able to hold out much longer, unless reinforcements arrive, for the number of the insurgents increases daily, and as the snow diminishes the number will be greater.

This day advices have been received from Armyro, that Ally Agha with his eighty men has been released by Pappa Costa. Ally Agha is the nephew of Abbas Agha, and when Pappa Costa was driven from Greece and residing in Thessaly, he received much kindness from the old Lalliott chief. Upon his meeting Ally Agha he embraced him, and told him that he was free to return with his men, for he did not make war against friends, and friends too to whom he was under so many obligations. The authorities are also informed that most of the Christians of Aymero have left with their families and gone to Volo.

Advices have likewise been received of an attack made by the insurgents, in which they were defeated, on the 25th instant, at Fenir. Also that another band of 150 had attacked and taken eight Turkish villages, in the district of Chataljah, likewise that the Derbent of Domoco is in possession of the insurgents. The son of Blackhava has appeared with fifty men in the vicinity of Descata, but it is hoped that they will be defeated by the Christians of that place and Hasha; for the latter have written to the Mudir of Turnova to say that they will do their best, either to kill or capture Blackhava and his men.

It is to be regretted, my Lord, that reinforcements do not arrive, for the danger daily increases; and as far as I can judge, an extra force of less than 8,000 men will not be sufficient to check the insurgents from getting possession of Thessaly. It is impossible to obtain a correct estimate of the forces of the insurgents; but from all that I can learn, I am inclined to the opinion that there cannot be less than from 10,000 to 15,000 men, between Agrafa and Platana, the last town, or rather large village, upon the most eastern frontier. The plan of the insurgents appears to be, to get possession of all the mountain passes, and thus have Thessaly in their power.

I hear of no enormities; but they decapitate all their own men who are killed, that the heads may not be taken by the Turks, and exposed, as they suppose they would be.

The Beys of Larissa, many of whom are wealthy men, will not, under present circumstances, come forward to give the least assistance to the Porte, although they well know that most of the irregular troops are in a state of insubordination from having nine months' pay to receive.

The Pasha has no funds, and cannot raise any, except, I believe, about 50,000 piastres from the Christians.

The party of Hagji Hussein Pasha has got up a petition to the Porte, begging that he may be sent to Thessaly. That was set on foot by Moolah Shefick Bey, whom I mentioned in my last despatch. I can assure your Lordship that if Hagji Hussun Pasha returns to Larissa, the consequences will be most fatal, for the Christians will then fly the country.

I have just received the inclosed, to the address of Commander Spratt, and as it is the reply to his letter to Croni Basdeck, I opened it. I will not attempt a translation; but it will, I think, satisfy your Lordship how the insurgents make the name of Her Majesty's Government serve them to carry out their plans.

I am of opinion, my Lord, that Zeniel Pasha should be immediately removed and recalled, for he is not a military man, neither is he respected by his men. And he is a man of too anti-Christian feelings to carry out the benevolent views of the Porte. I wrote and told him that I should report his conduct to your Lordship. It is also necessary, my Lord, that an efficient Caimacan be sent to Volo, for the present man is not only unfit, from fear and want of activity, but is seldom sober. He was formerly the secretary of the Capudan Pasha, who took the Sultan's fleet to Egypt, and gave it over to Mehemet Ali. The irregulars at Volo continue their depredations in the villages, and there is hardly a church that has not been plundered by them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHAS. BLUNT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 99.

Letter from Volo.

(Extract.) *Volo, March* 29, 1854.

I HAVE just arrived at Volo, but you must excuse my writing, as my eyes are almost destroyed by the effects of the sun and snow.

I merely wish to rectify some statements which appear in my letter of the 25th instant.

The first is, that Armyro was not burnt, but a village within a short distance called Backlavee, but Armyro is now blockaded by near 5,000 Greeks. An Austrian cutter just having arrived, with a friend of mine who speaks English, and he states that the Greeks have given notice to the Turks to quit in twenty-four hours; but before this time can elapse Her Britannic Majesty's ship "Highflyer" and the French steamer "Gomer" will be with them in that place, having left here this morning together.

My letter of the 25th is substantially correct, with one exception of fire, but now I give you the names of the principal leaders; viz., Nako Panovia, 1st; Papa Costa, 2nd; Grezano, 3rd; Cara Yorgi, 4th; Kronia, 5th. And also further additions daily arriving, and the whole province of Ghoova is now in the possession of the Greeks.

Also Demika is surrounded by Greeks, and will soon be taken unless the Turks are active.

Agrafa is also in great trouble from the revolutionists. Nureddin Bey writes from Curditsa to his son in Volo with great fear, directing him to listen, and put himself under the protection of myself and Gazotre.

Mr. Blunt not yet arrived from Larissa, and will not be here for several days.

All the Christians in Volo have shut up their magazines, and gone to the villages.

The Greeks are certainly deceived; reports have been spread amongst them that England and France were supporting them, and from this view the Grecians at Ipero were going ahead with great glory under this false impression; but when the news came that English troops had arrived at Prevesa, it had the contrary effect, and now they are in a dilemma, because they see England and France must keep up their contract with Turkey.

Again another messenger, stating the whole of Agrapha in the possession of Greece.

Inclosure 3 in No. 99.

Extract from a Private Letter from Volo.

Macrikeni, March 25, 1854.

A MESSENGER has just arrived with the following intelligence:—

The Greeks, about 600 in number, commenced their operations within five hours from Volo on Thursday, the 23rd instant.

Amalyopoli, you are aware, is the boundary of Grecian territory; four hours from this place there is a village called Platania, which they took possession of—the people quietly submitted; from this place they marched upon Armora, attacking the town. The Greeks were commanded by Captains Kronia, Akeleft Valencia, and Dupiot. The Turks and Albanians, about 2,000, commanded by Zeynel Pasha and Ismail Bey; the former had eight cannons and the latter twelve.

They commenced fighting at ten o'clock, and fought desperately with muskets for three hours, and then with sword for one hour and a half, when it was found that the Turks had lost 1,000 men and the Greeks only 80; they then set fire to the town, which consisted of about 2,000 houses; the remaining Turks then fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of the ruins. Armoia is a town situated about four hours from Volo, used as a skilly or landing-place for part of the Sandjack.

It is the general opinion that, unless some speedy aid be sent to the Turks in this quarter, they will have to take a final adieu of Roumelia. The 2,000

troops sent are men without discipline, and the Albanians are the same: the latter make the best robbers; every day we hear of these men committing thefts from the poor, and these are the men who should protect, which is one cause of the ill feeling against the Turks.

Mr. Blunt has not yet returned from Larissa, and if I can possibly get across on Monday I will do so, and give you all the information I can obtain.

The bearer of my letter saw from Meleos the flames and heard the firing, which convinces me that the statement is correct.

No. 100.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 20.)

Berlin, April 20, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

I AM informed that the Convention between Prussia and Austria has been just signed.

No. 101.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 150.)

Constantinople, April 6, 1854.

My Lord,

UNDERSTANDING from your Lordship's instructions, No. 123 of this year, that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to ratify the Tripartite Treaty concluded in this capital on the 12th ultimo, on behalf of Turkey, France, and England, I hasten to transmit herewith the original Treaty signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiaries of the Three Powers.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the term within which it has been agreed that the ratification should be exchanged. Of the six weeks prescribed for the execution of that requisite formality, twenty-three days have already elapsed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I also inclose the original of the Protocol which accompanied the Treaty. S. de R.

Inclosure in No. 101.

Protocol.

Constantinople, le $\frac{12 \text{ Mars}}{24 \text{ Février}}$, 1854.

LES Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France s'étant réunis aujourd'hui en conférence avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, à l'hôtel de son Altesse, les trois Représentants ont arrêté le présent Protocole pour constater ce qui suit:—

Les Gouvernements Anglais et Français ayant pris la résolution, pour le cas où la Porte Ottomane en exprimerait le désir, d'envoyer des troupes de terre pour aider Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à repousser l'agression de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, et ce désir venant d'être manifesté au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, par son Altesse Réchid Pasha, les trois Représentants ont arrêté d'un commun accord les Articles d'un Traité ci-annexé, qui a été signé par son Altesse Réchid Pacha et son Excellence Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, en vertu des pleins pouvoirs dont il sont munis. Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de France n'étant pas muni des mêmes pouvoirs, n'a pu signer le dit Traité pour le moment, tout en étant d'accord que les Articles stipulés dans cet Acte sont conforme aux intentions de son Gouvernement, et que l'arrivée des troupes Françaises en Turquie n'aurait lieu qu'après l'acceptation formelle du Traité par la Cour de France.

En employant d'un commun accord la langue Française pour la rédaction du Traité précité, les Représentants n'ont voulu préjuger en rien les cas à venir.

Son Altesse Réchid Pacha ayant proposé de laisser le susdit Traité ouvert à l'accession de toute autre Puissance amie qui désirerait y adhérer, les deux Ambassadeurs se sont engagés à soumettre cette proposition à leurs Cours respectives.

Fait en triple pour un seul et même effet.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.
BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS.
RECHID.

No. 102.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 161.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 6, 1854.*

THE Act of Parliament (59 Geo. III, cap. 69) inclosed with your Lordship's circular of March the 10th, was brought for the first time on that occasion to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Embassy. It so happens that, notwithstanding the frequent applications addressed to me by British subjects desirous of entering the Sultan's service, I have never given a certificate for that purpose. Since the receipt of your Lordship's circular, I have given notice of the Act to every candidate for employment in the Turkish army; and the responsibility must lie with those who, in contravention of its enactments, may enter that service without a license under the Sign Manual, or by Order in Council or Proclamation.

If your Lordship instructs me to prevent any subject of Her Majesty from entering the Sultan's service without the legal license, I shall, of course do what depends upon me to give effect to the instruction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 163.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 10, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith are copies of such further despatches as have passed between Admiral Dundas and myself since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to call your serious attention to the contents of a despatch addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, under date of the 23rd ultimo, and inclosed herewith in copy. Mr. Brant is apprehensive of disturbances at Smyrna during the Greek Easter, and requests that one of Her Majesty's ships, under your command, may be stationed there for the discouragement of those who are violently disposed, and for the protection of Her Majesty's subjects, and their property, in case of need.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 103.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Baljik, April 6, 1845.*

I HAD the honour to receive, this day, your Excellency's letter of the 3rd instant, No. 52, with its inclosure, from Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, and I acquaint your Excellency that I am unable to detach any more vessels from my squadron beyond the Dardanelles, or to station a vessel at Smyrna, as requested by Mr. Brant as a precautionary measure.

Her Majesty's ships and vessels now employed on the coasts of Greece, and in the Archipelago, and the ships of war of different nations now at Smyrna and the vicinity, will, I imagine, suffice to keep the peace in that quarter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS

Inclosure 3 in No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, April 4, 1854.*

I HASTEN to send you the accompanying telegraphic despatch, which has this moment reached my hands. As it appears all but certain that we are at this moment in a state of war with Russia, I feel some anxiety for the situation of Her Majesty's Consuls at Odessa, Galatz, and Ismail. I cannot, however, doubt that, together with our commercial shipping in the Black Sea, they will be objects of your solicitude. Mr. Yeames, our Consul-General at Odessa, is an old man, and on that account more particularly liable to feel the want of safe and commodious means for leaving his post.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, April 6, 1854.*

INFORMED that two or three men-of-war might be so placed near Varna as to command the ground where operations are likely to be carried on by the Russian forces against that fortress, I have made it a point of duty to learn whether the Porte would be disposed to detach a portion of her naval force for the supposed object. Having obtained an affirmative answer from the Captain Pasha, I wish to know whether the suggestion falls in with your views, and if so, what number and kind of vessels would be desirable for the purpose. In the event of your seeing any decided advantage in stationing a Turkish squadron of large ships off Varna now that the fine season is coming on, and thereby leaving the combined fleet more at liberty to operate with efficiency elsewhere, I am inclined to think that the Porte would acquiesce in your opinion, and act accordingly.

You will oblige me by a reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, April 6, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to request your attention to the accompanying letter, addressed to me by an Ionian merchant, and stating that the British vessels laden with grain, also British property, are detained by the Russian authorities in the roadstead of Odessa.

The letter is in Italian, and there is not time to translate it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 103.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *off Baljik, April* 7, 1854.

My Lord,

AS it will be necessary that a squadron, under Sir Edmund Lyons, should visit the coasts of Georgia and Circassia as soon after the declaration of war as possible, I have to request your Excellency will inform the Turkish Government that, if a steamer under their flag cannot be spared to accompany the combined squadrons under the Rear-Admiral, officers (either military or civil) may be appointed to embark in the French or English steamers, to enter into some arrangements with the Circassians, so that the services of those people may be made available against Russia, and if they should require powder, &c., we may have an opportunity of assisting them, as well as coming to an understanding on what parts of the coast attacks might be made in concert with them during the summer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 7 in No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, April 8, 1854.

Sir,

THE Porte has received a telegraphic message of the 29th ultimo, from its Minister in London, announcing that war had been declared by Her Majesty against Russia.

No direct intelligence to that effect has yet reached me from the Earl of Clarendon.

The Porte is embarking three battalions of regulars for Varna, in steam-vessels of burden, returned from Varna.

Five battalions more of regulars are starting to-day or to-morrow by steam, for Volo. Two of the steamers detached on this service are to go on to Tripoli, where they will embark two battalions, and land them at Prevesa.

All the steam-vessels employed on these services, are to return to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 8 in No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, April 8, 1854.

Sir,

I NEED not send you Her Majesty's declaration of war against Russia, as there cannot be a doubt of your own despatches containing it.

The following points of intelligence can hardly fail to interest you.

General Ferguson has been ordered to proceed with 4,000 men from Malta to Gallipoli.

4,000 men were to be embarked from England immediately in steamers, and come straight to this country.

The remainder of the army, whether at Malta or in England, will be sent on as quickly as possible.

There is good reason to believe that by the middle of April, or very soon after, 20,000 French will be in this country.

It is presumable that the advanced guard, with General Canrobert, is included in that amount. You are aware that the English advanced guard, under Sir George Brown, is at Gallipoli, together with the French, under General Canrobert.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 9 in No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, April 9, 1854.

Sir,

I LEARN from the Commander of the "Banshee" that the "Niger" went away without a part of your correspondence from England, and my last despatch to you.

As Commander Reynolds, when I saw him to-day, was inclined, under an impression of duty, to go on to you with the despatches thus left behind, I encouraged him to do so, conceiving that the declaration of war might possibly be among them. As a consequence, however, of his departure, we shall be left without the presence of the British flag, both here and on the Bosphorus, until some other of Her Majesty's ships may happen to arrive.

For communication with England, to-morrow, I have the ordinary messenger at my disposal, and, I believe, the French steamer, which takes him on board, will go by way of Malta; but there is no vessel for communication with you or with Varna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 104.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 166.)

Constantinople, April 10, 1854.

My Lord,

SIR GEORGE BROWN has apprised me of his arrival at Gallipoli with the advanced guard of Her Majesty's army.

It appears from his letter that some alterations had been made, by what authority he knew not, in the trace of the fortifications advised by Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel Ardant, and also that he apprehended difficulties as to a sufficient supply of water near the proposed position.

I have written, at his request, to Brigadier General Tylden, suggesting the expediency of his going down to confer with Sir George Brown at Gallipoli; but I fear that the state of General Tylden's health will not permit him to leave the Bosphorus at present.

For your Lordship's information I inclose herewith, in copy, two despatches addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles respecting the arrangements made there, and also at Gallipoli, for the accommodation of the troops.

As it is presumable that the whole army, with the exception of 3,000 or 4,000 men, will come to Constantinople in the first instance, I have obtained barrack room, with hospitals attached, for the whole, or nearly the whole, number, close to the suburb of Scutari, on the Asiatic side of the southern entrance to the Bosphorus.

Mr. Commissary Smith is in possession of all the information that I can give him with a view to collecting provisions for the use of the troops on their arrival.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 104.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Gallipoli, April 6, 1854.

My Lord,

SINCE I last had the honour of addressing your Excellency, I returned to the Dardanelles in company with Lieutenant Wrottesley, of the Royal Engineers and Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General Thompson, for the purpose of examining the accommodation which might be made available both for troops and stores, and which had been prepared, under my inspection by the Turkish Government.

Immediately after our arrival, we examined the quarantine establishment at Nagara, which we found in a tolerable good state of repair. We have therefore recommended on account of its healthy position, and many other reasons, that the lazaretto which will hold 500 patients very comfortably, be used as the principal hospital for our troops stationed in this neighbourhood. We have also recommended that the lazaretto stores, which are perfectly safe from fire, and will hold several thousand tons of stores, be used as the principal depôt for the Commissariat department.

The water communication between Nagara and Gallipoli, will render the transport to and from, between the two places very easy.

Neither the Assistant Commissary-General nor the Lieutenant of Engineers being, however, authorised to do so, and as it was evident that if I did not interfere, the French officers would have soon appropriated for their service every available store and house in Gallipoli, I have taken upon myself the responsibility of requiring the Turkish Commission to place the whole of the Greek quarter of Gallipoli, and all the lazaretto buildings at Nagara at my disposal until further orders.

We were about to inspect the quarters prepared at the Dardanelles, and the neighbouring villages for the reception of our troops, when I received information that the steamer "Golden Fleece" with the first battalion of the Rifle brigade and two companies of Sappers had passed the forts during the night for Gallipoli, I therefore lost no time in returning to this town, and placed myself at once in communication with Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, who is in command of the division.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 104.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Gallipoli, April 7, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING placed myself in communication with the General Sir George Brown, I had done all that has been required by him at my hands, to facilitate his arrangements for landing with all possible dispatch the troops and stores

brought here by the "Golden Fleece." By means of the efficient co-operation of the Turkish commission, the troops will encamp this evening at Boulair, and the "Golden Fleece" being cleared, also of the Commissariat stores, will be able to start on the morning of the 8th instant, on her return to Malta.

French steamers of war have been almost daily arriving here with troops from France and Algeria.

In addition to the "Christophe Colomb" and "Africain," already reported to your Lordship, the steamers "Canada," "Albatros," "Salamander," "Marocain," and "Pluton," have also arrived here, so that altogether about 2,300 French troops are now encamped in this neighbourhood.

They consist of detachments of Artillery, Chasseurs à pied, Sappers, and Zouaves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

No. 105.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 167.)

Constantinople, April 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the substance of a despatch from Ahm Pasha, at Kalafat, concerning a demonstration made by the Russians against that place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 105.

Substance of the Despatches from Ahmed Pasha, at Kalafat, to Omer Pasha, March 30, 1854.

ON Thursday, 9th of March, two Russian battalions of Infantry, three regiments of Cavalry, five or six hundred Cossacks, and some Artillery, advanced upon Kalafat from different directions, to within a distance of two gun-shots, as if to attack it. A body of their Cavalry having approached to within gun-shot, we opened our fire and killed six or seven men. The enemy withdrew without attacking, after five hours.

No. 106.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 191.)

Foreign Office, April 21, 1854.

My Lord

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph in Mr. Consul Calvert's despatch to your Excellency, of the 30th ultimo, of which a copy is inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 156 of the 5th instant, I have to state to you that, if you should think it expedient to do so, you can convey to the Greek Bishop of Gallipoli the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the offer he has made to place his own residence at the disposal of the officer in command of Her Majesty's forces.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 107.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 193.)

Foreign Office, April 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings and the advice which you have given to the Sultan's

Government, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 149 of the 4th instant; and Her Majesty's Government have learnt with great satisfaction the disinterested and patriotic offer of Omer Pasha, communicated to you in Captain Simmons's letter of the 29th of March, which reflects the highest credit upon him, and gives him a fresh title to the confidence of his sovereign.

I have to instruct your Excellency to express to Captain Simmons Her Majesty's Government's approval of his conduct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 108.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 215. Confidential.)

Berlin, April 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 83, inclosing the copy of one marked No 67, "secret and confidential" of the 25th ultimo, from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm, in which Mr. Grey reports a conversation which he had held with the Crown Prince of Sweden, as to the means that might be employed to induce the King of Prussia to depart from his wavering policy.

Your Lordship has been pleased to desire that I would communicate to you any observations I might have to make on this subject, and I should have replied sooner to your instructions, were it not for the uselessness of making any calculations as to what the King of Prussia is likely to do, for he may have one opinion to-day and one entirely opposite to-morrow. His wish is evident enough, and the events which have taken place at Berlin during the last two months, have proved that His Majesty's wishes anything rather than to quarrel with the Emperor of Russia. His Majesty desires in reality to be neutral, and circumstances alone will force him to change his policy: one half of his Government supports this opinion, but the other half feels the impossibility for a great power like Prussia to be inactive in the approaching struggle.

The Court are all, I may say, in the interests of Russia, and hence the wavering conduct of the King, who is first impelled in one direction by Baron Manteuffel, who desires to see Prussia take that honourable part in the war which becomes her position, and no sooner is HisMajesty brought round to his views, than a few hours afterwards the Russian party at Court undo all that has been effected by the Minister President, and I apprehend that the King's feelings are successfully worked on, first through his dread of Russia, and next through his want of confidence in the means possessed by England and France to effect the objects they desire to attain by the war.

He believes it, in fact, to be impossible for us to make any serious impression on Russia without the aid of Germany, and is persuaded that if Germany were to unite cordially with the Western Powers, that Prussia would be the country to suffer most from the vindictiveness of the Emperor Nicholas.

The policy of this country, however, is not exactly neutrality, for the King desires to retain for himself the character of mediator and peace-maker; neither is it dictated by a sense of what is just or right or dignified, but by a terror of a powerful neighbour and of the revenge which will some day be inflicted on Prussia, if she departs from her present pusillanimous system.

As to the means which the Crown Prince of Sweden seems to think could be successfully employed in bringing the King of Prussia to adopt a more decided policy, I suspect that His Royal Highness is but imperfectly acquainted with the very vacillating character with which we have to deal.

There is no doubt but that a promise given by England and France that the Kingdom of Poland should not be re-constituted might have a momentary effect on his Prussian Majesty and remove the apprehensions of revolution in that direction, whilst on the other hand he might be alarmed if we threatened him with the re-establishment of the monarchy if he did not unite with us; but I am not of opinion that such language at the present moment would have any other effect than to drive him towards Russia, or make him more decided in his endeavours to maintain a neutral position.

A threat of blockading the Prussian Baltic Ports would, I also believe, do more harm than good. The King knows full well how easily this could be done at the present moment, and the act itself would set public opinion completely against us.

With reference, however, to the question of the possibility of the re-establishment of the Polish Monarchy, and to the King's opinions on this subject, I have availed myself of an opportunity which lately offered to allude to this question in conversation with Baron Manteuffel, and on my asking how His Majesty felt about it, and if, as had been reported to me, he clung seriously to the continuation of the present order of things in Poland, his Excellency replied that he did not imagine the King had any settled opinions on the subject, and he believes that His Majesty cares very little about any of his own Polish Possessions except the fortresses, which he of course would require for the line of defence of Germany against an attack from the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 109.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 217. Confidential.)

Berlin, April 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship to-day by the telegraph that the Treaty which has been for some time under negotiation between Austria and Prussia has been signed.

Since sending off that despatch I have had a few minutes' conversation with Baron Manteuffel, but was unable to learn from his Excellency anything of importance connected with this Convention beyond what I have already reported. He said that the two Governments engaged to guarantee the territory of the other from all aggression pending the duration of the war; that Austria would have full liberty to take whatever steps she pleased to force the Russians to quit the Danubian Principalities, and that the Two Powers would immediately call upon Russia to evacuate them, and that if she refused they would take into consideration the means which would become necessary under such circumstances, and that Austria would then, he believed, march into these Turkish provinces.

His Excellency added that, by a secret article, the negotiation of which had caused the great delay in terminating this affair, Prussia binds herself to hold 100,000 men in readiness for the defence, if necessary, of the Austrian frontiers.

General Hess left Berlin for Vienna this evening, and has promised that not a moment shall be lost in preparing the Austrian Ratification which the Prussian Government desire to have exchanged for theirs as soon as possible, in order that a communication on the subject may be made to the German States.

Baron Manteuffel mentioned to me, in confidence, that he had a most dreadful scene at Charlottenburg yesterday when he went to take the King's final orders on the Treaty, and that when he considers all the influences which were opposed to the completion of this document, he is surprised that he should have obtained His Majesty's consent to it. This, however, he said was no sooner obtained than he was set upon by the Queen, and attacked in so violent a manner by Duke George of Mecklenburg for having recommended the adoption of this measure, that the King was obliged to interfere and take up M. Manteuffel's defence.

I mention this circumstance to show how incalculable are the King's acts. It is only a few days since he refused to give his consent to one of the articles of this Convention to which he now agrees, and now His Majesty appears to have been obliged to come forward to defend his Minister against attacks from other quarters for the advice he had given on the subject.

This last proceeding proves the difficulty and uncertainty which attend all negotiations with the Court of Prussia in consequence of the public manner in which these important matters are discussed, and the many influences which can be brought to bear against the King.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 110.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 533)

Paris, April 22, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT HATZFELDT appears to have made another attempt yesterday to induce the French Government to open further negotiations at St. Petersburgh for the yet pacific solution of the Eastern question, such overtures to be founded on the old story of the evacuation of the Principalities by an early day in May, the evacuation to be followed by the retreat of the allied squadrons from the Black Sea and internal waters of Turkey, and Conferences to be established for the purpose of securing the civil emancipation of the Sultan's Christian subjects.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that France had already on two occasions addressed the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in the sense suggested from Berlin, once in a most friendly, and another time in a more peremptory form. Neither of these overtures had succeeded, and France could not now make a third attempt, as if ashamed or afraid of the position in which she found herself. Besides which, the Prussian proposition offered no guarantee for the future. What was there to prevent Russia renewing at any moment the game she was playing to-day?

Sebastopol was within thirty-six hours of Constantinople; Bessarabia and Turkey touched.

What security was there against future Russian aggression when Turkey was left alone and unprotected?

The Four Powers had recorded at Vienna their reprobation of the conduct of the Emperor of Russia. Prussia, by becoming the mediator for Russia, destroyed the effect which this unity of opinion might otherwise produce. It was the hesitation of the German Powers which had, in his opinion, been the indirect cause of the war which they now deprecated, and it depended again upon them to determine whether the war should be confined to the East, or be spread throughout Europe.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then turned the conversation on the Convention which had been signed lately between Austria and Prussia, and said to Count Hatzfelt that he did not wish to betray any indiscreet curiosity—that if this Convention related solely to Austrian and Prussian interests he had no right to expect that it should be made known to him, but that if it had reference to the Eastern question, he must say that a concealment of its provisions was a bad return for the confidence which France and England had reposed in the German Powers, they having communicated to the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin every engagement which they had taken as soon as such engagement had been contracted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 111.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 539.)

Paris, April 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to apprise your Lordship that the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and France, signed in London on the 10th instant, was promulgated in the "Moniteur" of this morning. M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated to me that he had previously ascertained that your Lordship had no objection to the publicity thus given to this important document.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the "Moniteur."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys inquired of me yesterday whether your Lordship proposed giving equal publicity to the Tripartite Treaty signed at Constantinople on the 12th ultimo. He himself desired that it should be promulgated. I presume, however, that this cannot be done until the Ratifications have been exchanged.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 112.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 147.)

Vienna, April 21, 1854.

My Lord,

THE official Gazette this evening announces the signature yesterday at Berlin by General Hess of the Treaty between Austria and Prussia, and in an official article on the subject, states that this Treaty is a further confirmation of the adherence of these Two Powers to the Protocol signed by the Four Powers at Vienna on the 10th instant, and that when the proper moment arrives they will come forward with that active co-operation with the other Powers which from the present state of things it seems likely that circumstances will require.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 113.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 224. Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, April 22, 1854.

My Lord,

SINCE I had the honour of addressing to your Lordship my despatch No. 208 of the 15th instant, Chevalier Bunsen has tendered his resignation.

Baron Manteuffel has just expressed to me his great regret and annoyance on this subject, and has informed me that Chevalier Bunsen has communicated his intention in a manner which has seriously offended the King.

I asked his Excellency whether there might not be some misapprehension, and whether the door might not be left open for explanations. He replied that the King was so excited when he spoke to His Majesty, that he had thought of ordering Chevalier Bunsen to come immediately to Berlin, and have him tried before a tribunal. That Chevalier Bunsen had declared that he should be able to justify his conduct by the publication of documents; that it was his intention at the same time to take care that nothing appeared in print which would implicate the character of his Royal Master, for whom he must ever entertain the highest respect and veneration.

Baron Manteuffel went on to state that Chevalier Bunsen's conduct had been extraordinary beyond all explanation, and that he had now written that he would cease to carry out the instructions that might be addressed to him, expressions which had naturally produced a most unfortunate effect on the King.

I observed that it was impossible so devoted a servant as Chevalier Bunsen could have meant any disrespect to his Royal Master, and that the matter might calm down in a few days, and something occur which would enable him to place the matter in a different shape before the King. Baron Manteuffel rejoined that he wished it might be so, but to make things worse, he had just seen a telegraphic message from London, dated to-day, which had been received by a commercial house at Berlin, reporting the resignation of Chevalier Bunsen, and that consequently the intelligence would be in the newspapers to-morrow.

I endeavoured to impress on Baron Manteuffel the necessity of taking measures to prevent Chevalier Bunsen leaving his post; that at the present moment this intelligence would have the worst possible effect, and would be looked upon not only in Germany but throughout Europe as an indication of a change of policy in the Prussian Government, and to be the result of Russian intrigue, and would perhaps be deeply regretted hereafter.

His Excellency feels all the inconvenience of Chevalier Bunsen's proceedings, but sees no means of applying a remedy at this moment and in the present temper of the King, who is evidently deeply offended by his Minister's conduct, and I may add, that the Sovereign of this country does not admit that his servants have any right to resign, and considers such proceedings as acts of treachery on their part.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 114.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 227. Confidential.)

Berlin, April 22, 1854.

My Lord,

I ALLUDED again in the course of conversation this evening with Baron Manteuffel to the Austro-Prussian Treaty, which was signed here on the 20th instant, when his Excellency told me that as soon as the Ratifications were exchanged, which he expected would be done next week, it would be communicated to the German Governments, but that the Treaty would not enlighten them much as to the consequences which were likely to follow from the engagement which had been entered into by the two great German Powers, as the Secret Articles, which would not be published, were the important parts of the Convention. His Excellency told me that by these Articles it was agreed that 40,000 Prussian troops should be concentrated in East Prussia, having their head-quarters at Konigsberg, and that 80,000 men would be placed in the Duchy of Posen, and that more troops would be concentrated on other points if necessary. That this was done not for the purpose of threatening Russia with any attack on her territory, an appearance of which it was thought advisable by Austria as well as Prussia to avoid at the present moment; but he said that he believed it was the intention of the Austrian Government to concentrate an army in a position which would enable her, on the expected rejection of the summons to be addressed to Russia to evacuate the Principalities, at once to march into Wallachia, thus obviating the necessity of any movement on Servia.

I understand that it is anxiously desired by both Governments to avoid war being declared by Russia, which would naturally follow any invasion of her territory, but that if a collision took place between the two Imperial armies in the Principalities, and war were declared by Russia against Austria, Prussia would consider such declaration as directed equally against herself.

With regard to the communication to the German Governments, Baron Manteuffel has already addressed a circular to them announcing the fact of the conclusion of this Convention, and that it will shortly be made known to them, and I understand from some of my German colleagues that they are not satisfied with what has been told them on the subject by his Excellency, and that they regret the precipitation which, in their opinion, has been shown in this matter, and which is likely so soon to bring Germany into war.

Baron Manteuffel has also mentioned in reply to a question which I addressed to him that there is no present intention of making any communication to the German Diet on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 115.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 230.)

Berlin, April 22, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 99 of the 18th instant, I have this evening spoken with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the Prussian Consul-General's proceedings in the Danubian Principalities; and inquired whether it were true that he had crossed the Danube with the Russian troops.

His Excellency said it was perfectly true that Baron de Mensebach happened to be at Ibraila when the passage of the river was effected, and that some of the Russian officers having asked him to witness the engagement that was about to take place, he had accompanied them across the Danube.

Baron Manteuffel said he had done this as a piece of bravado, and for no other purpose; that he had given an account of the proceedings of the Russians on this occasion, and had not depicted them in a very favourable manner, and described the state of the Commissariat to be very discreditable. That further, Baron de Mensebach had again urged the necessity of his leaving the Principalities, that he had refused to hoist his flag again at the Consular residence at Bucharest, though earnestly requested to do so, and had given such an account of the state of things in the Principalities, that orders would be immediately sent to him by telegraph to retire from them altogether.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 116.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 550. Most Confidential.)

Paris, April 24, 1854.

My Lord,

I FIND from Count Hatzfeldt, whom I saw this morning, that the conversation which he had a few days ago with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the substance of which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 533, was occasioned by the communication to the French Foreign Minister of the despatch written on the 8th instant by Baron Manteuffel to General de Rochow, for the knowledge of the Russian Government, which the Chevalier Bunsen had also some days ago brought under your Lordship's notice.

Count Hatzfeldt told me further, that having had an opportunity of showing this despatch to the Emperor, he had asked His Majesty whether he thought that any good could result from it, and that the Emperor had replied, that all these expedients were now too late; that no peace was, in his opinion, possible, until actual warfare had taken place, and that no peace could be made which would not, by its stipulations, prevent a renewal of the aggressions of Russia for the future. "But," said Count Hatzfeldt to His Majesty, "such stipulations can only be obtained when Russia is completely beaten. A long war will be required to arrive at that point." "I know it," replied the Emperor, "and the war will probably be a long one."

I mention this circumstance because the language of the Emperor appears to have made a great impression on Count Hatzfeldt. He said that he had never known His Majesty so stiff, so reserved, and (although courteous to himself personally) so uncourteous in his tone towards the policy of the Prussian Government; and he argues from it, that the Emperor has made up his mind—now that all his efforts to preserve peace have been made in vain—to follow up the war with as much energy and vigour as the means at his disposal will admit of.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 117.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 408.)

Foreign Office, April 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 533, that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the opinion expressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Hatzfeldt, on the impossibility of making any fresh overtures for peace to the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 118.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 409.)

Foreign Office, April 25, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency states in your despatch No. 539 of the 23rd instant, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had informed you, with reference to the publication in the "Moniteur" of the Military Assistance Convention of the 10th instant,

that his Excellency had previously ascertained that I had no objection to the publicity thus to be given to that important document. Count Walewski spoke to me upon the subject, and I distinctly asked him that the Convention should not be published in the "Moniteur" until Her Majesty's Government were able to lay it before Parliament; but Count Walewski told me, much to my regret, that his Government could not wait so long.

With regard to the Tripartite Treaty, signed at Constantinople on the 12th instant, I have to acquaint your Excellency that publicity cannot be given to that document until the Ratifications are exchanged.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 119.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 26, 6 P.M.)

Berlin, April 26, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE King of Prussia has accepted Chevalier Bunsen's resignation. This intelligence was conveyed to him this morning by telegraph, with the request not to mention it until he received the communications which are to be prepared. Count Bernstorff has been summoned from Naples; his political bias is anti-Russian.

No. 120.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 181.)

Constantinople, April 15, 1854.

My Lord,

A DESPATCH which I received to-day from Captain Simmons, at Shumla, confirms the impression which I had previously entertained, of the comparatively quiescent state of things in Bulgaria and the Dobrudscha. A copy of it is inclosed herewith.

I learn to-day from the Porte that Omer Pasha has recalled to Shumla the troops which were stationed at Tartukai, Sistova, and Nicopoli, on the Danube. The Turkish Ministers appear to be surprised by this retrograde movement, and to entertain some doubts of the motive which has caused it. It is a natural conjecture that the Pasha feels the necessity of concentrating a larger force at Shumla.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, April 9, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 1st instant, and to inform you that Omer Pasha desired me to express to your Lordship his acknowledgments for the manner in which you have been pleased to express your readiness to meet his confidence with a corresponding sentiment.

His Highness was much pleased to hear that his intentions with respect to Shumla and the Dobrudscha, agree with the impression which your Lordship has derived from military officers observant of what is passing on the theatre of war, as also that 20,000 of Her Majesty's troops are already at Malta.

Since writing my former despatch, reporting the events which had passed on the banks of the Lower Danube, at the time of its passage by the Russian forces on the 23rd ultimo, I have been enabled to obtain some details, which I believe to be more nearly accurate than those before stated by me, and which will, no doubt, be interesting to your Lordship.

Before proceeding with them, I would beg to observe that it is a matter of extreme difficulty to arrive at the truth respecting such matters. The conflicting statements of individuals who partook in these operations, combined with the imperfect reports at first received, render it very difficult to arrive at the truth.

It appears now that the Russians attacked at three points only, namely, Pothashi, which is about an hour and a half in distance below Matchin; Galatz, and Ichatal Bournu, about one and a quarter miles above Toultcha.

The Turkish force at Pothashi, appears to have consisted of three battalions of Infantry, with three guns of position and three field guns. The attack was made soon after daylight commenced. The Russian force is stated to have consisted of five battalions of Infantry, and was supported by a flotilla of eleven gun-boats and one steamer.

A part of this force, with three field-pieces, was landed, and attacked the position, but was driven back by the fire from the Turkish battery with considerable loss, leaving their guns in position. These guns being protected by the fire of the flotilla, the Turkish troops were not able to capture them, and they remained for three hours between the fire of the combatants, in the possession of neither. Night put an end to the contest, and, although the Turks had been reinforced by a battalion sent from Matchin, they were obliged to retire in consequence of the passage which had been effected at Galatz. They brought with them all their guns, ammunition, &c.

A battalion of Turkish Infantry was posted in front of Galatz, but of course retired when the forward movement of the Russians was made.

At Ichatal Bournu, a battery had been constructed upon a small island separated from the mainland by a narrow branch of the Danube, across which a bridge had been thrown. This battery was armed with three garrison guns and three field-pieces, and was occupied by a battalion of Infantry.

The Russians advanced against this position at break of day with considerable force, said to amount to thirteen battalions of Infantry, supported by fourteen gun-boats and two steamers, which were divided into two divisions; a part firing upon the battery from a position higher up, and the remainder from a position lower down the stream. The defence appears to have been most obstinate, and to have lasted until night. The result, however, was that the troops in the battery had their retreat cut off, and were nearly all either killed or taken prisoners. Another battalion which was on the mainland opposite the island, in support of the battery, also suffered much. The guns within the battery, six in number, fell into the enemy's hands. The total loss in these engagements appears to have been about 500 killed or taken prisoners.

The loss on the part of the Russians, and the precise amount of the force engaged, and of that which crossed the river, is not known.

It appears, however, that since that period up to the last advices which Omer Pasha has received from the Dobrudscha, the Russians have not advanced beyond Babadagh, but are still occupied in intrenching their position on the right bank of the Danube.

From what I am informed of the nature of the banks of the river and the adjoining ground, I should be led to conclude that the position of the Russians covering their bridge, will be very strong.

The greatest part of the troops from the Dobrudscha have now arrived at Shumla, excepting three battalions, which his Highness has directed upon Varna as a reinforcement for its garrison and to secure that place, and some cavalry which are in the neighbourhood of Hajji Oghlu Bazarjik, for the protection of the inhabitants from the ravages of the Tartars and Bashi-Bozouks, who are retreating from the Dobrudscha.

It is to be regretted that these latter, who are altogether useless and undisciplined, have been sent in such numbers to this country. They are of little or no use against the enemy, and are most injurious to the inhabitants of the country in which they act. There are scarcely any crimes, if the unanimous reports of the fugitive inhabitants are to be believed, of which they have not been guilty; robbery, rape, and even murder. They bring discredit on the army of the Sultan, and cripple its movements by exhausting the resources of the country, and tend to engender feelings of hostility against the Sultan's Government among the population.

This disorganized rubble, for they cannot be called soldiers, with the excep-

tion of a few contingents from Asia, which are more disciplined, ought to be withdrawn, and it is much to be hoped that the Sultan's Government will take immediate steps to withdraw them before the arrival of the auxiliary forces, for if the allies should advance, and this rabble follow in their wake, they will assuredly bring discredit upon the allied armies, and upon their cause.

Upon hearing of the atrocities committed by the Bashi-Bozouks, I took an early opportunity of speaking to Omer Pasha upon the subject, and he fully concurred with the views above expressed as to their uselessness, with the exception of some few, and he feels the difficulties in which they place him and his army, both as to reputation, and the exhaustion of the resources of the country.

Upon my observing to him that it appeared to me absolutely necessary that an example should be made of those of them against whom any flagrant crime could be proved, and that they should be executed, his Highness informed me that some of them had been captured, and would be severely punished by beating.

This punishment is sometimes carried to the extent that death ensues, but there appears to be a great objection on the part of the Turkish Government and, I am informed, of the Sultan personally, to the punishment of death. Omer Pasha does not therefore feel himself authorized to order the execution of these miscreants.

I would observe that, under these circumstances, it appears to me most desirable that orders should be issued by the Government at Constantinople to the effect that all offenders charged either with rape, murder, or ill-treatment of the inhabitants, should be brought before a tribunal, before which, if the charge be proved, they should for either of the first two offences, suffer death, and, for the latter, such other punishment as the tribunal should award, subject to the approval of the generalissimo.

Such a system would relieve the generalissimo of all suspicion of cruelty or personal animosity, and would have a very beneficial effect.

The publication of the views of the Government upon the subject, would, I have no doubt, tend much to check the evil.

It cannot, however, be put a stop to without sending the whole body, with the exceptions before alluded to, to their homes. This, again, cannot be done with safety, unless they are disarmed.

His Highness informed me confidentially that it was his intention to do this, but as it is a delicate measure to undertake, it will require caution, and some little time must elapse before he can venture upon it.

In the meantime he assures me that he has done all that he can to cure the evil, having detached some cavalry to patrol the country for the protection of the inhabitants, and having given strict orders upon the subject. Your Lordship will observe that this increases unnecessarily the fatigue of the soldiers, and tends to render them and their horses less fit to meet the enemy than they otherwise would be.

In my despatch No. 3 of March 29th, I did not state the strength of the battalions of infantry, as I had not then sufficient information to enable me to form a very correct estimate. Omer Pasha considers them as averaging 750 effective. I should be inclined, however, to estimate them rather less; the Line battalions at 500 and the Redifs at 700. These latter, however, vary very much, and my estimate may possibly not be accurate. For the present I should be inclined to consider the average of the whole at 600, but I hope shortly to be able to give a more accurate estimate.

At present the troops here are much occupied in strengthening the fortifications, and the opportunities of seeing them together are rare.

The new fortifications in course of erection, or about to be erected, will add very materially to the strength of this position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. E. SIMMONS.

No. 121.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 237.)
My Lord, *Berlin, April 26, 1854.*

INTELLIGENCE having been received by Baron Manteuffel from Vienna that orders had been sent to the Russian forces in Little Wallachia to march eastward, and various reports having been current here as to the object of this apparently retrograde movement, which, in the belief of some persons, was dictated by an intention to avoid a collision with the advance of an Austrian army in that direction, I have inquired of his Excellency what impression he had received from this report. He replied that he believed the object of this movement was to strengthen the Russian forces that were advancing to the attack of Silistria, which he understood was to commence, under the direction of Prince Paskiewitch, on the 29th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 122.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 238. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, April 26, 1854.*

THE Prince of Prussia has been using all his influence with the King to bring about a reconsideration of M. Bunsen's case, and had hoped until to-day that means might have been devised to prevent His Majesty accepting his resignation. I understand that the Prince suggested that the correspondence of M. Bunsen which had given rise to the difficulties should be submitted to M. Alvensleben, a person, in His Royal Highness's estimation, of upright character, and who would be likely to give an honest opinion on M. Bunsen's proceedings. The King consented to this, and, unfortunately, M. Alvensleben has sent in a report which confirmed the King in his original impressions, for he winds up his examination of the correspondence by stating that M. Bunsen had far outstepped the limits of his instructions, and had been endeavouring to carry out a policy which he must have known was not strictly in accordance with the wishes of the King and his Government.

Such is the result of this unfortunate examination into M. Bunsen's conduct, which was communicated to-day to the Prince of Prussia. His Royal Highness was much grieved at it, but he was still in hopes, this morning, that means would be found to accommodate matters. The King's decision, however, was irrevokably taken on learning the result of the investigation; and it is now, I apprehend, useless to think of any alteration in the resolution which has been communicated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 234 of this date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 123.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 209.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 28, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 181 of the 15th instant, inclosing a report, dated the 9th instant, from Captain Simmons, at Shumla, I have to state to your Excellency that the recommendations of Captain Simmons as to the orders which should be sent from the Porte respecting the Turkish Irregulars appear to Her Majesty's Government to be very judicious.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 124.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 169.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 12, 1854.*

ACCORDING to our latest advices from Varna, of the 10th instant, no striking change had taken place on the theatre of war.

The Russians were not advancing in the Dobrudscha. They were understood to be rather engaged in securing the positions which they had already occupied.

The Turkish army, still concentrating at Shumla, is described as amounting to 40,000 men. It was likely to add 10,000 more to its numbers. The regular cavalry was called in from Kalafat.

That position was still maintained by the Infantry; but a very considerable mortality prevailed among the troops.

At Pravadi, which fronts one of the principal passes of the Balkan, between Varna and Shumla, four battalions of Infantry and 1,000 Irregular Cavalry are stationed, according to the information received by Colonel Neale.

The money sent from here to pay up the arrears of the army, at least in part, had reached Varna in safety. The garrison of that fortress amounts now to between 8,000 and 9,000 men. Twelve transports had arrived there with guns and stores. Measures also were in operation for getting in grain from Kustendji, whence most of the inhabitants had fled, dreading the approach of the Russians almost as much as the presence of the Turkish Irregulars.

Much difficulty is said to be experienced in collecting provisions for Shumla, where, however, it is believed the supplies of grain and flour are by no means deficient.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 125.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 171.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 14, 1854.*

ON the 9th instant I received despatches from Sir Henry Ward and Mr. Saunders relative to the state of affairs in Lower Albania. An earlier report from the latter had encouraged me to hope that the plan of proceeding ordered by the Porte, under my advice, had produced a salutary effect, that the inhabitants of the disturbed district were gradually returning to their duty towards the Sultan, and that the sympathizers from Greece, though not expelled from the country, were held in check. The subsequent advices from both represent the disastrous events which had ensued, the injudicious conduct of the Turkish authorities, and the destructive outrages perpetrated by the Irregular troops in league with the barbarous mountain tribes from whom they derive their origin. They also brought to my knowledge the afflicting consequences of so much imprudence in one quarter, and of so much atrocity in another, leading by natural sequence to a revival of the insurrection and an increased pressure on the resources of the Porte. I spare your Lordship a repetition of particulars which have, no doubt, been transmitted by the direct channel to Her Majesty's Government.

Immediately on receiving the intelligence I went over to Reshid Pasha, and I sent at the same time both to the Sultan and to the Grand Vizir, requiring of each and of all that a special council should be assembled on the ensuing day, and that effective measures should be forthwith taken, not only for redressing the special crimes committed in Albania by the Irregulars, or Bashi-Bozouks, but for putting a final stop to the excesses of those barbarians in every part of the empire.

Satisfactory answers were given to this remonstrance. The Sultan issued an order agreeably to my demand, and his Ministers, the Grand Vizir and Reshid Pasha, undertook that a Council should be summoned without delay.

Next morning I sent in a paper repeating the substance of my complaint, and specifying the measures of redress which I thought indispensable. Of this paper a copy is herewith inclosed for your Lordship's information.

The Council was assembled at the time expected, and the measures I proposed were adopted. Inclosed herewith is M. Pisani's report, which he submitted to Reshid Pasha before he sent it to me, and which, as M. Pisani assures me, received His Highness's unqualified approval.

It remains for the Porte to give effect to the decisions of the Council in a determined and imposing manner, nor shall I be contented with anything short of a full measure of redress, and the utter extinction of an evil which can no longer be tolerated with any degree of prudence and humanity.

Your Lordship may be assured that I had not waited for the afflicting incidents in Albania to urge the importance of abating so great an evil as that of the Bashi-Bozouks. My remonstrances had been repeated to satiety; but owing to the inherent difficulties of the case, every assurance of redress had remained little more than a dead letter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 125.

Memorandum.

THE British Ambassador is inexpressibly grieved by the intelligence which reached him yesterday from Prevesa and Corfu. He has already stated orally to the Ottoman Secretary of State the circumstances which constitute that intelligence, and he now sends extracts of the correspondence containing particulars in support of the general statement. In point of policy as well as of humanity, the atrocious outrages perpetrated by the Albanian Irregulars under Haireddin Bey, and the Turkish tribes in connection with them, are calculated to rouse the strongest feelings of indignation. Whole districts laid waste, forty-six Christian villages burned, many of their inhabitants slaughtered, their cattle taken away, their women violated, their children led into captivity. —such are the barbarous facts ascertained upon the spot by a British naval officer, who risked his life to verify the statements which had been submitted to him. These inhuman acts have been committed, not by a foreign enemy, but by subjects of the same Sovereign and by neighbours living previously on amicable terms with their victims. They have been committed in defiance of the Sultan's Commissioner, and almost in presence of His Majesty's allies, on a population threatened by the Greek insurgents on account of the loyal and peaceable behaviour which they continued to maintain, and at a time when the endeavours to raise an insurrection in the country were checked by the temperate and conciliatory measures which, together with military assistance, had been adopted by express orders from the Porte.

It is well known that the savage cruelties practised by the Bashi-Bozouks in Epirus are also practised throughout the empire wherever these creatures of infamy are collected and wherever they pass. Facts in proof of this assertion have been repeatedly submitted to the Porte, and promises of justice have been as frequently given by the same authority, which has not sought to conceal the horrors complained of, and which must admit that the Irregulars are as dangerous to the Sultan's armies as to the peaceful rayah subjects whom they trample under foot.

Their measure of wickedness is now full. Justice must have its due. The Sultan's allies have a right to demand it. They cannot send their fleets and armies to fight in His Majesty's cause, and give their countenance and support to the measures adopted by the Porte for the restoration of tranquillity in disturbed districts, without incurring a deep share of the responsibility attaching to crimes such as those which are recited above. The Governments and people of Christendom must alike feel the indispensable obligation of not being made to appear as accomplices in the commission of such atrocities. The Porte must show by its acts, and the honest enforcement of adequate remedial measures, that it redeems the pledge which it has given, and exerts its authority

with good faith and energy as well for the suppression of the evil as for the punishment of the offenders and the indemnification of the sufferers.

The British Ambassador expects that the present day will not come to a close without a meeting of the Council, and the adoption of suitable measures directed to those objects.

First, with respect to the particular calamities inflicted on the inhabitants of Paramithia and other adjacent districts, orders must be sent forthwith to proclaim the Sultan's reprobation of what has occurred, to seize and punish the guilty, particularly those well known Agahs, who are mentioned in the accompanying papers, to arrest and send to Constantinople such others as are justly suspected of conniving at their crimes, to recover and restore to their respective owners all of the plundered property that still remains among the plunderers or those who have purchased it from them, to provide a sufficient indemnity for that portion of the plunder which cannot be recovered by an assessment on the tribes which received it, and for the prevention of further outrages, to establish rural guards, properly selected, under responsible leaders, and supported by such of the regular troops as can be spared for the service.

Secondly, with respect to the irregular soldiery in general, it is of paramount urgency that His Majesty the Sultan should proclaim his determination to repress their outrages, and place them in that degree of order which is necessary for them to co-operate with his regular troops and the forces of his allies, giving authority to his generals to punish summarily by court-martial on the spot every act of insubordination or violence against his peaceable subjects, and making their chiefs and the regular officers under whom they are called on to act, responsible for any remissness in the execution of his commands.

Justice at the same time requires that those irregulars who are employed in His Majesty's service should be sufficiently and regularly paid. It will also be necessary that arrangements be made by the respective Commanders-in-chief for watching over their conduct, controlling their predatory movements, and protecting the towns and villages or other dwelling places near which they have to pass. Above all, it is desirable for the Sultan's service that their numbers should be reduced, or, if possible, that they should be dispensed with altogether.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 125.

Mr. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, April 10, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING communicated and left with Reshid Pasha a translation into Turkish of your Excellency's memorandum respecting the atrocious outrages committed on the inhabitants of Paramithea by the Bashi-Bozouks or Irregulars, I have the honour to report, that I am informed by his Highness that the Ministerial Council which assembled to-day with a view to deliberate on the measures to be adopted for the restoration of the plundered property, and the punishment of the offenders, and also for the future prevention of the savage cruelties practised by those barbarous people throughout the country, they came to the conclusion suggested by your Excellency, namely, that orders should be sent forthwith to Fuad Effendi to cause the guilty parties to be apprehended and punished without loss of time, and that he should arrest and send to Constantinople such others as are justly suspected of conniving at their crimes; to recover and restore to their respective owners the whole of the plundered property, and if the property could not be recovered in toto to provide an adequate indemnification for that portion of the plunder, by an assessment on the tribes. This applies to the occurrences at Paramithea.

With regard to irregular soldiery in general, it was decided by the Council that a firman or Imperial order should be addressed to the military as well as to the civil Pashas, giving them authority to punish summarily by court-martial on the spot any act of insubordination or violence against the peaceable subjects of the Sultan. This firman will be published. Besides, the Commanders-in-Chief

of the two armies, in Asia and Europe, have been instructed to place the Irregulars under the controul of officers belonging to the army, who are to be held responsible for any remissness in the execution of their orders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

Inclosure 3 in No. 125.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, April* 8, 1854.

THE pillage and disorder committed by the fugitive Tartars from Dobrudscha, and by the Bashi-Bozouks in the district of Bazardjk, and to the northward of Baljik, continues to occasion the utmost panic among the inhabitants. In the immediate neighbourhood of Varna, the Tartars have carried off cattle, and the road even between this and Baljik is invested with the marauders. The inhabitants in many instances have abandoned their villages, and a large number of carts arrived here yesterday from Bazardjik, bringing the merchandize and effects of the shopkeepers and other inhabitants. About forty or fifty Turkish families have also arrived here from the neighbourhood of Toultcha from Isakcha and Matchin, as also most of the Turkish authorities of those places.

At Kustendjee the inhabitants have fled, and I hear that two wounded children of three years and fifteen months old were taken off the shore at that place on board Her Majesty's ship "Firebrand," by Captain Parker; the fate of their parents is as yet unknown. At this place (Kustendjee), I am informed that a considerable quantity of wheat is reported to be abandoned in the magazines belonging to the Government. The Turkish authorities might probably easily adopt measures to ship and save this grain for the public service.

At Baljik the panic and fear of being assailed at night by the bands of Tartars who are traversing the country has been so great, notwithstanding the presence of the fleets, that the inhabitants have packed up all their merchandise and effects, and are prepared to leave immediately for Varna and Constantinople, unless some protection were afforded to them. The Pasha and Council of Varna, after seriously deliberating upon this state of things, decided upon sending two companies of Infantry to Baljik from Varna, and they left this yesterday in the French war-steamer "Cacique."

Admiral Dundas informs me that he had landed some Marines at Baljik, for the protection of the watering parties from the fleet; but the Admiral observes that he could not interfere with the police of the place, and thought that a few Turkish soldiers would be useful in pacifying the inhabitants; and in such an event as the sudden appearance of the Russians in that quarter, the Admiral says the fleet would take them off.

Having heard that many of the fugitive Tartars were making their way to the Balkan by the road of Pravodi, together with all their plunder in cattle, &c., I yesterday addressed a letter to his Highness Omer Pasha mentioning this fact, and submitting to his Highness the practicability of sending a few squadrons of Cavalry in that direction, to cut off their escape, and to retake the plunder with which they are laden. I also represented to his Highness the serious inconvenience of the present insecure state of the road between Varna and Baljik, by which the land communication with the fleets was rendered difficult and dangerous; so much so, that the couriers were afraid to go on that road. I acquainted the Pasha of Varna with what I had written on these subjects to his Highness, and I hear this morning that the Pasha of Varna, having been informed last night that a party of Tartar families had arrived at the river Kamchee, about five hours to the southward of this, with upwards of 3,000 oxen, the greater part of which they had plundered on the road, immediately sent three companies of troops to seize them, and it is thought they will succeed in doing so.

Profiting by the disorders committed by the Tartars and Bashi-Bozouks, some gipsies attempted to carry off the cattle of the peasants in the immediate vicinity of Varna; but they were seized by the Bulgarian peasants, and brought into Varna, where they have undergone severe punishment. I am also informed that five Tartars were arrested here yesterday evening.

In some of the Bulgarian villages, assailed by the Tartars and Bashi-Bozouks, I am told the inhabitants armed and defended themselves, and I hear that near Isakcha, the Bulgarian peasants have attacked and massacred the Turks of some neighbouring villages.

At Toultcha it is reported the Greek bishop went out with great ceremony to meet the Russians as they entered.

If any doubts existed hitherto as to the course the Bulgarian Christians would adopt upon the approach of the Russians, the unhappy incidents which have occurred since the passage of the Russians across the Danube, and the atrocious conduct of the Turkish Irregulars are well calculated to remove those doubts. The crimes perpetrated by these marauders during many months, it may certainly be expected will now recoil upon them; as also, unfortunately, upon the peaceable and respectable Turkish inhabitants, whenever the opportunity is afforded to the Bulgarian Christians by the close vicinity of a Russian force.

Sufficient time has not yet elapsed for us to ascertain what measures his Highness Omer Pasha has been enabled to adopt to suppress the disorders committing in the district of Bazurdjik by the Tartars and Bashi-Bozouks, and which is producing a state of things which his Highness will doubtless not fail to observe, will probably hurry on the operations of the Russians in this province.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 126.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 175.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 15, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the continuation of my correspondence with Vice-Admiral Dundas.

I beg to call your Lordship's attention to the report sent in by Commander Fatham, of Her Majesty's steam-ship "Fury," as inclosed with the Admiral's despatch dated yesterday, and also to the information respecting Sebastopol and Odessa, transmitted therewith. I avail myself of the same opportunity to bring under your Lordship's notice a memorandum received from the Captain Pasha, and part of a report from Mr. Pisani, both being in answer to applications made by Her Majesty's Embassy in compliance with suggestions from the fleet, and shewing an unqualified disposition on the part of the Turkish Ministers to act under advice with respect to affairs in the Black Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Baljik, April 5, 1854.*

WITH reference to the following paragraph of your Excellency's letter to me of the 21st March last, No. 43, viz.:—

"Knowing the importance which you very justly attach to the correctness of data as grounds of judgment in matters of official business, I beg to inform you, as the result of special inquiries at the port that 500,000 kintals, equal, I believe, to about 27,000 tons of coals are actually in a state of readiness at Heraclia."

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that from actual inspection made by Commander Spratt of the "Spitfire," there are at present at Heraclia only about 650 tons of coals, of which 450 tons are of bad quality.

At the pit's mouth at Kosloo, about sixteen miles north-east of Heraclia, there are also about 9,000 tons of good coals ready for shipment, when the weather will admit.

I inclose for your Excellency's information a copy of the valuable report made to me by Commander Spratt, on his late visit to Heraclia and the coal districts, and I shall be obliged by your Excellency's obtaining an order from the Ottoman Government, that such of Her Majesty's steam or freight vessels presenting themselves either at Heraclia or Kosloo, may be supplied with coal of the best quality as pointed out in Commander Spratt's report.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 126.

Remarks upon the Anchorage off Heraclia.

THE bottom in Heraclia Bay is clay under sand, affording good holding ground, but it is not a safe anchorage against a west and north-west gale, unless anchored well-up in the bay, between Cape Baba and the ancient Mole, so to obtain some shelter from those winds.

The south-west gales seem not to blow home, or to bring a sea that would endanger a vessel well found in cables and anchors. The light over Cape Baba is visible eight to nine miles distant.

(Signed) T. SPRATT.

Remarks on the Roadstead of Kosloo.

THE accompanying survey of the roadstead of Kosloo will sufficiently show it to be only a summer anchorage. The traders resort to it in May for the shipment of coal, anchoring to the north-east of the valley, so to get better shelter from the point, the wind being in general to the east of north-east. The bottom is sand under twelve fathoms water, and mud and sand in deeper water, with this plan the lead will be a sufficient guide for anchoring, or the extreme West Cape kept open of Alepo Point will lead to a good berth at a quarter of a mile from the shore. But to expedite the embarkation of coal, a nearer berth may be taken. During the month of May the coast is sometimes subject to north-north-east gales, which on one occasion caused the wreck of eight or nine vessels. During June, July, August, and September, the coast is said to be perfectly safe. The locality is best disinguished by the houses near the shore, there being no other village or similar settlement on the whole coast between Heraclia and Amostros; and the land about it presenting no remarkable object; the coast being generally bordered by high bold mountains covered with forest.

(Signed) T. SPRATT.

Inclosure 3 in No. 126.

Commander Spratt to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1854.*

1. I HAVE the honour to report my return from the examination of the coal mines in the vicinity of Heraclia, and to communicate the following facts connected with them.

2. Coal is found in almost every valley opening to the sea, from about five miles north-east of Heraclia, as far as Amastros, and at distances of from one-quarter to three miles from the shore.

3. In several of these valleys parties of Croats have for ten or twelve years been employed in working the coal seams, cropping out on their sides, and as some of the valleys contain as many as seven or eight seams, good and bad, these have been indiscriminately worked, until a want of capital and skill have obliged them to abandon these localities for others nearer the surface, this coal being unskilfully worked from the worst part of the seam, and much exposed before shipping, reached Constantinople in a greatly deteriorated condition, as well as being of an inferior quality, through mixing the coal from several seams.

4. The chief locality for good coal is at the valley of Kosloo, about sixteen miles north-east of Heraclia, where the Turkish Government have an establishment, under the direction of two civil engineers, Messrs. Barkley, who are in receipt of a good salary, with an advantage in addition in proportion to the quantity of coal obtained. At this time four Englishmen, miners, belong to the establishment as foremen to the native workers, besides which are some Poles and Hungarians, and a few Servians and Bosnians.

5. The natives employed are Turks from the neighbouring villages who are forced to work out their by from fifty to sixty days labour at these mines. They are consequently obtained with great difficulty, quit upon every opportunity, and labour with no interest, the foreigners employed being the only men paid by the Turkish Government, and this only at intervals of three, six, or nine months.

6. In this valley of Kosloo there are no less than nine seams of coal, but only four are at present worked. The thickest of these seams is eighteen feet, and the least about three feet. Some of them would not pay to work, and those now worked have only a portion of their coal good. A tram-road leads from all these mines to the shore at Kosloo; the extremity being carried out upon the east point of the bay, so to enable boats to be under eight or nine shates, and receive the coal direct from the trucks. According to the statement of the engineer and director, Mr. Barkley, 300 tons can be shipped per day, weather permitting.

7. Some of these mines penetrate 300 or 400 yards into the mountain.

8. Under these skilful engineering and mining operations, the Director, when supplied with them in sufficient number, is enabled to procure, on an average per month, 2,500 tons from the four Kosloo mines. This amount he can ensure even with the present means at his command, and for a period of three years; thus averaging from the Kosloo mines only about 30,000 tons of good coal per annum.

9. At the present moment there is lying adjacent to the railway in the Kosloo Valley, about 9,000 tons of coal in three or four heaps at the pit mouth. Twenty-five tons of coal was shipped in Her Majesty's steam-ship "Spitfire" from these heaps, taking a portion from each, of what is technically termed, "picked near the pit's mouth."

10. The coal of the three heaps have a close resemblance to each other, and in the furnace, whether for steaming or economy, have no appreciated difference; the whole being very like Newcastle in weight and appearance also.

11. The result of the trials of coal from each pit or mine, as given in the Engineer's report, after nineteen hours steaming, on the first grade, with both boilers, shows that the Kosloo coal is equal to the very best Newcastle coal, having a loss of about seven per cent. only in clinker and ashes.

12. The chief engineer of "Spitfire" reports that the coal used from the heaps when "unpicked" would not show a loss more than from eight to ten per cent., the whole being in general large and excellent coal.

13. Thus, there is lying at Kosloo ready for shipment, 9,000 tons of coal equal to good Newcastle, and, if shipped into steamers direct from this valley, would suffer little or no diminution of its value; but, as the quality of the coal is of a delicate and friable nature, it easily crumbles into small fragments, and would lose much of its value on being often trans-shipped and long exposed to the air; which is the condition that a great portion of it reaches Constantinople. The coal has been worked on the Kosloo mines at a cost of as little as six shillings per ton, but, as the mine is frequently allowed to be idle for want of a supply of candles from the Government, and the absenting of the forced labourers, the renewing of the operation brings the average cost to ten or twelve shillings per ton. Last year the coal was sold by the Turkish Government at seventeen shillings per ton at Kosloo, and one pound per ton at Heraclia, to which place it is trans-shipped at the depôt and residence of the Turkish director of the mines, who is also the governor of the place. And as in this trans-shipment it is liable to be mixed with the inferior coal also sent there from the mines worked by the Croats, it is, therefore, more likely to be of much less value at Heraclia than at Kosloo; but at the latter place it can only be shipped in fine weather, or with southerly winds, whilst at the former it can be shipped at all times; it is, therefore, most desirable that the coal supplied to our ships from these mines should be shipped direct from the Kosloo

valley, or selected from the coal heaps stored at Heraclia by one of the engineers, Messrs. Barkley, who have offered their services, through me, for such a purpose, to prevent the Government being imposed upon with the inferior Croat coal, as in the case of the "Triton," that very coal having been previously condemned by these gentlemen when lying at the mouth of the valley it was worked from, and by them reported to the Turkish Director at Heraclia as unfit for use. But as it is to the interest of this official to send to Constantinople as much coal as possible, the report of Messrs. Barkley was unheeded, and the coal on arrival not finding a sale at Constantinople, was finally handed over for the use of "Triton," on her application.

14. The importance of obtaining from these mines a coal to ensure "full speed" when necessary, induces me to dwell upon the above point, and to recommend the acceptance of the voluntary services of these gentlemen, under sanction of the authority, whenever Turkish coal is required by our Government.

15. At Heraclia there is at present only two parcels of coal, and one of about 450 tons and the other nearly 200 tons. The former is coal procured by the Croats, and of an inferior quality; the small parcel of coal is from a seam of coal recently opened by the Turkish Government, under Mr. Barkley, at about nine miles from Heraclia and one from the sea; thirteen tons and a half of this coal, and shipped at Heraclia by the "Spitfire," and found to be equal to that from the Kosloo valley. During the year 1853 about 50,000 tons of coal was exported from this district.

16. There was found lying at Heraclia, and moored in the bay west of the town, between 20 and 30 vessels from 100 to 150 tons, which are employed during the summer in the transport of the coal. Small caiques are so employed during the winter as weather permits, and bring coal to Heraclia from all the valleys' mouths, where it is piled.

17. Country vessels lie moored head and stern here during the whole winter, and are said to be perfectly safe from every gale, although exposed to some fetch from the south-west.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. SPRATT.

Inclosure 4 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Baljik, April* 8, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have, at my suggestion, directed me to be supplied with four anchors and cables for presentation to the Turkish Government as an acknowledgment of several gratuitous supplies furnished to Her Majesty's fleet in the Turkish waters. I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Baljik, April* 8, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to request your Excellency will urge upon the Turkish authorities the expediency of a large store ship or corvette, laden with coals, being stationed at Varna for the service of the steam-vessels employed on this coast.

This vessel could easily run over to Heraclia or Kosloo from time to time to replenish.

It is equally desirable also that coals should be sent as soon as possible to Sinope, where I have now only 350 tons for the use of the steamers on the coasts of Anatolia, Georgia, and Circassia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off Baljik, April 9, 1854.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of the 6th instant No. 54, I beg to acquaint you that having consulted with Vice-Admiral Hamelin relative to the employment of the Turkish ships of war, we are of opinion that a ship of the line and a frigate (drawing as little water as possible), and a small steamer, should be stationed under the guns at Varna.

One of the best steamers should accompany the squadron to the coast of Georgia, and with another steamer (not of much speed) attend to the combined squadrons, to bring up from Constantinople supplies, despatches, &c.

A frigate and steamer should run along the coast of Anatolia, calling at the coal fields, Sinope, Trebizond and Batoum, but not remaining more than three days at any one place.

When the communication is open with the Circassians, the Turkish navy may be employed to operate with them, but until then they should not extend their cruize beyond the coast of Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 7 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off Baljik, April 9, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency's letter of the 8th instant has just reached me, and I have the honour to acquaint you that this afternoon I received the official declaration of war against Russia, and shall act accordingly, in co-operation with Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

The reinforcements your Excellency mentions as having been sent to Varna will render that fortress secure, and I have not heard of any advance of the Russians in this direction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 8 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off Baljik, April 10, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my letter of the 6th instant, No. 87, I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the "Furious" did not communicate with Mr. Yeames at Odessa, as the boat carrying a flag of truce was fired at.

Having now received the formal declaration of war against Russia, I shall shortly make further inquiries into this matter.

I believe that the Consul at Soulina is now on board the "Sidon," at present cruizing along the coast from this bay to the northward.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 9 in No. 126.

Mr. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, April 13, 1854.

(Extract.)

AS regards the Turkish squadron both Reshid Pasha and the Capoudan Pasha are of opinion that the fleet ought to proceed to the Black Sea, and follow the suggestions of the Admirals and act under them. The number of

ships to be sent out, according to the list given to me by the Capitan Pasha, and which I beg to inclose for your Excellency's information are the following: namely, 9 sail of the line, 1 frigate, 3 brigs, 2 corvettes loaded with coal, 7 steamers, and 3 fire ships. The Admiral commanding them will be instructed to follow the advice of the Admirals of the combined squadrons.

Inclosure 10 in No. 126.

Memorandum.

LE Ministre de la Marine Impériale Méhémet Pacha a l'honneur d'informer son Excellence Lord Redcliffe, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, qu'ayant pris en sérieuse considération les demandes qui lui sont parvenues de sa part, par l'entremise de M. Pisani, a fait les dispositions suivantes :—

1. Le Ministre de la Marine a donné ses ordres pour que les bateaux, à vapeur, ou frégates de Sa Majesté Britannique, qui pourraient se présenter à Eraclée, ou à Kaslou, seront fournies de charbon de la meilleure qualité, l'agent que nommera Mr. Barkley peut en faire son choix sur les lieux.

2. Au lieu de tenir en stations à Varna, une grande corvette remplie de charbon dans la ville, et quatre navires, vont être chargés d'alimenter ce depôt continuellement.

3. Quatre ou cinq chargements de charbon seront immédiatement envoyé à Sinope, et mis à la disposition des flottes alliées, et on continuera à alimenter encore le depôt.

4. Deux millions de piastres ont été expédiées déjà à Kaslou, pour donner la plus grande extension possible à l'exploitation des mines; à Eraclée il y en a déjà un dépôt de plus de 40,000 tonnaux.

5. Pour faciliter autant que possible le transport du charbon dans les différents ports susmentionnés, un remorqueur à vapeur fut destiné à ce service spéciale.

6. MM. les Amiraux paieront le charbon au même taux que le Gouvernement Impérial paie pour ses propres services.

Le Ministre de la Marine portant à la connaissance de son Excellence Lord Redcliffe les dispositions susmentionnées, espère que le service du flotte en sera suffisament satisfait jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Inclosure 11 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off Baljik, April 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have directed Mr. George H. Mowbray, Her Majesty's naval agent at Galata, to collect and receive all despatches and letters for Vice-Admiral Hamelin and myself, and for the combined squadrons, and to forward them to the Black Sea by the vessels I have appointed for that service.

Her Majesty's Consul at Varna will always be informed of the point where the squadrons may most probably be met with.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 12 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off Baljik, April 10, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING received a very recent communication from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty relative to the great difficulty and expense there exists even in England at this moment in obtaining coals for Her Majesty's service, the sum of 5*l.* per ton having been demanded and paid for that article to be delivered at Constantinople, I have in my own name and that of Vice-Admiral

Hamelin to request that your Excellency will be pleased to urge the Ottoman Government to push on the mining operations at Kosloo with increased vigour, and with this view, should your Excellency deem it expedient, I am fully prepared to pay for all coals we may receive from time to time at such rates as may be considered just and reasonable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 13 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Baljik, April* 10, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letters of the 8th and 9th instant, No. 58 (Confidential) and No. 59, and to thank your Excellency for the information they convey.

The "Banshee" I have directed to return to Constantinople forthwith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 14 in No. 126.

Information obtained from the Master of a Russian Schooner, taken off Sebastopol by Her Majesty's Ship "Fury."

THE prize and her companion were bound to Kosloo to take in salt, and then to proceed to Odessa for provisions. The owner is a Russian, at Odessa; the master an Austrian, native of Cattava.

Four or five days ago five transports sailed from Sebastopol to St. Nicolai for provisions. Between Sievarna and Sebastopol town-point there are two chains, buoyed up by heavy timbers.

There are four Admiral's flags. The line-of-battle ships are in two divisions:—

Three three-deckers, three two-deckers, across the harbour.
Ditto ditto in dockyard.

All have sails bent, and are ready for sea. There are in all about thirty men-of-war, twelve being ships of the line, twelve steamers, and seven of these ready for service, the remainder frigates and smaller craft. Two of the steamers are said to be very fast.

The garrison is about 50,000, principally Artillery, and are exercised by day and by night with targets placed in the harbour. An attack by the combined forces is expected.

The two captured Turkish steamers are under repair, one at Sebastopol, one at St. Nicolai.

Two thousand heavy Cavalry have recently arrived, and four divisions are expected.

The large fort of Nicolaieska, mounting from 200 to 300 guns on the three tiers, appears the only land defence on the north.

The town of Sebastopol is surrounded on the south by walls and ditches.

At Odessa there are about 60,000 troops, and on the quarantine point there were lately ten heavy guns; the defences are since increased.

Osman Pasha, who was taken in Sinope, has quite recovered, and recently gone to Odessa. He was attended by four medical men. He receives great kindness, was frequently with the Russian Admirals, and on leaving Sebastopol in a steamer all the Russian ships manned yards.

In Sebastopol there is a passage on each side of the chain for merchant vessels drawing about ten feet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD TATHAM.

Inclosure 15 in No. 126.

Commander Tatham to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Her Majesty's Steam Sloop "Fury," off Baljik, April* 14, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that complying with your order to reconnoitre Sebastopol, and get information from any vessel I could capture, I got close in under the land north of that place at midnight of the 11th instant; at 4 A.M. of the 12th ran for the port; 5.30 saw two men-of-war, brigs, weighing, and two merchant-schooners coming out. Hoisted neutral colours, and proceeded easy to entrance: a Russian man-of-war's boat pulling out.

When I considered the outside schooner clear of the battery's fire, I put the engines at full speed, and making a quick turn ran alongside, and endeavoured to secure her, which her boom on the quarter prevented, and I was obliged to send a hawser by boat, and take out the vessel's crew, hoisting a blue ensign (Cape Constantine south-east by east).

In the meantime the Russian boat boarded the other schooner coming out.

At this time the two brigs-of-war were outside on our weather-quarter, with a strong breeze from the southward, also two frigates and a steamer at the entrance. I now proceeded full speed with fore and aft sails, and prize in tow.

Perceiving the frigates neared us, at 7.35 I cut the tow-rope. As frigates still neared, started water, and transported guns aft. "Fury's" speed 8½ to 9 knots.

At 8.40 brigs dropping; at 8.54 opened fire from stern-gun at weather-frigate, which she returned, hoisting mast-head flags. At 9.7, finding our distance increased, ceased firing.

Considering the position of the frigates, brigs and steamer, and expecting a sudden change of wind to the northward, so common in this sea (and which we had strong from that quarter in the afternoon), I did not risk my ship for the small amount of damage I might have done with my stern-gun.

At 11 the squadron gave up chase, tacked, and returned to Sebastopol.

The promptitude of my first-lieutenant enables me to possess, I believe, the first Russian flag taken in the Black Sea.

I inclose a statement of the information obtained from the master of the prize.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD TATHAM.

Inclosure 16 in No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Baljik, April* 14, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a communication I have received from Commander Tatham, of Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Fury." And I beg your Excellency will make known to the senior officer in command of Her Majesty's troops in Turkey, the intelligence gained as to the forces at Sebastopol and Odessa, although it is difficult to say what degree of reliance can be placed upon it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 17 in No. 126.

List of Turkish Vessels under orders for the Black Sea.

1	line of battle-ship	"Mahmoudié"
1	"	"Peyki Zafer"
1	"	"Mendouhié"
1	"	"Teshrifié"
1	"	"Peyki Messret"
1	"	"Nousvetigé"
1	"	"Djihad abad"
1	"	"Fayorun"
1	"	"Miftahi djihad"
1	frigate	"Bahiré"
1	corvette (coal transport)	"Ferak nousma"
1	"	"Djeyrani Bahree"
1	brig	"Djari Ferah"
1	"	"Shéref noumà"
1	"	"Saïka"
3		Fire-ships
18		

Steamers.	
"Feizi Bari"	1 three-decker
"Mouhliri Sourour"	8 two-deckers
"Medjidiyé"	1 frigate
"Saïki Shadee"	2 corvettes (coal-ships)
"Sheheer"	3 brigs
"Messiri Bahri"	7 steamers
"Peyki Tedjaret"	3 fire-ships
Total 25 vessels	

No. 127.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 176.)

Constantinople, April 15, 1854.

My Lord,

THE "Himalaya" arrived yesterday, with 2,000 of Her Majesty's troop on board, under the command of Brigadier-General Adams. They have landed this morning at Scutari, and taken possession of the barracks prepared for their accommodation.

It was not till after the arrangement had been made that I received information of Unkiar Skelessi having been designed in England for the occupation of the army. If landed at that place the troops must encamp; and the weather is still so uncertain, and was but yesterday so severe, that it may be found desirable to put them into barracks on their first arrival. Under this impression I shall endeavour so to direct the preparations, that Lord Raglan, on his arrival, may be able to make choice between the two stations of Scutari and Unkiar Skelessi.

I take this opportunity to inclose copies of such correspondence as I have exchanged with Sir George Brown, since his arrival at Gallipoli.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 127.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Gallipoli, April 10, 1854.

My Lord,

LAST night Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Vulcan," having on board the 44th regiment, and three Companies of the 50th, arrived here.

To-day the greatest part of the stores have been put on shore, and to-morrow the troops will be landed, and encamped at once between this place and Boulaïr.

Two French war steamers have also arrived in port, laden with troops, but I have not yet ascertained their names, nor the number of men on board, for I have been out all day with Sir George Brown, reconnoitring the country near Cavak, with a view to ascertain its capabilities for the encampment of troops.

The great deficiency of a supply of fresh water between this place and Boulaïr will render it absolutely necessary that a great part of the large bodies of English and French troops now expected to arrive here, be moved further on.

I return early to-morrow morning to the Dardanelles, as I have been informed that the buildings of the Lazaretto of Nagara which had been given to me for the service of the British army, have been demanded by the French General.

We allowed our allies to take possession of every available house in Gallipoli, without making any remonstrance because we depended upon the stores and other buildings at Nagara, which had been made over to me, with every wish therefore to be conciliatory, I shall not accede to the demand now made upon our resources, without seeing good cause for so doing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 127.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Gallipoli, April 11, 1854.

My Lord,

IT is only this morning that the letter addressed by your Lordship to the Commander of Her Majesty's land forces destined for Turkey on the 29th ultimo, has been sent to me from Malta, and I mention the circumstance lest you may have been surprised at not having received an earlier answer to it.

The delay which has taken place, you will observe, is of the less consequence, seeing that acting under the instructions with which I have been furnished by the Secretary of State, it would have been impossible for me to have complied with your Lordship's suggestion, or to have diverted the small force placed at my disposal from the specific service, for which it was destined without the express sanction of the Government, or the directions of the General Officer under whose orders I have been placed.

Immediately on the declaration of war, orders were transmitted to Malta to forward as many of the troops assembled there to this place, as they had the means of transport for, and accordingly the 44th and 93rd regiment, together with part of the 50th, have arrived in the course of yesterday and to-day, and have landed and gone into camp in the neighbourhood

As the amount of force is increased, we shall be more and more cramped for store rooms, magazines and hospitals in this poor place, but the greatest difficulty it seems to me, will consist in an inadequate supply of water as the season advances, when I am led to believe, nearly all the small streams on which the troops now mainly depend for their supply will be dried up.

The reports, however, from the proposed fortified position, are rather more favorable in respect to the supply of water, and I am induced to believe we might now employ a brigade on the works on the left of it without subjecting the troops to any great inconvenience on that score.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BROWN

Inclosure 3 in No. 127.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown.

Constantinople, April 13, 1854.

Sir,

I AVAIL myself of Mr. Wellesley's departure from Gallipoli to reply to your despatch of the 11th instant, from which I learn that you are not at liberty under your instructions to bring up the troops under your command to Constantinople.

Such being the case, it is more satisfactory to learn, according to the latest advices from Varna, that the Russian army is not advancing into Bulgaria as quickly as might have been expected.

Circumstances are, nevertheless, of such a character on the theatre of war that, although I am not yet acquainted with the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, I apprehend that the presence of a large auxiliary force at some nearer point to it is becoming daily more desirable.

Under this impression, confirmed by other considerations, I have obtained from the Turkish Government for the use of Her Majesty's army the most convenient and roomy accommodation in barracks that Constantinople affords, and I have encouraged the Commissary to provide in other respects for the contingency of its sudden arrival.

My latest unofficial letters from England lead me to expect that a large portion of the Infantry will come out straight to Turkey by steam, and a portion at least of the Cavalry will traverse France in order to embark in a Mediterranean port. If so, a few days will probably suffice to determine the place of their disembarkation. I need not add how important it is that I should receive the earliest intelligence of their more immediate approach, or of the certainty that they are not to come here for the present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 127.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Gallipoli, April 13, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to apprise your Lordship that, by an intimation which I have just received from the Duke of Newcastle, it would seem now to be the intention to limit the force of British troops to be landed at this point to 5,000 men, and that I have accordingly received his Grace's directions, after the arrival of the next two regiments from Malta, to send on the rest of the troops as they successively come in to Unkiar Skelessi, then to disembark.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BROWN.

Inclosure 5 in No. 127.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown.

Constantinople, April 15, 1854.

Sir,

YOUR letter of the 13th has just reached me. The troops, which arrived yesterday by the "Himalaya," and I believe there will be room for the greater part, if not the whole of those which are yet to come. Nothing is prepared for their reception at Unkiar Skelessi; if they disembark there they must encamp. Every exertion, however, will be made to have preparations completed for their reception both there and at Scutari, so that Lord Raglan may be able to choose. I reckon upon his Lordship's arriving at the Dardanelles in the course of next week, thither I propose to write to him by the earliest safe opportunity. Should you see his Lordship before he hears from me, I beg you will show him this letter.

The combined squadrons are in the Black Sea. The Russians have advanced but little since they crossed the Danube.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 128.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 573.)

Paris, April 29, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY writes word from Vienna that M. de Meyendorff having insinuated that the evacuation of Lower Wallachia was a concession made to Austria, Count Buol, after taking the Emperor's orders, had replied that the same objections existed in the opinion of the Austrian Government to the Russian occupation of Upper Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bulgaria, and that the evacuation of Lower Wallachia did not in the least modify the aggressive position of Russia in Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 129.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 243.)

Berlin, April 26, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a circular which has been addressed to the Prussian Ministers at the German Courts announcing the signature of the Austro-Prussian Convention.

I understand that nearly all these Courts have expressed their anxious desire not to take any part in the war which may ensue, and that they wish that, instead of a separate communication of the Treaty being made to them, it should be laid before the Diet at Frankfort and there discussed.

This proceeding of the small Courts has caused annoyance here and at Vienna, and the two Governments have been in active correspondence to see how they shall meet the difficulty thus raised, which may oblige them to modify their original plan on the subject.

The Ratifications have not yet arrived here from Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 129.

Circular addressed to the Prussian Diplomatic Agents.

(Traduction.)

VOUS avez vu par ma circulaire du 16 Mars, que le Gouvernement Royal s'était entendu avec le Cabinet Autrichien à l'effet, de prendre avec les Etats Allemands une attitude commune dans les complications Orientales. Les espérances que nous attachions à cette entente, et qui certainement ont été partagées par tous nos confédérés Allemands, se sont réalisées de la manière la plus satisfaisante. Je suis heureux de pouvoir vous annoncer que les négociations qui ont été suivies ici dans ce but avec le Feldjägermeister Baron de Hess, ont amené des stipulations qui ont été signées aujourd'hui par les Plénipotentiaires des deux Gouvernements, et qu'elles contiennent une disposition formelle d'après laquelle les Gouvernements Allemands seront invités à y accéder.

En vous faisant remarquer que cette invitation leur sera transmise sous peu au moyen de démarches collectives de la part des Légations de Prusse et d'Autriche, je vous prie d'en informer dès à présent le Gouvernement auprès duquel vous avez l'honneur d'être accrédité.

No. 130.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 247. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April 28, 1854.*

THE following is the most authentic version which I am able to obtain of the Secret Military Articles of the Treaty concluded here on the 20th instant with the Austrian Government.

1. Austria agrees to place 100,000 men on the Galician frontier in addition to the corps of 100,000 men now stationed on or near the Danube.

2. Prussia agrees to mobilise a corps of 100,000 men within three weeks whenever Austria may call upon her to do so; and, if necessary, to put in movement a similar force within the same given period.

These two corps are to be stationed in Eastern Prussia, near Königsberg, Breslau and Posen, ready to march into Poland.

3. The incorporation of the Principalities, or an attack on the Balkan, or an attack on either of the two German Powers, are to be considered by both as "casus belli."

Without being enabled to vouch for the truth of this information, which I have received from a private and secret source, I am the more inclined to believe in its authenticity, as it agrees generally with the communications which have been made to me on this subject by Baron Manteuffel.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 131.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, April 27, 1854.*

I HAD the honour to acknowledge the receipt, in a previous despatch, of your Lordship's despatch No. 16, Confidential, informing me that Her Majesty's Government had learned that intrigues were going on amongst the smaller States of the German Confederation with reference to the expected declarations to be made to the Diet by Austria and Prussia, regarding the neutrality of Germany in the impending war, and that the Wurtemberg Government had recently addressed a circular to the other second-rate States of Germany, calling on them to come to an understanding as to the course which it will be their common interest to pursue when the announcement of the policy of the two great German Powers shall be made to them in the Diet; and further that the South-western States of Germany are disposed to insist on the concentration of a Federal force on the Western frontiers of Germany, and instructing me to report what credit is to be attached to these rumours.

In order to test as fully as possible the truth of the reports in question, I have had conversations with the Representatives of some of the German Powers here, and subsequently with M. de Neurath on the subject, and I have now the honour to report to your Lordship their result.

I learned from the former that as far as they were acquainted, no circular of the nature alluded to had been addressed by this Government to their Governments; and M. de Neurath, in reply to my inquiry whether the Wurtemberg Government had come to any concert with the other German Governments as to a common recourse to be pursued, replied distinctly not; that as yet they were unacquainted with the precise stipulations of the offensive and defensive Treaty concluded between Austria and Prussia, and until they were, concert was impossible. With respect to the desire to concentrate a Federal force on the Western German frontiers, my informants assured me they had no knowledge of such a measure, and the Wurtemberg Foreign Minister assured me that at this moment there was no question of it; he said that last autumn before the Eastern question had assumed its present development, there was some question of such a measure,

but that at present they might, on the contrary, be obliged to advance their reserves to support Prussia, in the event of that Power being called on by the more active participation of Austria, to cover the Galician or Hungarian frontiers of the latter from any attack on the part of Russia. It appears to me very improbable that the concentration of a Federal force on the Western frontiers should be either desired or pressed for by the minor German States at this moment. Such a measure would be attended with considerable expense to those States individually, a point on which they are the most sensitive, and would amount to the gratuitous expression of distrust towards France, which I have no reason to believe is felt at this moment. There is quite as little probability either, as I believe, that such a measure if proposed would be carried in the Diet.

That intrigues are carried on by the minor German Courts, and particularly by this Court, is, I fear, too true; but such intrigues can alone produce any result when a want of concert exists between Austria and Prussia; when the councils of those countries are united, they are harmless.

A desire to give greater weight to their representations at the Diet by previous concert, is also felt, and particularly by the four Royal Members of the Confederation, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and Wurtemberg, and it is said that the late visit here of M. de Knesbeck, the Hanoverian Minister at Munich, who is also accredited to this Court, was connected with that object, but I am informed that he was not successful in his mission.

As I ventured to state that the intrigues of the minor German Courts could alone have any result when the opinions of the great German Powers were at variance, I may add that the late visit of the King of Wurtemberg to Weimar, stopping on his road there, at the Courts of Darmstadt and that of the Duke of Nassau, was probably undertaken with the view of inducing those three Courts, which are all, as well as His Majesty, immediately connected by marriage with the Imperial Family of Russia, to support the supposed Russian bias of the Cabinet of Berlin at a moment when the Treaty which has since been concluded, was still pending.

The King of Wurtemberg is said, and I believe correctly, to take an active part in political affairs in Germany, without the knowledge or participation of his Ministers. His sympathies, both from personal friendship and from his connection, as well as from appreciation of Russian power, are in favour of that country. His Majesty is at the same time supposed to set great weight on his popularity and position as a German Prince—witness his letter to the late Prince Schwarzenberg advocating a representation at the Diet, which shortly after appeared in the newspapers, and which, I remember, Prince Schwarzenberg assured me had not been made public by him. It is probable then that His Majesty would gladly avail himself of every opportunity to support secretly a policy favourable to Russia, and to make a merit with that Power of having done so; but it is improbable, as I believe, that His Majesty would endanger his popularity by supporting publicly at the Diet any measure in favour of Russia, or which might be regarded by the public opinion in Germany, which is certainly not inclined to Russia, as anti-German.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 132.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, April 22, 1854.*

IN my brief despatch No. 18 of the 13th instant, written after the interview which I had on that occasion with M. de Bismark, I reserved to an opportunity of secure transmission the giving your Lordship some further details of my conversation with his Excellency.

Speaking of the last Vienna Protocol, M. de Bismark said he looked upon himself as the originator of that State paper.

After the rejection of the proposed Convention, he had seen M. de

Moustier, the French Minister, and suggested to him that the object which it had been sought to obtain by the Convention might, perhaps, be secured in some other way.

The great difficulty was, that the King had an invincible repugnance to put his hand to any act which might have for its object a war with Russia.

M. de Bismark told me that he had then held a long conversation with M. de Moustier, as to the points under discussion, and that M. de Moustier took notes of these points with a view to embodying them in some such document as had since been agreed upon.

M. de Bismark further said that he had at the same time observed to M. de Moustier, that France in the present conjuncture need have no apprehensions on the side of the Rhine, and might safely act on that assurance.

Prussia did not say that in no case would she make war on Russia; what she did say, however, was that she would not be driven to take that decision, and would only adopt it in view of her own undoubted interests.

Speaking of the Treaty, not then signed, with Austria, M. de Bismark remarked that if the Treaty was based on real mutual interests, it would be solid, if otherwise it could have no durability.

Prussia, he said, had not sufficient confidence in the foresight or prudence of Austrian statesmen to enter into engagements which should bind her in all such contingencies as were comprised in a simple offensive and defensive alliance.

M. de Bismark had previously read to me a letter he had received from some one at Berlin, without telling me the writer's name, which, with reference to the proposed Treaty, said that Prussia would reserve the right of withholding a declaration of war against Russia, even though Austria should take that step.

I remarked to M. de Bismark that whenever the Treaty was concluded, it would, at any rate, allow a concerted communication to be made to the Diet. To this M. de Bismark gave a very hesitating kind of assent, and my observation led him to enter on a lengthy detail of Prussia's complaints against the constitution of the Diet, and the superior influence exercised therein by Austria.

He particularly inveighed against the order of proceedings (Geschäftsordnung), said how unfair it was that no notice should be given to members before a sitting, of what was to be the current business of the day; or, what was worse, that the President might acquaint friends and supporters, withholding any communication from opponents, who were thus taken by surprise, and obliged to discuss matters upon which they were quite unprepared.

The President had also the faculty of putting a stop to proceedings on any question under deliberation at any stage before the final vote, and not only that, but of preventing the matter being again taken up.

The President had the entire official patronage of clerkships, &c., "and so much," said M. de Bismark, "do these gentlemen look on themselves as Austrians, that I give you my word, I, as a Prussian, am looked on with an eye of intolerable suspicion, whenever I show my face in the offices."

M. de Bismark told me without reserve, that in view of these and other circumstances, too tedious to explain, Prussia would as much as possible slight and ignore the Diet, until its constitution was essentially altered. "They would not," he said "subject themselves continually to have unpalatable measures thrust down their throats by Austrian majorities."

Prussia had 17,000,000, Austria but 12,000,000 of German population, &c.

I asked, in a pause of M. de Bismark's conversation, how he would have this Assembly reformed? Would an alternation in the Presidency suffice?

M. de Bismark replied at once, that this would not be enough. There must be such a change as would put these two States on a footing of equality.

I observed that it would be a matter of difficulty to induce Austria to abdicate the position she held traditionally; but what I most desired to see was, that Prussia should adopt such a course of policy as tended to rally the majority to her. It was, however, I said, tolerably clear, that as long as Prussia herself only semi-constitutional, and the majority of the little States, striving to govern as absolutely as possible, this result was hardly to be attained; for, whatever might be the influence on public feeling of a liberal policy on the part of Prussia, constituted as the small Governments now were,

such a policy would only drive them all the more infalliably into the arms of Austria.

I by no means concealed from M. de Bismark my opinion of the unpopularity, and consequent insecurity, of nearly all the Governments of the minor German States, nor did this opinion meet with any marked expression of dissent from his Excellency.

That his own Government did not, to his thinking, enjoy any high share of popular favour, he was at little pains to conceal; but as M. de Bismark's personal and party principles would tend to the substitution of a system even less liberal than that which now subsists, it is to be apprehended that if his party were in a position to put their theories in practice, matters could hardly be improved in that respect.

M. de Bismark complained much of what he called want of principle on the part of M. de Manteuffel, and when I asked him in what respect, he said that he had no fixed objects, that he tided over difficulties, took his chance of success by temporising, and rarely took a decision except in the last extremity.

I said that whoever guided the reins of her Government, I thought it greatly to be regretted that Prussia had not taken a more decided line of policy against Russia; that such a decision would, in my judgment, have rallied to her the sympathies, if not of the Governments, still of a vast majority of the German people.

This opinion did not meet with M. de Bismark's assent. Germany, he thought, wanted peace, and would reap greater benefit from that policy than from any other; nor did he appear to attach much importance to a hint which I threw out, of internal discontents becoming troublesome.

I remarked that if, as it seemed, the actual crisis of affairs presented only a choice of evils. War with Russia, under the auspices now held out, presented itself to my mind with far fewer appearances of danger, than were to be anticipated, either if hostilities were greatly prolonged, or in the less probable contingency of Russia coming out of them successfully.

The least evil to be incurred under a lengthened duration of war would be the heavy charges of a prolonged armed neutrality, to say nothing of the discontents of which his Excellency made so light, whereas I saw no other prospect to Germany, from the possible success of Russia, than subserviency (to use the mildest term) in their relations with Russia which must ensue. If, on the other hand (as could not for a moment be doubted), an active co-operation of the Four Powers speedily and effectually curbed the ambition of the Czar, Europe might in all likelihood repose in tranquillity for another long series of years.

The position held by M. de Bismark here, as well as in his own country, where he is almost always called for by the King to give personal advice on every emergency, render his opinions worth reporting to your Lordship. I must even venture to call further attention to his Excellency's opinions respecting organic changes in the constitution of the Diet, and beg leave to enter into some general considerations on the political condition of the German body politic, but will reserve what I think it my duty to say on these heads to a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 139.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, April 25, 1854.*

THE views opened by M. Bismark's remarks relating to the Diet, as reported in my preceding despatch, appear to me to have such important bearings on the present posture of Continental affairs, that I think it my duty more particularly to call your Lordship's attention to considerations attaching thereto.

By the actual working of the German Diet, as now constituted, 20,000,000 of an homogeneous population are rendered of almost no account in the adjustment of European affairs.

Through the power exercised by the President, and by traditional influence, Austria not only excludes Prussia from what would seem to be her just and natural position (a state of things which Prussia endeavours to counteract by making the Diet of as small importance as possible), but the antagonism of the two Governments works on the rest of Germany in a thousand shapes, all tending to weakness and to the destruction of independence.

It would be easy to enlarge on this subject, but I must avoid prolixity, and point attention as briefly as possibly to the tenacity of Austria, on the one hand, in retaining her grasp, while Prussia is not less resolved to wrest the power she holds from her Imperial rival, and only watches her opportunity to make the attempt seriously.

The body politic of the States themselves, as well as their rulers, are vividly alive to the prospect of absorption. Each contemplates without much apprehension the fate reserved for his neighbour, with some vague idea of profiting by his misfortune, but with small notion of concerting measures to avert the catastrophe.

Perfectly informed of the state of things, Russia and France have kept up their interests with the minor States. France in this respect has done neither more nor less of late than follow her usual policy, but Russia has taken (and I have good reason to believe is still using) extraordinary efforts to maintain her position.

It is quite needless to point out how the different influences at work establish a hopeless state of division, and the conviction that a change is likely soon to happen, is probably one of the chief motives for Prussia's striving to remain neutral on the Eastern question, in the hope that while the rest of Europe is fully occupied, she may secure the object of her dearest ambition.

It is my firm conviction that if in this conjuncture France and England would concur in making their influence felt in the Diet, Prussia would feel such a step as a check of vital consequence to her own intended move.

If it became known that the two Governments would appeal to the Diet on the present posture of European affairs, and would no longer allow the voice of 20,000,000 to be stifled by the want of concert between those who should lead them, the effect on the public mind could not be otherwise than of the most powerful kind.

The joint action of France and of Great Britain would prevent the apprehensions which might attach to the isolated action of one or the other Powers, and the members of the Diet itself could not be otherwise than flattered at an appeal to their independence.

Austria (unless her policy is much changed) would see a support of her own views in the course I would recommend. Prussia alone, with whose ambitious projects it would interfere, would feel dissatisfied, but might thus be forced into a line of policy more consonant with that of the Western Powers.

I do not trespass further on your Lordship's time in recommending a course which may not meet the approval of Her Majesty's Government, but as the recent policy of Prussia does not any longer render it advisable that we should support her policy of ignoring the Diet, I should not have felt I had done my duty if I omitted to point out a course by which the minor confederated States of Germany may be turned to useful account in the great question now agitating Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 134.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 216.)

Foreign Office, May 1, 1854.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 176 of the 15th April, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your Excellency's intention, so to arrange matters that Lord Raglan on his arrival at Constantinople, may be able to make his choice between the two stations of Scutari and Unkiar Skelessi for Her Majesty's troops.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 135.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 588. Confidential.)

Paris, May 1, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE seen a despatch dated the 26th ultimo, from M. de Serre, the French Secretary of Legation at Vienna, who (M. de Bourqueney being prevented by a domestic calamity from attending to business) had had an interview with Count Buol on that day, and had endeavoured to ascertain the contents of the Convention lately signed between Austria and Prussia. M. de Buol had excused himself from communicating it, on the plea, that it had not yet been ratified, and that, although it was hardly to be supposed that the King of Prussia would refuse to give this solemn sanction to the act of his Minister, yet, with so vacillating a character to deal with as that of His Majesty, the Austrian Government could not be too much upon its guard. M. de Buol, however, repeated that the Convention bound the Two Powers to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and guaranteed their respective possessions, both German and non-German, to each other. It stipulated that they were to come to each other's assistance, in case either should be attacked, but bound them to consult each other before either became an aggressor. On M. de Serre's remarking that this clause was at variance with the assurances given by Count Buol to M. de Bourqueney, that the free action of Austria was in no way fettered by the Convention, Count Buol replied that Austria had taken care to enumerate in the body of the Treaty certain cases in which she should be left free to act as her own interests required.

Count Buol added that, as soon as the Ratifications had been exchanged, it might be advisable to summon a Conference, at which the Representatives of England and France might communicate the Treaty signed at Constantinople, between England and France on the 10th ultimo, and those of Austria and Prussia that of which he had been giving a summary, but he did not appear to wish that this should be taken at present as an official proposition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 136.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2, 11 P.M.)

Berlin, May 2, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE ratifications of the Austrian-Prussian Treaty were exchanged here this day.

The Duke of Mecklenburgh-Strelitz has returned to St. Petersburgh, having been unable to effect a reversal of the Prussian policy favourable to Russia. He is bearer of a letter from His Majesty to the Emperor of Russia, and of a despatch to the Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, expressing the hopes of the King of Prussia that His Imperial Majesty will not force him to change his present position towards him.

No. 137.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 219.)

Foreign Office, May 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 175 of the 15th of April with its inclosures, and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government has learnt with satisfaction that the Porte is so well disposed to afford assistance to the allied fleets in the Black Sea. The importance of procuring an adequate supply of coal for the fleets cannot be over estimated, and it would be advisable that your Excellency should place yourself in communication with Messrs. Barkley, in order that you may obtain any information which you may require and they may be able to afford with regard to this desirable object.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 138.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 220.)

Foreign Office, May 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 171 of the 15th of April, on the subject of the excesses committed by the Turkish Irregulars, and I have the satisfaction of conveying to your Excellency the cordial approbation of Her Majesty's Government for the promptitude and decision with which your Excellency acted in this matter, and of the memorandum you presented to the Porte, in which the atrocities of the irregular troops are indignantly denounced.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction that your Excellency's remonstrances and your advice were received in a becoming spirit by the Sultan and his Ministers; but you must know too well, from your own experience, how little trustworthy are promises of bold and decided action on the part of the Porte, not to feel the necessity of vigorously following up the steps you have already taken; and Her Majesty's Government rely upon your Excellency's vigilance and firmness for putting a stop to crimes that have now become systematic, and which, while they deeply injure the Sultan's interest, and promote the objects of Russia, must end by disgusting the allies and rendering it impossible for them to support a cause sullied by such atrocities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 139.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 111.)

Foreign Office, May 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Lordship's despatch No. 234, of the 26th instant, inclosing the copy of a communication which you had received from Baron Manteuffel, announcing that His Majesty the King of Prussia had been pleased to accept the resignation of the Chevalier Bunsen, and had appointed Count Bernstorff, at present Minister at Naples, to be his Prussian Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Her Majesty.

Even if Her Majesty's Government possessed accurate information respecting the causes that have induced the Chevalier Bunsen to resign, they would not think it decorous to offer any opinion upon a question that has arisen between the King of Prussia and his Minister, and of which his Majesty

and the Prussian Government are alone competent to judge; but Her Majesty's Government cannot refrain from an expression of sincere regret that at this most critical juncture of the affairs of Europe, the Chevalier Bunsen should be withdrawn from a Mission the important duties of which he has fulfilled to the entire satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government, and particularly as regards the zeal with which he has always laboured to identify the policy, and to strengthen the friendly relations between England and Prussia.

The retirement of the Chevalier Bunsen at this moment, and the knowledge that he has incurred the displeasure of his Royal Master, must lead to the belief that the relations between the two Governments have undergone a change, and a painful impression will accordingly be produced in this country.

Your Lordship will communicate this despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and you will at the same time assure his Excellency that Count Bernstorff will be received by Her Majesty's Government with the consideration due to the Minister selected by the King of Prussia to represent His Majesty at the Court of our Sovereign.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 140.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 157.)

Vienna, April 29, 1854.

My Lord,

IN conformity with the statement made by Baron Meyendorff to Count Buol, it appears that the Russian troops which have hitherto been in occupation of Lesser Wallachia have been in great part withdrawn from that Province, and it is expected that they will abandon Caijora, so as to confine their occupation of the Principality to the positions upon the river Aluta and in its immediate vicinity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 141.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 162.)

Vienna, April 30, 1854.

My Lord,

THE "Oest. Correspondenz" journal of this evening states, that according to trustworthy accounts, dated Odessa, the 23rd instant, nine steamers of the English and French fleets had attacked the Pratique harbour of that town, and dismounted a battery of four guns. Eight Russian and one Austrian ship, lying in the harbour, had been burnt, and the town bombarded with shells and rockets. The bombardment lasted ten hours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 142.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, May 5, 1854.

BY accounts received by this Government, subsequent to those I transmitted by telegraph on Monday, the town of Odessa and the Woronzow Palace appear to have suffered less in the bombardment than was at first stated.

No. 143.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 224.)

Foreign Office, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 161 of the 6th ultimo, that the circular despatch of the 10th of March, to which you allude, was specially directed against a practice which was accidentally brought under my notice, of formal certificates of permission to enlist in foreign service, being granted by one at least of Her Majesty's Ministers abroad, to British subjects applying for the same. But such formal permission can only be given by the Crown, and therefore persons seeking to obtain formal permission, can only do so by applying to the Crown through the usual channel.

In some foreign services I have reason to know the applicant for employment must show that he has obtained the formal permission of his Government; but where that condition does not apply, I apprehend that Her Majesty's Ministers abroad cannot interfere to prevent a British subject from accepting a commission, at his own wish, from a foreign Sovereign. Her Majesty's Ministers, indeed, cannot formally permit a British subject to accept a commission; but I am not aware that they have any authority to proceed against a British subject in a foreign country for doing so; nor is it any part of their duty to interfere in the matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 144.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)

(Télégraphique.)

Vienne, Mai 6, 1854.

LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE écrit de Constantinople, le 27 Avril, 1854:

"Le Général Baraguay d'Hilliers a causé bien d'étonnement ainsi que d'alarme dans le commerce en suspendant ses relations avec la Porte, au sujet des Hellènes Catholiques. Ayant vainement cherché à le dissuader de cette démarche, j'ai fait mon possible pour effectuer une éconciliation moyennant quelques sacrifices; le différend a été arrangé, mais non sans peine. L'Ambassadeur avait fixé comme pour son départ le 30 du mois courant dans le cas où on ne lui rendit pas la satisfaction demandée. J'en réfère pour les détails à ma correspondance ordinaire. J'ajoute le message suivant du Vice-Amiral Dundas à l'Amirauté, datée Odessa, le 24 de ce mois, qui m'a été transmis par Mr. Mowbray, l'Agent Naval ici: Une division de bateaux-à-vapeur des escadres combinées détruisait le mole Impériale et les navires Russes à Odessa, le 22 de ce mois. Le mole de la Quarantaine des navires étrangers et la cité n'ont pas été molestés; de grands soins ayant été pris afin de respecter les propriétés neutres et particulières."

No. 145.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 164.)

Vienna, May 3, 1854.

My Lord,

INFORMATION will have been transmitted to your Lordship from Berlin of the ratification by the King of Prussia of the Treaty and Conventions lately negotiated by General Baron Hess, between the Governments of Austria and Prussia. The ratification by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, had already taken place. Count Buol proposed to the Prussian Cabinet that as soon as this ratification had taken place, these documents should be communicated to the Governments of England and France, he has not as yet received the

reply of the Prussian Government to this proposal, but he expects it without delay, and he has retained here Baron Hubner, in order that he may be the bearer of this communication to Paris, whence it will be immediately transmitted to Count Colloredo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 146.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 166.)

Vienna, May 3, 1854.

My Lord,

IN consequence of the withdrawal of the Russian army from Little Wallachia, and in fulfilment of the Treaty ratified by Austria and Prussia, with the view of carrying out the engagements already taken by these Governments in the Protocol of the 13th ultimo, the Austrian corps of observation on the Turkish frontier, together with a larger force collected from other parts of the Empire, has received orders to assemble partly in Transylvania, and partly in Galicia, in which two provinces the greater portion of this force will be concentrated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 147.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 169.)

Vienna, May 4, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL has informed me that the late Hospodar of Wallachia had waited upon him for the purpose of calling upon the Austrian Government, now that the Russian troops had evacuated the Lesser Wallachia, to occupy that district with detachments from the Austrian army, and he stated that he made this application in a sentiment of loyalty to his Sovereign the Sultan, and of anxiety for the protection of the inhabitants of the district who might suffer from the violence of both belligerents, should the war be carried on in their province.

Count Buol replied that this proposal was one to which he could give no attention whatever; that the Austrian Government would certainly not place any part of their forces in a position which would in fact be one of hostility to both parties; he therefore declined altogether to enter upon the subject, although if both parties applied to his Government to give any protection by the occupation of any portion of territory, the question would assume a different shape, but that such a state of things appeared so entirely improbable, that he could not look upon it as worthy of any consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 148.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 183.)

Constantinople, April 20, 1854.

My Lord,

NOTHING of sufficient consequence to make it the object of a special report has come to my knowledge from the theatre of war, since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship.

It does not appear that the Russians are advancing; but statements from Bucharest allege that Silistria will soon be attacked, and that Marshal Paskewitch is expected in the Principalities. Omer Pasha is understood to be still engaged in assembling his troops round Shumla.

The advices from Asia continue to be anything but satisfactory. Whatever improvements have been effected by General Guyon and the other European officers, whatever readiness to follow their counsels may have been shown by Zarif Pasha, the wants of the army are unsupplied, and its ranks are so much thinned, through disease and desertion, that instead of amounting to 25,000 men, it is reported not to exceed the number of 12,000. Nothing has been spared to impress upon the Turkish Ministers the importance of applying a remedy to these evils without delay. But, unfortunately, the want of money has come in aid of the difficulties occasioned by a winter of unusual severity and protraction, and most, if not all, remains to be done in the essential points of providing supplies, and augmenting the numerical force.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 149.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 8.)

(No. 184.)

Constantinople, April 20, 1854.

My Lord,

REFERRING to my previous despatches relative to the events of the Greek insurrection, and to the excesses committed by irregular troops in the service of the Porte, I have now the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy, translated into French, of the Firman issued at my earnest solicitation for the control of those troops in general, and for the condign punishment of their excesses. Together with that document, I transmit an English translation of the additional instructions addressed to Fuad Effendi, the Sultan's Commissioner in Epirus, in consequence of my remonstrances as to the late events in Paramithia.

I venture to hope that your Lordship will find these respective papers as satisfactory as language can make them. I propose to take measures for putting the Firman into general circulation, and I entertain a sanguine hope that by proper attention on the part of our Consuls and officers, it will not remain without effect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 149.

Instructions of the Porte to Fuad Effendi.

April 18, 1854.

(Translation.)

I HAVE received your despatches dated the 4th of Rejeb, reporting the lawless proceedings of some of the Bashi-Bozouks and volunteers employed in that neighbourhood against some Christian villages, and the measures taken thereupon by your Excellency, and stating that the reports of these occurrences were somewhat exaggerated; that those lawless acts had arisen out of certain local occurrences, and that Haraddin Bey, who had been employed for their repression, had acted with great energy and uprightness. On the other hand, different reports have come to us on this subject, namely, that all sorts of atrocities had been committed in the district of Paramithia by the Albanians serving under Suleyman Aga, by order of the said Haraddin Bey, and that they had even burnt down forty-six flourishing villages, put the inhabitants to the sword, and carried off some of them to the mountains; that they had plundred all their property; that Suleyman Aga and the Albanians in Paramithia were the chief actors in these scenes; that the share alone of Suleyman Aga and his men consisted of 3,850 sheep, 400 head of other cattle, and a good many horses; that a certain Noureddin Aga was also concerned in the plunder; that the other Albanians of Paramithia took for their share of the spoils the silver ornaments of the women and their household goods; and that Haraddin Bey had not conducted himself as well as he might have done.

All manner of crimes have been committed by these Bashi-Bozouks and volunteers both in Europe and in Asia, and the Porte can no longer suffer the

subject to be neglected. New regulations have been therefore forwarded concerning the employment of these troops, and the punishment of any crimes committed by them, and peremptory orders thereon have been sent in every direction. A copy of these regulations is enclosed herewith, and your Excellency will cause them to be publicly promulgated in your province, and to act in conformity with their tenor.

It is of the greatest importance that, while this general measure is carried into operation, the measures also bearing reference to the occurrences in question should be also carried into full execution. These Albanians were guilty of such crimes after having contracted a written engagement with your Excellency concerning their peaceable demeanour; they were, moreover, guilty of murder and robbery, and of the atrocious crime of carrying away the children of the Christians, and it is evident that they must be treated with a greater degree of severity.

The Sublime Porte has therefore decided that the following measures shall be adopted.

Your Excellency will, in the first place, make formal proclamation of His Majesty the Sultan's displeasure at these shocking occurrences, and of the punishment that awaits the offenders.

The accused parties, especially those whose names have been given in, are to be immediately arrested, and put upon their trial and punished. In doubtful cases the parties are to be sent to the capital by steam.

If the children separated from their parents should have not been already given up, they are to be found and restored.

All plundered property and cattle in the possession of the plunderers, or which may have been sold to other parties, is to be restored to the owners. A suitable indemnity is to be paid by the suspected parties for the property not forthcoming.

It is of importance that these measures should be fully carried out, and we expect that your Excellency will take suitable steps likewise for preventing the recurrence of such atrocities, as well as for giving due course to the general regulations. Although it may have resulted from the inquiries entered into that there existed a certain degree of provocation on the spot for the occurrences in question, this is no reason for delaying the punishment of the guilty; but as your Excellency also reports that some Christian subjects were associated with the Albanians in the attack (on the villages), these Christians and their associates, if the statement be correct, must likewise be punished.

As the delay which has necessarily arisen in the punishment of the guilty parties may be ascribed by lawless men to weakness, it is of the utmost importance that the punishment in question should be carried out with the greatest rigour.

Although it has been proved that the Greek brigands have inflicted the greatest evils on the frontier territory, even against their own co-religionists, burning more particularly the Turkish villages, and putting men, women and children to death with great cruelty and all manner of ignominy, the Sultan's subjects will not be guilty of the actions committed by those vile robbers, but conduct themselves like men. They must in the present conflict shew their patriotism by doing their best to beat the enemy.

Your Excellency is instructed to set forth these matters in language intelligible to all classes.

The present instructions have been approved by the Council, and sanctioned by the Royal Will. Your Excellency will therefore attend to the due performance of them.

Inclosure 2 in No. 149.

Firman.

(Traduction.)

A TOI, mon Vizir, Bekir Rustem Pacha, Vali de la Province d'Andrinople et dépendences; à toi, Cadi d'Andrinople, et à vous, membres du Medjlis et notables du pays, j'ordonne:

En conséquence de la guerre qui existe entre notre Sublime Porte et la Russie, tous les habitants et les sujets de mon Empire, mus par leur patriotisme et par les sentiments généreux qui les animent, viennent de côté et d'autre et se rassemblent pour servir avec dévouement et au sacrifice de leur vie la cause de ma Sublime Porte et prouver par là leur attachement à elle.

Les troupes à la solde sont connues sous la dénomination primitive de Bashi-Bozouk (troupes Irrégulières). Or, parmi ces troupes, il y en a, à la vérité, qui se comportent bien, mais tous ne se comportent pas de même. Quelques-unes, considérant leur mission comme une belle occasion de se livrer au pillage, et ne voulant pas distinguer ce qui est bien de ce qui est mal, commettent mille excès, soit en route en passant, soit dans les endroits où elles s'arrêtent. Entraînées par leurs anciennes et méchantes habitudes, elles attaquent les biens, la vie, et l'honneur de mes sujets Musulmans et Chrétiens, et se rendent coupables d'une foule de crimes qui sont incompatibles avec l'honneur militaire, et avec les besoins de l'humanité et d'un zèle bien entendu. Tels sont les avis qui ne cessent de nous parvenir, et qui sont bien constatés. On apprend aussi que dans les combats elles se comportent fort mal.

La guerre présente n'a été entreprise qu'uniquement à cause d'une question de la plus haute portée et d'une proposition déraisonnable. C'est une guerre légitime et sérieuse qui a été entreprise avec la résolution d'en supporter tous les maux. Aussi les Puissances qui sont les amis sincères de mon Empire, convaincues que ma Sublime Porte a raison et que la Russie a tort, ont-elles pris le parti de donner à ma Sublime Porte des secours par mer et par terre, et ont-elles commencé à agir avec le plus parfait concert. Tandis donc que dans cet état de choses il faut que les Bashi-Bozouks qui sont venus pour remplir les devoirs de soldats dans une si grande circonstance imitent l'excellente conduite de mes troupes réglées, et qu'ils servent notre cause avec zèle et honneur, et tandis que c'est ma ferme volonté souveraine que l'on ait à protéger comme les nôtres, la vie, l'honneur, et les biens de toutes les classes de mes sujets dont la surveillance m'a été confiée par la divine Providence, qui, dans ces graves circonstances, ont sacrifié leur vie, leur fortune, et leur repos, qu'ils ne soient molestés en aucune manière de la part de qui que ce soit; que, dans toutes les circonstances, ils ayent à jouir des bienfaits de l'équité et de la justice, et d'une parfaite sécurité, ainsi que les préceptes sacrés des Saintes Lois l'exigent; que les négocians et les sujets des Puissances amies et en paix avec ma Sublime Porte qui se trouvent dans mon Empire soient parfaitement bien traités, et qu'ils jouissent toujours de la plus parfaite tranquillité; que ceux de mes sujets, à quelque classe qu'ils appartiennent, qui contreviennent à ma volonté souveraine soient, sans le moindre retard, rigoureusement punis, et de la manière qu'ils le méritent; que telle a, de tout temps, été ma volonté ferme, inébranlable, et pleine d'équité; que ceux qui exercent le noble métier des armes ne doivent jamais perdre de vue que l'exercice de la justice et avant tout la crainte de Dieu sont deux des moyens d'obtenir la victoire, et qu'il importe beaucoup, tant par rapport à cette vie que par rapport à la vie future, de se donner bien de garde de commettre des excès qui ternissent leur gloire, et qui attirent sur eux des châtimens et dans cette vie et dans l'autre; tandis, dis-je, que tout cela est comme je viens de le voir, une partie de ces hordes, c'est-à-dire, de ces Bashi-Bozouk, a commis dans les endroits par où on a passé toutes sortes d'excès; excès qu'il est superflu d'énumérer ici, parce qu'ils sont bien connus à ceux qui en ont été les témoins oculaires et auriculaires. Du reste, les hommes honnêtes tiennent les auteurs de ces crimes en exécration, et, en effet, de pareils actes sont non seulement de toutes les manières contraires à la loi divine et à tous mes ordres souverains, mais nuisibles aussi sous les rapports de l'administration gouvernementale, et regardés comme des crimes horribles. Et comme ceux qui auront l'audace de commettre de pareils crimes se seront aux mêmes attiré les châtimens nécessaires et rigoureux qu'ils ont encourus, des ordres très-énergiques ont été expédiés exprès à son Altesse le Serdari Ekrem (Omer Pacha), ainsi qu'aux commandants supérieurs de mes armées Impériales, de faire passer par un conseil de guerre, d'après l'excellent système militaire, ceux parmi les Bashi-Bozouk qui se sont rendus coupables de pareils crimes, et de leur appliquer sur le champ le châtiment nécessaire.

Il n'y a pas de doute que le Serdari Ekrem et que les commandants susmentionnés mettront tous leurs soins à agir conformément aux ordres qui leur ont été expédiés; et il n'y a pas de doute non plus que c'est aussi le premier des

devoirs des autres commandants de troupes et des officiers civiles et militaires, de veiller soigneusement à empêcher les excès dont il s'agit. Il est donc dans les probabilités des choses humaines qu'il se glisse quelque négligence à cet égard, ou bien qu'en donnant peu d'importance à un crime commis par un des soldats à la solde, et en cachant la vérité, on donne à cet égard une information inexacte; mais l'inattention et la négligence dans les affaires de cette nature feraient, aux yeux de ma Sublime Porte, manquer le but que je me propose. Or, le seul objet de tous mes efforts, c'est de mettre à couvert de toutes violences toutes les classes des populations et des sujets qui sont un dépôt qui m'a été confié par le Souverain Créateur de toutes choses, et qui sont protégées à l'ombre de ma justice, et d'assurer leur repos et leur tranquillité. Et comme c'est là le point le plus important des devoirs des Muchirs, des Valis, et des hauts fonctionnaires, la nature même de l'objet en question leur fera voir la nécessité pour tous de travailler à l'obtenir véritablement et énergiquement.

En un mot, tant que les Bashi-Bozouk se comportent d'une manière honnête, ils seront considérés comme des troupes stipendiées faisant partie de mes armées Impériales. Mais dès qu'ils commettent des attentats contre la vie, la propriété et l'honneur de mes sujets, Musulmans ou Chrétiens, ils perdent le caractère de troupes, et ceux qui d'entr'eux ont commis ces attentats sont aussi coupables que les voleurs et les assassins; et par conséquent partout où ces forfaits se commettent, les autorités civiles et militaires doivent immédiatement intervenir pour les empêcher. C'est-à-dire, elles doivent tout de suite arrêter les coupables, et les consigner aux officiers supérieurs, qui auront à leur infliger sans délai la punition ordonnée par les lois militaires.

Tels sont mes ordres souverains qui ont été publiés par des firmans *ad hoc* dans toutes les parties de mon Empire, et le présent Commandement Impérial émané de mon Divan Impérial, est également expédié à vous, Vali, Cadi, et autres fonctionnaires susmentionnés qui verrez, à sa réception, qu'il s'agit d'un point qui mérite la plus sérieuse attention et comme, en dernière analyse, à Dieu ne plaise! les auteurs des excès dont il s'agit sont aussi coupables au même degré que les fonctionnaires, à quelque classe qu'ils appartiennent, qui les soutiennent et les protégent, et qu'il est décidé que ces fonctionnaires, grands ou petits, se mettent ainsi dans une position qui aura de très mauvaises conséquences pour eux; vous aurez d'abord à vous bien pénétrer de ma volonté et de mes ordres souverains, et après cela à publier et faire savoir en détail à tous les Caimakams, Mouhassils, et Moudirs et habitants des endroits qui se trouvent dans votre juridiction, qu'il faut qu'ils mettent tous leurs soins à ce qui est d'une grande importance, savoir, à maintenir la tranquillité et la sécurité du public en chaque circonstance, et à préserver tous mes sujets de toutes sortes de vexation, d'insulte et de préjudice.

Conformément à tout ce qui a été dit plus haut, il faut faire tout son possible de prévenir des désordres de la part des troupes à la solde, soit dans les endroits où elles sont stationnées, soit dans les endroits d'où elles ne font que passer. Mais si elles commettent des désordres, et que ce soit par exemple dans le camp Impérial, les coupables doivent être arrêtés sur le champ, et ce sera aux commandants supérieurs à les faire passer par un conseil de guerre, et à les faire exécuter tout de suite. Si des excès sont commis dans d'autres endroits où il se trouvent des troupes réglées ou bien des troupes stipendiées qui soient d'honnêtes gens, sans qu'elles ayent eu le tems de les empêcher, les auteurs de ces désordres seront aussitôt arrêtés et envoyés par les chefs des corps d'armée aux commandants supérieurs; et c'est qu'auront à faire aussi les autorités locales des endroits où il n'y aura aucune sorte d'autres troupes. Si à cet égard il se commet quelque négligence, lui, depuis le Vali jusqu'au Mudir du district, et même jusqu'au plus petit fonctionnaire, ne sera exempt de la responsabilité qu'il aura encourue par cette négligence.

Les coupables de premier ordre qui auront passés par les conseils de guerre que le Serdari Ekrem et les Muchirs des grands corps-d'armées sont autorisés à tenir, devant être fusillés, le Serdari Ekrem et les Muchirs les feront exécuter à l'instant même. Quant aux châtiments à infliger aux individus qui se seront rendus coupables de différentes espèces de crimes, un code pénal vient d'être arrêté à l'unanimité. Ce code a été imprimé, et l'on en a tiré plusieurs exemplaires qui ont été envoyés à tous les chefs des troupes irrégulières. Vous devez aussi mettre complètement à exécution toutes les dispositions qu'il renferme.

Ma Sublime Porte ne montrera la moindre indulgence envers les fonction-

naires en ce qui regarde la punition qu'ils auront méritée pour la négligence dont ils se seront rendus coupables. On recherchera aussi ceux qui jusqu'à présent ont osé commettre de pareils forfaits horribles, et on les punira de la manière qu'ils le méritent.

Telle est ma volonté souveraine et positive à ces égards, et qui est portée à la connaissance du public d'une manière détaillée. Ainsi, dorénavant, ceux qui oseront commettre des désordres de cette espèce seront immédiatement saisis; on dressera un procès-verbal sur leurs crimes sans rien cacher, et il seront consignés aux chefs militaires, et envoyés sans délai avec un Ilam et un Mazbata (procès-verbal) aux grands commandants pour être jugés d'après les règlements militaires en vigueur, et punis de manière à servir d'exemple.

Il se peut que des excés soient commis dans des endroits plus rapprochés à Constantinople que de mon camp Impérial; dans ce cas, les coupables doivent être envoyés droit à Constantinople.

Enfin, si d'un côté ma sollicitude s'étend sur tous les individus employés au service militaire, ainsi que sur tous mes sujets, je suis inéxorable, de l'autre, envers ceux qui se comportent d'une manière contraire à la Loi Sainte et aux institutions légales et pleines d'équité que, par la grâce du Trés-Haut, j'ai réussi à établir; et je suis formement résolu de les punir rigoureusement et sans miséricorde.

Les autorités doivent agir en conséquence; qu'elles sachent positivement que grands et petits, tous les chefs militaires, tous les magistrats de ma Sublime Porte, qui se permettront de protéger les coupables, et de négliger de vérifier et de punir le mal et les violences qu'ils ont commis, se seront vraiment et réellement assumé par là une grave responsabilité.

Si vous parvenez à prendre des mesures énergiques et propres à faire que dans aucune circonstance, dans aucun endroit, et à aucune époque, mes sujets Musulmans et Chrétiens, tous tant qu'il sont, ne soient nullement molestés, et qu'ils soient à l'abri de toutes violences, c'est bien; mais sans cela, sachez pour sûr qu'avant tous les autres vous serez les premiers à être reprimandés et châtiés. Agissez donc en conséquence, en mettant entièrement à exécution mes ordres souverains, et en prouvant par des faits qu'il ont été réellement mis à exécution, afin, que cela serve d'exemple aux autres. Voilà à quoi doivent se rapporter tous vos efforts, et donnez-vous bien de garde de contrevenir à ce que ci-dessus.

No. 150.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May.)

(No. 187.)

Constantinople, April 20, 1854.

My Lord,

THE present despatch has no other object but that of covering the transmission in copy of my latest correspondence with Vice-Admiral Dundas, whose squadron was at anchor off Baljik when the latest advices came away.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 150.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off Baljik, April 16, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Excellency a copy of the latest despatch I have received from Colonel Neale, at Varna. The Russians remain stationary at Babadagh; but a party of Cossacks appeared on the 14th at Kustenjeh, and were immediately dispersed by the fire of the "Sidon" and "Magellan."

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 150.

Colonel Neale to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Varna, April 5, 1854.

Sir,

I had the honour to address your Excellency yesterday by a messenger from the Pasha, who went by land to Baljik.

A French steamer arrived here yesterday morning, bringing the General of Division Bosquet, and some officers of the staff.

The General goes this morning by land to Baljik, to communicate with Admiral Hamelin. General Bosquet mentioned to me yesterday that he purposes going to Shumla, to consult with his Highness Omer Pasha, as to 10,000 or 12,000 of the French troops coming to Varna. The General did not appear to consider Gallipoli a desirable position, and said that water was even scarce there. He thought that the presence of European troops here would give a moral as well as material strength to the Turkish army and inhabitants, which no doubt it would.

I understand from Shumla, that his Highness Omer Pasha, will probably withdraw the Egyptians, who arrived here as a reinforcement, as he considers the former garrison sufficient, joined to the assistance which Varna may receive from the sea.

We have no important news from the interior. The inhabitants of Bazardjih and the surrounding villages continue to arrive from time to time.

By a letter dated 12th from Shumla, I find that the Russians had not advanced further than Babadagh, but some Cossacks had been seen at Harla.

General Bosquet seems to be of opinion that the designs of the Russian General have been defeated by the manœuvre of his Highness Omer Pasha, in withdrawing his troops, and concentrating at Shumla. He thinks that the Russians desired to draw the Turks into the Dobrudscha, when they would have crossed in force near Rustchuk and Silistria, and marched on Shumla or the Balkan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 150.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off Baljik, April 16, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Excellency a copy of a letter I have just received from Her Majesty's Consul in Varna.

The account the master of the Genoese vessel gives of the fire upon the boat of the "Furious," is sufficiently correct, except as to the date; and should his other statements be equally true, the intelligence is important.

The vessels he met were three steamers from the squadrons, two English and one French, from whom I expect to hear every hour.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 150.

Consul Neale to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Varna, April 15, 1854.

Sir,

A GENOESE merchant-vessel, which arrived here yesterday from Odessa, has reported as follows:—

The master states that he left Odessa on the 12th instant. That on the 11th an English steamer-of-war came into that port, and sent a boat on shore. That the authorities demanded for what purpose they had come, when it was replied that the steamer had come for the British Consul, when the authorities answered that the Consul had left four days before. The master says that the boat then returned to the steamer; but that while returning, an officer on

horseback galloped up to the battery, and found fault with the officers of the port for not having taken the boat, as they must have known it was from an enemy's vessel. Several shot were then fired at the boat and steamer without effect.

The master adds, that the firing of these guns caused half the batteries to fall, as the embrasures were composed of sand-bags.

On the 13th instant, the master states he saw three frigates about twenty-five miles to the southward of Odessa, and making towards Odessa with a strong contrary wind. The master supposed they were English or French. They showed no colours.

The Genoese master states that the utmost panic prevails at Odessa. All the grain in the town is said to be removing into the interior. Some Genoese merchants, having remonstrated against the sudden prohibition to export grain, and having imprudently said on the Exchange that the English and French, or Omer Pasha, would soon rescind the prohibition, they were ordered out of the town in twenty-four hours.

The master adds, that there are 25,000 troops at Odessa, but only twenty-five guns in the batteries, and that the Russians said that if they had eight or ten days time, they would be better fortified; but that if the fleets attacked them at present, they would be very ill-prepared to resist them.

The master conversed with some Polish officers. They said there were 15,000 Poles (of the 25,000 troops) in Odessa, who were in a great state of excitement, and very ill-disposed to the Russians, and that there would be a revolt the moment the fleets appeared and fired a shot. The first part of all this statement must relate to the "Fury;" by its correctness or otherwise your Excellency will be enabled to judge of the truth of what follows. I have thought it my duty to forward an express to your Excellency with this information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 150.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, April 19, 1854.

Sir,

THE accompanying paper which I have received from the Captain Pasha will inform you of the Porte's compliance with the several propositions which, agreeably to your wishes or to the wants of the combined service, I had recommended to the Turkish Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to inform you that the Porte will be prepared in a few days to send into the Black Sea a squadron of nine sail of the line and other vessels, according to the list inclosed herewith. It is to be commanded by Ahmed Pasha for the Turks, and by Hassan Pasha for the Egyptians, who will be instructed to act either together or separately under your directions and those of Admiral Hamelin. A portion, if necessary, might be employed on the coast of Circassia.

I have to request that you will make me acquainted at your earliest convenience with the view which you take of this intention, on the ground of expediency and usefulness.

It may interest you to know that about 5,000 men of Her Majesty's army are in barracks at Scutari, that upwards of 6,000 men are near Gallipoli, where 21,000 of the French troops are also landed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 151.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 196. Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 25, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Porte and the Servian Government are still disposed to view with uneasiness and mistrust the attitude assumed by Austria, and the uncertain

language of the Austrian authorities. Inclosed herewith, in copy, is a memorandum which was delivered to Reshid Pasha yesterday by the Servian Agent at the Porte. It has been communicated to me confidentially by both parties.

There is also inclosed herewith, in copy, a secret report addressed to me by M. Pisani of a recent conversation between Reshid Pasha and Baron de Bruck's chief interpreter. It is difficult to suppose that M. de Schreiner would have ventured to hold such language; I will not say without the Internuncio's authority, but at least without a knowledge of his Excellency's opinions.

M. Pisani assures me that there is every reason to believe the statement correct. It appears that the conversation reported by him originated in Reshid Pasha's impression as to the tendency of the Protocol lately signed at Vienna by the Four Representatives, to lay a foundation for the renewal of the Treaties between Russia and the Porte, whenever negotiations for peace shall be opened.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 151.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Secret and Confidential.)

Pera, April 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with a conversation which took place between Reshid Pasha and the Austrian Chief Interpreter, on the subject of the Protocol lately signed in the Conference of Vienna:

"Réchid Pacha ayant demandé quelques explications au Dragoman Autrichien sur les Protocoles du 5 Décembre, 1853, et de celui du 13 Janvier, 1854, et lui ayant observé que si l'on voulait faire allusion au renouvellement des anciens Traités entre la Porte et la Russie, son Altesse ne pouvait pas se rendre compte pourquoi l'Autriche y tenait tant.

"M. Schreiner a répondu (en ajoutant toutefois que c'était son opinion personnelle), que la raison pour laquelle nous voulons le renouvellement des anciens Traités, c'est que sans cela il pourrait y avoir un protectorat collectif sur les Principautés Danubiennes, ce que nous voulons éviter. Nous tenons, au contraire, que ces Provinces soient sous le protectorat exclusif de la Russie, qui les tiendra en ordre. Elles ont des tendances de liberté qui ne nous vont pas. Quant à la France nous ne nous en inquiétons pas tant; mais c'est l'Angleterre que nous craignons.

"Est-ce que l'Angleterre, a-t-il dit Réchid Pacha, n'est pas l'alliée naturelle, et n'est-ce pas elle qui dans maintes occasions lui a rendu tant de services?

"On ne peut pas le nier, a répliqué M. Schreiner, mais depuis quelque temps elle est devenue notre ennemi acharnée et nous n'aimons pas son voisinage. Corfou nous inquiète déjà, et si dans le temps nous avons mis tant d'instance au maintien du *statu quo* des ports de Klek et de Sotorina, c'est que nous voulions éviter par là l'ouverture de ces ports au commerce étranger, et surtout à celui de l'Angleterre, qui n'aurait pas manquée d'y envoyer ses bâtiments en foule.

"Tout cela est très-bien, a observé le Pacha, mais n'y aurait-il pas un immense avantage pour vous si l'embouchure du Danube était libre, et qu'avec cela vous vous débarrassiez d'un voisin si incommode que la Russie?

"Certes, l'Autriche verrait cela avec beaucoup de plaisir, et elle aurait eu des avantages manquants; mais si le protectorat de la Russie cessait, nous serions bien aise de voir les Principautés Danubiennes sur le même pied que les autres Provinces de la Turquie, plus tôt que de les voir soumises à un protectorat collectif. Si, par exemple, la Porte mettait ses Principautés sous le protectorat de l'Autriche la chose changerait, et c'est alors que l'Autriche se battrait autrement."

The above has been communicated to me, word for word, by Reshid Pasha, with a request to be reported to your Excellency in the most secret and confidential manner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 151.

Prince Alexander to Reshid Pasha.

Belgrade, 1/7 Avril, 1854.

Altesse,

LA question des préparatifs militaires que l'Autriche entreprend aux frontières de la Serbie dans le but avoué de s'en servir dans certaines éventualités pour occuper la Serbie, a pris une telle importance et est devenu d'une telle actualité que j'ai cru nécessaire de charger mon Capou-Khaya de vous en entretenir particulièrement et de remettre à votre Altesse de ma part un mémoire raisonné à ce sujet.

Je prends donc la liberté de prier votre Altesse de vouloir bien accorder son attention éclairée à cette affaire, et en attendant avec une juste impatience la réponse que votre Altesse daignera me donner, je saisis, &c.

(Signé) S. KARAGEORGEVITCH.

Inclosure 3 in No. 151.

Mémorandum.

DEPUIS le commencement de la guerre éclatée entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie, l'Autriche a pris envers la Serbie une attitude, qui tout en laissant à la politique de cette Puissance un caractère expectatif, tendait à lui donner le moyen de disposer à son gré de l'action de la Serbie. Suivant que l'Autriche croyait que le Gouvernement Serbe était plus ou moins bien disposé à l'égard de la Russie, ou de la Turquie, elle lui tenait un langage conforme à ces sentiments supposés, et lui promettait constamment son appui pour la défense des frontières de la Principauté contre toute agression hostile.

Au moyen de cette politique, mise en œuvre principalement par le Représentant de l'Autriche à Belgrade d'une manière tellement constante et suivie qu'elle a pu être remarquée par les Représentants des autres Puissances dans cette Principauté, l'Autriche se croyait déjà en possession de la confiance illimitée du Gouvernement Serbe, et soit pour donner plus de poids à sa politique et pour assurer mieux le succès de ses tendances, soit pour se mettre à même de donner plus de valeur à ses assurances quelconques auprès de telle ou telle des Grandes Puissances Européennes, le Cabinet de Vienne a ordonné, il y a quelque temps, une concentration de troupes très-considérable aux frontières de la Serbie.

Le Gouvernement de la Principauté, justement ému de ces démonstrations militaires, qu'aucun acte de la part de la Serbie ne provoquait, et que ni l'état des choses dans ce pays, plus pacifique et plus rassurant que jamais, ni les rapports de la Serbie avec la Sublime Porte et les Puissances ses alliées, ne justifiaient, a cherché à s'enquérir, directement, auprès du Cabinet de Vienne, et indirectement, auprès de la Sublime Porte, du but et de la signification de ces mouvements militaires de l'Autriche.

Ces démarches n'ont point réussi à nous éclairer sur la situation qu'on voulait nous créer. Tandis que les organes plus ou moins directs du Cabinet de Vienne nous faisaient sentir que l'Autriche ne faisait rien et ne se proposait de rien faire à l'égard de la Serbie sans l'assentiment préalable de la Cour Suzeraine, la Sublime Porte répondait au Kapou-Kehaja de Serbie, que l'Autriche lui laissait ignorer le but des préparatifs militaires en question, et qu'aucun concert, qu'aucune entente, n'étaient établies à ce sujet entre les deux Puissances. Les Représentants de la France et de la Grande Bretagne à Constantinople ne nous ont donné non plus des assurances satisfaisantes à ce sujet. Dans les entretiens dont ils ont honoré le Kapou-Kehaja de Serbie, tantôt ils paraissaient ne pas croire à la réalité des démonstrations aussi graves, et de la portée que nous leur avions toujours attribuée, tantôt ils partageaient notre propre incertitude, et les inquiétudes qui en résultaient. Le Pacha de Belgrade restait sans instructions,

ou pour mieux dire, il restait muni d'anciennes instructions qui lui avaient été données précédemment, et en vertu desquels il devait considérer toute intervention militaire de l'Autriche en Serbie comme une tentative hostile, dirigée contre l'Empire Ottoman lui-même et comme telle la repousser de toutes ses forces.

La conduite de l'Autriche par rapport à la question générale de la guerre actuelle ayant peut-être prise une tournure plus favorable aux intentions des Puissances Occidentales, les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres donnèrent au Gouvernement Serbe, par l'intermédiaire de leurs Agents à Belgrade, des assurances satisfaisantes au sujet des dispositions de l'Autriche. Vers la même époque, à peu près, le Cabinet de Vienne fit savoir au Gouvernement Serbe que les mesures militaires en question n'avaient rien d'hostile contre la Serbie; qu'en les ordonnant, l'Autriche a eu pour but de se mettre à même de protéger ses propres frontières, et qu'elle n'interviendrait en Serbie que si les troupes Russes y entraient, ou si des soulèvements contre l'autorité légitime y éclataient; que par conséquent même dans ce cas là elle interviendrait en amie, et pour prêter secours au Gouvernement et à l'autorité légitime.

Cette démarche de l'Autriche, tout en déterminant les cas dans lesquels cette Puissance se proposait d'intervenir en Serbie, n'était pas de nature à dissiper toutes nos inquiétudes. D'abord, nous n'y trouvions aucune garantie contre une intervention arbitraire, entreprise sans motif et sans nécessité réelle, et abondante en périls et conséquences funestes pour la Serbie. En second lieu, nous y voyions une action isolée de l'Autriche, qui sous prétexte d'accomplir un acte de coopération à la politique générale de l'Europe et d'appui en faveur de l'Empire Ottoman, se créait le moyen d'envahir la Serbie, et de produire dans cette Principauté, par sa conduite injuste et agressive, ce même désordre, ce même trouble, et cette même désolation, qu'il est justement dans l'intérêt de l'Empire Ottoman, comme dans celui des Puissances ses alliées, de prévenir, et dont le Gouvernement et la nation Serbe se consacreraient avec tous leurs efforts à éloigner les dangers de leur patrie.

En présence des éventualités aussi graves, et continuant à recevoir de Constantinople des nouvelles tout-à-fait en contradiction avec ce but avoué de l'Autriche; voyant d'ailleurs les préparatifs militaires de l'Autriche prendre de jour en jour un aspect plus menaçant, et poussées ou point où elles n'auraient qu'à être mises en exécution immédiate, le Gouvernement Serbe, d'accord avec son Excellence Izzet Pacha, prit la résolution de faire des démarches actives à Vienne et à Constantinople, pour savoir au juste à quoi nous en tenir sous ce rapport, et pour insister où de droit contre toute combinaison, qui rendrait l'Autriche arbitre des destinées actuelles de la Serbie. Ce fût l'objet de la mission d'Azzir Pacha à Vienne. Ce personnage se trouve maintenant à Constantinople, et a dû donner au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan un rapport détaillé de ce qu'il a fait à Vienne.

En attendant la solution diplomatique de cette question, le Gouvernement de la Principauté, parfaitement secondé par son Excellence Izzet Pacha, a ordonné toutes les mesures nécessaires pour défendre le pays d'une agression ennemie.

Au point où nous en sommes arrivés, il s'agit de savoir si l'Autriche pourra réussir à obtenir l'assentiment de la Sublime Porte pour une mesure injuste, et préjudiciable à tant d'intérêts qui sont communs et aussi chers à la Principauté, comme à l'Empire dont ce pays fait partie. Quant à une intervention opérée sans l'assentiment de la Porte, il y a peu de chances, dans les circonstances actuelles, à ce que l'Autriche y songe, à moins qu'elle ne veuille se déclarer ouvertement pour la Russie, contre la Sublime Porte et ses alliés.

L'Autriche met en avant deux raisons, qui devraient l'autoriser à intervenir militairement en Serbie: 1, l'entrée des Russes; 2, un soulèvement intérieur qui éclaterait en Serbie.

1. Si les Russes entrent en Serbie, la coopération de l'Autriche contre la Russie devrait rentrer dans l'assemblé de mesures que les Puissances alliées de la Sublime Porte sont appellées à employer pour la défense de l'Empire Ottoman, et que nous n'avons pas à déterminer. Il est peu probable que le cas de l'entrée des Russes en Serbie se présenterait; si l'on peut se fier aux assurances que le Baron de Meyendorff a données au Comte de Buol, la Russie aurait déclaré avoir l'intention de ne pas entrer en Serbie; ce qui paraît d'autant plus facile à admettre, que le théâtre de la guerre et la ligne d'opéra-

tions pour les troupes Russes sont sans cela déjà trop grandes pour qu'on songe à les agrandir davantage. Mais admettant même que les Russes tenteraient d'entrer en Serbie, ce qui ne serait pas facile d'effectuer, vu la résistance qui leur serait opposée de la part des Serbes comme des troupes Turques, nous pouvons affirmer hardiment que l'entrée des Autrichiens en Serbies erait dans ce cas une mesure extrêmement malheureuse, et qui pourrait donner lieu à une foule de complications.

Toutes les troupes auxiliaires quelconques, seraient préférables à celles de l'Autriche. La nation Serbe a une défiance, si non une haine, tellement prononcée contre l'Autriche, que l'entrée des Autrichiens en Serbie serait immédiatement considérée par tout le monde comme un danger tellement imminent, comme un malheur tellement grand, que toute l'action des Serbes se tournerait contre les troupes Autrichiennes, toute l'énergie de la nation s'emploierait à lutter contre ces ennemis, dans lesquels on voit toujours la personification même de cette convoitise qui pousse l'Autriche à chercher à exercer en Serbie, n'importe sous quel patronage, une influence égoïste. Autant le concours des Autrichiens pourrait être utile à la cause de la Sublime Porte, s'il était donné en temps et lieu convenables, et autant il pourrait créer des difficultés et des complications, si en dépit de tout ce qu'on sait, il était déployé en Serbie.

2. En ce qui concerne les soulévements intérieurs, nous les craignons aujourd'hui moins que jamais. Toute la nation est parfaitement convaincue que ses intérêts les plus précieux lui commandent le maintien de la tranquillité et de l'ordre, et l'éloignement de tout ce qui pourrait l'entraîner dans la guerre, et de ce qui transformerait la Serbie en champ de bataille. Remplis d'une profonde reconnaissance envers la Cour Suzeraine pour les privilèges qui leur ont été si gracieusement confirmés, et pour l'attitude qu'on leur a permis de conserver pendant cette guerre, le Gouvernement et le peuple Serbe sont trop éclairés sur leurs intérêts et trop attachés au bonheur de leur pays, pour hésiter un seul instant sur la ligne de conduite à suivre. La conscience qu'ils ont de leur situation les préservera mieux que n'importe quelles menaces de toute démarche fausse et nuisible. Du reste, depuis que la guerre a éclaté, la Serbie n'a-t-elle pas suffisamment prouvé qu'elle sait et qu'elle veut rester fidèle à ses devoirs et à ses obligations. Malgré tout ce qui a pu être dit, elle n'a jamais cessé de suivre une ligne de conduite, modeste il est vraie, mais loyale et conforme à ses engagements. Elle ne s'éloignera désormais non plus de cette voie. La Sublime Porte peut en être parfaitement sûre. Tout ce que demande le Gouvernement Serbe, c'est d'être honoré dès à présent de la confiance que la Cour Suzeraine lui a témoigné jusqu'à présent, et de ne pas voir sa patrie livrée à une occupation Autrichienne qui serait le signal et le commencement des catastrophes incalculables. A cette condition, le Gouvernement Serbe répond parfaitement du maintien de la tranquillité et de l'ordre public en Serbie. Si même des désordres isolés, possibles dans tous les temps et toutes les circonstances, éclataient quelque part, le Gouvernement est capable de les réprimer et de les anéantir avant même qu'on ait le temps de leur attacher de l'importance.

Le Kapou-Kehaja de Serbie a été déjà plusieurs fois chargé d'entretenir son Altesse Réchid Pacha de cette affaire, et quoiqu'il ait eu l'honneur de soumettre déjà à son Altesse la plupart des raisons et des considérations ci-exposées, qui sans cela n'ont pas pu échapper à la sagacité de la Sublime Porte, et qui nous font espérer que dans aucun cas, la Cour Suzeraine ne reconnoitra à l'Autriche une faculté, dont la demande même devrait la rendre suspecte, le Gouvernement Serbe a néanmoins cru de son devoir de présenter à l'attention éclairée de son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères un mémoire raisonné sur cette grave affaire, dont la décision touche à tant de questions, aussi essentielles pour l'honneur, la dignité et les intérêts de la Sublime Porte, que pour le repos et le bonheur de la nation Serbe.

No. 152.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 8.*)

(No. 257.)

Berlin, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch, No. 111, upon the subject of Chevalier Bunsen's resignation, and the appointment of Count Bernstorff to the post of Envoy in London, I this day read that despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and in order that the feelings therein expressed might be known to the King and to other persons, I left it with his Excellency, and trust that in so doing I shall have acted according to your Lordship's wishes.

The only passage of the despatch on which Baron Manteuffel made a remark, is that alluding to Chevalier Bunsen having incurred the King's displeasure. He said that this might have been so momentarily, but that it was no longer the case, and that Chevalier Bunsen had expressed himself most thankful for the manner in which his wishes had been met.

I replied that it was not to be expected that Chevalier Bunsen would do otherwise than make known in proper terms his sense of the arrangement made by the King's orders on his retiring from active service; but I begged leave to observe to him, that the effect of his removal from his post must be considered as indicating a change in the policy of Prussia, for the King would not, under any other circumstances, have been disposed to withdraw from office a Minister whose only fault was an excess of zeal in endeavouring to establish the most cordial relations with England; and that I hoped in the interests of Prussia that His Majesty would not have cause to regret the change.

But, I said, if proof were wanting of the King's altered feelings, I need only refer to the rumour which was general in Berlin, that His Majesty was about to dismiss General Bonin from the post of Minister of War, and I asked if this were true. Baron Manteuffel replied that it was so. Well, I rejoined, this then shows that any Minister who chooses to hold independent language, in accordance with the policy indicated by late public acts,—the Vienna Protocol and the Convention with Austria,—was sure to incur the Royal displeasure, and it proved beyond a doubt that the King was not disposed to carry out the stipulations of these solemn acts, and that I thought we must be prepared for further and more important changes in the Government; that his Excellency would stand nearly alone in his opinions, that General Bonin had been one of his staunchest supporters, and that I thought the party who now ruled would not rest until all persons were removed who happen to stand in the way of the Russian policy that was being pursued.

Baron Manteuffel scarcely made any reply to these remarks. He said that the King would never go with Russia; and that the person whom the King intended to place at the War Department was of the same political opinions as General Bonin.

He did not name the future Minister of War, but is said to be General Waldersee.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 153.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 8.*)

(No. 258.)

Berlin, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has mentioned to me that Baron Budberg communicated to him yesterday a despatch from Count Nesselrode, in answer to one which had been sent from here, containing the request of the King of Prussia, in his desire to act as mediator between the belligerent Powers, that the Emperor would state in writing the concessions which His Imperial Majesty was disposed to make, and which would give a chance of the negotiations for

peace being continued, for up to the present moment the Russian proposals were so vague that the Western Powers could not entertain them.

His Excellency said that the Emperor declined to name any precise conditions on which he was ready to negotiate, and had written in a tone which had disappointed the King.

I observed to his Excellency that I hoped the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to bring forward any reasonable proposition for peace would open His Majesty's eyes as to the inutility of attempting to negotiate without having a basis to work upon, and to the necessity of altering his vacillating policy, and preparing to act in concert with the Western Powers. The Minister President replied that he could assure me that His Majesty was far from approving the proceedings of Russia, and that it would be impossible for him to take part with her; but at the same time His Majesty could not bring himself to the idea that the war might not yet be averted from his own frontiers.

To this I replied, that but for the policy lately pursued by Prussia I believed that war would have been altogether avoided, for if the Four Powers had but declared that they were resolved to stand together in opposition to the encroachments of Russia in the East, and ready to take up arms for that purpose, if necessary, Russia would have hesitated if she saw Europe arrayed against her; that moreover I felt satisfied that the policy of Prussia would completely fail, and that she would be most unwillingly dragged into the war, and that nobody would thank her for her tardy decision; whereas a frank and straightforward policy would possibly have ensured the blessings of peace, and serve at all events to discourage the preposterous pretensions of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 154.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 259. Confidential.)

Berlin, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in original and in translation, copies of the Convention, with a Separate Article attached to it, which was signed between Austria and Prussia on the 20th instant, the ratifications of which have been since exchanged.

These documents were confidentially communicated to me by Baron Manteuffel, who in leaving them in my hands, requested that they might be considered as "secret and confidential."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 154.

Treaty between Austria and Prussia, signed April 20, 1854.

[See Eastern Papers, Part IX.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 154.

Additional Article to Treaty between Austria and Prussia, of April 20, 1854.

[See Eastern Papers, Part X.]

No. 155.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 262.)

Berlin, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have been informed by my telegraphic despatch of the 2nd instant, that the Ratifications of the Austro-Prussian Treaty were exchanged here on that day.

Vast efforts were made by Duke George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, previous to his departure for St. Petersburgh, to impede the fulfilment of that act by His Prussian Majesty.

I am privately informed that, aided by the counsels of the Russian Minister, and the support of the Court party, he endeavoured to persuade the King to sign a declaration which he had drawn up, or in failure of that to order a ministerial note to be addressed to the Russian Government, representing the nature and sense of the Convention with Austria, as a renewed effort for the restoration of peace, and disclaiming by his signature to that Treaty any intention of a hostile policy towards Russia.

I am happy to inform your Lordship that these endeavours on the part of Duke George proved unavailing, and that Baron Manteuffel successfully exerted his influence to counteract these attempts of the Russian and Court party to negative and nullify the engagements into which His Majesty had entered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 156.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 614. Most Confidential.)

Paris, May 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I OBSERVE that, within the last few days, there is considerable anxiety in the minds of the Emperor and of his Ministers, lest Russia should obtain some brilliant advantage over the Turks upon the Danube, and, having thus vindicated the honour of her arms, should, in seeming deference to the wishes of Austria and Prussia, retire behind the Pruth, and offer to enter into diplomatic conferences for the settlement of the Turkish question. It appears that M. de Serre, who is acting momentarily as French Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, has called the attention of his Government to the possibility of this course being taken by Russia—a course by which she would probably succeed in regaining her influence over the two great German Powers and their smaller satellites, and turn them from their unwilling and imperfect adhesion to the policy of Great Britain and France. To obtain such a result would be worth some sacrifice to Russia; and both the Emperor and M. Drouyn de Lhuys think that it may be the present plan of the Russians, after striking a blow on the Danube, to withdraw within the Bessarabian frontier, and, concentrating all their force towards the east, make the Asiatic provinces of Turkey their real point of attack. It could hardly be doubted that Germany, relieved from the perils of war at her very doors, would be inclined to look with complacency at this state of things, nor would there be wanting those who went further, and would regard a war undertaken by Russia in Asia as a holy warfare of the Cross against the Crescent.

"It was useless attempting to conceal from oneself," said the Emperor (and M. Drouyn de Lhuys holds the same language), "that, under such circumstances, the position of England and France becomes one of extreme difficulty. Alone, they cannot hope to bring Russia, with Austria and Prussia as her friends, even if the latter remain inactive, to such terms as would justify them in making peace. Their object then should be to seek alliances elsewhere, and to endeavour to make such a coalition with and among the other States of

Europe, as would in some degree counterbalance the danger that must arise from the formidable union of Russia and Germany. His Majesty had reason to think that Sweden, Sardinia, and perhaps Spain, would not be unwilling to join such an alliance, under certain conditions; and, if this were so, it was, in his opinion, well worth a pecuniary sacrifice to obtain, when possible, the material assistance of any of these Governments."

His Majesty said further, that he wished that Her Majesty's Government would take this view of the question into their most serious consideration. His own opinion was, that if Russia came out of this struggle with her wings unclipped, she became mistress of the destinies of Europe. He considered that there was no sacrifice too great to make, in order to preserve the world from so great a calamity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 157.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 162.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 9, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO yesterday read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that Prince Stirbey had strongly urged upon him that Wallachia should be occupied by Austrian troops. The Principality, Prince Stirbey said, having been devastated by the Russians, was now about to be totally ruined by the Turks, and that the Wallachians would be deeply grateful for the protection of an Austrian force.

Count Buol replied, that Austria had complained of the unjust proceedings of Russia, and would certainly not follow the example of that Power.

Austria, moreover, had no pretext for entering the territory of her ally, and were she to do so uninvited, she would lay herself open to just suspicion; but Count Buol added, if the temporary occupation of Wallachia by Austrian troops would be of any service to the Sultan, and that a request to that effect were directly made by the Porte, it would be favourably entertained by the Austrian Government.

I thanked Count Colloredo for this communication, and requested him to assure Count Buol that the determination manifested on this and other occasions by Austria, not to enter upon any portion of the Turkish territory without the consent of the Porte, was most satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 158.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 121. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 9, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 259 of the 5th instant, inclosing a copy and translation of the Convention between Austria and Prussia, which have been confidentially communicated to you by Baron Manteuffel, I have to instruct you to convey to his Excellency the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the communication of this Convention, which shall be considered confidential for the present.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 159.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 170.)
My Lord, *Vienna, May 6, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL has informed me that he has received intelligence that the advance of the Turkish troops into Lesser Wallachia has been accompanied with every act of conciliation and moderation, and a telegraphic despatch published in the "Oester. Correspondenz" journal of last night, and dated the 2nd instant, from Bucharest, states that the Turkish commander had issued a proclamation of a very tranquillising character. No person would be persecuted for his political opinions, nor molested in the exercise of his trade. All provisions for the army would be paid for in ready money. 3,000 kilos of maize had been distributed amongst the poorer peasants. The Bishop of Krajowa was expected to proceed to Rabaneschty to meet the Turkish troops at the head of a deputation of Boyars.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 160.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 240.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 10, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 184 of the 20th of April, with its inclosures, and I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the part which you have taken in procuring the just and most necessary Firman of the Sultan for repressing the excesses of the Bashi-Bozouks, and also the instructions to Fuad Effendi respecting the outrages committed by the Turkish Irregulars in the provinces bording on Greece

Her Majesty's Government likewise approve of your Excellency's intention to require Her Majesty's Consuls to watch over the execution of these orders.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 161.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 199.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, April 27, 1854.*

I HAVE sent this evening to Belgrade, by express, a dispatch in the following words to be forwarded to your Lordship by telegraph through Semlin and Vienna.

"General Baraguay d'Hilliers has created much astonishment and commercial alarm by suspending his relations with the Porte on the subject of the Hellenic Roman Catholics. Having vainly endeavoured to dissuade him from that course, I have done my best to produce a reconciliation at some sacrifice, and an adjustment of the difference has been, with no small trouble, effected. The Ambassador had fixed the 30th instant for his departure if he was not satisfied. I refer for particulars to my regular correspondence."

"I add the following message from Vice-Admiral Dundas to the Admiralty, dated Odessa, the 24th instant, and transmitted to me through Mr. Mowbray, the Naval Agent here:

"'A steam division of the combined squadrons destroyed the Imperial Mole and Russian shipping at Odessa on the 22nd instant.

"'The Quarantine Mole, foreign shipping, and the city were not molested, great care having been taken to respect all neutral and private property.'"

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 162.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 200.)

Constantinople, April 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I BEG to offer my special thanks for the support which your Lordship has given me by your instructions Nos. 152 and 153 of this year. They come powerfully in aid of my earnest and frequent remonstrances to the Turkish Government respecting their culpable inattention to the qualifications of those who are selected for high commands in their civil or military service. I have communicated both despatches to Reshid Pasha, and he has promised that they shall be submitted to the Sultan himself. The performance of this promise is the more important, as I have reason to believe that the appointment of Fezzoolah Pasha proceeded immediately from His Majesty.

The two Generals, Ahmed Pasha and Ali Ferik, have reached Constantinople within the last few days. They are detained at the Seraskier's office, which answers in some degree to our Horse Guards, and at my request the Sultan's pleasure has been taken as to their permanent arrest and trial. That they will be tried I have little doubt; it is probable also that they will be condemned; but I do not expect their punishment to go beyond a committal to prison for a term of more or less duration. Criminal as their conduct has been, they are understood to be protected by the late Seraskier, Mehmed Ali, who appointed them to their respective commands, and who, though dismissed from office, may be supposed to exercise some influence at the Palace by means of his wife, the Sultan's sister. I am assured that, owing to him, the late Captain Pasha, whose conduct was anything but laudable, received a pension of 15,000 piastres a month on his retirement from office instead of punishment, which in strict justice was more properly his due.

It is with much concern that I mention circumstances of so discouraging a nature. Your Lordship may, however, be sure that I shall not lose sight of the two commanders from Asia, and I hope that more attention will be paid to future appointments. It is but fair, at the same time, to bear in mind, that the choice is extremely limited, and that in other countries as well as in this we have seen disastrous reverses attributable to careless or partial appointments.

Though little was expected from the new Governor of Erzeroum or his predecessor, transferred to the command of the army at Kars, the reports of their conduct are favourable, and the counsels of General Guyon appear to receive the attention which they deserve. I continue to press the state of that army and its wants on the attention of the Turkish Ministers. The unusual prolongation of winter has necessarily retarded the transmission of supplies through a mountainous country, where the roads are generally little better than tracks.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 163.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 247.)

Foreign Office, May 11, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with much satisfaction from your despatch No. 200 of the 28th ultimo, that Ahmed Pasha and Ali Pasha are to be brought to trial, but Her Majesty's Government are convinced that it is essential to the interests of the Sultan, and to the success of the cause in which the allies are engaged, that the investigation of the conduct of these Pashas should not be a mockery, and their punishment, as is too often the case, a reward.

The atrocious conduct of these two men is the cause of the total demoralization of the Turkish army in Asia, and it is impossible not to look with apprehension to the disasters which, as a direct consequence of this, may before long occur in that portion of the Sultan's territory.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 164.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 180.)

Vienna, May 10, 1854.

My Lord,

THE ratifications of the Treaty lately negotiated by General Hess between Austria and Prussia, and which relates to the position of those Governments under the circumstances occasioned by the state of war at present existing between Turkey, supported by England and France, and the Russian Empire, having been exchanged, this document will this day be transmitted to Count Colloredo, in order that, in conjunction with the Prussian Minister, he should communicate it to your Lordship.

M. de Hübner, the Austrian Minister in Paris, has received similar orders as to the communication of this Treaty to the French Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 165.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 181. Confidential.)

Vienna, May 10, 1854.

My Lord,

ON a recent occasion Baron Meyendorff went to Count Buol with what he seemed to consider a most important statement to the Austrian Government. It was that the Russians would reduce their forces in Lesser Wallachia, and thus relieve Austria from any apprehension of military operations on or near her frontier, or in the province of Servia. Count Buol replied that having from the first given expression to his most anxious desire that the Turkish territory should not be invaded, and having since so repeatedly called upon, and endeavoured to engage the Russian Government to evacuate the Principalities, he could not now express any satisfaction at an announcement which still treated of the occupation of a large part of those Principalities by Russian troops. As far as the statement now made, was to the effect that the Russian armies would move to a greater distance from the Austrian frontier, and from that of the province of Servia, he was happy to learn it; but until he was informed of the total evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops, he could not receive any details of their movements within them as satisfactory to his Government.

In a conversation with me relative to the military cooperation of Austria with the Western Powers, Count Buol stated that his Government was bound by the Protocols to which they had been a party, as well as by the Treaty recently concluded with Prussia, to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and by the stipulations of the Protocols they were further bound to consult with the Western Powers as to the means of obtaining this object in connexion with further measures for attaching the existence and independence of the Turkish Empire, to the general equilibrium of Europe. He proceeded to point out that the relations of Austria towards her allies being of such a character, the eventual possibility of her armies being called into action to secure the objects for which they strove in common, was necessarily contemplated, and although he hoped that the employment of her troops might not be required, yet, should such be the case, she had a large army collected, or collecting on her frontiers towards Russia, extending from Gallicia and the Bukowina through Transylvania and Hungary, and occupying a most favourable position from which to act at a future period. He said it would not be thought advantageous under any case to call upon the Austrian armies to move, until the Western Powers could communicate the precise military position which they occupied, together with their plan of operations. When the Anglo-French force had moved towards the Danube, then would be the moment for Austria to concert operations with them, and they would then be justified by the stipulations of the Protocols, to call upon her to do so. Measures might then be taken for the defence of the Balkan, or any other plan of operations which should appear advisable, might be adopted in common. But in the case that the Russian armies did not advance against the Anglo-French forces, and remained in the Principalities, Austria would be the first to desire active operations, as she was the most interested in obtaining the evacuation of the Principalities. Count Buol assured me that the Western Powers might rely with the most perfect confidence, if her action was required, on the vigorous cooperation of Austria at the proper time, but he deprecated any appeal to her to destroy the fine military position which her armies at present occupied, by proposing that any part of her military force should move to secondary or detached positions, or move at all before the armies of England and France were actually in the field, when they might rely upon their supporting their operations. Count Buol concluded by saying that although he foresaw little prospect of obtaining by negotiation the great objects for which the allied Governments were acting together, yet he could not entirely discard all hope of it, and he must therefore retain that entire liberty of action for his Government, which he considers necessary, to enable him to take advantage of any proposal which appeared likely to lead to this result, but in every case it must be of a nature to embrace all the objects for the attainment of which his Government is pledged by the Protocols and declarations to which they have been a party.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 166.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 14.

(No. 271.)

Berlin, May 18, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has been to the country for a few days, and came back yesterday. Before his departure I had an interview with his Excellency, when he returned to me your Lordship's despatch No. 111, upon the subject of Chevalier Bunsen's resignation, which I had left with him for communication to the King. I inquired whether His Majesty had made any observations on it, to which he said that His Majesty had declared that his feelings towards England were unchanged, and that I might be assured that Prussia would follow up the policy which she had laid down, and which she had been pursuing for the last six months.

To this I replied, that if this was His Majesty's intention, I must naturally ask why two Ministers, Chevalier Bunsen and General Bonin, were removed from their respective offices because they were both devoted to carrying out a policy favourable to the Western Powers, and had both incurred the Royal displeasure for that reason, and I could not but tell him, that until the King gave some proof of sympathy with us, I could not conscientiously inform my Government that I believed Prussia to be following out a policy in harmony with her late professions and acts, for that everything appeared to have a Russian tendency. I said also that in all directions I heard that Chevalier Bunsen and General Bonin had been sacrificed to please the Emperor of Russia, and that the removal of these Ministers had been insisted on as a set-off to the Austro-Prussian Treaty, and had been urged on the King by the Court party, which seemed to have established the most complete power over His Majesty. Baron Manteuffel replied that no communication of this nature had passed through him, or had come from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

This, I said, might be; but would his Excellency answer for communications of this nature not having reached the King through the numerous channels by which the Russian Legation was able to approach His Majesty? The visit of Duke George of Mecklenburgh, I observed, had no other object than to obtain some species of satisfaction for the Emperor Nicholas for the steps which had been taken in opposition to his views; and though he was unable to prevent the ratification of the Austro-Prussian Treaty, the effects of his labours were nevertheless evident in the removal of Chevalier Bunsen and General Bonin, and the departure of the Prince of Prussia.

Here ended our conversation on Monday, and I have this evening had a further interview with his Excellency, and resumed the subject. I told him that during his absence M. de Bismark, the Prussian Minister at Frankfort, had been holding the most unmistakeable language here, and had stated that Prussia would never, under any circumstances, take up arms against Russia. Such language, I said, proved either that he spoke at random, or that the Treaty which Prussia and Austria had just concluded, was to be a dead letter. Baron Manteuffel seemed greatly surprised that M. de Bismark should have thus spoken, and said that he knew not whence he could have drawn such opinions, that they were groundless, for this day the King had told him, when conversing on the position of Russia, that she must not count upon Prussia's indifference, as the moment might not be far off when she might be called on to act.

I replied, that such expressions on the part of the King were no doubt satisfactory; but, I said, it was strange that M. de Bismark should talk in this wild way; he ought to be directed to disown his words, and speak in another tone. His predilections, I added, were with Russia, and these, perhaps, gave an impulse to his conversation, and was, perhaps, inspired by the language and wishes of the Court Party, with which he might be seeking to ingratiate himself.

Baron Manteuffel then said that M. de Bismark was to return to his post in a couple of days, and would then have to support the Austro-Prussian Treaty before the Diet, where he trusted it would be adopted without serious opposition.

It appears that the rumours which have been in circulation, that Count Dolma was to be the Minister President, and M. de Bismark, Minister for Foreign Affairs, have fallen to the ground, and to judge from Baron Manteuffel's manner and tone to me, he seems secure of his office for some time to come.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 167.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 14.)

(No. 272. Confidential.)

Berlin, May 12, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy and translation of a circular addressed by the Prussian Government to their diplomatic agents at the different German Courts, to which is annexed copy of a draft

of a note which they are instructed to present to the Governments to which they are accredited, communicating to them the Convention lately signed between Austria and Prussia, and inviting their adherence to it.

The Prussian Ministers at the German Courts are likewise informed that their Austrian colleague will receive a similar communication and instructions to present an identical Note simultaneously with them.

In this circular is likewise inclosed copy of the Declaration which is to be submitted by Austria and Prussia at one of the next sittings of the Diet at Frankfort.

I have to observe to your Lordship that I obtained the copies of these documents from a private and not an official source.

Although I do not deem it necessary to offer to your Lordship any comment upon these diplomatic papers, yet I cannot but remark that the Circular of the Prussian Government to their Ministers at the German Courts savours of a wish to court the support and popularity of the minor States at the expense of Austria, by giving them to understand that Prussia had used her best efforts to express more precisely in the Declaration to the Diet the nature of the Confederation of States, and to represent more energetically to Europe the union and independence of Germany as a political body, as well as her will and power, not only to repel any attack directed against any of her States, but also to preserve Europe from a general war.

It is freely acknowledged by the Prussian Government in the Circular that in consequence of the concessions which Austria had made and in view of the urgency of the moment, they had finally consented to the Declaration now drawn up.

The Prussian Ministers at the German Courts are further instructed to invite the Governments to which they are accredited to consider the desirableness of giving to their general adhesion to the Convention the form of a Decree of the Diet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 167.

(Traduction.)

Circular to Prussian Representatives at the German Courts.

Berlin, le 5 Mai, 1854.

Monsieur,

JE vous ai annoncé par ma dépêche du 20 du mois dernier, que la Convention conclue ce même jour entre la Prusse et l'Autriche serait portée à la connaissance des Gouvernements Allemands par une communication faite simultanément par les deux Gouvernements, et qu'il y serait joint l'invitation d'accéder à cette alliance. Après m'être entendu à cet égard avec le Cabinet de Vienne, je vous invite, Monsieur, à donner connaissance du projet de note ci-joint au Gouvernement près duquel vous avez l'honneur d'être accrédité.

Je vous prie de lui communiquer d'abord copie de l'exemplaire lithographié que vous trouverez également ci-joint, tant du Traité d'Alliance lui-même que de l'Article Séparé qui en est le complément.

Votre collègue d'Autriche sera également chargé de remettre une note identique. Vous vous entendrez avec lui pour qu'autant que cela possible, vous remettiez l'une et l'autre simultanément cette note.

Nous laissons le Cabinet de complétement libre de décider s'il vous fera connaître officiellement l'adhésion que nous espérons trouver auprès de lui, ou s'il chargera son Représentant près de notre Cour de nous en faire part.

Vous trouverez de plus ci-joint copie de la déclaration que, d'accord avec l'Autriche, nous comptons faire à la Diète dans l'une de ses prochaines séances. Je vous prie de la faire connaître confidentiellement au Gouvernement près duquel vous êtes accredité, et de lui exprimer en outre le vœu et l'espoir que nous avons que son Représentant à Francfort sera autorisé à s'y montrer favorable.

Nous aurions désiré faire ressortir dans cette déclaration plus succinctement, mais d'une manière plus énergique (prägnanter weise), le caractère de cette Fédération d'Etats (Staaten-bund), afin qu'elle formât un vrai corps politique,

complétement indépendant, et par cela, même puissant, qui ait la volonté et la force de repousser énergiquement non-seulement toute attaque faite contre chacun de ses membres, mais encore toute injustice et toute menace, et ne se contentant pas d'offrir à ses membres des sérieuses garanties, mais préservant encore l'Europe d'une guerre générale.

Cependant comme on ne peut nier que cette pensée ne soit renfermée dans cette déclaration quoiqu'elle n'y soit pas exprimée en toute lettre, nous avons consenti en raison des concessions que l'Autriche nous a faites sur plusieurs points de la rédaction de la déclaration, à ne pas retarder davantage par une discussion prolongée sur des termes, l'expédition de cette déclaration, que de puissantes raisons nous commandaient au contraire de terminer au plus vite.

Je vous prie en attendant de faire ressortir ce point de vue dans les communications verbales que vous serez appelé à faire.

Enfin nous voudrions savoir, soit par vos propres rapports soit par des communications que nous ferait directement le Cabinet de de quelle manière et avec quelle modalité il serait disposé à donner à l'adhésion générale à cette alliance la forme d'une décision fédérale.

Vous pouvez être assuré, Monsieur, que nous recevrons avec un intérêt tout particulier les informations que vous nous donnerez sur la manière dont vous vous acquitterez de la mission qui vous est confiée en même tems qu'à votre collègue d'Autriche.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 167.

Projet de Note.

(Traduction.)

LE Soussigné a l'honneur, d'après les ordres de son Gouvernement, à faire à les communications suivantes.

Pendant toute la durée des négociations auxquelles ont donné lieu les graves complications qui ont surgi en Orient, et auxquelles les Cabinets de Berlin et de Vienne ont pris part en s'efforçant constamment de maintenir et de rétablir la paix, il a été d'un grand prix pour eux non-seulement d'obtenir de leurs confédérés Allemands des marques réitérées de satisfaction sur leur attitude politique, mais aussi de recevoir l'expression sincère de la confiance qu'ils avaient, que dans une entente intime, et dans l'union de la Prusse et de l'Autriche se trouvaient également pour le reste de l'Allemagne la base la plus solide et la garantie la plus sûre pour conjurer les dangers qui menaçent l'Europe entière, ainsi que le moyen de peser énergiquement dans la balance des décisions. Ce n'est qu'avec grand regret que le Gouvernement du Soussigné a vu s'anéantir l'espoir qu'il avait placé dans les efforts médiateurs des quatre Cabinets représentés dans la Conférence de Vienne, et qui devaient mettre fin à la guerre entre la Russie et la Turquie sans que d'autres Puissances y fussent entraînés. Si d'une part la circonstance que la France et l'Angleterre se trouvent actuellement en guerre avec la Russie comme alliées du Sultan, n'a pas empêché (nicht abhalten) la Prusse et l'Autriche de donner de nouveau un caractère conventionnel à leur opinion exprimée dans les précédents Protocols, sur la nécessité de terminer le conflit Oriental sur la base de l'intégrité de la Porte et des garanties pour ses sujets Chrétiens; d'autre part, ces Puissances, à mesure que les dangers d'une guerre générale augmentaient, cédant à de hautes considérations et resserrant plus étroitement les liens qu'une amitié d'ancienne date a formés entre eux, ont dû ne pas perdre de vue la garantie des intérêts de l'Allemagne entière au moment où elles étendaient leur solidarité à leurs possessions extra-fédérales. C'était là la pensée qui a présidé aux négociations qui ont eu lieu récemment à Berlin entre les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse et Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, et qui avaient pour l'objet un Traité d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive, ainsi qu'une entente séparée formant partie intégrante de la Convention, documents que le Soussigné a reçu l'ordre de communiquer au Gouvernement.

Le Soussigné, en s'empressant de joindre à la présente des copies du Traité principal et des Articles séparés, a la confiance que le Gouvernement, après

examen des dispositions courtes et simples qui y sont contenues, les trouvera conformes à ses intérêts propres ainsi qu'à ceux de l'Allemagne, et fera parvenir à Berlin (Vienne) son adhésion formelle dans le plus bref délai.

De même que la Prusse et l'Autriche, en contractant cette alliance, ont reconnu avec joie qu'elle était sortie du besoin d'union, de fidélité, et de force de l'Allemagne, de même aussi (le Soussigné a la ferme conviction) que cette alliance, en recevant une extension plus grande, témoignera de l'entente, de la fidélité, et de la force Allemande, à la bénédiction de la patrie commune.

Inclosure 3 in No. 167.

Declaration.

L'Autriche et la Prusse.—LES Envoyés sont chargés de l'ouverture suivante:

Lorsqu'au 10 Novembre dernier, les complications de la question Orientale furent portées au sein de cette Assemblée, la guerre avait, il est vrai, éclaté entre la Russie et la Turquie, seulement les Cabinets de Vienne et de Berlin pouvaient se flatter de l'espoir que les efforts réunis des Puissances Européennes amèneraient les Puissances belligérantes à s'entendre, et à conserver ainsi au reste de l'Europe les bienfaits de la paix.

Cet espoir ne s'est malheureusement pas réalisé. La France et l'Angleterre, comme alliées de la Porte, prirent part à la guerre; et l'Autriche, qui jadis appuyait ses espérances pacifiques même en diminuant ses armées, a reconnu la nécessité de placer des forces imposantes sur les frontières méridionales.

La Diète ne s'attendra pas à une exposition minutieuse des négociations et des faits qui ont précédé l'état des choses actuel. Car les uns appartiennent à la publicité, les autres ont été portés individuellement à la connaissance des Gouvernements.

Quelques remarques seront suffisantes pour indiquer et déterminer le point de départ d'où la Prusse et l'Autriche croient utile de faire la présente ouverture à leurs hauts Alliés.

Les deux Cabinets se sont rencontrés avec ceux de Paris et de Londres dans la conclusion que la lutte entre la Russie et la Porte ne pouvait se prolonger sans porter le trouble dans les intérêts de l'Europe entière, et par conséquent dans ceux de leurs propres États. Ils ont reconnu que le maintien de l'intégrité de la Turquie et de l'indépendance du pouvoir du Sultan étaient une condition nécessaire de l'équilibre, et qu'en aucun cas la guerre ne pouvait avoir pour résultat un changement dans l'état territoriel actuel.

Ces déclarations et ces assurances des parties belligérantes donnent à l'action médiatrice des quatre Puissances réunies à Vienne en conférence l'espoir d'une solution. Les particularités de ces négociations et le motif de leur insuccès ressortent des cinq Protocoles de cette Conférence Protocoles qui sont communiqués ci-joint à la Haute Assemblée. Le dernier fait connaître que quoique la France et l'Angleterre soient entrées en état de guerre avec la Russie, les quatre Cabinets s'en tiennent immuablement aux principes énoncés par eux précédemment, et sont unanimes sur le principe de se consulter en commun sur le moyen d'atteindre le but pour lequel ils se sont réunis.

Les Hautes Cours de Vienne et de Berlin ont reconnu dans ces premiers rapports une invitation saillante de mettre à profit les liaisons d'étroite confiance et d'amitié qui les unissent entre elles, et de les faire servir dans les limites de leur pouvoir contre les dangers qui naissent des circonstances actuelles, et qui demandent un prompt remède.

Elles n'ont pu pas méconnaître que l'entretien continuel d'une force militaire sur le Bas-Danube compromettrait non-seulement les intérêts de l'Autriche qui en est voisine, mais aussi ceux de l'Allemagne entière.

Ce ne sont point seulement les rapports de puissance politiques qui seraient menacés d'une manière préjudiciable pour l'Allemagne, mais encore le développement naturel de sa prospérité matérielle.

Dans cette prévision les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin se tournent avec confiance vers leurs alliés Allemands.

Elles ont déjà fait part de leur conviction intime aux divers Gouvernements; et elles regardent comme un devoir de s'adresser aussi à la Diète et de

lui déclarer que les intérêts pour lesquels elles se mêlent aux complications actuelles, sont en réalité ceux de toute l'Allemagne.

Il leur paraît être pour l'Allemagne, comme une exigence de sa position politique, comme un élément de cette politique, comme une condition du maintien naturel de sa nationalité, que le *status quo* sur le Bas-Danube reste tel qu'il a été établi dans l'intérêt de l'Europe Centrale.

Pour l'industrie et le commerce de l'Allemagne s'ouvre en Orient un champs vaste et fructueux de rivalité avec les autres nations, un domaine, trésor de richesses pour l'intélligence et la puissance industrielles de ce pays. Les intérêts matériels peuvent prendre vers l'Orient le plus grand essor, et il est pour elle d'une importance immense d'assurer la liberté du commerce du Danube, et de ne pas voir cet essor limité par des entraves.

Mais avant tout, les deux Puissances ne regardent pas seulement comme un intérêt commun, mais encore comme un devoir politique inviolable des Gouvernements de la Confédération, de s'unir pour veiller à ce que par suite de la guerre présente le *status quo* des grands États Européens ne soit pas changé au préjudice de l'Allemagne, que l'alliance Allemande soit établie de manière à ce que le pays national soit conservé intact, et que l'Allemagne dans ses rapports extérieurs marche comme un seul homme, et sa force se conservera au milieu des crises Européennes dont la portée dépassera un danger local, et qui selon leur solution marqueront le rang que les peuples occuperont à l'avenir entre eux.

Les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin croient, tout en conservant leur position comme Puissances Européennes, avoir rempli en même tems leur mission comme membres de la Confédération Allemande.

Elles ont la confiance que leurs hauts alliés sont prêts à accepter la situation où elles se sont placées. Leur tâche est encore en ce moment de se préparer aux éventualités, et les deux Souverains s'estimeront certainement heureux si les événements n'amènent pas avec eux la nécessité d'une intervention active. Cette dernière hypothèse appartient encore à l'avenir, et l'Autriche et la Prusse ne peuvent pas avoir en vue de dévancer sur ce point le jugement de leurs confédérés. Un double but se trouve dans leur ouverture. Elles conservent l'espoir d'obtenir l'assurance tranquillisante que leur attitude dans la tournure sérieuse qu'ont prise les choses recevra l'approbation de leurs confédérés.

Il saute aux yeux que c'est une nécessité pour elles comme pour l'Allemagne, que l'organe constitutionnel du pays manifeste la résolution de tous les membres d'affronter bravement et avec confiance les épreuves que l'avenir réserve à la patrie commune.

Plus l'Allemagne se montrera forte dans son unité et sa puissance confédérée, plus elle maintiendra sa position honorable, plus elle contribuera efficacement à hâter le retour de la paix du monde.

No. 168.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 272.) *Berlin, May 12, 1854.*

My Lord,

INTELLIGENCE having reached me that M. d'Alvensleben was on the point of setting out for Vienna on a special mission, I have asked Baron Manteuffel if it were true that he was to endeavour to impede the execution of the Austro-Prussian Treaty. His Excellency replied, that he was sent there to give explanations on the subject of this Treaty, not, however, for the purpose of raising difficulties on the subject, but rather to prevent them, and that the King had decided on this mission in order that there might be less necessity for reference to Berlin in the event of opposition being raised by the German Powers to its adoption by the Diet. His Excellency said further that he had already answers from Hanover and Cassel respecting the communication and that they were favourable; and that he expected that the question would be laid before the Diet at Frankfort in about a fortnight.

I then inquired if there was any truth in a report which had reached me, that there was to be a Conference of the Representatives of several of the German Powers at Bamberg, to concert measures of opposition to it; to which

Baron Manteuffel answered, that this report had likewise reached him, and that he thought the meeting not impossible; but again his Excellency declared, that he was without apprehension as to the result, and felt convinced, on the contrary, that the propositions would be adopted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 169.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 203.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 30, 1854.*

THE Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's army in Turkey arrived here yesterday, and the number of troops now in barracks, or encamped at Scutari, cannot be much under 12,000, including the Guards.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 170.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 204.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 1, 1854.*

HAVING been informed from Smyrna that Prince Napoleon had arrived there, and would probably reach Constantinople in the course of to-day, I presume that the salutes which has just been fired from the Turkish batteries at Topanah, is meant to compliment his arrival here.

I have little doubt of his being here, although there is not time to ascertain the fact.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 171.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 125.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 16, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you in your conversation with Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 271 of the 12th instant, and I have to instruct you to inform Baron Manteuffel that you have correctly represented the opinions of Her Majesty's Government as well with reference to the dismissal of Chevalier Bunsen and General Bonin as with respect to the conduct observed towards His Royal Highness the Prince of Prussia.

For many months past Baron Manteuffel has been made aware, by the despatches that have been communicated to him, of the cordial and sincere desire of Her Majesty's Government that the independence of Prussia, and the high position she is entitled to hold in Germany, should be nobly sustained throughout a crisis which may determine the future destinies of Europe; and it has on several occasions been my agreeable duty to congratulate Baron Manteuffel, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, upon the course of policy that Prussia was pursuing. His Excellency will therefore not be surprised to learn the deep disappointment of Her Majesty's Government at finding their hopes and expectations frustrated by the ascendency of a party which now conducts the political affairs of Prussia in a manner which, as Her Majesty's Government venture to think, can neither promote the well understood interests of that kingdom, nor of Germany, nor consequently those of Europe.

On this, as on every other occasion, Her Majesty's Government disclaim all pretension to interfere in the internal concerns of Prussia, but having to their great satisfaction been intimately associated with Prussia in the important transactions at Vienna, having had good reason to think that the policy of the two countries was identical, and having now too much reason to believe that it is divergent, Her Majesty's Government feel entitled to express their opinion that the course now suddenly adopted by Prussia must extend and protract the war, for she gives to the unjust and aggressive policy of Russia more than an indirect support, and proves to the world that the influence which that Power claims to exercise over Germany is, in Prussia at least, a sad reality.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 172.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 16, 1854.*

I HAVE just left the Conference called by Count Buol, on the proposition of the French Ambassador and myself. The Prussian Minister having no instructions to communicate to Austria, the Convention has referred to his Government for orders.

Count Buol directs Baron Bruck to call upon the Turkish Government to prepare a Convention, according to which the Austrian troops, under special eventualities, might enter the Principalities.

No. 173.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 210.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 5, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, some further reports addressed to me from Shumla by Captain Simmons.

I add an account, received at the Porte and transmitted officially to me, of the retirement of the Russians from before Kalafat, and the circumstances, discreditable to their humanity, which accompanied that operation.

Her Majesty's Consul at Varna writes me word that the garrison of that fortress still consists of about 8,500 men, and that he understands the position at Paravadi to have as large a force in station for its defence as the nature of the ground admits of.

There is nothing of consequence from Kars or Batoum. The army at the former place appears, by the last advices, to have made some progress, though a very imperfect one, towards a condition of greater efficiency.

I am given to understand that the combined squadrons were still in the waters of Odessa when the last intelligence came away.

The Turkish squadron is prepared for a cruize in the Black Sea, and will probably get under weigh to-morrow. It is to be composed of nine line-of-battle ships, between Turkish and Egyptian, and it will be accompanied by two or three steam frigates. Inclosed herewith, in copy, is a letter addressed by the Captain Pasha to Vice-Admiral Dundas. It will serve to inform your Lordship of the Porte's intentions in sending out its fleet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 173.

Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, April 16, 1854.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Lordship's information a statement of the Ottoman army in Bulgaria, under the command of his Highness Omer Pasha, the details of which I obtained from his Highness yesterday.

Your Lordship will observe in the summary at the foot of the statement, that the battalions are estimated at 700 men, and the regiments of Cavalry at 750 horses each. These numbers were given by his Highness himself, but are, I think, somewhat in excess of the numbers which would be present under arms on taking the field; and therefore, as the number which must be calculated upon in any combination which may be under consideration.

His Highness stated that the number now present in this place amounted to 41,000. If the Artillery, Cavalry, and Irregulars be deducted, there would remain about 30,000 men as belonging to the regular Infantry, of which 46½ battalions are in Shumla, thus giving a strength of 645 men to each.

The numbers sick were 1,400, or less than 3½ per cent, a very small average, especially considering that a considerable part of the force has lately come in after a series of long marches.

Among the sick there are no maladies of a grave nature. On the whole I am inclined to think that the number 600, given in my despatch No. 5 of the 9th instant, is a near approximation to the average strength which may be calculated upon as effective in each battalion.

I would also observe to your Lordship that the Irregular troops, both Cavalry and Infantry, cannot be calculated upon as adding much, if at all, to the effective strength of the army.

Some of the Infantry may be useful for the defence of passes, but opposed in the open field to troops formed according to the system of European armies, I fear they would be valueless.

The regular Cavalry also being mounted on small horses and indifferently armed, will not, I think, be of much use against the Russian regular Cavalry. The effective squadrons of regular Cavalry may, I think, be considered as averaging 115 sabres.

If the force be calculated upon these data, it would appear that the regular army in Bulgaria would amount to—

Infantry effective . . .	78,000
Cavalry effective . . .	7,935
Artillery	9,550
Sappers	1,200
Total . . .	96,685 Men,

with 212 field pieces.

No movements have been made by the Russian forces, so far as his Highness is informed, since I last wrote to your Lordship. They are still in the lower part of the Dobrudscha, between Matchin, Baba-Bagh, and Toultcha, but their advanced posts of Cavalry have been seen as far as Karasu.

According to the latest information which his Highness has of the Russian forces in the Principalities, he considers that there is about 25,000 men, with 70 pieces of artillery, in front of Kalafat, a brigade on the Danube, above Rustchuk, another at Oltenitza, and a considerable force at Bucharest, and in front of it.

He also considers that one division of the sixth Corps has entered the Principalities.

On this subject I would refer your Lordship to a despatch from Sir H. Seymour to Lord Clarendon, dated 9th January, an extract of which I have seen in an Italian paper.

It would appear from this that the sixth Corps at that date was not placed on the war footing, but was about to be completed, and that its destination was the Crimea, Caucasus, and Cherson.

I would also observe to your Lordship, that the "Petersburgh Gazette" of the 11th February contained the parting address and benediction addressed by the Metropolitan of Moscow to the soldiers of the sixth Corps previous to their departure.

If therefore the sixth Corps had not quitted its permanent quarters in the district of Moscow before the commencement of February, it is impossible that it can have entered the Principalities.

The distance from Moscow to the Pruth being not less than 700 miles, the march would require, at least at the present season, two months, or under the most favourable circumstances they could reach Jassy about the middle of this month. I am inclined therefore to believe that his Highness is mistaken, and that probably the troops which have entered the Principalities are the Dragoons referred to by Sir H. Seymour and part of the third Corps d'armée, concerning which, I believe, there is no positive information that it had all entered the Principalities.

If this be the case, it would appear that, exclusive of Cossacks and of the Dragoons belonging to the Corps de Reserve of Cavalry, there cannot be in Bessarabia and the Principalities more than the following corps:—

Third Corps, Oston-Sacken's, consisting of the seventh, eighth, and ninth divisions, 36,000 Infantry, 4,000 Cavalry, and 112 guns.

Fourth Corps, Dannenberg's, consisting of the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth divisions, of the same strength as the third Corps.

Fifth Corps, Lüder's, consisting of the fourteenth and fifteenth divisions, with all the Cavalry of the Corps, or 24,000 Infantry, 4,000 Cavalry, and 76 guns.

Upon reference to the Russian bulletin relative to the battle of Akhaltzik in Asia, published in the "Presse" of the 22nd December, and addressed by Prince Andronikoff to Prince Woronzow, it will be seen that seven battalions and a half, or one brigade of the thirteenth division which belongs to the fifth Corps, was engaged in that affair.

In these calculations the battalion of Infantry is taken at 700 men, which is fully as strong as they have shown themselves in this war.

Hence it would appear that, exclusive of Cossacks and Dragoons, six regiments of which were, according to Sir H. Seymour, ordered into the Principalities, there can only be as follows, effective and present in Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.
Third Corps . .	36,000	4,000	112
Fourth Corps . .	36,000	4,000	112
Fifth Corps . .	24,000	4,000	76
Total .	96,000	12,000	300

Or counting 20 men men per gun,

Infantry . . .	96,000
Cavalry . . .	16,000
Artillery . . .	6,000
Sappers, &c. . .	3,000
Total .	121,000

I have entered into the subject thus fully in order to try and elucidate the true force of the enemy.

Unfortunately there is scarcely any information as to the actual numbers or names of the regiments as they are at present posted, except as regards Kalafat. It appears from the numbers on the shakos and shoulder-straps of the men killed at Isctaté, and from the information obtained from deserters and prisoners, that the first brigade of the tenth division were in front of Kalafat at that time, so that these are probably a division of the fourth Corps, Dannenberg's, and the Cavalry of the fifth division of the fifth Corps, Lüder's, now opposite Kalafat.

I counted myself 16 guns, or the complement attached to an Infantry brigade, on the 24th March at Oltenitza, and there cannot be less than a

division between Bucharest and Giurgivo, and a brigade between Bucharest and Krajova. There is also a brigade opposite Silistria, which would leave out of the eight divisions or sixteen brigades present in Bessarabia and the Principalities, nine brigades as possibly on the south and to the eastward of it.

If a division be considered as occupying Odessa, Ackerman, and Bessarabia, there would remain only seven brigades, or 42,000 Infantry, as possibly present in the neighbourhood of Galatz. I would also observe that according to the statements published some time ago in the newspapers, a brigade of the 14th division was either in the Caucasus or Crimea, which would leave only six brigades, or 36,000 men, as possibly near Galatz.

In the absence of positive information, and judging from the careful manner in which the Russians are proceeding in the Dobrudscha, I should doubt even that this force was concentrated at Galatz.

It appears to me highly probable that the passage at Galatz was made with the twofold object, first to secure a base on this side of the Danube, calculating on the Dobrudscha as the line of retreat to be taken in case of necessity, and secondly to draw Omer Pasha into the Dobrudscha with the intention of crossing near Rustchuk, and so cutting him off from Shumla.

The concentration of the Turkish army at this place will however have foiled the enemy in this latter intention.

The comparison however of the Russian bulletins with the tables of the Russian army which I have, will probably throw some light on the subject, and I should be much obliged if your Lordship will have them forwarded to me as soon as they appear in the public papers.

His Highness Omer Pasha still continues most active in his preparations for the defence of this place, and it is determined not to issue from this position, but to endeavour to maintain his army, who are animated with the best possible spirit, in an effective state until the arrival of the allied forces.

If the Russians advance it is his intention to give them battle in the position of Shumla, when he will receive the support of his batteries.

The works lately added, and now in course of addition to those previously constructed, will, I feel no doubt, secure this place until the arrival of the allies.

His Highness, however, trusts that the allies will not advance by the route of Adrianople across the Balkan. He says, and with justice, so far as I can judge from what I have seen of the Trajan's Gate pass, which is one of the best, that it will be a matter of very great difficulty to drag the artillery across the Balkan. The roads are bad, and during the thaw of the snow almost impracticable for Artillery, and the march by Adrianople will occupy two months, when the best of the season for a campaign will be passed, the troops and horses will be much fatigued and diminished in numbers by sickness, and the Russians will have had time to receive reinforcements, and concentrate their forces.

The advance by Adrianople will also have the effect, as soon as known, of declaring the intentions of the allies, and enabling the Russians to weaken their forces on the coast of the Black Sea, and send them towards the Danube.

These observations were made in consequence of a conversation with Colonel Dien, who stated that he had heard that a part of the French troops were on route from Gallipoli for Adrianople, and also of the information which Omer Pasha himself had received that the Government were making contracts for provisions for the allies on the proposed line of march.

He thinks that if it is desired to strike an effective blow and bring the war to a speedy conclusion, no time is to be lost.

The whole policy of Russia has been to gain time to bring up her forces to the scene of action, and now, therefore, before they are all arrived is the moment for action.

A statement of the provisions collected in this place as promised in my despatch No. 3 of the 29th March, is appended to this despatch. The stores have been increased rather than diminished since the date at which I obtained this information.

Your Lordship will perceive that there is a sufficiency of farinaceous food for 50,000 men for nearly three months, but that there is a very great deficiency in meat. This will however be in some measure supplied by the cattle, which will be driven in as the enemy advance.

The provisioning of the allies in Bulgaria will be a matter of very great difficulty, especially in the country between this and the Danube.

The drain upon the resources of the country has already doubled the price of most articles of consumption, and the late movements of concentration upon Shumla will have caused the destruction of a great deal of grain.

If the Russians advance of course what little remains will fall into their hands, and the allies will have, in great measure to depend on what can be brought by sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 173.

Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, April 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform your Lordship, that in a conference with which his Highness Omer Pasha honoured me this morning, he informed me confidentially that he had received last evening an order from the Sublime Porte to leave 15,000 men in Shumla for its defence, and to advance with the rest of his army and take measures for the defence of the line of the Danube between Kalafat and Rustchuk.

His Highness was evidently much surprised at receiving this positive order, and the more so as it came not from the Seraskier, but from the Porte; and after considering the subject in all its bearings, has happily determined for the present not to carry it into execution.

His Highness considers that the dispositions he has made for the protection of the Upper Danube are sufficient to protect the country in its rear against any movement which the enemy are likely to make in that direction, and that the dispersion of his forces along that line would be most detrimental.

The Turkish Government ought to be aware that it is impossible to prevent the passage of a river throughout a length of several hundred miles, upon any point of which a considerable force may be collected to effect it, and therefore that it is useless and absurd to suppose that by any arrangement of his troops, which the Pasha can make, he can prevent an invasion of Bulgaria, if the enemy are decided to make it in force.

Moreover, it is not probable that at the present time, and with the existing distribution of the Turkish army, any such invasion will be made, with a view to a movement in advance upon Roumelia.

The army now concentrated in Shumla could, in such a case, manœuvre upon the enemy's flank and rear; and the destination of the allied armies not being yet determined by any positive act, it is unreasonable to suppose that the Russians would divide their forces so as to make a forward movement upon Roumelia by a passage of the Upper Danube, leaving, as would be necessary, a considerable portion of their army in the Dobrudscha, separated from it, and unable to render it any assistance, when, if this latter position were carried by the allies, the communications of the invading force with Russia would be totally intercepted.

As to the prevention of any partial invasion of Bulgaria by a small force with a view to a rising of the population against the Turks, I beg to refer your Lordship to the statement of the Turkish army, under the command of Omer Pasha, appended to my despatch No. 6 of the 16th instant, which will convince your Lordship that his Highness has not abandoned the line of the Danube, but that the principal points between Kalafat and Silistria are occupied by fortresses or strong detachments; the latter of which, his Highness informs me, have orders to fall back on his second line, Turnova, the Balkan, &c., when they can no longer resist any attack which may be made upon them.

His Highness, as I have already reported to your Lordship, after well considering the relative strength and position of his own forces and those of the enemy, who are superior in numbers, considers that it is above all things necessary that he should maintain the army under his command in an efficient state until the allies can be in a condition to take the field.

This consideration has operated much in inducing his Highness to concentrate so many troops in this place, where they are constantly being drilled and exercised under his own eye, with a view to their being made as efficient as circumstances will permit. If they were scattered in small divisions and detachments in front of Shumla this benefit would cease; but if sent to a distance along the line of the Danube, not only would this benefit cease, but Shumla would be exposed to the greatest danger.

The Turkish Government had, previous to the war, almost entirely neglected to fortify Shumla, and it is alone due to the field-works which have been thrown up under the direction of Omer Pasha since its commencement that Shumla can be held at all against a large army; and, as it is, a force of 15,000 men is altogether insufficient for its defence, and even 50,000 men are not too many. It is, therefore, absurd of the Turkish Government, who cannot be such good judges of passing events and the strength of places as those who know them and are upon the spot, to issue such an order to his Highness, which, if carried into execution, and if the movement were known to the Russians, would, in all probability, cause an attack upon Shumla; which, if successful, as it would have every chance of being, would cause the destruction of the Turkish army, and increase immensely the difficulties of the allied armies.

Another consideration which, probably, has not had the full weight with the Porte which it deserves, is the fact, that such a movement as that contemplated by their order would require a re-arrangement of the magazines and stores which his Highness has collected in Bulgaria.

Finally, if the Government dread an advance of the enemy upon Roumelia, or if they dread a rising among the Christian population, they would probably, if his Highness had carried their order into effect, have done the very thing which would bring about such an event, for there is no danger to be apprehended from the population, except in the case of a successful advance of the enemy.

His Highness feels the extreme difficulty in which this order of the Sublime Porte has placed him; but, nevertheless, has taken upon himself the responsibility of not executing it, and he has no doubt that his determination will meet with the sanction of the high military authorities of the allied armies, with whom he will have to act.

The informs me that General Bosquet of the French army, who arrived here on the 15th instant, and left yesterday for Gallipoli, viâ Adrianople, entirely approved of his arrangements; and also, that he is confirmed in the opinion that there is no extensive movement to be apprehended on the part of the enemy on the Upper Danube, by the latest information he has received from Wallachia, which is to the effect that the Russians were concentrating their forces towards the Dobrudscha.

I have to inform your Lordship that no movement of importance has taken place since I last wrote to your Lordship.

A skirmish took place a few days ago at the village of Galentz, about three miles in front of Kalafat, between two regiments of Turkish Cavalry, supported by a few pieces of Artillery, and a force stated to consist of three regiments of the enemy's Cavalry.

The Turkish Artillery opened their fire upon the enemy with considerable effect, and then charged, when the enemy retired upon his supports of Infantry. The loss of the enemy is stated to be considerable, and the Turks have captured some arms and a few horses.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 173.

Statement of the Ottoman Army in Bulgaria.

STATION.	INFANTRY. Regular. Line.	INFANTRY. Regular. Chasseurs.	INFANTRY. Irregular.	CAVALRY. Regular.	CAVALRY. Irregular.	ARTILLERY. Horsed.	ARTILLERY. Not horsed.	REMARKS.
	Battalions.		Men.	Squadrons.	Horses.	Guns.		
Shumla	48	24	3,000	40	5,000	106	185	Included in this number are 4 battalions of Infantry which have not yet arrived at Shumla, but are expected; 3 regiments of Cavalry (18 squadrons), and 2000 irregular Cavalry, which are detached as advanced posts to Hazardjik, and reconnoitre the country thence to Karasu. The advanced posts of the Russians are on the other side of Karasu.—One regiment of Cavalry is employed observing the Danube between Silistria and Turtukai. Only 4 squadrons are now in Shumla—the remainder are coming from Widdin and Adrianople. There will be 4,550 gunners, and at Shumla after arrival of 1000 expected from Adrianople.
Widdin and Rahelar	22	1	4,000	12	6,000	51	Abundant, number not known.	Most of the irregular Cavalry are in rear of Widdin to keep the Bulgarians in check.
	4	...	1,600	...	188	12	10	In case of necessity these troops retire upon Somoucheu Balkan. The guns are ordered to be removed to the Balkan.
Rahowa	2	1 Company	2,000	...	100	3	More than 60	
Nicopolis	3	1 Company	620	2	685	5	1	In case of necessity these troops retire upon Tirnova.
Sistov	10	1 Company	...	1	345	6	Abundant, about 300	
Rustchuk	...	...	1,100	6	71	...	...	Merely as a corps of observation.
				4	294	4	Abundant.	One regiment of Sappers, 1200 men.
Turtukai	10	2 Companies	...	...	200	...	...	
Silistria	2	...	...	...	100	...	8 field pieces.	
Varna	4	...	...	...	...	...	12 field pieces.	See note above relative to Sistov.
Pravadi	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	The two passes by Trajan's Gate and Somoucheu are well provided with artillery.
Tirnova	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Trajan's Gate	4	...	1,360	4	1,360	24	24 field pieces.	
Sophia								
Total	126	4	13,730	69	14,343	212		

SUMMARY.

Infantry.—130 battalions at 700	91,000		
Irregulars	13,730	104,730	
Cavalry.—69 squadrons = 11½ regiments at 750	8,625		
Irregulars	14,343	22,968	

Brought forward		127,698
Artillery.—At Shumla	4,550	
Elsewhere, number not given but estimated	5,000	9,550
Sappers		1,200
Grand Total		138,448

Artillery field pieces, horsed, 212.

April 15, 1854.

Inclosure 4 in No. 173.

Substance of the Despatches received from the Vali of Widdin.

April 23, 1854.

(Translation.)

ON Monday the 17th, at about 9 A.M., six squadrons of regular Russian Cavalry, eight squadrons of Cossacks, and a battery of Artillery, were marched upon Kalufat, to a distance without cannon range, with the object of carrying our outposts.

We sent out a body of regular and irregular Cavalry, with eight guns, under the command of the Ferik Halim Pasha, and beat off the enemy, after an engagement of three hours, with considerable loss on his part. We pursued the Russians for three miles, and took a number of muskets, swords, lances and other arms, with some horses.

We had fifteen Irregulars killed, and thirty-three wounded.

Inclosure 5 in No. 173.

Mehmed Pasha to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, le 2 Mai, 1854.

M. l'Amiral,

LA frégate Anglaise le "Terrible" nous a apporté la nouvelle du succès remporté à Odessa par les flottes alliées; il est inutile de vous dire la joie que nous en avons ressentie.

Par ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan, la flotte Turque doit entrer Jeudi dans la Mer Noire; elle sera bientôt, je l'espère, rendue près de vous. Le commandement général en est confié au Ferik Ahmed Pacha, ayant pour second Hassan Pacha, Commandant de la division Egyptienne. Ils ont l'ordre de se réunir immédiatement aux escadres alliées, et d'agir entièrement de concert avec elles pendant toute la durée de la campagne qu'elles ont si glorieusement commencée. Le renfort que nous vous envoyons est sans doute peu considérable; mais c'est la confiance du Sultan et c'est aussi la mienne qu'officiers et matelots s'efforceront, par leur zèle et par leur courage, de rendre de bons services, malgré leur petit nombre, aux escadres alliées, et que si leur secours, que la force de ces escadres rend du reste inutile, ne peut être que d'un poids secondaire dans la balance de la victoire, ils sauront du moins, en face des dangers qu'ils brûlent de partager, se montrer dignes de combattre près de vous.

Sur les bâtiments qui, dans deux jours, doivent quitter le Bosphore, se trouveront un certain nombre de Circassiens, dont plusieurs, tels qu'Ismail Bey, Bechet Pacha, et Sefer Pacha, ont une grande influence sur leurs compatriotes: le dernier surtout a longtems commandé les Circassiens pendant leur lutte constante contre les Russes, et son fils est encore aujourd'hui à leur tête. Ils auront avec eux 6 canons et 250 projectiles pour chaque pièce, 5,000 ou 6,000 fusils, et près de 500 caisses de cartouches avec 75,000 pierres à feu. Leur débarquement sur les côtes de la Circassie avec ces armes et ces munitions, serait de nature, dans la pensée du Gouvernement Impérial, à redoubler l'énergie et l'ardeur de leurs compatriotes et à devenir le signal, dans ce pays, d'une attaque générale contre les Russes.

Dans le cas où il vous paraîtrait utile de disposer de quelques troupes de terre, soit pour attaquer les positions militaires des Russes, soit pour occuper celles qui pourraient leur être enlevées, Selim Pacha, Commandant du corps d'armée de Batoum, a reçu l'ordre de tenir toujours dans cette ville quatre bataillons, avec leur munitions de guerre, prêts à être embarqués en tout ou en partie à la première requisition qui lui viendrait des flottes et cela pour être transportés partout où vous les croiriez nécessaire.

Il ne me reste plus, M. l'Amiral, qu'à vous souhaiter beaux succès et heureux retour. S'il ne m'est point possible, durant cette campagne, de me joindre à vous de corps, comme je l'aurais voulu, mon esprit et mon cœur du moins sont avec vous, avec ces braves officiers et ces intrépides équipages près

desquels je serais heureux que votre Excellence voulût bien être l'interprète des sentiments d'admiration et de reconnaissance qui ne sont point seulement les miens, mais ceux de ma nation tout entière. Puisse le Ciel protéger leurs nobles et généreux efforts et les ramener promptement glorieux et triomphants à Constantinople.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) MEHMED.

No. 174.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 18.)

(No. 211.)

Constantinople, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

PRINCE NAPOLEON arrived here on Monday the 1st instant, and took up his residence in one of the two palaces on the Bosphorus, which His Majesty the Sultan had ordered to be prepared, respectively, for the Duke of Cambridge and His Imperial Highness.

On Tuesday he received the diplomatic body in uniform; and on Wednesday he dined with the French Ambassador, where the Turkish and Foreign Ministers, Lord Raglan, and other distinguished individuals, were assembled to meet him.

On the day following, an unusual incident took place. The Sultan himself paid a visit in private to the French Prince, the Grand Vizier having preceded His Majesty the day before.

Prince Napoleon has since presented his compliments in person to the principal Ministers of State. He proposed to extend the courtesy to Mehemet Ali, the Sultan's brother-in-law, but the ex-Seraskier requested permission to wait himself on the Prince, and the consequence was a long secret interview between them at His Imperial Highness's residence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 18.)

(No. 212.)

Constantinople, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of some further correspondence which has taken place between Vice-Admiral Dundas and myself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 175.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off Odessa, April 22, 1854.

My Lord,

AS it is very probable a quantity of ammunition and live shells may be sent to Constantinople for the use of the squadron, more than sufficient for immediate use, or more than can be safely stowed on board the several ships, I beg your Excellency will be so good as to obtain from the Porte some convenient and suitable store or magazine for their safe deposit.

Mr. Mowbray, the Naval Agent at Galata, will have the charge of the ammunition, &c., and attend to the directions that may be given on this subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 175.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *off Odessa, April* 22, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour in reply to the second and third paragraphs of your Excellency's letter to me of the 19th April, to refer you to my letter of the 9th instant, No. 92, wherein I have acquainted your Excellency with the opinion of Vice-Admiral Hamelin and myself, as to the employment of the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons in the Black Sea, and I remain of the same opinion, that those squadrons should not extend their cruise at the most beyond Varna, and should be distributed as Admiral Hamelin and I proposed; but from confidential letters I have received from Mr. Wyse, ships are required on the coast of Greece to blockade the different harbours, and also to prevent piracy, there the Turkish men-of-war would be far more useful than cruizing in the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 175.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *off Odessa, April* 24, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that a steam division of the combined squadrons destroyed the Imperial Mole and Russian shipping at Odessa, on the 22nd instant, the Quarantine Mole, foreign shipping and the city were not molested, great care having been taken to respect all neutral and private property.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, May 2, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatches to 105 inclusive.

The Porte is so desirous of sending a considerable portion of its fleet into the Black Sea, that I have not thought it right to oppose the measure, especially as the Turkish Admiral will be instructed to join his forces to those of the allied Governments, and to act according to any opinions which in concert with Rear-Admiral Hamelin you may think proper to express to him.

I understand that the present intention, as stated to Mr. Pisani, by the Captain Pasha, is to send six sail of the line with two or three steamers into the Black Sea, and the squadron is expected to be ready for going to sea the day after to-morrow.

Should you think it advisable after the receipt of Captain Spratt's report and survey, to advise that a part of the Turkish squadron should be anchored off Varna with a view to the eventual protection of that place, I am given to believe that your advice will be followed by the Admiral in command.

In like manner your opinion will guide the Admiral Ahmed as to any operations on the coast of Circassia. Persons qualified to assist in communicating with the inhabitants of that country, are I am assured to accompany the squadron.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, May 2, 1854.

Sir,

MY apprehensions respecting an increase of piracy in the Archipelago appear to be realized, as you will learn from the accompanying copy of a despatch addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, under date of the 28th ultimo, and the memorial annexed to it.

I am informed, moreover, that the transports which brought some of Her Majesty's troops to Gallipoli are fearful of entering through the Archipelago without convoy.

The Turkish Ministers, to whom I have proposed the expediency, according to your suggestion, of sending ships rather into the Archipelago than into the Black Sea, are unwilling to expose the larger ones to danger from fireships, the Greeks on former occasions having shown so much expertness in directing those engines of destruction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 175.

Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Smyrna, April 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that an English vessel called the "Sarah," Captain Cole, which arrived a few days ago from Trieste, at Alatyatta (near Chesme), there to load a cargo of fruit, was attacked a few hours after anchoring in that port by two piratical boats, containing about forty men, who robbed her of everything portable, a quantity of provisions, and even the clothes of the crew. They were very eager in their search for money, and, being disappointed at not finding any on board, threatened the captain's life, but, fortunately, did not maltreat him.

As the town of Alatyatta is at a considerable distance from the shore the pirates were able to get off with their booty before any assistance could be procured.

Two vessels, one Hanoverian and the other English, have lately been fallen in with off Andros, abandoned by their crews, who are supposed to have been murdered, marks of blood having been discovered on their decks.

It is to be feared that piracy will increase in the Archipelago in the absence of any ships of war to check its progress.

The shipmasters now in this port are afraid to put to sea, and I, therefore, beg to submit to your Excellency's consideration the necessity of a vessel being stationed here, if possible, for the protection of our trade, and to afford convoy to British vessels passing down the Archipelago.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. D. BRANT.

No. 176.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 277. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord,

Berlin, May 16, 1854.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 250 of the 5th instant, I have now the honour to inclose in copy, and translation, the Secret Military Articles of the Austro-Prussian Treaty. This document has been communicated to me by

Baron Manteuffel, with the request that your Lordship will consider it as strictly confidential, and will not make any allusion to your being acquainted with it in your communications with the Prussian Legation.

I have, &c
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 176.

Military Convention between Prussia and Austria for the maintenance of the German Offensive and Defensive Alliance.

(Translation.)

IN order to give the necessary guarantee and force to the Offensive and Defensive Alliance entered into by the States of the Germanic Confederation for the duration of the Oriental crisis, the two foremost great Powers of Germany, Prussia and Austria, have reciprocally engaged themselves to the following measures:

1. Austria binds herself, in case of need, to place as a second army, in addition to the 150,000 men already stationed in Hungary, as well as on the Danube and the Save, another 100,000 men, at periods to be determined upon with Prussia. Her troops mobilised in Galicia, Transylvania, and Moravia, and thereupon to be assembled in Galicia, either as a whole or in part, will continue in the closest communication with the active forces to be stationed in Prussia.

2. Prussia binds herself on the other hand to have, within thirty-six days, 190,000 men concentrated, as circumstances may require, with one-third in East Prussia, but with two-thirds near Posen and Breslaw, and, in case of need, and on a momentary agreement to be then taken with Austria, to increase this number of troops in three weeks after to 200,000 men.

3. The general regulations established in the Military Convention of the Germanic Confederation are also binding on Prussia and Austria to their full extent.

4. The Prussian Ministry of War, as well as the Imperial Austrian Supreme Command of the Army, are bound reciprocally to make every communication which may guarantee the strict maintenance of the above-named active forces, both as regards their number, their state of preparation, the periods at which they are to be supplied, as also of the particular points to which they are to be directed.

5. Superior officers of both armies are to be accredited to their respective states from the commencement of Prussia's mobilisation for a full and constant mutual concert of measures, and then, later, to their respective armies.

6. As a military rule for the allied armies the principle is laid down that the object of the mutual assistance is only the repulse of an attack.

(Signed) OTTO THEODOR MANTEUFFEL. (L.S.)
HENRY F. F. V. HESS. (L.S.)

Done at Berlin, April 20, 1854.

No. 177.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 278. Confidential.)

Berlin, May 16, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT ALVENSLEBEN has proceeded to Vienna, and is charged with an autograph letter from the King to the Emperor of Austria, and with a private letter also from Baron Manteuffel to Count Buol; but he is not provided, as I am informed, with any official instructions.

The mission would appear to be wrapped up in mystery; but I am nevertheless assured in the most positive manner, that there is no wish on the part of this country to prevent the execution of the Austro-Prussian Treaty, as is generally reported.

Information having, however, reached me from a private source, that the King's above-mentioned letter contained allusions which might bear a different sense, I asked several questions of Baron Manteuffel on the subject, and learnt

that the King has been pressing on the Emperor of Austria the propriety of postponing for a while the summons to be addressed to the Emperor of Russia to evacuate the Principalities, and urging that the terms in which the summons to be addressed to His Imperial Majesty should be drawn up in a tone which would be as little offensive as possible to the Court of St. Petersburgh. I learnt also, that the King has urged on the Emperor of Austria the propriety of his being crowned King of Hungary, and the advantage that would perhaps result from his not following implicitly the policy of centralisation recommended by Baron Bach, which his Prussian Majesty thinks impossible to be carried out.

There are rumours of other and important matters being contained in this letter, but I have not been able to ascertain the truth of them. I may, however, report the most important one, which is, that the King insinuates that the military preparations of France are on a scale to excite alarm, that the camp at St. Omer may be easily directed against Prussia, and the one at Marseilles against Italy, and that, consequently, it was necessary to be careful what steps were taken, as Germany might find herself with war on both sides. The whole tone of this letter appears intended, notwithstanding the assurance to the contrary, to shake the decisions of the Emperor of Austria, to gain time, in the hope of preventing the intervention of Germany in the Eastern question until it will be too late this year to commence hostilities, and that when autumn approaches negotiations can be resumed with a better chance of leading to some arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 178.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 281.)

Berlin, May 16, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL mentioned to me to-day that he has received a despatch from St. Petersburgh of the 11th instant, reporting that Count Nesselrode had completely recovered his equanimity and good spirits, that he saw no use in attempting negotiations for peace at the present moment, but that he felt confident that coming events would produce a desire with all parties to put an end to the state of warfare now existing.

I told Baron Manteuffel that this intelligence was further proof of the uselessness of supposing that Russia was, as many persons attempted to show, desirous of putting an end to the war; for no reasonable proposition, none that would be acceptable to the Western Powers, had ever been brought forward, and that the fair words to Baron Werthern were probably the result of the news which must have arrived, of the changes about to take place at Berlin. Further, I said, time was what Russia wanted, in order to complete her own military preparations, and she no doubt hoped that Prussia would continue in her present mood, which was all she required or wished at this moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 179.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 8.)

Hanover, May 17, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Minister and the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires here have communicated to this Government the Treaty lately concluded between the Cabinets of Vienna and of Berlin.

The latter was in possession of his instructions to this effect some days before the former had received his, but waited until they could take the step in question simultaneously.

They, at the same time, in the name of their respective Courts, invited the Hanoverian Government to give in their adhesion to the Treaty.

A secret Article appended to the Treaty was not communicated until an assurance in writing had been given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the tenor of it would, not under any consideration, be divulged.

It remains to be seen whether this and the other minor Powers of Germany will, by separately coming to a decision as to this Treaty, further the insidious scheme attributed to Prussia, of endeavouring by various means to weaken the authority of the Diet, especially by withdrawing from that body the faculty of collectively deciding upon such matters which is conferred upon it by its Constitution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 180.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 265.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 19, 1854.*

WITH reference to Captain Simmons' report to your Excellency, of the 23rd ultimo, of which a copy forms Inclosure No. 2 in your despatch No 210 of the 5th instant, and in which he states that he had been informed by Omer Pasha that the Porte had instructed him to leave 15,000 men for the defence of Shumla, and to advance with the rest of his army for the defence of the line of the Danube, I have to state to your Excellency, that now that the allied forces are arrived in Turkey, it is to be hoped that the Porte will issue no more orders such as those of which Captain Simmons clearly proves the absurdity, and which Omer Pasha properly determined to disregard.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 181.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 616. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris May 19, 1854.*

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 614, I have the honour to state that M. Drouyn de Lhuys read to me this morning a memorandum which he had caused to be drawn up, showing the advantages which would result to France and England could some of the smaller States be induced to join the Anglo-French Alliance against Russia. The countries alluded to principally in this memorandum are Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and Sardinia. I remarked nothing new in the arguments adduced by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to support his proposition, nor did he tell me with what intention the memorandum had been composed, further than that it was to be submitted to the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 182.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 622.)
My Lord, *Paris, May 19, 1854.*

THE Austrian Minister has made a communication to the French Government, which I gather from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to be of the following tenor:—

Count Buol relates that the Duke of Cambridge, during his late visit to

Vienna, showed a great desire to obtain some information respecting the intentions of Austria during the ensuing war between the Western Powers and Russia, and, above all, to know whether Austria would aid the British and French forces by attacking the Russian army in the Principalities. Count Buol observes that it was impossible for the Austrian Government to give the information asked for by His Royal Highness, for in fact Austria could form no plan until she saw the allied troops disembarked in Turkey, and was made aware of the operations which they intended to undertake. But it did not appear that any plan of operations had been decided upon by the allied Generals. How then could Austria be required to state her intentions, when they must in a great measure depend on the line of action pursued by the allied forces. Count Buol observes further, that if this hesitation on the part of Austria should induce the allied Generals to direct their operations to some other quarter than the Balkan or the Danube, he must admit their right to do so, though he would see objections to it.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys what was meant by Austria having objections, and whether they were political or strategic. He replied that he had questioned M. de Hübner on this point, observing that he could not understand the right of Austria to object to any plan to which the allies might be forced by her hesitating conduct, and that M. de Hübner had shown some embarrassment of manner, and had appeared to regret having read aloud the passage in question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 183.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 213.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, May 6, 1854.*

THE day before yesterday I presented Lord Raglan to the Sultan at a private audience. His Lordship was graciously received. The Sultan took occasion to repeat his acknowledgments for the assistance rendered by Her Majesty the Queen to his Empire and to himself. He said that England had given many proofs of her friendly regard for the Ottoman Empire, but that she had now surpassed all former precedents. He added that, although he was no soldier himself, he had heard of Lord Raglan's reputation, and as he cordially wished, so he doubted not, that it would still be increased.

I took advantage of the opportunity to repeat my earnest advice that greater vigour should be exerted in providing for the public necessities. I referred, in particular, to the want of money and supplies, without which no branch of the service, and least of all the army, could be efficient. The Sultan cast the blame upon his Ministers, intimating that the difficulty lay with them and not with himself. He instanced the road which was to have been made from Broussa to the Sea of Marmora, observing that authority had been given and funds supplied, but that his Ministers had not carried out the plan, and heaven only knew what had become of the money! He contrasted with this example of remissness a road which had been made under his own eyes, and which had been completed in a satisfactory manner. His Majesty concluded by appealing to my experience, and I was obliged in justice to admit that, whenever I had applied directly to him for a special object, I had experienced some new effect of his condescension.

Unfortunately cases of this kind are of necessity exceptional, and the Ministers frequently excuse their dilatoriness, of which I complain, by asserting that the Sultan's assent has not been given.

Before leaving His Majesty's presence I reminded him of Ahmed and Ali, the two late commanders of the army in Asia, and represented once more the importance of visiting their criminal proceedings with signal punishment. The Sultan acquiesced in my remarks, but the terms which he employed in

answering them indicated some reserve with respect to the former, who is little deserving of indulgence, though probably supported by some secret influence. Of Ali Ferik, His Majesty was pleased to say that he had committed the act of an assassin, and deserved no mercy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 184.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.— (Received May 20.)

(No. 214. Confidential.)

Constantinople, May 8, 1854.

My Lord,

PRINCE NAPOLEON has now been here a week, and I understand that he means to prolong his visit beyond the period which he had originally named. He has been treated with much hospitality by the Sultan, and with the most respectful attention by His Majesty's Ministers. The Sultan paid him the unusual, and, I believe, unprecedented compliment of a personal visit. A splendid banquet is to be given to him to-day at the Palace, and it is rumoured, that the Sultan will himself sit down to table, which he has never yet done on similar occasions. The Prince, on his side, has called in person on the leading Ministers, and he visits the common objects of curiosity with all the ardour of a young traveller. I have had myself, but two opportunities of seeing him; once when I went as a member of the diplomatic body, to pay my respects to His Imperial Highness, and, a second time, at the dinner given to him by the French Ambassador. On both these occasions I found his manner natural, and his conversation unreserved. The state belonging to his princely rank was, however, fully displayed. The Foreign Ministers were expressly invited to appear in uniform; the Ambassador himself attended in his richest costume, and the Secretary of Embassy performed the duties of gentleman-usher.

The Prince's manner in receiving me was affable. He held out his hand, and placed me on the sofa at his side. He talked of the war and its difficulties, of the sacrifices it involved, both for England and France, and of the resources, particularly in point of endurance and evasion, possessed by Russia. His language at the same time intimated that the game was to be played out, that France would eventually put no limits to her assistance, and that results commensurate with the sacrifices were to be sought.

At dinner I had the honour of sitting next to him. He talked with good humour, and vivacity, but nothing of interest or novelty, either in thought or expression, attracted my attention. One sentiment it gave me pleasure to hear from the lips of a Prince, who is in the direct line of succession to a powerful throne. Alluding to the frequent dynastic changes of the age, he said, that the great thing was to do as much good as possible while power lasted, and to resign it with a good grace when no longer tenable. He spoke of the Emperor as worthy of the fullest confidence, and superior in mental qualities to all around him. He expressed a strong wish that the idea of forming a Polish legion should be carried into effect without delay, and he mentioned General Wysocki with interest.

Some toasts were given after dinner. It was remarked that the Prince's health was given before that of the Emperor, that the Sultan's was given last, and that no allusion whatever was made to Her Majesty the Queen, or to British co-operation.

I now beg leave to draw your Lordship's attention to a secret report addressed to me by M. Pisani, and inclosed herewith in copy. Though it touches on several topics, they all have reference to Prince Napoleon, who, in declaring his opinions, would seem to have borne in mind rather his quality of Prince than his rank as an officer.

With respect to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, I will only allow myself to state that I am not suprised; and if a portion of his Embassy were included in the censure, there is reason to believe that little injustice would be done.

That the Commanders-in-chief should meet without unnecessary delay, is, indeed, most desirable. But I greatly question the expediency of authorising Omer Pasha to leave his army at the present juncture, and I should hear with more satisfaction that Varna had been selected as the place of meeting.

There is no want of truth, unfortunately, in the supposition that Omer Pasha and the Seraskier are not on cordial terms. I am assured that there is no substantial ground of difference between them, and I have myself endeavoured to prepare the way for a complete reconciliation.

The continued exclusion of the late Seraskier, Mehmed Ali, from the Cabinet is, in my humble judgment, essential to any tolerable administration of the public interests at this time; and as the French Prince did not entirely abstain from interfering on his behalf, I rejoice to learn from M. Pisani's report that His Imperial Highness appeared at least to acquiesce in the soundness of Riza Pasha's objections.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 184.

Mr. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Secret and Confidential.)

Pera, May 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that Reshid Pasha informed me that in a visit which Riza Pasha paid last night to Prince Napoleon, His Imperial Highness spoke very unfavourably of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and highly disapproved his conduct in the question lately mooted respecting the Catholic subjects of King Otho. His Highness advised the Pasha to urge the Sultan to write to the Emperor and demand his recall. But Riza Pasha having observed that he thought his Imperial Master would not do so, the Prince suggested that if His Majesty the Sultan was not inclined to adopt that step, his Ministers, at least, Reshid Pasha, ought to write to M. Drouyn de Lhuys. He added, that the Ambassador was not equal to the task he was called upon to fulfil, and that the sooner he was recalled the better.

Subsequently he spoke of the necessity of the Commanders-in-chief meeting together, with a view to concert about the plan of operations, and proposed that as soon as Marshal St. Arnaud arrives here, either Omer Pasha should repair to Constantinople, or the commanders of the allied forces should proceed to Shumla.

Reshid Pasha seems to think, for the good of the service, that Omer Pasha had better come to Constantinople, as it will be a fair opportunity for him to have also an explanation with the Seraskier Pasha, with whom it would appear he is not on very friendly terms.

Reshid Pasha further stated, that the Prince acquainted Riza Pasha with Mehmed Ali Pasha's visit, and gave him to understand that he (Mehmed Ali) seems very anxious to be employed in some capacity or other. The Seraskier availed himself of the opportunity to explain to the Prince why Mehmed Ali Pasha was dismissed, and added, that although he had nothing personal against him, his humble opinion was, that were he to form part of the present administration, he would do more harm than good. The Prince duly appreciated the motives put forward by the Seraskier Pasha, and assured him that he had no intention whatever to intercede with the the Sultan in his favour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 185.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 20.)

(No. 215.)

Constantinople, May 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE this day exchanged the ratifications of the Treaty concluded on the 12th of March, between the Representatives of England, France, and Turkey. The ratifications of their Imperial Majesties the Emperor of the French and Sultan Abdul-Medjid, which I have received in return for Her Majesty's ratifications from Reshid Pasha and General Baraguay d'Hilliers respectively, are forwarded to England herewith.

The two certificates sent to me for signature from your Lordship's office, are returned by the same opportunity signed.

The respective ratifications differ from each other in the French part, each Power having adopted its own form, but the signification is essentially the same, and that, I presume, is all which the case requires.

A French translation of the Sultan's ratification is inclosed herewith. The expressions are taken from the preamble to the Treaty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 185.

Ratification.

NOUS, Sultan Abdul Medjid Kan, par la grâce de Dieu Empereur de Turquie :

Savoir faisans par les présentes que leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et l'Empereur des Français ayant été invités de notre part à nous fournir des secours pour repousser l'injuste agression qui a été faite contre nos états par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et qui met en danger l'indépendance et l'intégrité de notre Empire, et leurs dites Majestés de leur côté pleinement convaincues que l'existence de notre Empire dans les limites actuelles est essentielle à l'équilibre Européen, ayant consenti à nous fournir les secours que nous avons demandé dans ce but, il a été jugé à propos qu'un Traité fût conclu entre nous et leurs dites Majestés, pour développer leurs intentions analogues à la question, et pour régler la manière dont leurs dites Majestés nous prêtent leurs secours et leur assistance, avons nommé et muni de pleins pouvoirs à cet effet, savoir :

De notre part, l'Illustre Mustapha Réchid Pacha, l'ex-Grand Vizir, actuellement notre Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères, décoré de notre Ordre Impérial le Medjedié de première classe et de cinq divers Ordres de Nishans Imtiayes, Grand-Croix de la Légion d'Honneur de l'Aiglé Rouge de Prusse, des Ordres Espagnols de Charles III et Isabelle la Catholique, d'un Ordre de Sa Sainteté le Pape, de l'Ordre de Belgique de Léopolde : de celui du Lion Néerlandais, de l'Ordre Suédois de Vasa, de celui de St. Maurice et Lazare ; de l'Ordre Portugais de la Tour et de l'Epée ; de l'Ordre de St. Louis de Parme, &c., &c. ;

De la part de Sa Majesté la Reine de sa Grande Bretagne, le Très Honorable Stratford, Vicomte Stratford de Redcliffe, Pair du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, son Conseiller Privé Chevalier Grand-Croix de l'Honorable Ordre du Bain et son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près notre Sublime Porte ;

Et de la part de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, le Comte Baraguay d'Hilliers, Général de Division, Grand-Croix de la Légion d'Honneur, et son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près notre Sublime Porte ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leur pleins pouvoirs respectifs trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont signé à Constantinople le [illegible] 1854, un Traité muni du cachet de leurs armes, et rédigé en langue Française en trois exemplaires originaux, renfermant cinq Articles parlant mot à mot ce qui suit :—

(Suit le Traité.)

Article I, &c., &c.

* * * * * *

Nous, après avoir lu et examiné les Articles du dit Traité inséré ci-dessus textuellement, les avons trouvés en tout point conforme à notre volonté. En conséquence nous les avons approuvé, conformé et ratifié, comme par les présents nous les approuvons, confirmons, et ratifions, promettant d'en accomplir fidèlement et invariablement le contenu.

En foi de quoi nous avons fait munir de notre secau Impérial cet acte de ratification en deux expéditions conformes, dont l'une sera echangée contre les actes de ratification de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français et l'autre contre les actes de ratification de Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et l'Irlande.

Fait à Constantinople vers le fin de Rejeb, 1270 (1854).

No. 186.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 20.)

(No. 216.)

Constantinople, May 9, 1854.

My Lord,

IT is not true that the Sultan had any intention of taking his seat at table on the occasion of the banquet given yesterday by His Majesty to Prince Napoleon. He appeared, as usual, in the saloon before dinner, and after paying his compliments to the Prince went round the circle of guests invited to meet His Imperial Highness. Toasts were given with the dessert, but limited in number to three, namely, the health of the Emperor of the French, that of Sultan Abdul-Medjid, and finally that of Prince Napoleon, his guest. The Prince read a short speech expressed in appropriate terms.

Such is the tenour of the report which I have received. To my great regret I was unable to attend the dinner myself. I had made a considerable exertion in the morning to exchange the ratifications of our Tripartite Treaty at Reshid Pasha's house, where the meeting was appointed. On returning home I found a decided manifestation of gout, and with it no choice but to send an excuse. Unfortunately Lord Raglan was also indisposed, and equally unable to go.

With the view of preventing any possible misconstruction, I wrote to the French Ambassador requesting that he would express my regret to the Prince. His Imperial Highness sent an officer to inquire after my health, and the Sultan did me a similar honour by means of one of his Chamberlains.

I mention these circumstances because I understand that signs of dissatisfaction appeared among the French, owing, as it would seem, to some delay in serving the dinner, and to some difficulty in arranging the toasts.

On the last point there had been a discussion in the morning between Reshid Pasha and General Baraguay, who insisted that the Emperor's health should be drank to the exclusion of other Sovereigns, and before that of the Sultan. This took place in my presence, and I was urged to give an opinion. I endeavoured to evade the appeal by saying that to my mind such matters were best left to the host ; but, constrained to speak out, I said that the toasts might with perfect propriety be confined to the Sultan and the Prince, or, if more were desirable, that the health of the Emperor of the French and that of Her Majesty the Queen, followed by a compliment to the States in friendship with the Porte, might be proposed with good effect.

Other matters of disagreement have occurred between the parties.

First, an individual named Durutti, suspected of being a Russian spy, was arrested some days ago. The French Embassy claimed him as under its protection, and one of its interpreters, deaf to every representation, took him away

from the police. An Ionian, named Civinis, the Porte's principal agent in arresting the man, was accused of having violated the rights of the French Embassy, and his dismissal was peremptorily demanded. Reshid Pasha resisted the demand, alleging that Civinis had acted under an express order from him. This was not sufficient in the eyes of the French Ambassador, and a victim is still required, though Durutti was only in possession of a Roman passport, and strongly suspected of being by birth either a Rayah or an Hellenic subject. Moreover it is not at all clear that the French Embassy has any authority for claiming a right to protect Papal subjects in Turkey.

Secondly, the Porte was known to have adopted the resolution of removing Vely Pasha, the Grand Vizier's son, from Paris, of appointing Namik Pasha in his place, of transferring the former Ambassador to the Government of Candia, and of bringing Mehemet Pasha, the present Mushir of that island, up to Constantinople, where he would resume his Ministerial functions as head of the police. For some reason or other the French Government wishes to keep Vely Pasha at Paris, and the French Ambassador appears to have been very decided in urging this demand on Reshid Pasha. The Ottoman Minister declared that the question was not in his hands, and that the proposed change proceeded immediately from the Sultan. At the Imperial Palace yesterday, before dinner, Prince Napoleon repeated the same demand to Reshid Pasha, and, on receiving a similar reply, demanded an immediate audience of the Sultan. This was granted, and he succeeded in obtaining a kind of promise, apparently much against His Majesty's inclination, and from special deference to the Emperor, that Vely Pasha should remain Ambassador at Paris.

Inclosed herewith, in copy, is a report addressed to me by M. Pisani. It will serve to inform your Lordship of any particulars which I may have omitted through inadvertence.

Much disgust has been occasioned by these and preceding transactions. It is thought no less ungenerous than impolitic that a foreign Power, which, in concert with others, has laid the Sultan under a weight of gratitude, shou take advantage of his obligation to dictate concessions irrelevant of the pending question, and calculated to display the weakness which it professes to uphold.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 186.

Mr. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, May 9, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that General Baraguay d'Hilliers remonstrated with Reshid Pasha on the subject of the arrest of Signor Durutti, and wanted his Highness to dismiss immediately Mr. Civinis, whom he said had caused him to be apprehended and sent to the police. The Pasha refused to comply with the Ambassador's demand, and observed that Mr. Civinis having acted in pursuance of instructions from the Porte, was not to be blamed in any way. Then Reshid Pasha asked him how it happened that Signor Durutti being a French subject as stated, had not produced his passport to the police. The General replied that he was not exactly a French subject, but that he was in possession of a Roman passport, which entitled him to the protection of the Embassy. He proceeded to complain that the Porte was paying little attention to the French Government, and was endeavouring to disparage the Embassy on every occasion.

He afterwards complained of the recall of Veli Pasha, and said that the Emperor will be much displeased when he is apprised of this decision. Reshid Pasha explained to the French Ambassador how the matter stands, and gave him to understand that he had nothing to say to it, and that it was the Sultan's own pleasure that he should be recalled. General Baraguay spoke in such an authoritative and dictatorial manner, that Reshid Pasha is unwilling to keep on his intercourse any longer, and has made up his mind to tender his resignation. Because, said, he, the General becomes every day more and more unbearable, and he foresees that some unpleasant scene will happen one of these days, which will lead to some serious question between the two Governments, and in

order to avoid being the cause of such scandal, he has resolved upon retiring from office.

At the dinner which took place yesterday at the palace of Beyler Bey, Prince Napoleon spoke to Reshid Pasha respecting Veli Pasha's recall, and expressed regret, and repeated what the Ambassador said in the morning. His Highness gave to the Prince the same reply he had given to General Baraguay. Upon which the Prince asked to see the Sultan, and was introduced to His Majesty by Kiamil Bey. After a few minutes interview, the Sultan promised to confirm Veli Pasha in his post, out of deference for the Emperor. As soon as the Prince left the Sultan, His Majesty summoned Reshid Pasha to his presence, and told him what had passed, and without positively saying so, he gave him to understand that the Prince complained of him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 187.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 218.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 10*, 1854.

MARSHAL ST. ARNAUD arrived here the evening before last. Yesterday he did me the honour of calling with the French Ambassador, but unfortunately I was confined to my bedchamber by indisposition, and consequently unable to see him.

It may be presumed that the respective Commanders-in-chief will seek an early opportunity of meeting, and come to an understanding as to the most advisable mode of cooperating against the common enemy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 188.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 219.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 10*, 1854.

THE Duke of Cambridge is arrived in Her Majesty's steam-ship "Carndoc," and the batteries are saluting His Royal Highness at this moment.

Unable to leave my room, and consequently deprived of the honour of waiting in person on His Royal Highness, I have sent Mr. Alison to conduct him to the Palace prepared for his reception; and, after affording him all necessary information, to take His Royal Highness's pleasure.

I had previously sent Mr. Brodie to receive His Royal Highness at the Dardanelles, and to attend him on his way to the capital.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRAFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 189.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 222.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 10*, 1854.

I AM informed by a message from the Seraskier that the Turkish troops at Kalafat have obtained a fresh advantage over the Russians. I have not yet seen the official report, but I am told that the Russians having sent a strong reconnaissance towards Kalafat, the Turks sallied forth, and driving the enemy back, followed up their success as far as Craiova, whilst Helmi Pasha, their

commander, took possession of it, with the intention of strengthening the position and remaining there.

It is added, that the Russians lost a considerable number of men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 190.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 20.*)

(No. 223.)

Constantinople, May 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of some further correspondence which has passed between Vice-Admiral Dundas and myself since I last had the honour to address your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 190.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, May 4, 1854.

Sir,

HAVING stated to you, in my despatch No. 65, that the Captain Pasha could send "six sail-of-the-line, with two or three steamers, into the Black Sea," and being now informed that the whole squadron, amounting to nine sail-of-the-line, is ordered out, I think it right to mention that a change, of which I was not apprised in time, has taken place—for what cause I know not—in the intentions of the Porte.

I conceive, however, that it remains with you and Admiral Hamelin to detain the ships in company with the combined fleets, or to advise the return of a part, or of the whole, of them, according to the view which may be taken of what is best for the service.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 190.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *off Sebastopol, May 5, 1854.*

My Lord,

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of the 2nd instant, No. 65, I have the honour to acquaint you that Vice-Admiral Hamelin and I, having consulted together, have deemed it prudent to request Vice-Admiral Ahmed Pasha, in command of the Turkish fleet, to cruize on the coasts of Bulgaria and Roumelia, between the Danube and the Bosphorus, until Sir Edmund Lyons returns from the coast of Circassia, and the arrival of the combined squadrons off Varna, on or about the 20th, when future operations can be concerted between us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 190.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *off Sebastopol, May 4, 1854.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 2nd instant, No. 66, with its inclosures from Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, and to acquaint you that I have directed Captain King, of the "Leander," to employ the "Wasp" and "Triton," as well as the "Leander," for the protection of English and French commercial interests, and the prompt and vigorous suppression of piracy in the Archipelago.

I regret to learn that the Turkish Ministers decline sending their naval forces for the protection of their coasts in the Archipelago for fear of their being destroyed by the Greeks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 190.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, May 7, 1854.

Sir,

AS the Turkish fleet went to sea yesterday, and your despatch No. 106 of the 5th instant did not reach me till this morning, I am unable to make any communication to Vice-Admiral Ahmed Pasha.

Your letter to that commander shall be sent to the Captain Pasha with the view of its being forwarded should any opportunity offer.

As it appears to have been his intention to join the combined squadron without delay, you will soon, I trust, be able to put him personally in possession of your opinions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 190.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, May 7, 1854.

Sir,

IN acknowledging the receipt of your despatch No 107 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to observe that the unwillingness of the Porte to incur danger from Greek fireships, refers only to ships-of-the-line. The Turkish Government has a considerable number of small vessels in the Archipelago, and its Ministers are ready to send more when required into that sea.

They have also expressed readiness, in answer to my suggestions and those of the French Ambassador, to employ some small armed steamers as patrols along the chief commercial passage of the Archipelago.

I fear, however, that the measures at their disposal will not be found sufficient for the purpose.

I avail myself of this opportunity to send you a memorial which I have received from the principal British merchants at Salonica.

Exertions are making to suppress any attempts at insurrection which the late descent upon Sizzica may engender, but with such imperfect means the issue is doubtful.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 191.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 188.)

Vienna, May 16, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON BOURQUENEY having received an official intimation from his Government, to communicate to the Conference the Convention which had lately been signed between the English and French Governments, and to invite the Governments of Austria and Prussia equally to place before it the Convention which they had entered into, and as I had received your Lordship's directions to support this proposal, we jointly made the request to Count Buol that he should assemble the Conference, and the meeting was fixed for this day.

At our assembly, I stated, in conjunction with Baron Bourqueney, the objects for which we had desired this meeting, and I placed in the hands of Count Buol a copy of the Convention concluded between Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French, relative to the military aid to be given to the Porte.

Count Arnim stated that this document had only been unofficially submitted to his Government by the French Minister at Berlin, and had not been communicated at all by the English Minister, so that up to the present time the Prussian Cabinet had not officially been informed of the existence of this document, he was therefore without instructions with regard to its reception in Conference, but being now invited to receive it, he would refer to his Government for orders upon the subject. Under these circumstances the Conference was adjourned until Count Arnim should be furnished with the instructions he required.

I stated, together with Baron Bourqueney, that the object of our Governments was to place on the Protocol of the Conference the engagements which they had taken towards carrying out the views which the Four Governments had, by the Protocol of the 9th ultimo, recognised as those by which their policy should be directed, and that by thus enregistering these, together with the measures which the other two Governments, parties to that Protocol, had taken in concert, to form a complete record of the series of engagements by which the Four Governments had sought to forward their common objects.

Count Arnim mentioned incidentally that he had been instructed by his Government to inquire of Baron Bourqueney and myself whether, since the last Protocol had been signed, in which the desire of the Four Powers to obtain an amelioration of the position of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey had been expressed, our Governments had obtained any assurances upon that subject, which we were enabled to communicate.

Count Buol stated, and Baron Bourqueney and myself concurred in the remark, that this was not properly a subject to be brought forward in Conference, that each of the Governments which we represented had taken the same engagement upon this subject, and they might therefore separately make a statement of what each had obtained; but that at present he thought it sufficient to say, that this object was anxiously pursued by all the Powers, and that ameliorations had already been granted by the Turkish Government, which, there was every reason to expect, might be further extended.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 192.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 158. Confidential.)

Copenhagen, May 17, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Minister and the Prussian Charge d'Affaires waited upon M. de Bluhme the day before yesterday, and presented to his Excellency identic Notes communicating to the Danish Government the Austro-Prussian Convention of the 20th April last, and inviting them to accede to it for the Duchies of Holstein and Lunenburgh.

I have not yet seen either the Convention or the Notes, M. de Bluhme having assured me that he has been requested to consider the communication which has been made to him as secret, and my Prussian colleague not having yet fulfilled his promise to make me acquainted with the contents of the Convention confidentially, as soon as he had communicated it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

From what I have learned, however, from Count Hartig and Baron Rechenberg, it would appear that the terms of the Notes which have been addressed to M. de Bluhme are not entirely identic with those which have been presented to the Governments of purely German States, and that, instead of the King of Denmark being formally invited to accede to the Convention, His Majesty is rather requested to consider whether it might not be expedient that he should do so.

Count Hartig also observed, in speaking upon this point, that some facilities might possibly be accorded to Denmark in the execution of the Convention, as more importance was attached to the moral effect of her accession to it than to any assistance which she could be called upon to afford to the Confederation in the event of hostilities with Russia.

M. de Bluhme, I am told, shewed in the course of the conversation which followed the delivery of the Notes, that he had little or no previous information respecting the nature of the communication which had been made to him, and that he, therefore, declined expressing any opinion with respect to it until he should have time to consult his colleagues, and to reflect on the consequences of the engagements which he was invited to undertake.

He made, however, some observations respecting the exceptional position of Denmark, and the difficulties and dangers which she might incur by fulfilling a duty to the German Confederation which its other members might perform without inconvenience.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 193.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 286.)

Berlin, May 19, 1854.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of your Lordship's instructions I have read to Baron Manteuffel your despatch No. 125 of the 16th instant, respecting the late removal of persons from certain high offices, and the alteration in the policy of Prussia which these changes indicate.

His Excellency seemed greatly annoyed at this communication, and when I had finished reading it said that these changes of persons did not mean a change in the policy of the Prussian Government, observing emphatically, that if the King had altered his opinions, or did not intend to carry out the Convention lately signed, or act up to the Protocols and arrangements of the Vienna Conferences, he should not be found where he was.

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He said that it was not true that the King was implicitly guided by the persons about the Court, for that he was not in the habit of being led by anybody; neither could he admit that we had any right to remark on quarrels that the King might have with his brother, or on the removal of General Bonin or anybody else from the Government, as long as there was no departure from international engagements entered into, nor was it fair that Her Majesty's Government should suppose that the King's policy had undergone any serious modification.

I replied that in England we were in the habit of judging of the probable manner of carrying out measures by the choice made of the men selected for that purpose, whose opinions were more or less known, and that at a moment of such vast European importance, when we were at war with a great and powerful country, we viewed these changes with pain, as indicating a modification of the policy which we had hoped to find the Prussian Government willing to carry out.

He then said that it was totally unusual for one Government to make to another observations such as I had read to him, and that he was sure that the British Government would never be disposed to listen to remarks of a like nature from him.

I replied that his Excellency must permit me to say that we disclaimed all pretension to interfere in the internal concerns of Prussia, but that having acted confidentially together at Vienna, we were grieved to think that the policy of England and Prussia might no longer be identical.

The Minister President here said that perhaps they never had been identical, for we wished to go much further than the King did, but that I might be satisfied that His Majesty would act up to his engagements; that the policy of Prussia was not the policy of this or that Minister who might be selected for the direction of affairs, but the policy of the King, and that as for the opinions of his colleagues in the Cabinet, they are not much consulted as to what passed in the Foreign Department. He then said that I had some time ago complained that General Bonin had been replaced at the War Office by Count Waldersee, who was Russian in his political feelings, and he could inform me that Count Waldersee had just declared to him, that he would have nothing to do with politics, that he should do his best to maintain the army in a state of efficiency, and that it should be ready to move whenever the King gave his orders to that effect.

The whole drift of this conversation was unsatisfactory. Before it closed Baron Manteuffel attempted to show that the persons about the King, and of whose influence we complained, did not possess the power that was supposed, and he evidently desired it to be understood that the King was all in all, and that his Ministers were mere tools, from whom implicit obedience was expected, but it may be observed, that as the party in power are less likely to raise opposition to his Royal Will than those of the liberal side, the hopes of any modification are very distant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 194.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 290.)

Berlin, May 19, 1854.

My Lord,

I UNDERSTAND that the Conference of the Representatives of some of the German Powers at Bamberg, to which I alluded in my despatch No. 273, is to take place on the 22nd instant, and that the Bavarian Government has been the chief instigator of this meeting. I am told also that in addition to the question of the Austro-Prussian Convention, one of the objects of this meeting is to discuss the question of the Greek Monarchy, and endeavour to

call forth the sympathies of Germany on the subject, and to urge the necessity of some guarantees being obtained for its integrity.

Baron Manteuffel, with whom I have spoken on the subject, does not seem to think that the King is disposed to join in any such decided measure as is likely to be proposed by Bavaria, but has written to Vienna for information as to the views taken by the Imperial Government, and will perhaps be decided by what is learnt from thence.

I hear also that the question of the navigation of the Danube and the position of the Russian troops in the Principalities is to be discussed, and there seems likewise to be some expectation that an attempt will be made by the smaller Powers to declare their desire of maintaining their neutrality under any circumstances, and their intention not to be forced to take part in a war which may concern Austria and Prussia, but in which they can have but a remote interest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 195.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 293.)

Berlin, May 19, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a circular which has been addressed by the Austrian Government to the Imperial Agents accredited to the German Courts, instructing them to communicate confidentially to the Courts at which they reside the Convention lately entered into between Austria and Prussia, and to request in the event of their responding to the invitation of the Two great German Powers to accede to that Convention, that instructions may be forwarded to their Representatives at Frankfort to subscribe to the declaration which the Austrian and Prussian Ministers have received orders to present to the Diet.

The Austrian Cabinet states in this document that they have constantly sought to promote a collective and spontaneous decision of the Diet on this matter, and that they have not ceased to take into consideration the general wish of affording to the Confederation an opportunity of expressing their opinion on the line of policy which Germany should pursue in the present phasis of political affairs.

Your Lordship will perceive that in explaining the decision which the Austrian Cabinet has taken with respect to the form of their communication to the Diet, it is gently hinted in the circular that the Convention with Prussia was contracted independently of Federal obligations, while it likewise admits that the Confederation, in virtue of the international character which it derives from its fundamental laws, is in no way precluded from acceding to it as a united political body.

It is therefore proposed by the Austrian Cabinet that a resolution shall be passed by the Diet, approving of the conduct of Austria and Prussia, which will obviate any delay or difficulties which might arise in the Diet itself to impede the prompt and unanimous acceptation of the Treaty.

This resolution would thus serve as the natural basis for all measures which the Diet may be called upon to take in case of active participation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD

Inclosure in No. 195.

Circular to Austrian Representatives at the German Courts.

Vienne, le 9 Mai, 1854.

DEPUIS que l'on est convaincu que l'Allemagne ne peut rester étrangère aux complications survenues en Orient, le Cabinet Impérial n'a jamais douté que la Diète ne soit appelée à fixer par les décisions qu'elle prendrait d'une façon légale l'attitude que la Confédération toute entière doit prendre dans cette grande question Européenne.

Le but continuel de nos efforts en cette circonstance a été de provoquer une décision collective et spontanée de la Diète, et dans ce sens nous n'avons cessé de prendre en très grande considération un vœu qui nous était adressé de tout côté, celui de donner à la Confédération l'occasion de se prononcer sur la ligne de conduite que devait suivre l'Allemagne en présence des événements politiques actuels.

C'est donc avec une bien vive satisfaction que nous pouvons annoncer à nos confédérés, au moment où, en union intime avec la Prusse, nous les engageons à adhérer au Traité d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive que nous avons conclue avec cette Puissance, que nous nous sommes entendues avec la Cour de Berlin, dont les dispositions amicales répondent entièrement aux nôtres, pour adresser en même temps une déclaration à la Diète.

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint le texte de cette proposition sur laquelle les deux Cours sont tombées d'accord avec prière de la communiquer de la manière la plus confidentielle.

J'ajouterai à cette communication les explications et commentaires suivants.

Les Cours d'Autriche et de Prusse se sont demandées si elles communiqueraient leur projet à Frankfort aussitôt que les Etats de la Confédération auraient adhéré au Traité d'Alliance conclu entre elles, ou si elles se borneraient à rendre compte à la Diète de la conduite qu'elles ont tenue dans la question pendante, conformément aux principes des Protocoles de la Conférence de Vienne, et à proposer une déclaration qui serait faite par la Diète, et à obtenir la promesse éventuelle de sa coopération.

Elles se sont arrêtées à ce dernier moyen de communication.

Cela se décida non que l'on fût d'avis que le Traité d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive, qu'ils comptent contracter avec tous leurs confédérés Allemands, ne fut complétement de nature à recevoir sa dernière sanction par une résolution de la Diète. Bien que les dispositions de ce Traité dépassent les obligations fédérales, les Cabinets de Vienne et de Berlin pensent néanmoins que la Confédération, considérant à leur véritable point de vue les lois fondamentales qui établissent un caractère international, ne saurait être empêché d'adhérer comme partie contractante en sa qualité de corps politique (Gesammtmacht) à la Convention Austro-Prussienne.

On n'a pas d'ailleurs l'intention de préjuger la question, de savoir si le Traité d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive (abstraction faite de l'Article Séparé) ne pourrait, après l'accession séparée des Gouvernements, être rédigée dans la forme d'un arrêté fédéral, et être généralisée de cette façon.

Les Gouvernements auxquels sera faite cette communication nous obligeraient, s'ils voulaient prendre en considération la question que nous leur soumettons, et nous faire connaître leur opinion sur la proposition d'adhésion de la Confédération au Traité.

D'un autre côté, on ne pouvait méconnaître les difficultés qui au sein de l'Assemblée Fédérale s'opposeraient peut-être à l'acceptation prompte et unanime d'un Traité de ce genre.

Une proposition à la Diète pouvait, à la première démarche, être la plus convenable; elle serait basée sur une approbation générale, par l'organe de la Diète, de la conduite de l'Autriche et de la Prusse.

Une résolution dans ce sens pourrait être prise à Frankfort sans retard et sans difficulté.

Cette résolution formerait en suite le point de départ naturel pour toutes les mesures que la Diète aurait à prendre en cas de participation active.

Par une résolution aussi caractéristique de la Confédération, les Gouvernements séparés donneraient à leurs décisions ultérieures la base d'une manifestation de la Diète.

En partant de ce point de vue, nous croyons pouvoir espérer que les Gouvernements confédérés, s'ils répondent à l'invitation de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, d'adhérer à la Convention des deux Puissances, voudront bien munir aussitôt leurs Représentants à Frankfort les instructions qui leur seront nécessaires pour accéder à la déclaration que les Représentants d'Autriche et de Prusse ont reçu l'ordre de soumettre à l'Assemblée Fédérale.

(Signé) BUOL.

No. 196.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 636. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 22*, 1854.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 614 and 616 on the subject of the desire evinced by the French Government to see some of the smaller States of Europe join the Anglo-French alliance, I have now the honour to inclose a copy of the memorandum referred to in the latter of those despatches which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has placed confidentially in my hands.

I fear that the desire of carrying out his project has made M. Drouyn de Lhuys more sanguine of success than circumstances warrant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 196.

Memorandum.

Mai, 1854.

LES efforts que nous avons dû faire de concert avec le Cabinet Anglais pour obtenir la coopération des Puissances Allemandes à la politique que nous suivons en Orient, attestent combien étaient étroits les liens qui les unissaient à la Russie, et avec quels sentiments de regret elles se sont écartées d'une alliance qui semblait être devenu la base même de leur système international. Nous avons lieu de croire que l'Allemagne ne se bornera pas, dans la crise actuelle, à se séparer du Gouvernement Russe; qu'elle cherchera cette fois des alliances en Occident. Mais, en nous engageant dans une entreprise aussi vaste, il est de notre devoir de nous rendre exactement compte de la mesure du concours que nous pouvons attendre des Cabinets Germaniques. Il se peut qu'en se prononçant avec nous contre la Russie, ils se proposent moins de la refouler que de la contenir; et l'abandon pour le présent des prétentions élevées à Constantinople par la diplomatie Russe pourrait leur paraître un motif suffisant pour se retirer de la lutte avant que des conditions plus conformes à l'intérêt général eussent été imposées à l'ennemie. Dans ce cas, l'accord des trois Cabinets se rétablirait avec d'autant plus de chances de durée que, fondé sur des services réciproques, il n'aurait plus désormais l'apparence blessante d'une sorte de vassalage. Dès lors la lutte deviendrait pour nous plus difficile sur terre, et nous pourrions nous voir obligées de nous borner à une guerre maritime qui, n'atteignant l'ennemi qu'aux extrémités de son territoire, ne remplirait qu'à demi le but que nous nous proposons.

Si donc, en dehors des Grands Cabinets, il était des Gouvernements moins puissants dont les intérêts et les dispositions fussent d'accord avec les nôtres, la faiblesse relative de leurs ressources ne devrait pas être une raison de ne point rechercher leurs concours. Leur coopération aurait pour nous d'autant plus d'importance qu'une fois aux prises avec l'ennemi commun, ils nous offriraient plus de garantie de persévérance et se montreraient plus désireux de rester associés à nos efforts jusqu'au dénouement.

Dans cet ordre d'idées la Suède est la premier des Etats secondaires sur lesquels notre attention doive se porter. Par sa position géographique en contact avec la Russie par les moyens maritimes et militaires dont elle dispose, elle nous assurerait à la fois un point d'appui et des moyens d'attaque. Il y a lieu de croire que les intentions du Gouvernement Suédois sont en harmonie avec les intérêts du pays. Soit que nous nous proposions de lui rendre la Finlande, soit que nous devions nous contenter de soustraire cette province à la domination Russe, et d'en faire un Etat presque indépendant, le but de la Suède ne saurait être en deça du nôtre et nous n'avons pas à craindre qu'une fois engagée, elle sorte de la lice avant nous.

Le Danemarc n'a pas de raisons aussi directes que la Suède de prendre part à la coalition de l'Occident contre la Russie, et sa coopération n'aurait pas pour nous la même importance. Cependant ce pays se distingué par des qualités politiques et militaires que l'on a pu apprecier dans son dernier conflit avec l'Allemagne. Sans nourrir des dispositions hostiles à la Russie, qui lui a prêté son concours dans l'affaire de la succession, le Danemarc pressent que l'ambition qui menace le Bosphore pourrait, si elle triomphait, mettre en péril la liberté du Sund. D'autre part, si la Finlande a été enlevée à la Suède c'est en définitive le Danemarc qui, par la cession de la Norvège, a fait les frais de cet agrandissement de la Russie. Enfin, en dépit de jalousies anciennes et réciproques entre les deux Etats, les Danois comprenent qu'ils sont intéresses à ce que la Suède reprenne une ancienne possession; en effet, tout ce qui accroit la puissance de ce pays est une force pour l'élément Scandinave dans la lutte qu'il soutient contre le Germanisme dans le Schleswig.

Au midi de l'Europe, l'intérêt Méditerranéan est en jeu, et cet intérêt est assez grand pour quelques Etats secondaires, qui ne sauraient voir avec indifférence la guerre que nous soutenons en faveur de l'indépendance des Dardanelles et du Bosphore. Bien qu'elle ne sorte qu'avec peine d'une longue crise intérieures l'Espagne paraît envisager de ce point de vue les affaires d'Orient; et si les difficultés nouvelles que la question de Cuba a soulevées pouvaient, moyennant nos bons offices, recevoir une solution, elle ne refuserait pas de coopérer à une entreprise qui flatterait et relèverait sa fierté nationale. Depuis les mesures de repression qu'exige l'état de quelques provinces Chrétiennes de la Turquie jusqu'aux opérations actives qui auront lieu sur le Danube et sans doute en Finlande, il y a des postes divers et honorables où le drapeau Espagnol pourrait figurer avantageusement à côté du nôtre. Les conditions particulières dans lesquelles se trouve l'armée Espagnole ne la rendraient que plus propre peut-être à supporter le genre d'epreuves et de privations qui attend nos troupes en Orient. Enfin le concours de l'Espagne ne dût-il avoir pour résultat que de nous assurer un suffrage de plus dans les conseils de l'Europe, ce serait déjà un motif suffisant pour ne pas le dédaigner.

Le bassin de la Méditerranée nous présente un autre pays désireuse de se signaler et de se relever aux yeux de l'Europe de malheurs récents. Je veux parler du Piémont. Le Gouvernement Sarde comprend d'ailleurs que son intérêt ne saurait être de faire passer des ressentiments particuliers avant les convenances générales; et loin de vouloir gêner les mouvements de l'Autriche sur le Danube, il prendrait volontiers part avec elle, on a lieu de le croire, à une lutte Européenne dont le résultat finale lui offre de séduisantes perspectives. L'intérêt évident du Piémont n'est-il pas en effet que le mouvement d'expansion de l'Autriche prenne la direction de l'Orient plutôt que celle de l'Italie. Or le contraire aurait lieu si l'établissement de la Russie sur le Danube arrêtait à tout jamais, de ce côté, l'essor de l'Allemagne. Ces considérations ne peuvent avoir échappé au Cabinet Sarde. La coopération du Piémont serait d'autant plus précieuse qu'en ajoutant à nos forces un effectif respectable, elle aurait encore pour conséquence de rassurer en même temps l'Autriche sur ses possessions d'Italie et de l'attacher plus étroitement peut-être à notre alliance.

Au nombre des Etats qui, dans des circonstances données, peuvent fournir leur contingent à l'alliance Anglo-Française, nous ne devons pas omettre la Suisse, dont la population exubérante et inquiète trouverait dans les enrôlements sous un drapeau étranger de précieuses ressources contre la misère.

Quand à la Belgique, son industrie bloqué pour ainsi dire de toute parts n'aurait d'autre débouché que celui qu'offrirait à les fabriques l'approvisionnement des armées Occidentales.

Telles sont les considérations générales qui seraient de nature à faciliter notre entente avec quelques uns des principaux Etats secondaires de l'Europe, et qui nous font un devoir de concerter à cet égard avec le Gouvernement Anglais une règle de conduite. La Suède en se prononçant bientôt ouvertement, donnera un exemple qui ne contribuera pas peu à seconder les efforts qui pourront être faits en ce sens. Alors la lutte contre la Russie sera véritablement Européenne, et alors aussi nous pourrons compter avec plus de confiance sur une solution conforme à l'intérêt général qui est le nôtre.

No. 197.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 181.) *Foreign Office, May 23, 1854.*

My Lord,

HER MAJESTY'S Government approve your Lordship's proceedings at the Conferance which was held at Vienna, on the 16th instant, as reported in your despatch No. 188 of the same day.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 198.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 268.) *Foreign Office, May 23, 1854.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Brant's despatches Nos. 21, 22, and 24 of the 12th, 18th, and 24th of April, respecting the critical state of the Turkish army at Kars, I have to instruct your Excellency to urge the Porte to place the command of the army of Kars under General Guyon. It is madness on the part of the Turkish Government to continue tolerating a system which has already destroyed the greater part of the army at Kars, and which will expose the remainder to irreparable disasters:

I am &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 199.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 269.) *Foreign Office, May 23, 1854.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 213 of the 6th of May, reporting the conversation which you held with the Sultan on the 4th instant, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your appeal to His Highness that Ahmed and Ali Pashas should be dealt with as they deserve.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 200.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 23, 1854.*

THE Conference met this day, the Prussian Minister having received his instructions. A project of Protocol, annexing the Austrian and Prussian and English and French Conventions to the engagements contracted by the former Protocols, was unanimously adopted. It will be signed this evening. I will send it by the messenger to-morrow.

No. 201.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 190.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 24, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me the Treaty that has lately been ratified between Austria and Prussia.

I told Count Colloredo that as the whole of the negotiations connected with this Treaty had been kept a profound secret, I was in ignorance of the terms in which it was originally proposed to the Cabinet of Berlin, but I presumed they could not have been those which were finally agreed to, and that Austria had probably made great concessions in order to procure the adhesion of Prussia.

The only points, I said, which could be considered of any importance in the Treaty, or as bearing upon the war, or the alliance of the Two German Powers with England and France, were to be found in the Additional Article, in which two *casus belli* were established, viz., the incorporation of the Principalities, and the attack or passage of the Balkan by Russia; but that the first case was null, and might have been altogether omitted, as Russia might occupy the Principalities for an indefinite period, and their formal occupation was unnecessary to her, and therefore improbable. On the other hand, if an attack or passage of the Balkan were attempted, and that Austria and Prussia immediately thereupon declared and made war against Russia, it would afford protection to the Sultan's territory, and lead to a speedy termination of the war.

Count Colloredo said that he would report this opinion to Count Buol.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 202.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Hanover, May 23, 1854.*

I WAS surprised upon my return hither to find so strong a feeling in favour of Russia, as regards the war, to be prevailing amongst that class of society with which I had principally to do, and such a total ignorance of the real circumstances which have brought on the war, as prove that, unless wilfully blind to facts and reason, the Russian manifestoes, proclamations, notes, and despatches must have been the study of those with whom I had to converse on the subject; whilst the plain evidence of falsehood and chicanery on the one side, and of truth and straightforwardness on the other, which is afforded by the published official documents that emanated from those who have been employed in these matters by Her Majesty, had been totally ignored.

I have been in no hurry to report this to your Lordship, being desirous of previously ascertaining to what extent this feeling went as regards the subjects of the Hanoverian Crown, and I have now the satisfaction of being able safely to assure your Lordship that it is confined to the nobility, which

fortunately as relates to this question of general political interest, but to be lamented by those who may desire to see established in this country a stable constitutional form of government, with a salutary balance between the Crown and the people, is exceedingly unpopular on account of its excessive exclusiveness and pretensions, and on account of its ignorance, which prevent its marching with the intelligence of the age; and on account of its prejudices, which forbid it to forget its lost privileges, is a class without even the weight which its territorial possessions ought to give to it.

The reasons for this feeling I believe to be the following:—The bitter remembrance of French occupation and tyranny which keeps alive a fear that similar evils will come again from that quarter, unless kept in check by Russian power. The seclusion of sentiment as regards us, caused by our ancient policy antagonism to France having been exchanged for intimate alliance with that Power. The apprehension that the success of such an alliance against Russia would entail the triumph of liberal ideas, if not of revolution. The vague hope that Russia will be able to quell the innovating spirit of the age, and thus indirectly help the nobility to recover their lost privileges. Such are the reasons, if worthy of the term, which excite the aspirations of a class in this country in favour of Russia. As however the people in general undoubtedly side with us, I merely mention what I have observed, without troubling your Lordship with the arguments with which I endeavour to combat such reasoning, and try to convince those who propound it that the time is fully come for all to join in resisting the domination of the Cossack.

One other class, which in fact however belongs in great measure to the nobility, is inclined to Russia, namely, the younger officers of the army, which perhaps may be accounted for by the prestige which attaches to a Government and Sovereign so essentially military as is that of Russia and its Czar. But I am glad to say that those officers who served in the German Legion, with very few exceptions (and those contemptible ones), retain a warm attachment for England, and are devoted to her cause.

The Court is supposed to be favourable to Russia, but great reserve is maintained there on the subject, and the King at present abstains altogether from speaking to any foreign Minister about politics.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 203.

Mr. Forbes to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Dresden, May 23, 1854.*

M. DE BEUST leaves Dresden this evening for Bamberg, where there will be held a meeting of Representatives of most of the secondary Powers of Germany, whose object will be to discuss and determine on the line they are to pursue regarding the late Treaty between Austria and Prussia. His Excellency told me at once that he utterly disapproved of the proposal made by the two great German Powers to the lesser ones, that they should all become parties to the Treaty without its being previously communicated to the Germanic Diet, whose authority would be thus *de facto* paralysed, and that he would certainly oppose it. As yet nothing has transpired here concerning the Secret Articles of this Treaty, but the sensation it has created leaves no doubt of their importance. For some time past the most confidential intercourse exists between the Governments of Saxony and Bavaria, and the two Ministers are working to create a third party in the Frankfort Diet, to be a counterpoise to Austria and Prussia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS R. FORBES.

No. 204.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 226.)

Constantinople, May 12, 1854.

My Lord,

MY very ill timed indisposition, though not of a serious character, has sadly impeded the communications of Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud with Her Majesty's Embassy, notwithstanding every degree of courtesy and personal sacrifice on their part.

The two Commanders-in-chief, however, met here in my presence on the 13th instant, and Lord Raglan has no doubt reported what passed on the occasion to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle. What it is right for me to bring immediately to your Lordship's knowledge may be stated in a few words.

Three points of leading importance more particularly drew my attention. One was the urgency of a meeting between the two Commanders and Omer Pasha; the second, an idea previously thrown out by Marshal St. Arnaud, that his command would extend over the Turkish army; the third, a modification of his idea, to the effect of incorporating a considerable part of that army with the French forces under his command.

It appeared to me in every sense desirable that the proposed meeting should take place with the least possible delay, and that, previous to that meeting, the other questions should be held in suspense, as matters to be decided after full consultation between the three Commanders-in-chief. To facilitate a timely understanding in this important respect, I read aloud Article IV of the Tripartite Convention lately ratified, and drew particular attention to that clause of it which establishes the principle in clear terms.

Whatever may have been his previous impressions or views, the Marshal asserted no claim to any exclusive command beyond that of his own troops, and in explaining his idea of interposing, with the Porte's permission, a Turkish brigade, composed of the three arms, between the two brigades of every French division, he said that, if the plan were adopted, he hoped that the troops might be obtained for that purpose from Constantinople, or any other part of the empire. He agreed with Lord Raglan that the efficiency of Omer Pasha's army was an essential object, and one to be maintained, not only for general military purposes, but even for the satisfaction and personal consideration of the Generalissimo himself.

I have ascertained that nothing in contradiction with this view has been conceded by the Porte, and it is settled that Omer Pasha shall arrive at Varna on the 19th instant, in order to meet Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan, who are to embark for that fortress on the preceding day, accompanied by the Seraskier and the Captain Pasha, a rendezvous in the same port being, moreover, given to the British and French Admirals now cruising before Sebastopol.

I will not conclude this despatch without mentioning that some conversation took place with respect to the armies on the Asiatic frontier. I thought it my duty to call attention to the reduced and dangerous condition of the army at Kars, and to the very serious prejudice which would infallibly result to the common interest if the Russians, encouraged by its weakness, were to advance when the snow clears away, and establish themselves in force within the Turkish frontier, without contesting either the one or the other of these points. The two Commanders-in-chief agreed in opinion as to the difficulty, not to say impracticability, of detaching any effectual aid from the auxiliary armies in that direction.

If such be a correct view of the case, how vastly is the importance increased of engaging the Porte to take effectual measures for placing its Asiatic armies on a less precarious footing, and how greatly is it to be desired that the military experience and tried ability of the generals may be able to put the Turkish Government in a way to apply its resources with better effect to the prosecution of the war on that side.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 205.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 227.)

Constantinople, May 13, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH the view of carrying out more completely its promises respecting the irregular troops in the Sultan's pay, the Porte has adopted regulations for introducing a certain degree of discipline among them, and bringing those who commit offences to account, by a regular form of procedure, and a regular scale of punishments.

Translations of the documents which have emanated from the Porte for these respective purposes are inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 205.

Code of Regulations for the Organisation of the Irregular Troops and Volunteers attached to the Imperial Armies.

(Translation.)

OWING to the want of a good system of organisation of the irregular troops serving with the Imperial army, and elsewhere; the absence of a strict discipline under the existing constitution of those troops, and of a suitable code of punishments for the crimes committed by them, they have not, in general, been efficiently or successfully employed, or properly administered, during the war, and under other circumstances likewise. Some of those troops, moreover, while on the march, and at places where they were quartered, have been guilty of oppression and violence towards the inhabitants of the country, against the Imperial pleasure; and, although as a body, they are animated with the desire of serving their Government, and thus earning a title to the Royal benevolence and rewards, some of them, as above stated, acted against expectation in a different manner, and this owing simply to the want of a proper organisation, as already set forth.

The following regulations for the organisation of those troops have been therefore sanctioned for general application by His Majesty's approval, and they are consequently to be carried into execution.

The proper efficiency of these troops when on service depends upon the removal of the confusion and want of order that prevails, and the introduction, as far as possible, of order and discipline; the first point to be attended to is, the formation and regulation of these troops on military principles; the appointment of proper officers and non-commissioned officers, and the introduction of strict discipline in the administration and command. The mounted troops, therefore, serving under the command of one chief at the Imperial camp, or elsewhere, shall be divided into companies of 120 or 150 men. Youzbashis will be appointed to each company from among the men who are distinguished for military experience, courage, and good conduct. A first and second Mulazim, four Tchaoushes, and ten Oubashis, among whom the privates will be distributed, will be likewise attached to each company. When the corps commanded by a Chief constitutes from four to eight companies, it shall be considered an Alay, and the commander a Mirali. When the troops under the command of a Chieftain constitute less than four companies, they shall be drafted into other regiments, if proper and possible. If this arrangement does not suit, those companies shall be employed separately, as they cannot be considered in the light of an Alay.

The Infantry, likewise, under the command of a Chief, shall be divided into companies of 100 or 120 men, to each of which shall be appointed a Mulazim, two Tchaoushes, and ten Oubashis. A corps commanded by one Chief, and constituting from four to ten companies, shall be looked upon as a Tabour, and the Chief as a Bimbashi. A corps forming from ten to twenty companies, as two Tabours, and above that number, three; the Chief, a Miralay. Separate Bimbashis will be appointed to the Tabours. A corps under the command of a Chief, constituting less than four companies, will be employed as above-stated respecting the Cavalry.

The volunteers also arriving either in bodies or in separate detachments at the army must, however volunteers, be subjected to the same order and discipline as all the other troops. They must always be attached to some part of the army, and have a commander. Large bodies of volunteers, led on by an efficient chief, will continue to be under his command, and will be formed into companies. Tabours and Alays, as above laid down respecting the mounted and foot Irregulars, under an organized administration and command. All detached bodies of volunteers will be prevented from roaming at large, and will be drafted into the volunteer companies, and entered upon their muster roll. In the event of there being no efficient commanders among the scattered corps of volunteers proper officers shall be appointed over them from the army, and the companies shall be formed.

No misconduct or irregularity shall be tolerated under any circumstances on the part of any class of troops whatever, and the most perfect submission and subordination towards superior officers shall be observed. They, on their part, shall treat their men with kindness, and be vigilant to maintain good order and discipline among the officers and non-commissioned officers under their command, and to prevent any injury, wrong or abusive language. They shall not screen or protect any parties guilty thereof, and, as their due punishment forms an important point of military discipline, the observance of these matters must be attended to by the officers and the privates of the Irregular corps. A special military order has been drawn up and sent to the proper quarters concerning the punishments to be inflicted on any soldiers of the Irregular corps guilty of the irregularities set forth. A copy of that code shall be given to each regiment, battalion and company of Irregulars, and well impressed upon their minds, and prompt punishment shall follow upon the commission of any misconduct.

Some of the irregularities committed by these troops took place on their march from the places where they were inscribed. Among them also were many badly armed, mounted, and physically inefficient men, evidently incapable of rendering any service. Should it be, therefore, necessary to call out any more Irregulars for the service of the army, or elsewhere, the person charged with this commission shall transmit to the Vali and officers of the Province where such troops are to be collected, an extract of this regulation concerning the organization of these troops, and several copies of the military code alluded to herein; and he shall state that the troops to be thus enrolled must be efficient men, well armed and mounted, and that no inefficient troops, badly armed and mounted, will be accepted. These matters must be duly attended to on the spot; the punishment awarded to the guilty must be in the first place fully explained to the men about to be enrolled, and the troops will then be organized and formed on the spot, according to the present regulations, and then marched to their destination. This improved system will be observed with regard to all the irregular forces hereafter enrolled.

It remains to be observed that if it be not possible to apply this system fully in the organisation of the Irregular troops under service where circumstances may require it, and that any changes or modifications thereof should appear to be necessary, proper measures shall be taken thereon, and the causes of such modifications shall be duly admitted to the Throne.

Inclosure 2 in No. 205.

Penal Code.

Mai, 1854.

(Traduction.)

LE but de sa Hautesse en employant ces soldats, est de profiter de leurs services dans les combats ainsi que dans d'autres branches de service. L'objet que ces troupes doivent avoir en vue est de leur côté de rendre réellement en chaque occasion de bons et loyaux services à l'Etat, afin de mériter des récompenses. Mais leur organisation est mal entendue, elle n'est pas telle qu'elle devrait être pour qu'elle puisse rendre de bons services. Et surtout des hommes de mauvaise conduite, et incapables de chercher à remplir les devoirs que l'honneur leur impose, des hommes qui ignorent ce que c'est que l'honneur de servir leur Gouvernement et leur patrie avec honnêteté et fidélité, se sont intrus parmi les stipendiaires, et c'est là la cause des excès de toute genre qui, contrairement à la volonté souveraine, se commettent dans quelques endroits. Et comme pour empêcher et prévenir ces excès, il faut mettre sur un pied mieux entendu le corps des troupes irrégulières, et punir, comme ils le méritent, ceux parmi les hommes qui les composent qui auront commis des excès et des crimes, et comme le réglements qui viennent d'être faits relativement à leur organisation d'après les règles établies, se trouvent insérés dans un pièce à part, il faut faire ce qui est nécessaire conformément à la présente organisation, et l'on aura également à punir, sans aucun délai, ceux parmi les irréguliers qui se seront rendus coupables de quelque crime ou de quelque excès.

Pour qu'un corps d'armée, de quelque déscription qu'il soit, puisse être utile à son Gouvernement et à son pays, il faut qu'il observe la plus stricte discipline. Or, la discipline exige que les soldats obéissent parfaitement à leurs supérieurs, et que les officiers aussi, tout en traitant leurs inférieurs avec clémence, surveillent avec soin leurs procédés, et les retiennent dans le devoir; et ces sages principes doivent être observés avec la plus grande vigueur dans un corps de troupes irrégulières aussi. Tout individu doit obéir, de leur côté, doivent maintenir la discipline parmi les soldats qui sont sur leur commandement; et c'est le désir de tous de mettre tous leurs soins à exécuter la mission qu'ils sont appelés à remplir, en tenant une bonne conduite; et d'éviter partout, et en chaque occasion, de commettre des actes non moins contraires à la volonté souveraine qu'a l'honneur militaires. C'est pourquoi, tout officier, de quelque rang qu'il soit, qui se montrera négligent à maintenir dans le devoir les soldats qu'il commande, ou bien qu'il tâchera de cacher les crimes qu'ils auront commis, aura par là agi d'une manière contraire aux intentions et à la volonté du Gouvernement; plus encore, il aura par là imprimé une tache à l'honneur militaire, et pour cela il sera cassé immédiatement et puni suivant le degré de sa culpabilité.

Les troupes irrégulières éviteront avec soin de maltraiter, de vexer en quelque manière que ce puisse être, et commettre des actes de violence envers les habitants du pays qu'elles occupent ou qu'elles traversent; ni envers les voyageurs et les passans, mais au contraire elles les traiteront tous parfaitement bien à tous égards; et il entre dans les devoirs de tous les commandans, petits ou grands, d'exercer une vigilance active sur tous ces points. Ainsi, tout individu, quel qui puisse être, qui aura pris par violence, soit d'un habitant soit d'un voyageur, de l'argent, des effets, du fourrage ou des vivres, si l'objet pris existe, il sera rendu en nature, et s'il n'existe point, on en fera payer la valeur: après quoi, celui qui a osé commettre ce méfait, sera puni d'une fustigation qui sera, suivant le degré de la culpabilité, de 10 à 200 coups.

L'attentat à l'honneur quand même il n'aurait pas été mis à exécution, sera puni de 10 à 100 coups de baton; et l'auteur d'un attentat à l'honneur consommé, recevra 500 coups de baton.

Si un individu insulte un des habitants des pays, ou quelque autre personne, pour quelque motif qu'il puisse être, en la frappant, ou bien en lui disant des injures, il sera, suivant la qualité et la condition de la personne insultée, mis en prison, pour tout le temps qu'il faut, ou bien il recevra des coups de baton.

Celui qui aura blessé quelqu'un, soit avec une arme soit avec quelque autre chose, aura à payer les frais encourus pour la cure du blessé jusqu'à sa guerison, ainsi que le montant de son ; et avec cela il

recevra, suivant le plus ou le moins de gravité de la blessure, de 20 à 200 coups de bâton. Et si le blessé meurt des suites de sa blessure, celui qui a fait la blessure sera remis à l'autorité afin qu'il soit fait de lui ce que la loi ordonnera.

Dans les cas où les crimes sus-énoncés sont commis collectivement par plusieurs hommes de guerre ensemble, naturellement quelques uns d'entre eux auront été les moteurs, tandis que les autres n'auront fait que céder à leurs instigations. Ainsi les principaux moteurs subiront les peines ci-dessus énumérées et les autres seront punis suivant les degrés de leur participation, et de leur complicité.

Les troupes irrégulières sont, comme les autres corps d'armées Impériales, destinées à garder l'Empire, à empêcher les désordres et les excès que des gens de néant et brigands pourraient commettre, ainsi que les actes coupables et subversifs du bon ordre établie dans le pays. Cela étant, les troupes irrégulières aussi doivent toujours se comporter, soit dans les pays où elles sont établis, soit dans les pays où elles ne sont que de passage, avec honnêteté et décence; s'abstenir de vices tels que l'ivrognerie, les jeux de cartes, et autres que la raison aussi bien que la loi défendent et qui sont généralement reprouvées; et faire assidument leur Namaz (prière canonique) cinq fois par jour, aux heures fixées pour cette prière. Leurs commandants doivent donc avoir sans cesse un œil attentif à tout cela, et ils sont autorisés à punir les contrevenans.

Si pendant qu'un corps de troupes irrégulières se trouve en présence de l'ennemi, un homme appartenant à ce corps répand, à dessin, l'alarme dans le camp, ou sert d'espion à l'ennemi, ou si, pendant que le corps marche en avant ou se retire, cet homme vole l'argent ou les effets, ou les chevaux de l'un et de l'autre, il sera saisi, et le fait une fois constaté, il recevra sur le champ 500 coups de bâtons; et s'il survit à cette punition, il sera éloigné et envoyé à quelque endroit convenable.

Si une partie des troupes, à moins qu'elle n'ait été autorisée par écrit de la part du Commandant, attaque pendant la guerre un village ou un district, situé aux environs du camp, ou compris dans les limites de l'ennemi, y tue des hommes, et s'y livre au pillage, elle sera arrêtée partout ou elle est; on fera rendre les objets qu'elle aura pris, et avec cela on administrera 500 coups de bâton à chacun des moteurs de cette entreprise coupable; et ceux qui y ont consenti et participé, recevront chacun, suivant l'exigence du cas, de 150 à 300 coups de bâton. Les survivants à cette punition seront envoyés à un endroit lointain.

Si les hommes qui commettent les crimes susmentionnées, sourds aux conseils de leurs officiers et des autres autorités de la Sublime Porte, ne se désistent pas de leurs mauvais procédés, et au moment d'être saisis, ils prennent les armes et refusent d'obéir et de se rendre, comme alors il ne conviendra point de garder de pareilles vilaines gens au service militaire de la Sublime Porte, et que continuer de les employer ce serait faire des torts aux militaires honnêtes, par ordre du premier commandant un nombre suffisant de troupes armées se présentera devant les réfractaires; on les sommera de nouveau de se rendre, et s'ils n'obéissent pas, on les attaquera et on les prendra vifs ou morts.

Parmi les irréguliers il peut y avoir des hommes d'un méchant caractère sur lesquels les châtimens ne produisent aucun effet, et dès lors, ils sont indignes de faire partie d'un corps de troupes. Les hommes de cette trempe seront conséquemment expulsées et reléguées à des endroits éloignés, et cela après avoir subi la peine qu'ils ont encourue pour les crimes qu'ils ont commis. Seulement, comme parmi les hommes de cette categorie, il s'en trouve qui à juger de leur extrême perversité, sont capables de faire beaucoup de mal, on ne mettra pas ceux-ci en liberté; mais on les enfermera dans quelque forteresse voisine; ou bien les on enverra à leur pays, où ils seront condamnés aux travaux forcés.

Les troupes en question doivent être toutes sous les ordres et la surveillance du commandant, ou du Vali, ou autre autorité de la Sublime Porte, auprès desquels, ou de laquelle, elles sont employées. Leurs officiers qui doivent obéir aux ordres des uns aux autres d'après leurs rangs réfatifs, doivent également obéir en tout à l'autorité supérieure auprès de laquelle elles sont employées. Ils doivent s'empresser d'exécuter ses ordres; ils doivent empêcher les soldats qui sont sous leur commandement de commettre de mauvaises actions; et procéder hardiment à les punir, s'ils en ont commis. Ainsi, tout bas officier, ou officier superieur, qui favorisera les crimes des soldats, ou que, pour ses propres

intérêts s'en rendra complice, sera, selon le degré de sa culpabilité, chassé du service de la Sublime Porte, ou mis en prison et exilé, ou, au besoin, condamné aux galères.

Vu la nécessité de punir, sans perte de temps, les coupables, la punition des hommes qui ont commis quelque crime sera mise à exécution par ordre du commandant, du Vali, ou de quelque autre autorité auprès lesquels, ou de laquelle, le corps de troupes auquel le coupable appartient, est employé. Mais quelquefois il arrive que l'autorité sans le commandement de laquelle un corps de troupes irrégulières se trouve placé, est un peu loin, qu'on n'a pas le temps de prendre ses ordres, et que la punition du crime presse. Dans ce cas, le Commandant-en-chef du corps fera infliger le châtiment; et après cela il informera du fait l'autorité sous les ordres de laquelle il se trouve.

Il est essentiel qu'une copie de ce réglement soit mise entre les mains des colonels, et des chefs de bataillons et de compagnies des troupes qui sont à la solde; que de temps à autre, le réglement soit lu à la troupe en lui faisant bien comprendre les dispositions qu'ils renferment et que tous les officiers d'un corps d'armée de troupes irrégulières, ainsi que les commandants, les Valis et autres autorités sous les ordres duquel ou desquelles ce corps se soumet, mettent tous leurs soins à l'exécuter.

Si allant à la guerre, ou étant sur le théâtre de la guerre, quelqu'un tient propos ou fait quelque action contre la discipline, ou s'il quitte les rangs et retourne en arrière et fait, ou refuse d'aller là que l'officier lui ordonne d'aller, reste en arrière et resiste à ses ordres, l'officier est autorisé par les lois et la discipline de le frapper avec ses armes ou de le faire frapper. Ainsi, les cas échéants on agira en conséquence.

No. 206.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 28,)

(No. 232. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 15, 1854.

ON the 13th instant, when Marshal St. Arnaud met Lord Raglan here, he informed his Lordship, in my presence, that he had found the performance of his duties as Commander-in-chief of the French auxiliary army so much impeded by the state of misunderstanding which, unhappily, existed between the French Ambassador on one side and the Turkish Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs on the other, that he had found himself under the painful necessity of sending off an express to Paris with information to this effect, and a request that the Government would interfere to remove an impediment so injurious to the progress of those important matters which he was called upon to direct.

His Excellency added that, in order to do what depended upon him for an earlier acceleration of business, he had waited upon the Sultan in company with the above-mentioned Ministers, and entered, with their concurrence, on such explanations as he judged to be necessary for that purpose.

He expressed an earnest desire to move in harmony with the British authorities, and, at the same time, gave strong indications of his resolution not to submit to any unnecessary obstructions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 207.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 233.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 15, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, in copy, for your Lordship's information, my latest despatches from Lieutenant-Colonel Neale and Captain Simmons.

Colonel, or, according to his present rank in the Turkish service, General Cannon has returned to Shumla to-day with despatches, announcing to Omer

Pasha the intended meeting at Varna. He arrived here a few days ago with complimentary messages from Omer Pasha to the respective Commanders-in-chief of the auxiliary forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 207.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, May 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for the information of your Lordship, the copy of a letter addressed to me by his Highness Omer Pasha and which reached me a few minutes after the Banshee had left yesterday evening.

The motives which have influenced the retirement of the Russians upon the Aluta, are variously conjectured at Shumla to be either to effect a still further concentration of the army opposite the centre of the Turkish line; or that the Austrians were about to appear in the field in Lesser Wallachia. To this it may perhaps be added, that the floods occasioned by the overflowing of the rivers will in a few weeks render the country in that part of Wallachia difficult for military operations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 207.

Omèr Pasha to Consul Neale.

Shumla, le 26 Avril, 1854.

M. le Consul,

VOILA quelques nouvelles du théâtre de la guerre d'après des rapports qui me sont parvenus récemment.

Le 19 du mois présent, deux régiments de Cavalerie de ligne Russe, un régiment de Cosaques, et une batterie d'Artillerie, sont venu en reconnaissance sous les fortifications de Kalafat. Le commandant de cette place a envoyé à leur rencontre, deux régiments de notre Cavalerie Régulière, 400 Chevaux Irreguliers, et 8 pièces d'Artillerie-à-cheval. Un combat s'est engagé. Notre Artillerie a lit du premier abord tant de tort à l'ennemi, qu'il ne tient plus place pour recevoir une charge de notre Cavalerie, mais tournant le dos il pris la fuite et fut poursuivir par notre Cavalerie Irrégulière. Dans cette poursuite des prisonniers, montures et armes sont tombé entre les mains de notre Cavalerie.

L'ennemi a laissé en outre des tués et blessés sur le Carrasu. D'après un autre rapport les Russes ont abandonné leur position devant Kalafat; ils ont démoli leur fortifications, brulé les barraques, gabions, fascines, &c. Il parait qu'ils quitteront la Petite Valachie. Nos patrouilles sont poussées jusqu'à Boleshti, huit heures de Kalafat, sur la route de Craiova.

J'apprends aussi que des masses considérables Russes se concentrent vis-à-vis de Silistrie en Valachie; on n'est par parvenu à me faire connaître le nombre et a formation de ces troupes, pour pouvoir comprendre leur dessin, qui pourrait être ou un passage effective du Danube, ou une démonstration pour masquer un autre mouvement. S'il me parvient des renseignments plus positifs, ou quelque mouvement important, je m'empresserai de vous en faire part.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) OMER.

La populazione dei villagi preso Calafut fu portata dai Russi solamente qualche vechi, et invalidi restanno nei villagi tutti le fortificazione furono distrute.

(Firmato) OMER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 207.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, May 11, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that by intelligence which I received yesterday from Silistria, I find that a body of Russian Cavalry (about 5,000 it is stated) had advanced from the Dobrudscha as far as Jenikoe, a village five hours distant from Silistria; some Cossacks also occupied the village of Kanly, two hours still further to the southward than Jenikoe. The most advanced position towards the enemy of the Turkish Cavalry was at Kynardji. The main body of the Turkish Cavalry was at Bazardjik.

The Russian force opposite Silistria at Karalash was calculated not to exceed 10,000 men. The number of Russian troops in the Dobrudscha has not been ascertained with any certainty, and has been variously stated to amount to, from 40,000 to 60,000 men. Eighteen Russian gun-boats were stationed at and near Karalash and opposite Silistria, and Russian steamers were daily disembarking tents, stores, and munitions, on the left bank of the Danube, about five hours lower down than Silistria.

For the last eight or ten days, Silistria had not been bombarded from the Russian batteries on the opposite shore, but everything appeared to indicate the intention of the Russians to besiege Silistria.

I am informed that a regiment of Turkish Cavalry had advanced on the 2nd instant, out of Kalafat under the command of "Seander Bey," and encountered a superior body of Russian Cavalry at Radovan, half way between Kalafat and Craiova. The Russians are officially reported to have been repulsed with loss. The Russians are stated to have left a small force to cover their hospitals at Craiova.

About the same period a party of about 300 Bashi-Bozouks passed the Danube, at Nicopolis, and having been eventually attacked by a superior Russian force were entirely destroyed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 207.

Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, May 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that his Highness Omer Pasha informed me this afternoon that he had received intelligence that on the 28th of April a skirmish had taken place between a regiment of Turkish Cavalry and several squadrons of Cossacks, who were superior in number, between Radovan and Craiova, in which the Turks appear to have been successful, for they are reported to have captured sixty horses, and to have made twelve men prisoners.

On the 2nd May a reconnaissance was made from Nicopolis into the Wallachian territory by 277 Albanians, supported by two companies of regulars.

They took possession of a Russian entrenchment, which was only occupied by a picket.

The party were then recalled, but the Albanians are stated to have refused, having sworn to die rather than fall back.

They were attacked, first by Cavalry, and afterwards two separate attacks by Infantry, are stated to have been made. The result was that the whole of the Albanians, with the exception of one man who was saved and got across the river, and fifteen wounded, who fell into the enemy's hands, were killed.

The loss on the part of the Russians is stated to have been very great.

No further movement of the enemy in the direction of Silistria or the Dobrudscha has been reported. Their advanced posts have not been pushed to the southward of the Karasu.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 207.

Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, May 6, 1854.

My Lord,

IN consequence of the anxiety in which, from your Lordship's private letter of the 26th ultimo, your Lordship appears to be respecting Pravadi, I went there on the 3rd instant to examine it, and have just returned.

The position of Pravadi is of considerable importance, not so much as covering any particular pass of the Balkan, as on account of its position between Varna and Shumla. If once in the hands of an enemy, he would be enabled from it to intercept the communication between Varna and Shumla, and would be in a very favourable position to prevent the junction of an army from Varna with one which had been obliged to maintain itself in the entrenched position of Shumla.

It is the latter consideration which appears to render it of especial importance at the present time.

The position is one naturally of great strength, but unfortunately it is not occupied by any works of a permanent nature, having been, like most of the Turkish fortresses, neglected during the peace.

Field-works have, however, been constructed to occupy the ground, and if properly laid out and armed, they would have enabled a small garrison to hold out for a considerable time against very superior forces. Some grievous errors had, however, been committed in occupying the ground, but orders have now been given to rectify them; and I should hope that, if the enemy does not attack it within three weeks, the works will be so advanced that Pravady would not then fall an easy prey to him, with its present garrison of about 2,400 men. As it is at present, it would offer scarcely any resistance if properly attacked.

As regards Varna, Colonel Neale informs me that the garrison consists of 6,500 men, which very nearly coincides with the statement I forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 6 of the 16th April.

Unfortunately, I have not seen the detached works since last November, when they were scarcely commenced.

If these works are in a respectable condition,—which, from what I hear, I presume they are,—the garrison ought to be sufficient to resist a *coup de main*, and to compel the enemy to undertake a regular siege, which, being a work of time, would allow of the garrison being reinforced to any necessary extent by sea. The fleet, not being able to assist much in the defence, may, of course, I presume, be calculated upon to prevent an attack by sea being combined with one by land.

As regards both of these places, however, I should be inclined to think that there is no immediate danger of an attack.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

No. 208.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon —(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 236.)

Constantinople, May 15, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith for your Lordship's information copies or extracts of the latest intelligence which has reached me from the Turkish army in Asia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 208.

Extract from a Private Letter to Vice-Consul Stevens.

THE state of affairs at Kars is now hopeless beyond description. The force has dwindled to some 12,000 men, starved, dejected, and commanded by little better than hopeless imbecility. The only means of keeping the force together is an immediate advance, but that is simply impossible in a hostile territority denuded of everything that can feed or shelter man or beast, with a starving country as your base of operations, with no point d'appui, no stores, no money, no courage and no military skill. There is but the alternative of sending a properly equipped force (European) or of letting the Russians march just where they please. Guyon is indefatigable, but his hands are tied, and what can the Mushir do with only 10 millions of piastres supplied, and actually 200 millions are necessary to accomplish an advance, the only thing that can save the army from dissolution.

We passed a cortége escorting some paper money to the army on one mountain. They are armed chiefly with tchibouques, and set in true Turkish indolence upon their high soft saddles. One man with a revolver pistol could have possessed himself of the whole affair in twenty seconds, and effectually quieted all informants.

Inclosure 2 in No. 208.

Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Erzeroom, April 30, 1854.

(Extract.)

THE Mushir Mustafa Yauf Pasha is a good but a weak man, that he adopts the advice of the last person he has conversed with, is totally ignorant of military matters, and from this he throws everything into confusion. His Excellency often says that he has no power to do what the General thinks indispensable, and he, General Guyon, seems to have come to the conviction that the army must be defeated and that he ought to resign, as he risks his character without a hope of success. Still he seems reluctant to take such a step, because he fears matters will become worse, for not a man in the army appears to care whether it will be beaten or victorious, and he adds that he should die of a broken heart were he to lose a chance of beating the Russians.

A contract was offered to the Mushir to supply 1,000 horses from Persia, his Excellency declined it on the plea that the price was high, and that he was promised supplies, none have been sent, and the army is in great want of them; such apathy and want of foresight cannot but entail ruin on the cause.

General Guyon was more hopeful when things appeared to me worse; he seems now to despair by perceiving I suppose that after such exertions he cannot make the army effective.

I am convinced that if he quit his post the army will be lost, and that with such a force the invasion of Georgia is out of the question. The present feeling of the army is desponding, and the soldiers will only regain their confidence on being reinforced by European troops.

Inclosure 3 in No. 208.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Trebizond, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the English screw steamer "Phœbe," which arrived here yesterday, brought six million of piastres for the use of the armies at Kars and Ichrooksow. A portion is in paper money.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. STEVENS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 208.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe

Trebizond, May 5, 1854.

My Lord,

NEWS arrived here last evening that the Russians having removed their garrison from Sokoom Kaleh to Redout Kaleh, the Circassians marched in and took possession of the former place on the 24th ultimo, without any fighting. The Sultan's standard was hoisted, and a Provisional Government formed under Hamit Bey, a relative, I believe, of Schamil's.

Two or three Europeans and some native traders belonging to this place were allowed to quit, and arrived here yesterday, several of whom lost their merchandize, which the Circassians seized.

From one of the Europeans I learn that Russia has abandoned Anapa after burning it down. It would seem Redout Kaleh is the only place which remains in Russian hands, but preparations were making to abandon it; many of its inhabitants had already removed to the interior.

I presume it would not be a difficult matter for the Circassians to form a junction with Selim Pasha's army, from which some good might result if a march towards Tiflis is in contemplation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. STEVENS.

No. 209.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 235.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 15, 1854.

THE Austrian Internuncio having called here yesterday, I took occasion to inform him that I was instructed to support the acceptance of his overture to the Porte respecting the entrance of an Austrian auxiliary force into Turkey for the repression of insurrectionary movements proceeding from Greece or Montenegro, and that I had acted agreeably to my instructions by recommending the Porte to accept the proposals of his Government.

An exchange of notes will accompany the Porte's acceptance, and I collected from what the Internuncio said that a Convention, perhaps, would eventually follow.

Inclosed herewith, in strict confidence, for your Lordship's perusal, is the project of a Note proposed by Reshid Pasha, with the view of drawing out an answer of corresponding purport from Baron de Bruck.

Notwithstanding the Porte's compliance with his Excellency's overture, I am persuaded that the Turkish Ministers would be better pleased if no necessity for the entrance of an Austrian army were possibly to take place.

I may observe, in conclusion, that the Internuncio's language tended considerably to confirm those prospects of a more complete co-operation on the part of Austria, which part of the correspondence forwarded to me by your Lordship enables me to entertain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 210.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon. (Received May 29.)

(No. 200.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 24, 1854.

COUNT BUOL informs me that he is occupied in drawing up the summons which is to be addressed by the Austrian and Prussian Governments to Russia to evacuate the Principalities. He has already received the adhesion of the Prussian Government to this measure, and he will, in the course of a day or two, transmit the draft of this document to Berlin for approval. Count Buol feels that if the object of this Note should be obtained, of which, however, he has little expectation, a negotiation for the re-establishment of peace, upon the conditions recognised by the Four Powers as stated in the different Protocols of the Conference up to this day, might then be undertaken with some chance of success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 211.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 203.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 24, 1854.

WITH reference to my despatch to your Lordship, No. 188, I have now to report that the Conference, which was adjourned on the 10th instant, was yesterday assembled by Count Buol, and upon our meeting, Count Arnim stated that he had received the instructions from his Government which he had asked for, and by which he was authorised to communicate a copy of the Austro-Prussian Treaty to the Conference, and to agree to the terms of the Protocol by which this Treaty, as well as the one between England and France, was accepted by the Conference, and was recognised as tending to carry out the objects of the engagements which had been taken by the Four Powers in the Protocol of the 9th of April.

In consequence of this communication, Count Buol read the substance of the Protocol which he proposed for the adoption of the Conference, which, having been approved, was drawn up according to the form in which it was to be signed, and the meeting was adjourned till that evening, when the copies of the different documents having been prepared, the Protocol was signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers.

I have the honour of inclosing the copies of these documents.

The Austro-Prussian Treaty is communicated without the Additional Article, which is stated to belong to it, but which your Lordship is acquainted with, and which refers to eventual military engagements and details.

I have not transmitted a copy of the Treaty between England and France, which I communicated to the Conference, and which remains deposited with the other documents preserved in the custody of Count Buol, as your Lordship will not require a copy of that instrument.

I cannot but congratulate your Lordship upon this further step towards securing the co-operation of the great Powers of Europe for the attainment of the important objects which they have engaged themselves to carry out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 211.

Protocol (No. 6) signed at Vienna May 23, 1854.

[See Eastern Papers, Part IX.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 211.

Treaty between Austria and Prussia, signed April 20, 1854.

[See Eastern Papers, Part IX.]

No. 212.

(The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 205.)

Vienna, May 24, 1854.

My Lord,

IN a recent conversation with Count Alvensleben, General Hess urged upon him the necessity of preparations which he thought the Prussian Government should be making to fulfil the military obligations of the Treaty between Austria and Prussia.

General Hess stated that the Austrian Government was placing in all haste three corps-d'armée upon a war footing, in addition to those which already were so, and that as soon as the men had joined their ranks, they would be moved into Galicia.

He added that the note which the Two Governments had agreed to transmit to St. Petersburgh, calling upon the Emperor to evacuate the Principalities, was immediately to be forwarded to Berlin for approval, and directly afterwards would be sent to St. Petersburgh, and as it was possible that the answer might be such as to call for the adoption of the military measures contemplated in the Treaty, it appeared necessary that the Prussian army should not be backward in its preparations.

Count Alvensleben stated that before he left Berlin, some dispositions had already been taken by the Minister of War for the purchase of horses for the Artillery, that being the only arm of the Prussian army which required time to prepare it for active service. He said that as it would require only twenty-six days to place the Infantry and Cavalry on a war footing, there would certainly be time enough for effecting this object before the march of an army could be necessary, and that it was a great object with the Prussian Government to avoid the expense which such a measure must entail, until a real necessity for it should occur.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 213.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 281.)

Foreign Office, May 29, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to what your Excellency reports in your despatch No. 226 of the 12th of May, I have to state that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the judicious course which your Excellency pursued to check the wish for the command in chief of the Turkish army, which appears to have been entertained by Marshal St. Arnaud, and which might have given just cause of dissatisfaction to the only General in the Sultan's service, and have lowered his personal consideration in the eyes of his army.

Her Majesty's Government have, for months past, urged the Turkish Government to recall men from Asia, whose criminal conduct brought disgrace upon the Sultan's cause, and will occasion the disasters contemplated by your Excellency.

You have done what was in your power to support these remonstrances and entreaties, but to no purpose, as it would appear; and your Excellency must now make a last appeal, and endeavour at least that the army at Kars should be placed under the sole command of General Guyon.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 214

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 657.)

Paris, May 29, 1854.

My Lord,

THE French Government has received advices from Servia, which show that the Servian Government is arming to a considerable extent.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has an idea that these armaments are caused by the position assumed by Austria on the Servian frontier, and he has written to M. de Bourqueney to shew the danger which Austria will incur should she have any idea of violating the Servian territory.

I am not sure that this measure of the French Minister is a wise one, for if he alarms Austria by exciting apprehensions of the force of which Servia can dispose, he will give her fresh reason for remaining simply upon the defensive within her own frontier.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether there was not cause to fear that the armaments reported to them from Servia were excited and paid for by Russia, and whether they might not eventually be turned against the Porte. He admitted that such might be the case.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No 215.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 663. Confidential.)

Paris, May 29, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has given me, confidentially, the substance of a conversation which he held a few days ago with the Austrian Minister, M. de Hübner, and which is not without interest at the present moment.

I should observe, that since M. de Hübner's return from his late visit to Vienna, he appears to me to be far less sanguine of the immediate cooperation of his Government with the Western Powers than he was previously to his departure from hence; and though he maintains that Austria will remain faithful to all the engagements which she has contracted in the Protocols signed at Vienna, he does not conceal his apprehensions that the retreat of the Russians from the Danubian Provinces may, in the eyes of his Government, cancel those engagements.

On comparing notes with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I did not find that the Austrian Minister's language had made the same impression upon his Excellency that it had made upon me; and it was only a day or two ago that he admitted that he had had a conversation with M. de Hübner, which was far from satisfactory, and in the course of which he had spoken his mind to the Austrian Envoy with considerable freedom.

Among the reasons which M. de Hübner appears to have given for the backwardness of his Government was this, that the Emperor Francis Joseph was apprehensive that the Maritime Powers wished to enfeeble Russia, and to reduce her to the state of a second-rate Power. To this Austria could not lend assistance. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that the Emperor was quite mistaken; that what France and England desired was, to prevent Russia dictating the law to the whole world; that France had as much need of Russia to preserve the balance of power in Europe, as Austria had, and that if Austria counted upon Russia to hold France in check, he could assert, that France would be as sorry to see Russia in a position which would prevent her from cooperating with France to keep Central Europe in order. "What, then," said M. de Hübner (promising secrecy, if necessary), "are your plans?" "I cannot tell you what our plans are," said M. Drouyn de Lhuys; "but I will tell you what my personal impressions are. Russia is too strong in the Black Sea, and must be weakened there. She is too strong in the Baltic, and must be weakened there, too. In both places, she bids defiance by sea to the united fleets of what have been considered the two greatest Maritime Powers in Europe. This, in itself, is a contradiction to the balance of power, and must be altered." While saying this, M. Drouyn de Lhuys seems to have intimated various ways by which this result might be attained.

M. de Hübner did not dissent from the correctness of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' views, but he said that his Government feared that more was intended, and that there was a hope of raising in the centre of Europe a barrier against the encroachments of Russia, alluding plainly to the restoration of the Kingdom

of Poland, to which he gave it to be understood his Government would never consent.

"You are mistaken," replied M. Drouyn de Lhuys; "France no doubt has sympathies for the Poles, which she will never gainsay, and being at war with Russia, she is not sorry that a Polish Legion should be formed in the East to aid the cause which she is defending. But the reconstruction of the Kingdom of Poland, however much she may abstractedly desire it, is politically by no means of the same importance to her, that, in her opinion, it is to Germany. Russia is too far removed from France to render her encroachments dangerous to France. She has a vast amount of way to make before she can reach the French frontier. It is Germany that requires such a barrier between her and Russia as the reconstruction of Poland would furnish. But if Germany does not see the advantage of it, it is not for France to stir the question."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then argued on the impolicy of Austria contenting herself with the simple evacuation of the Danubian Provinces by the Russians. Supposing the evacuation to take place on the summons about to be sent to St. Petersburgh by the Austrian Government, did the latter suppose that the Russians would not feel the humiliation to which they were subjected, and that they would not take the earliest opportunity to avenge themselves on those who had been the immediate cause of this humiliation, namely, the Austrian Government; but if the Austrian Government left the Western Powers in the lurch, by contenting themselves with the evacuation of the Provinces, did they suppose that those Powers would come to the assistance of Austria if attacked by Russia? He maintained, therefore, that the true policy of Austria was to act at once and decidedly, and to determine, not to consider, the Eastern question as settled, until it became materially impossible for the Russians to make the conquest of Turkey. "But if you are apprehensive of what may be the views and intentions of England and France," continued M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Hübner, "why do you not propose a Convention to us? Let us, at least, know what it is you desire, and if we can sign a Convention together, it is likely that many of the smaller States would wish to join in it, Sardinia most probably among others, and you would thus have indirectly during the war a guarantee for the safety of your Italian dominions."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys thinks that his reasoning made considerable impression on M. de Hübner, and that the latter will write to his Government recommending that something of the kind should be done. At the same time, M. Drouyn de Lhuys means to send to M. de Bourqueney confidentially the substance of this conversation, and instruct him to follow it up whenever a favourable opportunity presents itself.

When recounting all this to me, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he continued to receive accounts from Sardinia, which showed that a little pressing would induce the Sardinian Government to declare themselves for the Western Powers, but that he had written to the Duc de Guiche to be cautious in his proceedings. The proper time was not arrived, he thought, for putting Sardinia forward. A declaration on her part would come with greater effect hereafter, either as a relief to Austria, should the latter eventually co-operate actively with the Western Powers, or as a menace to her, should her policy unfortunately indicate a different tendency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 216.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 30.)

(No. 238.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 17, 1854.

IT appears that General Baraguay d'Hilliers has been recalled. The day before yesterday he wrote to the Sultan's Secretary, requesting an audience of leave, which was granted by His Majesty. He went in full uniform, unattended by any one but the chief interpreter of his Embassy. No Minister was present, and the Porte was not informed of the visit. The Ambassador excused

this irregularity, on the plea of his almost immediate departure, and the consequent pressure on his time. He informed the Sultan that he preferred a military to a diplomatic position, and that, on returning to France, he was to have the command of the Baltic camp.

I take this opportunity to remark, that in my humble judgment, the Sultan would have done better to decline this direct application for an audience of leave, which was, in truth, an abuse of privilege, and a slight on the Ministers of the Porte. I am the first Ambassador in favour of whom the Sultan has openly admitted a right of private audience, and I have made a point of using the privilege with much reserve, as well out of respect for His Majesty, as to maintain my influence unimpaired. No such considerations appear to have occurred to my French colleague; and, favoured by the peculiar circumstances of the juncture, he has thrown down every barrier, and rendered access to the Sultan a matter of mere convenience to himself. I am mistaken if Marshal St. Arnaud is not inclined to pursue the same course. The natural results may be foreseen. The Sultan will, hereafter, either return to the old forms of etiquette, or find himself obliged to receive in private all Foreign Ministers without distinction, according to their individual pleasure. It is, no doubt, most desirable that the Ottoman Court, as well as the Ottoman Government and people, should be brought into easier intercourse with foreigners, not only of high diplomatic rank, but of every respectable description, and the present course of events may produce a salutary effect by facilitating that process. But to those who have the advancement of this Empire at heart, and who have had opportunities of studying the character of its Government and people, the advantage of conducting such matters without exaggeration or levity must be apparent. Proceedings of a different stamp originate rather in personal motives, than in views of public interest; and while they tend to compromise the dignity of the Throne, they render the whole scheme of improvement an object of disgust to the country at large.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 217.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 30.)

(No. 240.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 19, 1854.

I HAVE received with much satisfaction your Lordship's authority to obtain from the Porte permission for Colonel Beatson, and other British officers, to enter the Sultan's military service, with the view of bringing into some kind of order and available organisation those irregular bands which, under pretence of cooperating with the Turkish armies, have done so much mischief, as well to those armies as to the peaceable inhabitants of this country.

Your Lordship is aware, that when Colonel Beatson was here before, I put him into communication with the Seraskier, and recommended the acceptance of his services in earnest terms. At that time Mehemet Ali filled the post of Seraskier. Events had not then advanced to the point which they have reached since; and I doubt whether Colonel Beatson made on the Turkish authorities, by his personal bearing, an impression equal to the reputation which he justly enjoys. While hesitating whether or not to persevere in the offer of his services, he received intelligence of a most honourable and lucrative office having been conferred upon him in India, and this circumstance, as I understood, determined his return to England.

He will now present himself under circumstances far more favourable to the accomplishment of his purpose, and I shall endeavour to carry out your Lordship's instructions on his behalf, with a confident hope that the Porte will not be insensible to the many advantages which may result from his employment in the manner proposed.

Some difficulties, inherent in the very nature of the undertaking, remain, however, to be overcome, and before Colonel Beatson arrives, and is again put into personal communication with the Seraskier, who succeeded to Mehemet Ali, I cannot hope to ensure the success of my exertions, even with the

advantage of your Lordship's instruction, and the facilities afforded by its contents.

I observe that Colonel Beatson is authorised to report progress to your Lordship, and at the same time to communicate unreservedly with me. Hence I infer that he is either to send his reports under flying seal through me, or to give me copies of them; but as no such thing is specified in your Lordship's instruction, I must beg that the point may be cleared up.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 218.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 244. Confidential.)

Constantinople, May 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, a note presented by Reshid Pasha to the Austrian Internuncio, on the subject of military aid to be afforded to the Sultan by Austria, with reference to the insurrectionary movements, expected in Montenegro and partially checked in Albania.

I am not in possession of Baron Bruck's reply, nor indeed do I know whether his Excellency has sent one in as yet. But I avail myself of this opportunity to transmit to your Lordship, in copy, the note by which the Internuncio opened this correspondence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 218.

Baron Bruck to Reshid Pasha.

Constantinople, le 4 Mai, 1854.

LA Cour Impériale d'Autriche, partageant l'opinion des Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre, que le moyen le plus sûr de circonscrire l'insurrection éclatée en Epire et dans la Thessalie et d'empêcher nommément que les insurgés en reçoivent des secours de la Grèce, serait d'établir un cordon militaire sur la frontière de l'Empire Ottoman vers ce Royaume, les dits Gouvernements ont cru devoir lui proposer de s'associer à une pareille mesure en envoyant de son côté un certain nombre de troupes sur la frontière en question.

Par suite de l'intérêt que l'Empereur mon auguste Maître a plait à témoigner en toute occasion en faveur du maintien de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et du prompt rétablissement de la paix en Orient, Sa Majesté s'est montrée disposée à coopérer à une mesure qui tendrait vers ce double but, en prenant conseil toutefois des conditions particulières qui aux points de vue géographique et militaire devraient régler sa participation.

En conséquence Sa Majesté est prête à envoyer dans les parages de Prévesa et d'Arta quelques vaisseaux de guerre, qui conjointement avec ceux des autres Puissances amiés et alliées de la Porte auraient à appuyer du côté de la mer les opérations, des troupes qui formeraient le cordon. En outre, Sa Majesté pourrait se décider à donner l'ordre à un certain nombre de ses troupes stationnées dans le district de Cattaro de se porter en avant dans l'Albanie—démonstration qui, d'une part, serait propre à empêcher l'insurrection de s'étendre jusqu'au nord de cette province, et de l'autre en imposerait aux Montenegrins pour le cas qu'ils eussent la velléité de faire cause commune avec les rebelles.

Le Cabinet Impérial, qui s'est au préalable ouvert au sujet de l'exécution de ces mesures envers les Gouvernements maritimes, a chargé le Soussigné, Internonce et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, de s'entendre avant tout avec la Sublime Porte, pour s'assurer de son assentiment et pour provoquer dans le cas que celui fût donné, les ordres nécessaires aux autorités et aux commandants militaires dans les Provinces Ottomanes, où les forces de terre et de mer de Sa Majesté l'Empereur mon auguste Maître seraient appelées à agir.

Le Soussigné, qui se fait un devoir de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance de son Altesse Réchid Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, la prie de vouloir bien donner suite au plutôt possible à la présente communication et saisis, &c.,

(Signé) BRUCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 218.

Réshid Pasha to Baron Bruck.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note de votre Excellence en date du 4 Mai, dans laquelle il est dit que le Gouvernement d'Autriche enverra quelques bâtiments sur les côtes de Prevesa et d'Arta, pour aider par mer, en agissant de concert avec les bâtiments des Puissances alliées, au cordon de troupes que, par suite des troubles qui ont éclaté dans les provinces de Janina et de Tricala, il faut établir sur les frontières de la Grèce; et qu'il se peut que, dans le but, d'un côté d'empêcher que les actes de rebellion ne s'étendent sur la partie septentrionale des Provinces, et de l'autre de détourner les Monténegrins de leurs mauvaises intentions, si jamais ils voulaient faire cause commune avec les insurgés, Sa Majesté l'Empereur se décide à donner l'ordre à une partie des troupes Impériales qui se trouvent dans le district de Cattaro, d'avancer vers l'Albanie; et que la Sublime Porte, si elle y donne son assentiment, voudra bien envoyer des ordres à cette égard aux autorités des endroits où ces ordres sont nécessaires.

L'accord du Cabinet d'Autriche aussi avec les sentiments qui animent, à ce sujet, les Cours d'Angleterre et de France, alliées de la Sublime Porte, et cette nouvelle preuve des bonnes intentions qu'on voit toujours de la part de Sa Majesté l'Empereur envers la Sublime Porte, dûment appréciés par Sa Majesté le Sultan, lui ont causé une grande satisfaction.

Comme les notes qui seront données de part et d'autre sur cette affaire auront la force d'une Convention, il faut que la question y soit clairement posée, et voilà pourquoi on donne les éclaircissements suivants:

D'abord on fera savoir aux autorités des côtes de l'Albanie jusqu'à Prévesa que des bâtiments de guerre Autrichiens vont arriver.

La Sublime Porte consent à ce que les troupes de terre avancent vers l'Albanie, et à ce que, si elles ne sont pas nécessaires pour l'Albanie elle-même, et supposé que les Monténegrins fassent quelque mouvement insurrectionnel, elle entrent à Monténegro seulement.

Si des troupes doivent venir vers l'Albanie, comme la province de Scodra (Scutari), quelques districts du Gouvernement de Roumélie situés près des côtes, et la province de Janina se trouveront, comme Monténegro, sur leur passage, lorsque les troupes Impériales sont arrivées, et pendant tout le temps qu'elles y resteront, jusqu'à ce que l'objet qui est en vue soit obtenu, elles seront amicalement traitées, on aura pour elles beaucoup d'égards, et l'on mettra le plus grand soin à ce que tout ce qui leur est nécessaire soit préparé; et non-seulement on écrira dans ce sens aux autorités nécessaires, mais la Sublime Porte enverra aussi à cet effet un commissaire exprès à ces environs-là.

Considérant que l'Herzegovine, la Bosnie, et la Servie avoisinent avec Monténegro, si dans ces pays-là on ignorait le véritable motif du mouvement des dites troupes, cela exciterait une grande agitation dans les esprits, et c'est pour cela qu'on fera savoir à temps aux autorités de ces environs-là aussi, ce dont il s'agit véritablement, et qu'il n'est aucunement question d'entrer dans ces provinces sans accord mutuel et exprès au préalable.

Attendu que l'expédition d'un corps de troupes dans les environs sus-mentionnés devra être basée sur une nécessité réelle, aussitôt que Sa Majesté l'Empereur aura pris son part là-dessus, et que l'on s'apprêtera à la mettre à exécution, il faudra que le Gouvernement Impérial en avertisse la Sublime Porte.

Lorsqu'on aura atteint le but qu'on se propose, c'est-à-dire, lorsqu'on aura réprimé les mouvements insurrectionnels dans ces pays-là, il est tout naturel qu'alors les troupes venues retournent dans les Etats Autrichiens. Ainsi, on donnera à ces troupes lorsqu'elles s'en retourneront les mêmes facilités qu'on leur aura données lorsqu'elles son venues, et tels sont les ordres qui seront expédiés aux autorités Ottomanes.

J'ai l'ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale de communiquer à votre Excellence la décision sus-énoncée, et je saisis, &c.

No. 219.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 30.)

(No. 245.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 20, 1854.

THE day before yesterday the two Commanders-in-chief of the auxiliary armies embarked for Varna in order to meet and confer with Omer Pasha there. The Seraskier and the Captain Pasha embarked at the same time for the same destination. It is not improbable that they will go on to Shumla. As the combined squadrons were to return to their former anchorage at Baljik, the Admirals also will have an opportunity of conferring with the Commanders of the land forces.

This meeting, which it was an object of common interest to hasten, will, I trust, prove the point of departure for a more complete combination, and a more vigorous prosecution of measures directed to the defence of Turkey and the discomfiture of its unprincipled assailant. It is to be expected that the numerous questions already talked over and prepared for solution, as partial opportunities offered, will now be matured and brought to a final decision. With respect to such of them as in any degree possess a political bearing, I have endeavoured to afford Lord Raglan the best information at my disposal, and I have sent Mr. Alison to Varna, with his Lordship's consent, in the hope of placing some additional elements of deliberation within reach.

Unfortunately, the question of deepest importance remains to be settled here. The Turkish Ministers are now awakened to a full sense of the danger resulting from their financial embarrassment; and I trust that necessity will at last effect what prejudice, levity, and ignorance have so long and so fatally delayed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 220.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 30.)

(No. 247.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 20, 1854.

I BELIEVE I am not premature in stating that General Count Baraguay d'Hilliers terminates his embassy to Constantinople, and embarks for France to-day.

I had intended to take leave of him by a personal visit, but being confined to the house by illness, I have sent Mr. Brodie to express my regret.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S. Since writing the above I have received from General Baraguay d'Hilliers an official note announcing his departure, and the appointment of M. Benedetti as Chargé d'Affaires. Copies of the note and of my reply are inclosed herewith.

S. DE R.

Inclosure 1 in No. 220.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Pera, le* 20 *Mai*, 1854.

J'AI l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence qu'autorisé par Sa Majesté à rentrer en France pour y exercer un commandement près de sa personne, j'ai accrédité M. Benedetti, Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade en qualité de Chargé d'Affaires.

Au moment d'interrompre des relations dont il m'est précieux d'emporter le souvenir, je réclame pour M. Benedetti la continuation des excellents rapports que j'ai été heureux d'entretenir avec votre Excellence.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 220.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le* 2 *Mai*, 1854.

JE viens de recevoir l'office par lequel votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de me prévenir de son départ, et de la nomination de M. Benedetti en qualité de Chargé d'Affaires.

Soyez assuré, M. l'Ambassadeur, que je me ferai un vrai plaisir de continuer avec M. Benedetti les mêmes relations cordiales que j'ai eu à cœur de maintenir avec votre Excellence.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 221.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 30.)

(No. 249.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 20, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the latest despatches which I have received from Colonel Neale, Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, and Captain Simmons, attached to the head-quarters of Omer Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 221.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, May* 16, 1844.

THE French Imperial steam frigate "Vauban" arrived yesterday from the combined fleets off Sebastopol. I learn from his Excellency Vice-Admiral Dundas, by a letter dated the 13th instant, that the French and English squadrons would, weather permitting, be at Baljik for water about the 21st instant.

The Ottoman fleet appeared off Varna a week ago. Mouslaver Pasha (Admiral Slade) came into Varna in one of the steamers, and after communicating with the authorities here, proceeded in the steamer to communicate with the Admirals in command of the combined squadrons off Sebastopol.

Mouslaver Pasha returned here on the 14th instant, and having again visited the Pasha, left yesterday to join the Turkish squadron, which had been

unable to reach the rendezvous at Kavarna Bay owing to contrary winds and foggy weather.

I believe the whole of the Turkish squadron has not yet reached Kavarna Bay; and several of the ships are still lying to the southward of Varna.

On the 13th instant a line of battle ship got aground during the night in a small sandy bay between Varna and Baljik. A Turkish steamer coming to her assistance, she was got off in a few hours.

I understand it is the intention of the Turkish Admiral to anchor in Kavarna Bay until the arrival of the combined squadrons at Baljik.

On the evening of the 14th instant Her Majesty's steam sloop "Fury" arrived here from off the Sulina mouth of the Danube and Kustenjee. The "Fury" brought with her an Ionian brig laden with oil and other stores. Captain Tatham informs me that this vessel was stopped by the "Sulon" while entering the Sulina mouth, and that upon examining her papers she was found to have a permit to proceed to Bourghas, and from thence to the Ionian Islands, issued by your Excellency.

The vessel having been recently purchased was required to proceed to the Ionian Islands to obtain the necessary documents.

She awaits in Varna the decision of the Admiral, having on board an officer and four men from the "Fury."

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 221.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, May 16, 1854.

My Lord,

THE only new feature in the reports which I have received from the interior respecting the movements of the Turkish army since I had last the honour of addressing your Excellency is, that Selim Pasha, with about 8,000 or 10,000 of the Egyptian troops, had marched from Shumla to Silistria, and that some additional troops had also been ordered from Shumla towards Bazardjik.

The Russian forces in the Dobrudscha is stated, upon the authority of several Turkish officers arrived within the las week from the Danube, to consist of General Lüders' corps, consisting of 48 battalions, or, at 700 per battalion, 32,600 Infantry, and about 10,000 Cavalry, including the Cossacks; in all about 42,600, exclusive of the usual proportion of Artillery.

The Russian advanced guard of Cavalry from the force in the Dobrudscha was within four hours of the south-east of Silistria. I understand that native travellers going from this district to Silistria take the road of Shumla, as it is considered unsafe to go the direct road. Stores and ammunition sent from Shumla to Silistria are now accompanied by a strong escort of one or two battalions.

A very considerable quantity of guns, shot and shell, gun cartridges, muskets, and other military stores, have been received recently in Varna from Constantinople, but the means of conveyance to Shumla, for which place most of these stores are destined, are most difficult to be procured, still some portions are sent forward daily.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 221.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, May 16, 1854.

My Lord,

M. PISANI having requested me, by your Lordship's directions, to explain the discrepancy which occurs between the statements of Captain Simmons, and that made by myself to your Excellency, respecting the strength of the present garrison of Varna, I have the honour to observe, that I presume

Captain Simmons must have misread my letter, as 8,500 is the true number of the garrison here. I believe I mentioned to Captain Simmons that 6,500 was the number of the troops at Pravady.

There are six battalions of Rediff here, and three battalions of Egyptians. These nine battalions may be calculated at 800 men each, making 7,200 Infantry. There are 1,100 Artillery, and 200 Irregular Cavalry; in all, 8,500. Most of the Irregular Cavalry is, however, at present detached at Baljik.

I should, however, state to your Lordship that there is a good deal of sickness among the troops here. In great part amongst the Turkish, not the Egyptian troops. The number of sick may be estimated at about 500; thus reducing the nominal effective strength of the garrison to 8,000. The three battalions of the Rediff here, which came from Matchin, and which suffered much in the Dobrudscha, are in a very weakly state, and inefficient; although not being in hospital, they are included in the effective strength.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 221.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, May 18, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to state to your Lordship, that I find I was misinformed with respect to the number of Egyptian troops which have left Shumla for Silistria. I now understand that those who marched from Silistria were about 2,500.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

P.S.—1 P.M.—His Highness Omer Pasha has this moment arrived from Shumla to meet Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud, who are expected to arrive early to-morrow. I am informed that the Russians have appeared within four miles of Silistria, on the right bank of the Danube, and that they are within sight of the battlements of that fortress. E. N.

Inclosure 5 in No. 221.

Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, May 14, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant, inclosing an extract of a despatch from the Earl of Clarendon expressive of the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt the disinterested and patriotic offer of Omer Pasha, communicated to your Lordship in my letter of March 29th.

I have to inform your Lordship that when I read this extract to his Highness, he appeared much gratified with the expression of the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, and his Highness desired me to inform your Lordship, that in the authorised communication contained in my letter above referred to, he only considers that he was performing in a proper manner the duty which he owes to his country, and the cause which is common to it and the allies of his Sovereign.

I beg to add, that I esteem it a high honour that Her Majesty's Government have been pleased to approve of my conduct, and to assure your Excellency that no endeavour shall be wanting on my part that I may continue to merit their approbation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

No. 222.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)

(Private and Confidential.)

Constantinople, May 20, 1854.

My dear Lord,

I INCLOSE for your perusal a report addressed to Lord Raglan by Lord de Ros on the return of the latter from Shumla, and a memorandum which I proposed and placed in Lord Raglan's hand, at his request, before he embarked for Varna.

The report has probably been sent to the Duke of Newcastle, and therefore I send a copy of it herewith merely for your Lordship's convenience.

With respect to the memorandum, I drew it up under an impression that it might, perhaps, be agreeable to Lord Raglan to have all the leading points which call for deliberation and decision placed under his eyes in a single frame, at a moment when he was going to meet his colleagues under circumstances of signal interest and urgency.

Of the matters recommended by Omer Pasha, the most pressing are already done or in train.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 222.

General Lord de Ros to General Lord Raglan.

May 17, 1854.

My Lord,

IN compliance with your orders, I proceeded on the 10th instant to Varna in the "Banshee," and landing early on the 11th at that place, rode post to Devna, and reached Shumla on the evening of the 12th. Next morning I had a private interview with Omer Pasha, and began by stating your wish to know his present views and intentions as to the war.

He said he conceived there was but one course for him to pursue; and that he had already taken, and was still taking every measure for the concentration of his force at Shumla, with the exception of the Danube garrisons, and some regiments of Cavalry which were posted at some villages in advance, both for gaining information of the enemy's movements, and for relieving the stores of provision in Shumla by the absence of so many horses and men. Some squadrons were also posted for communication between Shumla and Varna.

It was, he said, a matter of the utmost importance to the Turkish army that the French and English should immediately make some movement demonstrative of a speedy resolution to support him. He did not desire any premature advance of the armies, but the sending up of even 1,000 men to Varna by the English, and a small advanced guard of the French to Adrianople, would have a most useful effect in encouragement of his troops, and in checking the operations of the Russians towards Silistria, from which place his last intelligence represented them to be but five marches distant on the south bank of the Danube.

On my observing that the siege of Silistria was in all likelihood their immediate intention, he said he did not feel so sure of that, because the rise of the Danube these last few days was an impediment to attack on the river side, while their knowledge of the concentration of the Turkish force at Shumla, only sixty miles distant, would make them hesitate to commence the siege on the land side until they had brought up a very large force to cover their besieging army. Now, as the troops in Silistria amounted to full 15,000, the Russians must have 35,000 for the siege, and double that number for the covering army. He estimated their whole force at 140,000, and his own in Shumla at 50,000; but I think he has not above 45,000. This is exclusive of about 4,000 or 5,000 Cavalry in his front, already alluded to. He said his authority as Civil Governor of Roumelia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia, enabled him to

command great supplies for the allied armies in the event of their advance, every town and village being assessed in proportion, and no reluctance in the inhabitants to contend with; because the prices fixed by the Turkish Governments were a fair and real remuneration to them. He spoke of his having already 4,000 carts drawn by two bullocks each, and of 25,000 bullocks available at once as meat for the armies. Orders had been given to certain factories, where beasts were killed in great numbers merely for their fat, to desist from that proceeding; this being the more important, because in this climate lean meat is considered productive of dysentery.

In reference to this point, he expressed a strong desire that the allied fleets should entirely abstain from purchase of either corn or beef in Roumelia or Bulgaria; it raised difficulty as to regulation of prices, and they could, he was sure, obtain equally abundant supplies from the coasts of Asia Minor.

As your Lordship had desired me to ascertain from Omer Pasha whether you or Lord Stratford could in any way assist him with his own Government, he said it would be a very great relief to him if the Sultan would send him a public officer to take charge of the whole finance of the army, with which he was often much harassed when his attention was needed for other matters. He dwelt also very strongly on the great evil of his not having any power of trying criminals for life, observing on the horrible alternative left him in aggravated cases, such as the recent murder of a boy of ten years old in his father's sight by two followers of the army, of sentencing to 500 blows of the stick, which the criminal is seldom known to survive many days. He said, with much truth, that such hideous punishments often produced compassion for the sufferer, however enormous his guilt, rather than that approval of a just example, which so often enhanced its force and moral effect upon the soldiers.

Omer Pasha is not fond of writing, and, indeed, with all he has upon his hands, it would be impossible for him to write more than regards his own army; and he said he was very anxious to have a "confidential corresponding officer" from the British army to carry on all his communications with your Lordship; remarking, at the same time, on the very great assistance Captain Simmons had rendered him both by his correspondence and his thorough knowledge of his profession as an engineer. I asked if I should propose Captain Simmons for this purpose, to be permanently attached to his headquarters, to which he replied, that nothing would be more agreeable to him if it could be done, but that it would be still more so if Captain Simmons could have two more under him for the "travail de bureau," thus leaving him more time for giving his useful attention to the numerous posts and field-works becoming every day more necessary, both at Varna and Pravady.

Here I feel it is but justice to call your Lordship's attention to the very great service which I could plainly perceive Captain Simmons has rendered to the Turks by the advice he has given, as well as by the ability he has shown in strengthening the works at Shumla and Pravady, and pointing out where the old ones can be improved.

Omer Pasha receives so much advice, and some of it, as he himself told me, so absurd and uncalled for, from officious adventurers, that it requires much discretion to press any matter upon him; and this discretion, I think, Captain Simmons has very judiciously exercised, and with the best possible result of gaining his entire confidence, without exciting any jealousy in those about him. At the same time he has acquired a knowledge of that difficult country, which may one day prove invaluable to the allies, as well as to the Turks.

Omer Pasha expressed a great wish for a supply of good swords of our ordinary pattern for his Cavalry. In the exaggerated reforms of Sultan Mahmoud, the Turkish Cavalry were deprived of their old sabres and supplied with a short, weak, and ill-made sword, which lessens the confidence of the soldier. I believe that some of our old Light Dragoon swords in store at the Tower would be immediately available.

It would be very desirable that officers going up to Shumla should have some sort of credential to distinguish them from the persons who are constantly appearing there as "English officers," and who are troublesome to Omer Pasha, who, in his anxiety to show attention to our army, finds great difficulty in distinguishing who are officers from reporters and other intrusive

visitors. It need hardly be added, that there is danger of information reaching the Russians through the English newspapers, which would be extremely inconvenient.

In reference to the possibility of forming a corps officered by British or French and German officers, Omer Pasha seems to think it might be brought about; but that much discretion must be used in the commencement of a system so novel to the Turks. He proposes, he told me, to begin with one model squadron, and, if he finds no insuperable difficulties, to increase the corps by degrees to a regiment; and, once introduced, he anticipated much advantage from the example of order, method, and discipline to the army in general.

As I had seen at Shumla a person named O'Reilly, whom I remembered an excellent drill at the Maidstone Depôt, I mentioned the fact to Omer Pasha, with the assurance that he could not find a man more calculated for the task, while O'Reilly's present position as supernumerary major of Cavalry, made him nearly useless. He seemed to approve the suggestion, but said that O'Reilly must first study the Turkish language a little, which is perfectly reasonable, and will, I am sure, be diligently followed up by O'Reilly, who is an active man, and already knows a little Turkish.

From what I saw of the Bulgarian peasantry, I cannot but think an excellent corps of Cavalry or Infantry might be raised among them by English or French officers, and as they are all Christians, no religious obstacles would interfere.

In returning by Varna, I took notice of several facilities for landing troops, easily to be accomplished, and I have communicated on this point with Admiral Boxer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DE ROS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 222.

Memorandum.

THE meeting at Varna is the first step towards active operations against Russia by land. It is the more important as affording a fit opportunity for reviewing the whole situation, and bringing the force of collective opinion to bear on the counsels of the Porte.

The numerical strength, the efficiency in other respects, the composition and distribution of the Turkish army in Bulgaria, may then be ascertained, together with its command of supplies, its positions for defence, its means of recruitment, and its capacity for moving without danger to its communications.

The Commanders-in-chief will also have to consider in what manner the auxiliary armies may best co-operate with the native forces. The question of command, as well as the plan of campaign will necessarily come into view.

The theatre of war may be confined to Bulgaria and the Dobrudscha.

The Russians may possibly obtain an ascendancy there, and risk the passage of the Balkan.

The allies may cross the Danube, and attack their army in the Principalities.

The part to be played by Austria will enter, more or less, into every calculation.

Attention will, no doubt, be paid to the means which can be employed for improving the Turkish forces, and rendering them, altogether, more disposable and reliable.

Their officers of the middle and higher grades are said to be generally deficient. Their Cavalry is notoriously ill-armed; and the Infantry is far from being supplied with muskets of the best kind. There is also the irregular force, the Bashi-Bozouks, horse and foot—without discipline, without pay, without courage, doing in every way more harm than good, and equally difficult to retain with advantage, or to dismiss without danger. By what additional measures, whether of severe repression, of organization, or of

judicious distribution, can they be humanized into soldiers, and made available either separately or otherwise?

The aid derivable from the services of foreign officers may also be worthy of attention.

Employed on the Staff, commissioned in the Line, as partisans, instructors, or intermediaries, they may, perhaps, in large proportion be turned to account. Could not those of a more enterprising character, having experience of irregular warfare, be employed in reducing bodies of irregular soldiery into some kind of order and disposable usefulness. For purposes of this kind the names of Colonel Beatson, Sir Stephen Lakeman, and others, naturally present themselves.

Lastly, we have the Poles, with other emigrants on one side, and sundry portions of the local Christian population on the other, settled like the Cossacks,* or indigenous like the Bulgarians.†

The means of utilizing these several resources, involve political as well as military considerations. With respect to the Poles it would be difficult to suggest anything now. Their claims for our sympathy are very strong. Collected in good earnest, and formed for service in such manner as to give full scope to their national feelings and military ardour, they might be useful even in point of numerical force, and still more so by their moral influence as well on Poland, as on the Russian armies. But can they be united? Can adequate funds be supplied for their efficient organization and employment? Can they be brought forward as they desire, without giving umbrage to Austria, and engaging the allies prematurely? The solution of this problem is very desirable.

Other refugees, if formed into a corps, might, perhaps, be neutralized, as to political impressions, by mixture with natives, and employment in Asia.

Lesser Wallachia, Circassia, Daghesta; of these three points of interest it may be remarked, that with respect to the second the Admirals have that matter in hand. It remains, however, to be considered, whether the army of Batoum might not, since the Russians have withdrawn and left the natives free to act in concert with the ships, be made more useful by reinforcing the army of Kars, which is in so deplorable a state.‡

It is highly desirable that communications should be opened with Schamyl, and that a clearer notion should be formed as to his inclination and means of cooperating with the Circassians and Turks. It is understood in the present state of our information, that he is too far off to assist the army of Kars, though he might detach a force in support of the Circassians.

With respect to Wallachia, the Porte is prepared to raise the population in favour of its views, and a man of property, influence, and military capacity, is ready to carry out its intentions. But such a movement has its objectionable side with reference to Austria, and the troops at Kalafat might be wanted for concentration in Bulgaria.

The army at Kars, if the latest accounts be true, only in part is exposed to much danger. If there is no prospect of its being assisted by the allies, the question is the urgency of adopting other expedients for its immediate restoration to a state of efficiency. Money, supplies, ammunition, artillery, recruits, have been sent, but in very limited quantities, and under unfavourable circumstances. The opinion of the Commanders-in-chief might determine the Porte to adopt more efficient measures. The counsels of General Guyon ought to be more implicitly followed, and such arrangements should be made as would revive the hopes, and retone the energies of the Turkish soldiery.

Turning towards other quarters, and taking in succession the vulnerable points of Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Albania, down to the frontiers of Greece in Thessaly and Epirus, there is, on the whole, a more cheering prospect.

Servia is no longer menaced by Russia. The vicinity of the Austrian army is viewed with less apprehension by the Servians. Austria is disposed, under suitable guards and limitations, to enter within the Turkish frontier, controlling

* Count Zamoyski's original idea was to take the Cossack battalion as the basis of his Polish formation.

† Omer Pasha is said to be favourable to the idea of forming a Bulgarian regiment.

‡ Whether the army of Batoum remains where it is or not, the services of General Klapka might, I conceive, be made available for its command or direction.

thereby Montenegro, and by the coincidence of her naval movements on the coast, even up to Prevesa, operating as a check upon the Greeks.

The Sultan's forces have obtained a positive ascendancy in the disturbed provinces, and with a cordon on the frontier, and an occupation of the Piræus and Athens, it is to be hoped that the sources of the insurrection will be so far dried or dammed up, as to enable the Porte to withdraw a considerable portion of its regular forces from that side. Blockade and cruizing stations for steamers, with a moveable force to operate on threatened points, may suffice to maintain order in the Archipelago.

The means of operating successfully either for the possession of the Crimea, or for the destruction of the Russian shipping at Sebastopol and Nicolayeff, ought not to be lost sight of; and the means of providing reserves for the protection of Constantinople, and the reinforcement of the Bulgarian army, will also probably enter into the discussions of the Commanders-in-chief.

The great remaining point on which, after all, the direction and success of the most promising system of operations must finally hinge, falls not, unfortunately, within the range of military consultations.

The Porte has alone to answer for the deficiency, but too apparent, in its financial resources, and whatever may be the difficulty or the loss, immediate measures must be taken to find sufficient means for supplying the armies, and prosecuting the war.

The Commanders-in-Chief will, probably, take the opportunity of their meeting at Varna, to join in a forcible representation as to the urgency of attending without delay or reserve to this matter of universal and paramount importance.

No. 223.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 191.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 31, 1854.

HER MAJESTY'S Government observe with disappointment and regret that the Austro-Prussian Treaty has been communicated to the Conference without the Additional Article which alone had reference to the war, or was of any value or importance to England and France.

The Treaty, as it now stands recorded, might, in fact, be considered to apply, eventually, as much against England and France as against Russia, and it is difficult to comprehend in what manner it serves to secure the maintenance of the principles recorded in the series of Protocols of the Conference of Vienna.

It is a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, which the two great German Powers have entered into for German objects exclusively, and Her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, consider themselves in any way bound by the engagements which Austria and Prussia have entered into for these objects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 224.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 142.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 31, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch from Baron Manteuffel to Count Henckel, which the latter has placed in my hands, on the subject of the observations of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the recent changes in the Cabinet of Berlin, conveyed to you in my despatch No. 125 of the 16th instant.

I told Count Henckel that Baron Manteuffel laboured under a complete mistake if he seriously thought that Her Majesty's Government had, even in the most indirect manner, sought to interfere with the internal affairs of Prussia, or had made newspaper reports the subject of official communications, or had ever pursued a course towards any other Government which they would have thought disrespectful if adopted towards themselves, but, I added, if high functionaries were all at once displaced in this country notoriously, and without disguise, on account of their adherence to the policy in which Prussia had been associated with Great Britain, Baron Manteuffel would be perfectly justified in expressing his regret at such dismissals as indicative of a change in the former policy of England, and His Excellency would run no risk of being charged with meddling in our domestic concerns for the simple reason that he would not have done so.

I expressed to Count Henckel, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, my satisfaction at the assurance contained in Baron Manteuffel's despatch that Prussia will be happy to find herself in agreement with England upon the means of attaining the object which both Powers have in view, viz., a just and durable peace, for it is only on those terms that the present war can be brought to a close.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and give his Excellency a copy, should he desire it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 224.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Henckel.

Berlin, ce 21 *Mai*, 1854.

M. le Comte,

LORD BLOOMFIELD est venu, il y a quelques jours, me lire des passages d'une dépêche qu'il venait de recevoir de Lord Clarendon, et qui a trait à plusieurs changements récents parmi les serviteurs du Roi notre auguste Maître. Comme cette dépêche était rédigée en Anglais, et que je n'en possède ni traduction ni copie, je ne saurais suivre M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique dans le détail des considérations qu'il a jugé convenable de rattacher à ces questions de personnes. Mais j'en ai gardé l'impression, et je n'ai par tardé de la porter à la connaissance du Roi, que Lord Clarendon, en les rapprochant de quelques autres faits de la compétence exclusivement intérieure de la Prusse, mais dont la presse étrangère s'est emparée, croit devoir en conclure qu'un changement s'est opéré dans la politique extérieure du Cabinet du Roi et notamment dans son attitude à l'égard de la question d'Orient. Sa Majesté a daigné partager la surprise que j'ai éprouvée moi-même en entendant articuler de cette manière et de ce côté des appréhensions et des insinuations, qu'on ne peut exclure du domaine du journalisme, mais qui, pour s'introduire dans des communications officielles entre des Gouvernements amis et liés par plus d'un intérêt commun, devraient, ce nous semble, pouvoir se fonder sur le langage officiel et les actes diplomatiques du Cabinet auquel l'on s'adresse.

Sa Majesté le Roi suivra avec calme et fermeté la ligne de conduite qu'elle s'est tracée dans les graves et déplorables complications qui, bien contre son gré et malgré ses efforts, pèsent sur l'Europe.

Notre auguste Souverain sera toujours heureux de se trouver d'accord avec Sa Majesté Britannique tant sur le but qu'il s'agit d'atteindre, et qui consiste dans le prompt rétablissement d'une paix juste et durable, que sur les moyens qui pourront y conduire. Mais plus le Roi et son Cabinet ont la conscience de rester conséquents dans leur attitude et fidèles à leurs engagements envers les Gouvernements étrangers, moins ils sauraient admettre de la part de ceux-ci, un contrôle quelconque des actes intérieurs, que le Roi entend exercer dans la plénitude des droits que la Providence lui a confiés.

Je vous invite, M. le Comte, à donner lecture de cette dépêche à Lord Clarendon, et à en laisser copie à sa Seigneurie, si elle le désire.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 225.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 1, 1854.)

Vienna, June 1, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

BARON BRUCK writes to Count Buol from Constantinople, 25th May, Marshal St. Arnaud, Lord Raglan, the Seraskier and the Capudan Pasha returned yesterday from Varna and Shumla; it was found necessary to send, as soon as possible, French and English troops to Varna to defend that fortress and the position of Pravady. To-morrow the first English division starts, the second will follow when the transport returns. Two French divisions will be embarked in Gallipoli. The third will march thither with Prince Napoleon.

No. 226.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 2.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

Frankfort, May 30, 1854.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH in Germany the attitude is one of attempted quietude and expectation, it would be quite wrong to suppose that public attention is not deeply excited by England's acts and projects.

Our alliance with France becomes a subject of progressively increasing wonderment as it assumes appearances of greater extent and durability, and all Germany is alive with expectation in seeing England giving a direction to European policy in concert with, instead of opposition to, her great continental neighbour.

The prevailing inclinations of the minor Governments, influenced by inordinate fears of Russia, and the occult influence of that Power, exercised in various ways, as well as from dislike of incurring the risks and costs of a state of war, are unquestionably to observe neutrality.

I feel, however, equally convinced that anything which would give them a semblance of independence, would modify even these dispositions, so deeply are they galled by their state of subordination.

The question occurs how best may this feeling be utilised and turned to account, and two courses of action suggest themselves, which I will endeavour to the best of my humble ability to submit to your Lordship's judgment.

The first of these would be by such action as it might be possible for Her Majesty's Government to exercise upon the separate States of the Confederation, or upon the Diet itself.

The composition and idiosyncracy of this body are too well known to your Lordship to make it necessary for me to enlarge upon them. I must, however, observe that there exists within this Assembly a sentiment of dissatisfaction at their impotence for all useful ends, and a wish to enter on a larger sphere of activity, and that any assistance to attain such objects, come from what quarter it might, would meet with eager welcome in not uninfluential quarters.

I have, for instance, had pointed out to me by members of the Diet itself the clauses of Article XXXV and Article L of the final Act of the Ministerial Conferences of Vienna, of May, 1820, establishing political rights in the Diet, such as that of contracting Treaties and other attributes of independent sovereignty, which they have never yet exercised.

It is the clear opinion of several Members of the Diet with whom I have spoken on the subject, that these rights might be called into practical use, but your Lordship is well aware of the difficulties which would beset any attempts

to exercise a dormant right, unless one or other of the great Powers sanctioned it.

Prussia has systematically opposed any useful action of the Diet, especially since the recent reconstitution of that body after the political storms of 1848-9.

Austria has been more deferential in forms, but has not in reality varied from the old Metternich policy of using this political body as a sort of blackhole into which she thrusts troublesome political questions, or as a Star Chamber to bear the odium of unpopular enactments.

It is therefore hardly to be expected that Austria or Prussia would concur in attempt to arouse the Diet into political activity, unless they had themselves a point to gain in so employing it.

Their influence would besides always succeed in so dividing the votes of the secondary and minor States, that, notwithstanding the Articles of the final Act previously cited, important measures could scarcely be expected to be carried unless by a vigorous interference of the Western Powers in exercising rights hitherto allowed to fall into abeyance. This mode, therefore, of acting upon the Germanic Confederation would be slow in its operation, and uncertain in its result; and though it might be worth attention under other circumstances, is hardly to be resorted to in a crisis requiring promptitude in decision and vigour of action.

The other mode of proceeding, which I venture to state as possible and likely to be effectual, is perhaps calculated to startle some minds, but not, I think, those of Germans, or of persons familiar with German political views and ways of thinking, it consists in finding means to satisfy the desire of Prussia for territorial extension.

The wish for this change is by no means confined to Prussia herself, but is familiar to all Germany, and would, I am persuaded, be acceptable to a far greater extent than is generally supposed elsewhere.

The great questions attaching to such a change, the assent of France and Austria, I do not venture to do more than touch upon, in the persuasion that if the object to be attained, namely, that of engaging Prussia to take part in our hostilities against Russia, is worth the sacrifice, means will be found of conciliating all exigencies and reconciling conflicting interests.

I must, however, seek to guard myself in your Lordship's mind against being thought to have put forward and recommended a measure not accordant with notions of political morality, by strongly urging my persuasion that, with the exception of Holstein, I do not know any state of Germany which could be coveted by Prussia that would not be infinitely benefited by the change, and my belief that such a re-adjustment of the balance of power (equitable regard being had for vested rights), would not only be without danger, but highly advantageous to the future tranquillity and prosperity of Europe, guarded as it must necessarily be by Treaties and mutual engagements of the most stringent kind.

It cannot escape your Lordship's perspicacity that Russia, perfectly aware of all that Prussia requires, is perhaps at this moment bidding higher for her neutrality than we are inclined to do for her active cooperation, and it may (I anxiously hope) be thought worth while to consider the feasibility of some policy which may convert into useful allies those who, under other influences, must be unserviceable friends, if not dangerous enemies.

It is by no means irrelevant to what precedes, to mention that the President of the Diet, Baron Prohesch, is constantly harping upon the doubtful attitude of Prussia, even since the signature and ratification of the Berlin Treaty, and on the influence thereby exercised on Austria, in holding her back from the course she would otherwise pursue, a point the importance of which will certainly not be lost sight of at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 227.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 25.)

Stuttgardt, May 24, 1851.

My Lord,

A CONFERENCE of the Representatives of many of the German States to whom the Treaty of Alliance between Austria and Prussia has been separately communicated, is to be held at Bamberg in Bavaria, to-morrow, the 25th instant.

The object of their meeting is to concert a common answer to be returned by their Representatives at Frankfort, to the communication of that Treaty to the Diet, and to the invitation which the Representatives of Austria and Prussia are to make to-day to that body to accede to it. I understand that the four Royal Courts, the two Hesses, Baden, the two Mecklenburgs, and Nassau will be represented at the Conference of Bamberg. M. de Neurath leaves Stuttgardt to-day for Bamberg, and it is probable that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Baden and Hesse Darmstadt, who are expected here, will accompany him.

M. de Neurath thinks he will be absent till the 29th instant, and as he may not have returned here before the departure of the next messenger for London, I called upon him yesterday, and had a conversation with him on the subject of his mission.

I remarked that I supposed the States to be represented at Bamberg meant to accede to the Austrian and Prussian invitation, to which he observed that he was not at all certain that such was their intention; he added that what they all desired was the re-establishment of peace; or, if war continued, that they should be as slightly implicated in it as possible. I then observed I could fully understand both of these wishes, but that if Germany appeared cordially united with Austria and Prussia, the Treaty offensive and defensive which the latter Powers had concluded must have much greater weight in the counsels of Russia, and that as to any chance of their being implicated in active warfare by their accession to the Treaty, it appeared to me so improbable and remote that I thought it ought not to weigh in their decision. By their present engagements as members of the German Confederation, they were bound to defend any part of those two States belonging to the Confederation which might in consequence of a rupture with Russia be attacked by the latter; and I put it to him, whether it was probable that they would ever be required to defend those portions which did not belong to the Confederation. He at once answered that he thought they might; he added that Austria was so embarrassed in her finances, he feared she would put her allies forward, not to save her army, for she was rich in men, but to economize her finances.

M. de Neurath told me that both the Courts of Saxony and Bavaria were deeply hurt, and he frankly added that the King of Wurtemburg was equally annoyed at the reserve and secrecy which they had met with from Austria respecting the Treaty in question; I much doubt, however, whether greater frankness would have at all modified their opinions, though it might have flattered their self love. The minor States of Germany have such an awe of Russian power that they are only too willing to seize on every occasion of making a merit of supporting in any underhand way the interests of that State, and I hear from good authority that most of the Representatives of those Powers at Vienna express without reserve very Russian views.

I inquired from my Austrian colleague whether he thought Russia was sincere in her desire to obtain the accession of the other German States to the Treaty which she had concluded with Austria. M. de Handel, in reply, assures me that both from the despatches from Berlin which Count Seckendorff had communicated to him, and from the conduct of the latter here, he had no reason to doubt her sincerity, and I must add that Count Seckendorff's language on all occasions to me has been very much opposed to Russian views.

It appears to me probable from all I hear that the joint answer to be concerted at Bamberg will be an accession in some modified form to the Austro-Prussian Treaty, coupled perhaps with the desire or secret stipulation that

the forces of the minor States shall not be put forward, except for the defence of the Confederation. They will, I think, continue to play in secret the Russian game, and to make a merit with that Power for so doing.

M. de Neurath told me that he thought the Bavarian Government would endeavour to introduce the subject of Greece at Bamberg, though he did not think that such a chord would find any echo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 228.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 511.)

Foreign Office, June 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 657 of the 29th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government concur with you in doubting the wisdom of the instructions sent by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Bourqueney, respecting armaments in Servia. The influence of Russia in Servia is great; the tendencies of the Prince and his advisers appear to be more towards Russia than to the Porte, and there is some reason for supposing that the military force of Austria, collected on the frontier, has hitherto prevented a rising in favour of Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 229.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 685. Confidential.)

Paris, June 2, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS was good enough to give me yesterday, confidentially, the substance of a despatch of some importance, dated the 29th ultimo, which he had just received from M. de Bourqueney.

M. de Bourqueney had had a conversation with M. de Buol respecting the present state of the Eastern question, and the measures to be employed by Austria.

Count Buol stated, that the summons to be sent to St. Petersburgh by the Austrian Government, for the evacuation by Russia of th Danubian Principalities, was ready, and would be sent as soon as the Emperor's sanction to it had been obtained; that Prussia had not required any delay in its transmission, as had been supposed, but had merely expressed the hope that its form and tenour might be as courteous as circumstances would permit, and that the Austrian Government had never, of course, had the intention of departing from this, its general rule of conduct; that Count Alvensleben had shown him the document which was to be sent by the Prussian Government to St. Petersburgh, in support of the Austrian summons, and that he was satisfied with it; that he had, in return, communicated to Count Alvensleben the substance—not the text—of the summons; that no observations had been made by the latter, nor would they be attended to, if made.

M. de Bourqueney then asked M. de Buol whether he had reflected on the course which Austria should pursue, if the answer to this summons was neither complete silence, nor a refusal, but evasive. He could not but fear that this would be the plan followed by Russia; that she would endeavour to gain time, and, by negotiations, prevent Austria from taking any active part in the present campaign. The Emperor of Russia had never abandoned the hope of destroying the unanimity of purpose which existed among the Four Powers; and, if he could stave off until the winter all active cooperation against him on the part of

Austria, he might hope during the winter to sow discord in the Councils of the Four Powers. In this policy he would be assisted by Prussia; but, in his (M. de Bourqueney's) opinion, every care should be taken not to fall into the snare, for who could tell whether a war undertaken in the Spring of 1855 could be engaged in under the same auspices, or with the same hope of success, as one commenced at the present moment?

M. de Bourqueney thinks that this reasoning made a considerable impression upon Count Buol.

In general, the Count said that another six weeks must elapse before the Austrian forces were complete; but that this was not without its advantage, as time would be given to the allied armies in Turkey to take up more advanced positions.

In the course of the conversation, Count Buol mentioned that he had received the Porte's answer to the offer of assistance against the insurrection in the Sultan's dominions, offered by the Internuncio, and although the answer was upon the whole satisfactory, yet it showed the distrust of Austria, which still lingered in the Ottoman councils. He complained of the suspicions entertained in Servia of the intentions of Austria, and said that he could do nothing more in this matter until some diplomatic agreement had passed between the Austrian Government and the Porte, and that to insure this the ground must be prepared at Constantinople.

I ought not to omit stating that M. de Bourqueney, in the course of his communication, says that he had ascertained beyond a doubt, that the reports circulated some weeks ago, and alluded to in my despatch No. 630 of the 21st ultimo, of the King of Prussia having written to the Emperor of Austria for the purpose of instilling into the latter's mind suspicions of the real intentions of the French and English armaments, were not founded on fact.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 230.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 694. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 5, 1854.*

I HAVE communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the substance of your Lordship's despatch No. 512 of the 2nd instant, expressing the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government in the language which I had reported his Excellency to have held to M. de Hübner, on the policy of Austria in the Eastern question.

I informed your Lordship in my despatch No. 663 of the 29th ultimo, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposed repeating this language in an instruction to be addressed to M. de Bourqueney. Yesterday his Excellency placed a copy of the instruction in my hands, giving me permission to send it confidentially to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 230.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Bourqueney.

M. le Baron, *Paris, le 31 Mai, 1854.*

J'AI les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 93, et j'approuve complétement la rédaction du nouveau Protocole de la Conférence. M. le Baron de Manteuffel, au surplus, ne s'est point mépris sur la valeur de cet Acte, car ses instructions ont été envoyées à Vienne avec assez de promptitude et de mystère pour que personne à la cour, le Roi Frédéric Guillaume excepté, n'en ait eu connaissance. Sa Majesté Prussienne convenait elle-même que son entourage se montrerait très mécontent de cette discrétion accoutumée.

J'espère avec vous, M. le Baron, que le Cabinet de Vienne ne tardera pas à adresser à celui de St. Pétersbourg la communication prévue par le Traité de Berlin. D'après les informations que je reçois d'Allemagne, il semblerait que l'Autriche attendit de cette démarche un résultat suffisant pour lui permettre de rouvrir les négociations, ou tout au moins de prendre une situation intermédiaire entre les parties belligérantes. Votre correspondance me donne lieu de croire que ces bruits ne sont pas fondés, et que le Cabinet de Vienne ne se prêtera jamais à une combinaison qui n'assurerait pas l'Europe contre le retour des événements qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos. Pour entretenir ma confiance à cet égard je n'ai qu'à me rappeler que M. le Comte de Buol, au commencement du mois de Décembre dernier, me faisait communiquer par M. de Hübner une dépêche dans laquelle il proclamait la nécessité de chercher des garanties pour prévenir une nouvelle perturbation et de prendre des engagements mutuels contre les velléités inquiétantes de la Russie, ou contre les entreprises de toute Puissance qui tenterait de porter atteinte à l'intégrité et à l'indépendance de la Turquie; et que plus tard, lorsqu'il s'agissait de signer la Convention à quatre, dont les dispositions générales ont été reproduites dans le Protocole du 9 Avril, il était le premier à nous signaler les dangers qu'il y aurait à permettre au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg un retour pur et simple au *statu quo ante bellum*.

Evidemment, M. le Baron, rien dans ce qui s'est passé depuis cette époque n'a été de nature à modifier les sentiments de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche, et je compte fermement que, si le Cabinet de Vienne voyait dans l'accueil, il est vrai peu probable, de ses propositions, c'est-à-dire dans la retraite des Russes au delà du Pruth, une raison d'espérer que la guerre pourrait être suspendue, il n'admettrait pas plus que nous que la paix fût rétablie sans les conditions qui doivent seules la rendre solide et durable. L'intérêt général de l'Europe exige impérieusement que la question posée par Russie soit vidée. Il faut que cette Puissance sorte corrigée pour longtemps de la lutte que son ambition a soulevée. Je ne veux pas dire en employant cette expression, que l'Empire Russe ait nécessairement à subir une diminution de territoire mais ce qui me paraît indispensable, c'est de la contenir moralement, c'est de mettre une ligne à l'influence prépondérante et abusive qu'il avait la prétension d'exercer.

L'ouverture de la Mer Noire, l'affranchissement des bouches du Danube, l'affaiblissement de l'état militaire et maritime de la Russie dans la Mer du Nord, voilà le but auquel nous tendons et que l'Autriche et la Prusse elle-même doivent désirer de nous voir atteindre. Quant à l'Empire Ottoman il ne sera garantie que lorsque le grand fleuve qui borne ses possessions Européennes formera une barrière infranchissable fortifiée encore par une organisation de la Moldavie et de la Valachie conçues sur des bases nouvelles.

S'il est une Puissance intéréssée à la réalisation de ce projet, assurément c'est l'Autriche; et, pour notre part, nous ne serions ni jaloux ni inquiets des progrès qu'elle ferait dans une direction vers laquelle le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg aurait seul du mécontentement à la voir s'étendre. Jamais l'occasion d'introduire dans ses contrées un régime qui, sans les soustraire à l'autorité nominale de la Porte, les soumettrait à l'influence Autrichienne de préférence à l'influence Russe, ne sera plus favorable qu'aujourd'hui.

Le Cabinet de Vienne a tout fait pour éclairer le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; il a largement payé sa dette de reconnaissance. Les circonstances ont été plus fortes que les volontés; la guerre est engagée, et dans cette guerre la France et l'Angleterre ont déjà, je le reconnais, le concours moral de l'Autriche. L'attitude de cette Puissance, demeurait-elle encore passive, lui a aliéné la Russie pour longtemps. Cette considération à elle seule suffirait, à mon sens, pour rendre le Cabinet de Vienne aussi difficile que nous sur les conditions définitives de la paix. Sa conduite loyale et ferme est considérée à St. Pétersbourg comme une offense; une politique habile et prévoyante ne lui conseille-t-elle pas de prendre aussi ses gages pour l'avenir et de diminuer des forces qui à un jour donné pourraient se retourner contre elle?

Les événements dont nous sommes les témoins, M. le Baron, n'établis-

sent-ils pas tous les dangers du crédit exagéré que l'Europe troublée chez elle avait accordé à la Russie? La France et l'Angleterre obligées à des démonstrations maritimes formidables; l'Autriche ayant à sa tête un jeune Empereur, qui, dès le premier jour, a compris les intérêts de sa Couronne, les exigences de sa dignité, et qui a épuisé à l'égard de la Russie tous les ménagements; la Prusse s'excusant en quelque sorte à St. Pétersbourg des hésitations qui la mettent ailleurs en suspicion; tous les Princes de la Confédération Germanique dans l'effroi à l'idée d'une guerre la plus juste et, en dernière analyse, la moins chanceuse qui ait jamais été entreprise. Voilà en quelques traits, M. le Baron, les effets de cette influence qui renaîtrait bientôt plus menaçante et plus forte si l'Europe, oubliant toutes les traditions de son histoire, ne ramenait point dans des bornes normales la Puissance qui exerce déjà un tel empire. Cette tâche serait bien difficile si l'Autriche n'en acceptait pas résolument la part qui lui revient. La tranquillité règne dans toutes ses provinces; elle est maîtresse de ses mouvements; au dehors et au dedans de grandes alliances s'offrent à elle. Il y a là un concours de circonstances heureuses qui, à une autre époque, ne se reproduiraient peut-être pas.

A ne considérer les choses qu'à un point de vue moins général, l'ordre dans les Etats Autrichiens court moins de risques si le Cabinet de Vienne se décide à l'action que si, après avoir pris diplomatiquement parte contre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, il demeure matériellement dans l'immobilité. Tout nous annonce, en effet, que si l'Autriche marchait avec nous, le Piémont lui donnerait des garanties dont la première et la plus forte serait sa participation à la guerre contre la Russie. Je ne crois pas trop m'avancer en disant que la Cour de Turin suivrait en cette occasion les conseils de la France et de l'Angleterre. Toute possibilité d'un mouvement sérieux dans la Péninsule serait aussi écartée et d'amers et fâcheux souvenirs s'éteindraient dans une solidarité commune. Quant à la Hongrie et aux provinces Slaves de Transylvanie et de Croatie, par qui aujourd'hui menacent elles d'être troublée si ce n'est par des émissaires de la Russie, par des sectateurs de l'idée Panslaviste? Un échec infligé par l'Autriche aux armes du Czar, arrêterait l'essor de cette propagande et rattacherait sûrement à la Maison de Hapsbourg-Lorraine, par le prestige de la gloire et de la force, des contrées où il est essentiel pour tout le monde que son pouvoir le maintienne.

Ce qui est vrai de la Hongrie et de ses annexes, M. le Baron, c'est plus encore de la Pologne; et, puisque j'ai prononcé le nom de ce malheureuse pays je m'expliquerai franchement. Parceque des Polonais ont offert leurs services à la Porte, on a répandu le bruit que la France et l'Angleterre leur promettaient le rétablissement de leur ancienne indépendance. Nous avons trouvé tout simple que la Turquie menacée par la Russie ne refusât point le concours des ennemis de cette Puissance; mais ce n'est pas une nation, ce sont des individus qui sont à Constantinople, et si une certaine expérience militaire les met en mesure d'être utiles à l'armée Turque, à quelques rêves qu'ils se livrent, il n'y a rien dont une politique grave et réfléchie doive en ce moment prendre ombrage. La question de la Pologne a été réglée à la fin du dix-huitième siècle; elle l'a été surtout par l'Allemagne, la Prusse et l'Autriche, ont-elles eu raison ou tort d'accéder aux offres de la Russie, c'est un point qu'il n'appartient qu'à elles de décider et qui se trouve maintenant hors du débat pour les autres. Quant à la Pologne, proprement dite, incorporée dans l'Empire Russe, nous pouvons regretter ses tristes destinées. Mais en raisonnant froidement nos intérêts politiques, nous ne voyons pas que ce soit la France que ait le plus à souffrir de l'introduction de la Russie jusqu'au sein de l'Europe Occidentale, et nous n'avons pas, si la Prusse et l'Autriche s'accommodent de cet état de choses, à réagir les premiers contre ses conséquences, qui ne nous atteignent point directement.

Je vous ai dit, M. le Baron, toute la pensée du Gouvernement de l'Empereur et vous n'avez pas à la cacher à M. le Comte de Buol. Il y verra une preuve de notre entière confiance en lui; il y sera aussi, je l'espère, qu'il n'existe entre les intérêts loyalement compris de la France et de l'Autriche rien qui puisse s'opposer à leur alliance native.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 231.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 697.)
Paris, June 5, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY writes word, in a despatch received yesterday evening, that orders had been sent to the Internuncio to ask the Porte's consent to the entry, if necessary, of Austrian troops into the Danubian Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 232.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 255.)
Constantinople, May 25, 1854.

My Lord,

MARSHAL ST. ARNAUD and Lord Raglan returned from Shumla and Varna the day before yesterday. I have not seen either of them since their return. Lord Raglan has been detained in camp by indisposition, and a similar cause has prevented my going to wait upon his Lordship, though I hope to make the attempt to-day, after the departure of the messenger.

I learn, meanwhile, that strenuous efforts are making by the two Commanders-in-chief to convey a considerable force into Bulgaria, by way of Varna, with the utmost practicable dispatch. Sir George Brown's division has received orders to embark for that destination without any unnecessary delay. At Lord Raglan's request, I have applied to the Porte for orders to procure whatever the troops are likely to want from the Turkish authorities in point of supplies and means of conveyance. I have also given letters in the same sense to the Commissaries dispatched with that view to Shumla and Varna.

I am informed by Mr. Alison that the British and French Generals were pleased with what they saw of the Turkish troops; that Omer Pasha will be able to concentrate between 60,000 and 70,000 men, after withdrawing 10,000 from Kalafat, and 6,000 from the Danube.

The Russians are engaged in besieging Silistria. They appear to have about 70,000 men on the southern bank of the river. The garrison of Silistria is stated at 15,000. If the place is duly provisioned, of which there is a doubt—I hope a groundless doubt—it may be expected, as I am told, to resist for three or four weeks.

Inclosed herewith are translations of two reports transmitted from Omer Pasha to the Turkish Government, and communicated by the latter to me.

I have thought it my duty to state these leading points to your Lordship. But fuller accounts will no doubt be forwarded by to-day's messenger from Lord Raglan to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 232.

The President of the Council at Silistria to Omer Pasha.

May 19, 1854.

(Translation.)

ON Tuesday last I informed your Excellency that the Russians had thrown a bridge over at Killik Bouraun, and had established their camp there, pushing forward their troops to within cannon range. The fortifications on the hill above the Bilanlik battery on the ground commanding Silistria being weak; another

six-gun battery had been constructed and occupied by Colonel Mustapha Bey with three Egyptian regiments. The Russians on Wednesday last marched some Infantry and Cavalry with eight guns against that battery, and we sent out the Irregular Cavalry with three guns to meet them, under the command of Mirliva Hassan Pasha and the aforesaid Colonel. The reserve, consisting of the Regular Cavalry and one battalion of Infantry, was also moved forward, and the action commenced on both sides. The enemy was defeated by the valour of our regular and irregular troops, and lost upwards of 200 men. We had five men and six horses killed. Great praise is due to all hands, but especially to Mustapha Bey and the commander of the Damascus Irregular Cavalry for their gallant attack.

On Thursday the Russians moved their troops forward to the distance of cannon range from their camps, and we also met that movement by drawing up our forces at an equal distance from the aforesaid battery, but both parties retired without any action taking place.

To-day, Friday, we are also both prepared for action, but it is now 1 P.M. and no movement has taken place.

Last night the enemy commenced fortifying his first parallel, and to-day they have constructed a battery and zigzag approaches. It is evidently the intention of the Russians to invest the place, but we trust in God that their object will be frustrated by your Highness' advance with the army, and a great battle which will result in the infidels' being thrust back into the Danube, to their utter destruction.

During the last three days the Russians have been pouring shot and shell into Silistria from the fortifications on the opposite bank and on the island, night and day. We have not suffered much, thank God, neither by fire nor from their shot, which fell principally upon the hospital and barracks, suffering severely. Three of the sick were killed by one shot, and we have removed them to the casemates under the Medjidiyé battery. A number of other buildings in the fortress have been destroyed, and neither the troops nor the inhabitants have a moment's rest or sleep.

From the midst of the fire we look forward to the speedy arrival of your Highness with the army.

Inclosure 2 in No. 232.

Mousa Pasha to Omer Pasha.

(Translation.) *Silistria, May* 21, 1854.

YESTERDAY, Saturday, the Russians marched some troops against the outworks and were duly opposed on the part of our troops. In the action which ensued we lost a few killed and wounded, while the Russians, defeated by the bravery of our troops, had 150 men killed and a great many wounded. They attacked the fortifications again to-day, Sunday. During the action two Russian horsemen, Circassians, came over to our troops, and were interrogated by me. They are both "Mulazims" (Ensigns), and are called Osman and Hassan. Inspired by religious zeal, they deserted to give information of the Russian movements. The Russians have, they state, come against Silistria with three corps d'armée; the Emperor's son is with them. They have made a vow either to take Silistria to-day by assault or to sacrifice their army. They have the appearance at present of attacking the works round Silistria; but as they are prevented from advancing by the fire of the batteries, their troops are stationed without cannon ranges. Our troops are properly distributed amongst the batteries and are prepared to defend them. There is no knowing what will happen next; but, as we are in great distress, we beg, as I have before done, that we may be speedily succoured.

No. 233.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 6.)

(No. 256. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 25, 1854.

THERE is much reason to apprehend that Riza Pasha, the Seraskier, instead of making his visit to Varna an occasion of reconciling himself with the Turkish Generalissimo and acquiring his confidence, acted so as to increase the estrangement between them, and to cause additional dissatisfaction to his Highness. Such was the impression made upon Mr. Alison, and also upon Lord Raglan.

Apprehensive of some such consequence I had discouraged the idea of the Seraskier's going on to Shumla, unless Omer Pasha proposed or appeared to like it, and the European Generals thought proper to be of the party. It would seem that Marshal de St. Arnaud, though agreeing beforehand with the Seraskier's intention of pushing on to Shumla, recognized the importance of upholding Omer Pasha, and not affording him cause of discontent.

On returning to Constantinople, the Seraskier went straight to the Sultan and proposed that His Majesty should give audience to the French Marshal on the following day in the presence of several of his Ministers. Reshid Pasha, on receiving notice of this arrangement, sent word of it to me, and expressed his opinion that Lord Raglan ought to have the opportunity of being present at the same audience. I apprized his Lordship of this suggestion, and I stated both to him and to Reshid Pasha my impressions as to the impropriety of such irregular and unilateral proceedings, not over respectful to the Sultan, and likely to be attended eventually with much inconvenience and risk of understanding to all parties.

The audience took place without Lord Raglan, who was indeed too unwell at the time to attend.

I have since been informed by Reshid Pasha that Marshal St. Arnaud's communications to the Sultan were confined to a statement of what he had observed in the Turkish camp, and of what he intended to do in conjunction with Omer Pasha, with the addition of an earnest recommendation that measures should be forthwith adopted in order to obtain an adequate supply of money for the prosecution of the war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 234.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 6.)

(No. 257.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 25, 1854.

THE Austrian Internuncio called here yesterday, and with much courtesy of expression informed me that he was authorized to put the Porte in possession of the late Convention signed and ratified between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin. The communication was, in substance at least, to comprise the Additional Article, which he appeared to identify with what has been elsewhere termed the Secret Articles of the Convention. The Prussian overture for peace had, he told me, been rejected by the Russian Government. The Cabinet of Vienna was now proceeding to make a formal demand at St. Petersburgh for the evacuation of the Principalities. If Russia withheld her consent, Austria would be free to enter upon that territory, and meanwhile, as I understood him to say, an Austrian army would take position in Transylvania. If Russia were to attack the Austrian territory in consequence of the former movement, Prussia was engaged to send troops for its defence, and the same obligation

would take effect in case that Russia should either annex the Principalities, or advance beyond the Balkan.

I thanked Baron Bruck for so encouraging a communication, and endeavoured to ascertain whether he could afford me any explanation of the late change of Ministry at Berlin consistent with the policy indicated by that Convention of which he had so obligingly given me an outline. His answer implied that he was equally at a loss with myself to explain the apparent contradiction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 235.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 6.*)

(Private and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 25, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith for your information, is copy of a letter addressed to me by Captain, or Admiral, Slade, together with a memorandum which accompanied it. Not knowing what character its author meant to give to the communication, I think it advisable to forward it to your Lordship in this confidential manner. Its bearing on the Porte's views respecting Circassia give it interest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 235.

Admiral Slade to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Techrifick," Kavarna, May 19, 1854.*

ASSUMING that you have been aware of the departure of the Ottoman squadron from the Bosphorus, I will now acquaint you with its subsequent movements.

Achmet Pasha's orders were to proceed straight to the combined fleet, even before Sebastopol; and, after consulting with the Admirals, and combining operations with them, to proceed to the coast of Circassia, land there the Circassians and warlike stores embarked in the fleet, and take Soukoum-Kaleh, for which, and other objects, a regiment would be spared from the Batoom division.

On the 8th instant, we sent a steamer to Varna, and there found a letter from Admiral Dundas to Achmet Pasha, telling him that he had heard from the Captain Pasha of the Turkish squadron coming to join, and co-operate with him, but that nevertheless it was his and Admiral Hamelin's opinion, that it would be desirable first to cruise on the coast of Roumelia and of Bulgaria until the the return of Sir Edmund Lyons from Circassia, and the arrival of the combined fleets at Varna, which would be on or about the 20th instant.

The delay was not approved of in the fleet, especially by the Circassian Pashas; and I was deputed to find the Admirals, read Achmet Pasha's orders to them, and explain the circumstances of the fleet. Proceeding accordingly in a steamer, leaving the squadron off Cape Kellagria as a rendezvous, I found the combined fleets on the 11th instant, twenty-five miles off Sebastopol. Waiting on the Admirals in their respective ships, I communicated Achmet Pasha's orders to them; also memorandum to show the nature of the service intended for his squadron.

I beg to inclose the memorandum for your Lordship's perusal, to show you that all arguments have been used to obviate delay in carrying out the objects for which we have come to sea. To me it is a matter of regret that the expedition

now on the coast, had not been delayed a few days from us. It is thought that the information it will bring, will prove valuable to us; but I doubt if any that may be picked up in a hasty first visit can add to the information which the Porte has collected on the subject lately, and possesses traditionally. Both Admirals, separately, expressed their discontent to me, at the Turkish squadron having come out with the intention of doing more than cruize on the coast of Europe, as they had recommended. I observed that it might do good service on the eastern, but would perhaps be in the way on the western shores of the Black Sea. The scarcity of supplies raises a particular objection to agglomerating more force than is necessary on one point. With the slender ration of the Turkish sailor, we require 200 sheep daily; we do not obtain half that number, and it may be, in a few days, none will be forthcoming: only 300 head of cattle, three days' supply, have, I hear, been collected at Varna for the English fleet, and fresh meat is needed there, for the scurvy has appeared in one or two of the ships, so Admiral Dundas told me. That malady, is, I hear, among the Turkish troops on the Danube, and there is a small encampment, near Varna, of men thus affected, brought from Matchin. We have had lately about 50 cases in the Turkish fleet in the Bosphorus, which of course went to the hospital. Damp, monotony, and nostalgia, have been the predisposing causes with us.

The Admirals told me they could not confer with me separately on the matter I had come about; but promised to meet in one or other of the flag ships, adding there would not be much delay, as they would make sail for Baltchik on the 15th instant, if some absent steamers returned from the Bay of Odessa as expected.

I found Admiral Hamelin and his Staff-Captain very sore with me on account of my letter to your Excellency of the 15th December last, which I learnt then had been transmitted to the Admiral by the French Minister of Marine.

The Admirals altered their minds about a conference, and did not meet while I was in company.

On taking my leave on the 13th instant, Admiral Dundas gave me a letter for Achmet Pasha, which only contained a recommendation to him to abide by the advice given in his previous letter, and a caution not to send him a verbal message in future. He desired me also to mention his wish for the Turkish fleet to go to Kavarna on the 16th instant, to wait the arrival of the combined fleet; but we intend to weigh in the morning and remain under weigh until it makes its appearance, grieving all the time to see valuable time slipping away. The objection of the Admirals to see the Turkish fleet employed elsewhere than in the Roumelian and Bulgarian coast is anomalous, for they seem resolved that it shall neither sail or remain at anchor with them. This exclusion would assuredly affect the *morale* of the Turkish fleet, and constitutes a reason for its being employed elsewhere, apart from the consideration that European ships, wanting the affinities of language, customs, and religion, and being strange to the scene, cannot effect the good on the coast of Circassia that Turkish ships can. Admiral Hamelin has told me that he does not wish to have another Sinope reproached him, and if we go to the eastward the allies must watch Sebastopol.

I have observed in reply that no parallel exists between the circumstances of last November and the circumstances of the present time, whether in regard to the composition of the Turkish fleet at sea, or in regard to the position of the allies. The Turkish fleet would render a good service if it should be the bait to draw out the Russian fleet. In the meanwhile no objection is seen to our lying in the outer berth of the Bay of Kavarna while they occupy the inner one, twelve miles distant. The wish of the Admirals has been for the Turkish fleet to remain in the Bosphorus altogether; they, in conjunction with their Rear-Admirals, had drawn up a letter to their respective Ambassadors recommending that. I was then at Baltchik; they were kind enough to read it to me; I protested against such a recommendation being made, and overruled it. The passage was erased, and a recommendation for its cruizing on the coast of Europe pending eventualities substituted. I had no occasion to make more than a cursory remark on that, as they were already aware of a proposition of mine to the Captain Pasha for its employment elsewhere. It is short-sighted policy, in my humble opinion, to repress or depress the Turkish fleet, for it is in a position to turn the scale in the Euxine, assuming certain possible contingencies. The Turkish officers and

seamen are very inexperienced, and another season in the Bosphorus would have been of serious detriment to them. The elements are their chief foe; and it was this feeling which made poor Osman Pasha remain at anchor. He had been heard to say that he would rather meet the Russians than another gale of wind.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) A. SLADE.

P.S.—I will keep your Excellency informed of the movements of the Turkish fleet as opportunity occurs.

Inclosure 2 in No. 235.

Memorandum.

THE weakness of the Turkish army in Asia has excited serious apprehension, viewing the consequences that would probably ensue from its defeat. In that case the Russian army of Georgia would occupy Erzeroom in the course of the ensuing summer: and decided by that exhibition of force, Persia, now waiting on events, would declare herself against the Porte, and in all likelihood march on Bagdad, the conquest of which would prove very acceptable to the whole Persian nation, and would be considered more than an equivalent for the provinces wrested from Persia by Russia during the last half-century. Hereditary association and religious fervour both influence the Persians with respect to Bagdad, and the Power which will hold that prize out to them must be readily listened to. Such an event might necessitate the sending of an Anglo-Indian army to the Euphrates, for the extension of Persian power under Russian protection interests England as much as the decline of Ottoman power under Russian pressure.

The Sublime Porte has considered that it may find the means of checking the assumed advance of the Russian army of Georgia across its Asiatic frontier, in the hostility of the Circassian and Daghistan tribes. Hitherto, during the present war, these tribes have rendered no service to the Sublime Porte, and have offered no more hindrance to Russia than they have done at any period during twenty years: their attitude has been defensive, whereas the object is to render it offensive, thereby acting on Russia by creating the apprehension of, or by making, a powerful diversion on the flank or rear of her army in Asia. For this purpose it is necessary to unite cordially the tribes under Sheik Schamyl's direct rule and the tribes ruled vicariously by him, and to supply them with aid in the guise of soldiers and munitions of war, and if possible with money.

With orders to proceed to the coast of Circassia, after consultation with the allied Admirals, the Turkish squadron has left the Bosphorus. Sefer Pasha and Behtchet Pasha are embarked in the squadron, with about 150 Circassians, their countrymen, and with several European military officers. They bear the Sultan's firman empowering them to act in his name, and are carrying nishans of merit and of rank to give to influential individuals. They are sanguine in the hope of being able to create union between Sheik Schamyl's people and the Circassians, and induce offensive operations on an extensive scale; they have the feeling that unless the Circassian tribes operate in concert, the Russian advance in Asia will be certain.

There is embarked with the fleet a battery of field-pieces, with all appurtenances complete, including two Artillery officers, and 300 rounds of ammunition for each gun; also 500 barrels of gunpowder, 500 cases of muskets, 20,000 pistols, 20 cases of cutlasses, 10,000 moulds of lead, 1,000 axes, 7 cases of flints, 300 soup kettles, 20,000 okes of salt, besides tents and bales of cotton goods. Some Circassian merchants have also embarked with wares, to reopen the trade suspended for many years.

Concurrently an order has been sent to Selim Pasha for the embarkation of a regiment at Batoom for conveyance to Circassia in the fleet.

It is anticipated that with 4,000 regular troops, some European officers, a battery of guns, and the other named munitions of war, the Circassian forces

will be able to act offensively on the enemy's territory; at the same time Soukoum-Kaleh, after being reduced, will be garrisoned, its works strengthened, in order to its part becoming of due value to Turkey.

The Circassian Pashas in the Turkish squadron, and the superior officers of the squadron, trust that the allied Admirals will see with pleasure the departure of the squadron from the coast of Roumelia to the coast of Circassia without delay. Time is precious; the season for operations is rapidly advancing; and if the Circassians shall not be able to act soon, it is doubtful if they will be in a position to render valid service in the war. Defensive hostility will prove of no avail as regards the point at issue; they must take the offensive, and to do that effectually they require the exciting causes of union in rewards and praise, and the encouragement and aid which the Ottoman squadron is bringing them, not mentioning the effect which the presence of that squadron on their coast is calculated to produce.

The Porte has been in communication with the Circassians on the subject, and the latter are daily expecting the squadron with the promised aid, as the signal for their gathering. If it does not soon make its appearance doubts may arise in their minds of the Porte's earnestness.

(Signed) A. SLADE.

May 10, 1854.

No. 236.

Mr. Grey to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 129. Confidential.)

Stockholm, May 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I LEARN this day from authority upon which I have implicit reliance, that instructions have lately been sent to the Swedish Minister at Vienna, General Mansbach, to inquire from the Austrian Government what course they proposed to pursue in the present state of affairs, and, as far as he was able, to ascertain the real intentions of Austria. General Mansbach was further instructed to accompany these inquiries with the most flattering expressions with regard to Austria on the part of Sweden. Count Buol is said to have received the Swedish Minister's compliments with evident pleasure, and in reply to his inquiries, to have said, "Your Government will shortly receive a communication, which will be made to them by General Langenau, at Stockholm."

According to my informant this communication is anxiously expected by the King; and, as far as I am able to form an opinion, it appears that His Majesty supposes that the Austrian Government will suggest to Sweden the possibility of the two Powers acting in concert against Russia, the one in the south, and the other in the north.

I was further told that a Secret Article of the Convention between Austria and Prussia was the ground upon which the King founded his expectations, I will not say, his hopes. This Article is said to be to the following effect:—

That a prolonged occupation (une occupation prolongée) of the Danubian Principalities by Russia would, in the eyes of Prussia, justify an active intervention on the part of Austria; and if such intervention was the immediate cause of a war, Prussia would deem it her duty to take the side of Austria.

Your Lordship will doubtless know whether any such Secret Article exists or not; but I have reason to believe that if such is the case, any communication from the Austrian Government to Sweden in the sense I have reported, will be most favourably received.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. GREY.

No. 237.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 7, 11 A.M.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 2, 1854.*

LORD STRATFORD écrit de Constantinople le 31 Mai, 1854:

"Lord Raglan wishes your Lordship to be informed that the movement of the allied armies upon Varna has commenced; that a division of the British force has already arrived there, and a part of a division of the French army will arrive there to-day or to-morrow; that the siege of Silistria is proceeding with great activity, and that, under the circumstances, it would be of the greatest benefit if the Austrian corps could be moved to Widdin by water, or even lower down the Danube, at the earliest moment possible."

P.S.—I have sent to Count Buol the substance of the above despatch.

No. 238.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 7.*)

(No. 218.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 3, 1854.*

BARON BOURQUENEY and myself were invited to call upon Count Buol, when he read to us the despatch he had addressed to Count Esterhazy, in which he states that, "l'Empereur mon auguste Maître attache un grand prix à la suspension des opérations militaires dans les provinces trans-Danubiennes, et vous demanderez des explications nettes et promptes sur la date pas trop éloignée où les Principautés seront évacuées." I quote from memory; but I believe such to be the words used in the despatch, which further states, that if these conditions were not obtained, "l'Empereur n'aurait qu'à aviser aux mesures réclamées par les intérêts de son Empire." There is a second document, which is *réservé*, and which Count Buol described as stating the points which, if the Russian Government should propose to enter into a negotiation for the reestablishment of peace, they are recommended to avoid, more particularly such as would call for any concessions from the Governments of England and France in return for those at present required from Russia.

As I have only had a few moments in which to write this report to your Lordship, which I must forward by the post, and as Count Buol's despatch, above referred to, will be submitted by Count Colloredo to your Lordship nearly at the same time with the arrival of this present despatch, I will not enter further into its details, except to say that it is couched in courteous terms towards the Emperor Nicholas.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 239.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 7.*)

(No. 36.)

My Lord, *Munich, June 2, 1854.*

THE Bamberg Conference has terminated in a far more satisfactory manner than the language held by M. von der Pfordten to myself and my French colleague had led us to expect.

It seems that finding, before the deliberations commenced, how little

chance he had of obtaining any support to his projected conditions in respect to Greece, he made a virtue of necessity, and opened the proceedings in a speech in which he dwelt upon the propriety of the closest union among the German Powers in the present crisis, and recommended their immediate accession to the Austro-Prussian Treaty signed at Berlin on the 20th of April.

The only semblance of a condition, if such it can be termed, was, as far as I can learn, that the adhesion of the smaller States should be given collectively through the Diet, in such a manner as to exhibit their determination to uphold and maintain the coalition, the groundwork of which was laid at the Darmstadt Conferences some time ago, against any encroachments which might be attempted against their independence by the two great German Powers.

It is somewhat singular that precisely those small States—for instance, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, the Kingdom of Wurtemburg, and the Duchy of Nassau—whose reigning houses are closely connected with the Imperial family of Russia, are said to have been the most pressing and eager for an immediate and unconditional adhesion to the policy of the two Great Powers. If such be the case, as I am informed from very good authority, I can only account for it on the ground of the apprehension felt by their respective Governments as to the effects which a contrary course would have produced on public opinion.

M. von der Pfordten has returned from Bamberg to this capital, but I have not yet had an opportunity of conversing with him on these subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 240.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 8.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 7, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL has informed me that the King of Prussia having proposed to the Emperor of Austria to meet him at Teschen, on the frontier of Bohemia, he has been called by His Imperial Majesty to join him in order to be present this meeting. Count Buol leaves for Prague to-night. He expects to return here in four or five days. With respect to the proposal in Sir S. Canning's telegraphic despatch of the 31st of May as to a movement of Austrian troops on Widdin, Count Buol says whilst waiting for the answer it was impossible to take an offensive moment of the nature proposed.

No. 241.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 8.*)

(No. 706.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 7, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received this morning from M. de Bourqueney a despatch dated the 3rd instant, in which that Minister informs him that he had been invited, together with the Earl of Westmorland, to a conference by Count Buol, at which the latter had communicated to them the despatch about to be sent to St. Petersburgh to engage Russia to evacuate the Principalities.

M. de Bourqueney intimates that the tone of this despatch is much milder than he thinks the circumstances of the case require. Russia is requested to fix an early and positive period for the retreat of her armies beyond the Pruth, and to engage at once not to advance beyond the Danube.

This despatch is accompanied by another not intended for Count Nesselrode's knowledge, in which Count Esterhazy is charged not to enter into any discussion respecting the operations of the maritime Powers.

After this communication some discussion appears to have ensued between

M. de Bourqueney and Count Buol as to the terms on which a final peace might be concluded; but the wording of M. de Bourqueney's despatch on this point is so vague that it is impossible without further elucidation to understand the points on which the discussion arose.

I was sorry to observe that M. de Buol stated, that although all diligence had been employed, both by the civil and military authorities, the Austrian army would not be in full strength upon the south-eastern frontier before the end of July.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 242.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 546.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 8, 1854.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the best thanks of Her Majesty's Government, for communicating to them the very clear and able despatch which his Excellency has addressed to M. de Bourqueney, and of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch No. 694 of the 5th instant.

Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna will be instructed to hold similar language to Count Buol.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 243.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 325.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 7, 1854.*

THE Austrian General Meyerhofer has arrived here from Vienna with detailed accounts of the military arrangements which the Emperor Francis Joseph intends to carry out, in the event of the Emperor of Russia persisting in a prolonged occupation of the Danubian Principalities. He was to have his first interview with Baron Manteuffel to-day, and I was only able to learn from his Excellency what he expected to be told—which was that the Emperor of Austria would shortly have 286,000 men under arms on his eastern frontiers; that he called on Prussia to carry the stipulations of the Treaty of the 20th of April into execution, and that he proposed that Austria and Prussia should conjointly, and at once, invite the States of the Confederation to mobilise one-half of their armies.

His Excellency said that he believed this was the substance of the propositions of which General Meyerhofer was the bearer, and that he could not say more on the subject until he had seen him.

In reply to a question which I asked as to the present disposition of the King with regard to these matters, he gave me to understand that he believed he was coming round to the absolute necessity of doing something; but his Excellency did not seem to think that much active co-operation would be obtained from Prussia at an early day, though he did not hesitate to say that in the course of time the Prussian armies would be set in motion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 244.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 326.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 7, 1854.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL told me to-day that the summons to evacuate the Principalities had left Vienna for St. Petersburgh on the 4th instant, and that the Austrian Government demanded a clear and an immediate answer to their communication.

I inquired if the King of Prussia approved of the terms in which the summons was drawn up. His Excellency replied that His Majesty regretted that the Austrian Government had not alluded to the retiring of the fleets of the Western Powers from the Black and Baltic Seas as necessarily taking place simultaneously with the evacuation of the Principalities; and he gave me almost to understand that the King had suggested the insertion of something to this effect; however, Baron Manteuffel informed me notwithstanding this objection that His Majesty would support the summons at St. Petersburgh, and that a messenger should this night be dispatched with orders on the subject to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at the Imperial Court.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 245.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 329.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 7, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith an analysis of a memoir drawn up by M. von der Pfordten, and submitted to the Conference of the German States lately held at Bamberg. I am informed that the collective declaration agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries assembled there and transmitted to their respective Courts for ratification is founded on the opinions and embraces all the points expressed in the inclosed document.

This memoir indisputably bears proof of the exclusive pretensions which the group of States in Central and Southern Germany (and previously known as the "Darmstadt Coalition") assume to itself. It is evidently their wish and ambition, under the influence and intrigues of Bavaria and Saxony, to create in Germany an intermediate or third Power, and thus to obstruct and impede the policy of the two Great German States. I am likewise informed that the replies which have been received from the different States who met at Bamberg, to the invitation of accession to the Austro-Prussian Convention addressed by Prussia, are identic in language and embody likewise the opinions expressed in this Bavarian memoir.

I am told that they further contain the wish that all the communications which have taken or may hereafter take place on the Oriental Question should be laid before the Diet at Frankfort. It would thus seem to be their object to establish a permanent Committee of the Diet who shall discuss these questions, and to give to that federal body the character of a separate and independent power.

I have been informed that they likewise intend to propose that the whole of the Austrian and Prussian armies shall be at the disposal of the Diet, as a counterpoise to the guarantee to Austria and Prussia of their non-German possessions.

Baron Manteuffel, in speaking to me this evening of the Bamberg Conference, remarked with some bitterness that Austria had on a previous occasion instigated this coalition against Prussia, and that in the present instance she had found her policy to recoil against herself.

These States have been much annoyed at the communication of the Austro-Prussian Convention to the Vienna Conference previous to its being laid

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before the Diet for their acceptation, and they are still more incensed at the departure of the Austrian summons to St. Petersburgh without their assent.

The course pursued on these occasions by the Austrian Cabinet seems clearly to indicate the resolution to pursue its own course of policy without yielding its important interests to factious intriguers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 245.

Analysis of Bavarian Memorandum which served as a Basis for the Deliberations of the Bamberg Conferences.

[See Inclosure in No. 301.]

No. 246.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 222. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 7*, 1854.

WITH the view of carrying out your Lordship's instructions, as contained in your confidential despatch No. 193 of the 31st ultimo, directing me to hold similar language to that which is detailed in the despatch of Lord Cowley, No. 663, as having been held to the Austrian Representative at Paris by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I read the substance of that document to Count Buol. Previously, however, to my doing so, I consulted with M. de Bourqueney, who had informed me of his having received a despatch from his Government, which he was ordered to communicate to Count Buol, and which was generally of a similar import to the conversation to which the despatch I had received referred. M. de Bourqueney stated that there was a passage in the despatch addressed to him which alluded to the Sardinian Government, which he thought at the present moment it would be unadvisable to bring forward, and he had by telegraph inquired of his Government whether they would authorise his omitting it, and he had received their sanction to do so; he therefore requested me, if there was any such allusion in the memorandum of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' conversation, that I would equally abstain from alluding to it, and in deference to his desire I agreed to do so.

Upon the general questions which might arise if a negotiation was entered into with Russia for the reestablishment of peace, Count Buol entirely agreed with the statement made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that France had as much need of Russia to preserve the balance of power in Europe as Austria had, and that it might be as essential to her to have the assistance of Russia to keep Central Europe in order, as it would be to Austria, under certain circumstances, to hold France in check; but Count Buol believed that neither of these eventualities were likely to arise. He then stated that there could be no doubt that Russia, by her invasion of the Principalities, had taken advantage of her preponderating position towards Turkey, which Austria had never failed to remonstrate against, and he thought that Russia ought no longer to retain the sole Protectorate of those Provinces, but that means should be taken to secure their present relations with Turkey under the guarantee of the European Powers. Count Buol also thought that stipulations should be entered into by which the mouths of the Danube might be rendered entirely free, with a view to which he considered that a portion of territory which was now belonging to Russia, should be ceded for that purpose.

With respect to the Treaty of 1841, by which foreign ships of war were interdicted from passing through the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, Count Buol thought that the Sultan should be consulted as to its abrogation or its modification; that it certainly might be a question with that Sovereign how far it would suit his objects to have foreign ships of war passing under the windows of his palace without restrictions; but he in no way objected to take the whole matter into

consideration, with the view of coming to a proper arrangement with regard to it.

Count Buol expressed, however, his belief that the events of war might at any time bring about a material change in the views of the allied Powers as to the stipulations by which the restoration of peace might be accompanied. Any great success, such as the taking of Sebastopol, might render the arrangements at present contemplated inapplicable to the altered position of the contending parties, in the same way that successes on the part of Russia might render those at present to be required of her more difficult of attainment. There could be no doubt that the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops, with the understanding amongst the allied Powers that the *status quo* with regard to them was not to be reestablished, would be a considerable advantage to have obtained; but while the operations of war continued, no questions short of those for which the war had been undertaken and for the attainment of which the allies of Turkey had bound themselves by the engagements which they had contracted amongst themselves, could with any certainty be decided upon.

While I was reading that part of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' conversation, as reported by Lord Cowley, which relates to Poland, and in which he states that "it was not for France to stir that question," Count Buol remarked that it was similar in tendency to what was stated in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch, which M. de Bourqueney had read to him; and that Minister told me that Count Buol had been so much satisfied by that passage that he had requested to be furnished with a copy of it, which M. de Bourqueney had complied with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 247.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 271.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 30, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract the "Journal de Constantinople" of this day's date, containing a relation of the operations of the Russian army before Silistria, from the 14th to the 31st instant, and of the repulse experienced by the Imperial forces in an attack on one of the outworks of that fortress.

The accompanying copy of a private letter from Lieutenant Nasmyth, of the Bombay Artillery, will afford your Lordship additional particulars of the Turkish defence, which appears to have been carried on in a manner highly creditable to Moussa Pasha and the troops under his command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 247.

Extract from the "Journal de Constantinople."

OPÉRATIONS DE L'ARMÉE DE ROUMÉLIE.—Depuis un mois, les feuilles d'Europe parlent du bombardement de Silistrie par les Russes. Les nouvelles données par ces feuilles étaient inexactes. D'après des dépêches du 25 Mai, arrivées avant-hier de Choumla à Constantinople, par courrier extraordinaire, et d'après le récit de personnes venant également du camp de Choumla, et arrivées hier de Varna, voici ce qui est vrai:

Le 11 Mai, les Russes ont attaqué Silistrie du côté du Danube, et ont voulu établir un pont au-dessous de cette place, entre des îles et la rive droite. Ils ont été repoussés avec perte.

Le 16, renforcés par une partie d'un nouveau corps d'armée arrivé tout récemment sur les lieux, les Russes ont recommencé l'attaque, et, en sacrifiant une partie de leurs forces, ils sont parvenus à établir le pont, et ont passé du côté de la rive droite du Danube au nombre de 20,000.

Pendant ces attaques, autres 20,000 Russes, venant de la Dobrodja, arrivaient près de Silistrie, après avoir essuyé de très grandes pertes en forçant la ligne de Rassova, défendue par un très petit nombre de troupes Ottomanes qui avaient ordre de se replier partie sur Silistrie et partie sur Choumla.

Du 19 au 21, toutes ces troupes ont dirigé leurs principales attaques sur le fort détaché d'Arab Tabia, situé à 2,500 pas de la place, et qui défend une ligne de travaux de fortifications distante de 500 mètres de Silistrie entourée d'une enceinte continue. Leurs efforts sont venus se briser contre la bravoure des troupes Impériales qui ont fait, le 21, avec de l'Infanterie et de la Cavalerie, sous les ordres de brave Moussa Pacha, Commandant-en-chef de Silistrie, une vigoureuse sortie, dont le résultat a été la défaite d'une partie de l'armée Russe, qui a perdu dans cette action plus de 300 hommes, des armes et des munitions, et a eu un grand nombre de blessés.

Les Russes sont commandés devant Silistrie par Paskewich et le Grand Duc Constantin, dont les débuts dans ces affaires importantes ont été des plus malheureux.

La place de Silistrie, qui est approvisionnée pour longtemps de tout ce qui lui est nécessaire en armes, munitions, et vivres, n'est pas investie du côté de Tortokaï, et par conséquent, ses communications avec Choumla sont complètement libres. Ainsi tombent tous les bruits qui avaient été semés par la malveillance, ces jours derniers, sur le sort de cette place, dont on ne peut se rendre maître qu'en s'emparant d'abord du fort détaché d'Arab Tabia, puis de la ligne des travaux de fortifications qu'il protége, et enfin de l'enceinte continue, ce qui demanderait les plus grands efforts durant trois mois. Ainsi Omer Pacha n'a aucune inquiétude sur Silistrie, et il ne commencera son action offensive que dans deux ou trois semaines: il est probable que la plus grande partie des forces allié sera réunie à cette époque aux troupes Impériales, et tout indique que dans un mois, à peu près, une grande bataille sera livrée dans les environs de Silistrie, et qu'une grande victoire sera remportée sur les Russes.

Inclosure 2 in No. 247.

Lieutenant Nasmyth to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Silistria, May 13, 1854.

My Lord,

AFTER making a short tour in the Dobrudscha, in company with Captain Butler of the Ceylon Rifles, I arrived here on the evening of the 10th instant, and next day, the 11th, we witnessed a smart cannonade from both sides, which lasted from about 4 to 8 P.M. By the official despatches you will have received, your Lordship will be by this time aware of the effects of the Russian fire: namely, one Chasseur, a peasant,* and one horse killed, and a child badly wounded, in the town. Considerable damage, however, has been done to the buildings, and a shallop lying under the bank has been destroyed. The practice of the enemy was, on the whole, very indifferent. What their object could have been I am at a loss to ascertain, as they made no demonstration of an attempt to move any portion of their force across the Danube, and their loss must have considerably exceeded ours, as the Turkish practice was much superior, particularly towards the close, most of our shells bursting in or immediately over their batteries. The manner in which the Turkish artillerymen worked their guns particularly struck me as being first-rate. They have been trained under a Prussian Artillery officer, Colonel Grach, who seems to have spared no pains in rendering this portion of their force, as well as the fortifications, most efficient, and in which he has certainly succeeded. During the night of the 11th a small battery of four guns was thrown up by the enemy, on the little island of Saliuni Adax, which was not previously occupied by them, and yesterday, during the whole of the forenoon, they appeared to be engaged in transporting ammunition and stores from the mainland to the Island of Hoppa, as their boats and shallops made frequent passages from one side to the other, and towards evening we observed large bodies of Infantry moving down to the water's edge, for the purpose, as we concluded, of being thrown

* The peasant only wounded.

into that island.* Apprehending therefore, a passage would be attempted during the night, every preparation was made to give them a warm reception. The road that skirts the Danube had already a fosse for riflemen; this during the night was deepened, and three additional batteries for field ordnance thrown up behind this line, on the opposite side of the road. During the night we accompanied Moussa Pasha to visit the working parties engaged in these works, and had a very good opportunity of observing the admirable manner in which the men performed their duty. They worked with a will and energy for which no terms of praise are too great. Up to 2 this morning, when we returned, there were no signs of a crossing being attempted, nor was anything done during the night. Intelligence was received by Moussa Pasha yesterday that a body of the enemy had been thrown across at Rassova, and afterwards a report was brought in by a person whom he considers trustworthy, who states that he saw 14 guns, and estimated the force with them to be from 20,000 to 24,000 men. The amount of the latter, however, appeared, to say the least of it, very doubtful.

Presuming that there could be no objection to our doing so, Captain Butler and myself have tendered our services in any way they can be useful to his Excellency during our stay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES NASMYTH.

No. 248.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 273.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 30, 1854.

ALTHOUGH I must presume that Lord Raglan informs the Duke of Newcastle in detail of whatever concerns the movements of the army under his command, I think it right to acquaint your Lordship with the departure of General Brown's Division yesterday for Varna and its neighbourhood. A French brigade of rather less force, under command of General Canrobert, is appointed for the same destination. Other detachments from each army are to follow, in proportion as they attain the requisite degree of completeness.

Omer Pasha continues, meanwhile, to collect his forces in the neighbourhood of Shumla, withdrawing them entirely from Kalafat, calling in the reserves, whatever they may be, from Sophia, bringing up others from Bosnia, and forming a camp at Monastir, with reference to the insurrection in Greece. He has requested my assistance to obtain further supplies of money and clothing from the Government, and I have made application in consequence. He is, at the same time, anxious to increase his army, particularly by an additional park of artillery, and, with Lord Raglan's sanction, I have suggested to Reshid Pasha the expediency of transferring nearly the whole of the army at Batoum to Bulgaria, and of sending thirty or forty pieces of field artillery from the depôt here to Shumla.

The operations against Silistria continue: but the investment of that fortress was not completed a few days ago, and the Turkish Generalissimo had thoughts of attempting to throw a small reinforcement into it, under cover of a strong demonstration of Cavalry. The loss of the garrison hitherto is stated at 1,000 men. The besiegers are said to have suffered severely, and, in consequence, to have slackened their exertions since the last attack.

The report of the Grand Duke Constantine's presence at the siege appears to be untrue.

Two Englishmen, formerly officers in the Company's Service, are in the town of Silistria. They seem to have made it a point of honour to remain there. One is a Mr. Nasmyth, who corresponds, I believe, with the "Times."

On the whole, my Lord, there is much reason to hope that the Russians will be occupied with Silistria until Omer Pasha shall have completed the concentration of his army, and the auxiliary forces shall be on the theatre of action

* These I have since learnt were subsequently crossed to the Island of Tschiblak-Ada, the same island on which the Russians formed their bridge in 1828–29.

in sufficient numbers to cooperate effectually with him. Appearances warrant the expectation of a great battle at no distant period, and few can look forward to its result without feelings of the deepest anxiety.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 249.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 281.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, May 30, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a despatch from Admiral Dundas, reporting the successful operations of the combined squadrons at Redoute-Kaleh and Poté. The accompanying reports from Vice-Consul Stevens will place your Lordship in possession of additional particulars, and of the last movements of the Turkish forces on the Batoom frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 249.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Baltchik, May 25, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the Russian flag on the coasts of Circassia and Georgia now only flies over Aunpa and Soujak.

All the other forts have been evacuated, and more or less destroyed; from Redoute-Kaleh and Poté the Russians were driven by the fire of the ships under Sir Edmund Lyons and the Count de Chabannes.

Redoute-Kaleh is now garrisoned by a Turkish battalion, who, with three field-pieces, were embarked at St. Nicolai in our vessels, and last night the "Sanspareil" and two Turkish steamers sailed for Redoute-Kaleh with arms, ammunition, and 200 or 300 Circassians.

The various tribes along the coast now appear more united than they were, and Captain Brock, R.N., and Lieutenant Stanton, R.E., were landed at Burden to endeavour to see Schamyl and to incite the people to rise against the Russians, and destroy, at different points, the great military road in the rear of the mountains.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 249.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Trebizond, May 24, 1854.*

NEWS was received here this morning by the Turkish steamer "Essery Hairez," from Batoom, of the taking of Redoute-Kaleh by the squadron under Sir Edmund Lyons. The following are the details given to me by a Turkish officer who was present on Saturday, the 20th instant. The combined squadron, while passing Redoute-Kaleh, was fired at by the Russian forts. It proceeded to Choorookseo, and, after embarking Turkish troops, returned to Redoute-Kaleh, landed the troops, and bombarded the town. The custom-house and quarantine were spared, and, after the bombardment, were found to contain a great quantity of merchandise, which was seized. Two guns were found spiked, and, from the account of the officer, it appears the place had been occupied by about 2,000 Russian troops. The same steamer brings news of the evacuation of Kuturo, of

the advance of seven hours made by the force under Selim Pasha towards Marani, and of the capture, by the steam squadron of Anapa, of two Greek vessels, laden with 700 Russian soldiers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRAS. S. STEVENS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 249.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Trebizond, May 24, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the English steamer "Phœbe," which arrived here two days ago, brought 500 Irregulars from the Province of Genik. This force will proceed to Batoom at once.

The "Phœbe" also brought about 12,000*l.* worth of paper money.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRAS. S. STEVENS.

No. 250.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 19.)
My Lord, *Hanover, June 7, 1854.*

THE word to that effect having been given from Munich, the Austrian and Prussian Ministers have received from the Hanoverian Government, as the result of the Bamberg Conferences, formal answers to the communication made to this as to all other Governments of Germany, of the Austro-Prussian Treaty of April 20, and I understand from M. de Lenthe, that the Hanoverian answer is identical with that of all the Governments which were represented at Bamberg.

As far as I can ascertain, no accredited agent of the Governments which took part in the Conferences in question, was better disposed than M. de Lenthe to give a pure and simple adhesion to the Treaty, the adoption of which would have strengthened the position of Austria, and obviated prejudicial delays as to the course of action under certain eventualities which may ensue, from the reservations which the Governments represented at Bamberg express their intention of attaching to their adhesion to the Treaty, if it should be submitted to the Diet for that purpose.

Their intention of reserving to themselves the right of deciding as to the application of certain provisions of the Separate Article of the Treaty which have reference to offensive action, may only have been put forward for the assertion of their independent rights, and may, and probably will, not prevent their acting in common with the Great German Powers under the specified eventualities; but anything like hesitation as to community of purpose is, of course, much to be deprecated at the present moment, whilst Prussia is so vacillating and whilst Russia is striving to foment discord in the Confederation. Something, however, would appear to have been gained by the unanimity which prevailed in a right direction at Bamberg, when, from the strong desire of Bavaria to mix up Greek politics with the question, and the Russian predilections of some, at least, of the Courts, disunion favourable to their cause was expected by Russian agents, among others by Baron Budberg, according to observations of his when he was lately here, which were reported to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 251.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 224. Confidential.)

Vienna, June 7, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 191 of the 31st ultimo, stating the regret and disappointment felt that the Austro-Prussian Treaty had been communicated to the Conference without the Additional Article, which alone had reference to the war, or was of any value or importance to England and France; I think it right to explain that as I had not been furnished with any instructions from your Lordship, except that in reply to a confidential communication to you of the 3rd of May, in which I stated that M. de Bourqueney "had on that day proposed to Count Buol to take into consideration the propriety of assembling the Conference, in order that the English and French Treaty of the 10th of April might be officially communicated and placed on the Protocol of the Conference, and that the new Treaty or Convention between Austria and Prussia might be equally communicated in the same way;" your Lordship had answered in your letter of the 9th of May, that "you considered it would be quite right to summons the Conference to place on record the two Conventions, namely, that of France and England and that of Austria and Prussia, but that there should also be a memorandum to denote the agreement between the Four Powers, and their united purpose for a common object." I, consequently, considered myself as cooperating with M. de Bourqueney in supporting this measure, with whom the idea had originated, and who had been furnished with the instructions of his Government with the view of carrying it out.

When M. de Bourqueney received these instructions, he called upon me to join him in inviting Count Buol to assemble the Conference, and I stated that, as I was aware your Lordship would approve of such a measure, I should not hesitate to give my sanction to it; and it was therefore upon our united application that the Conference was assembled, and upon its second meeting, as reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 203, the Prussian Minister stated his having received the directions of his Government to concur in communicating the Austro-Prussian Treaty to the Conference, and in taking part in the Protocol which had been drawn up by Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney, and submitted to his Government for their approval. When the Treaty was presented to the Conference, I remarked upon the absence of the Additional Article, but it was stated by Count Arnim, and it was concurred in by Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney, that as this Article referred to the military operations which might arise out of the stipulations of the Treaty, and as it had already been communicated to the Governments of England and France, it was not considered necessary to annex it to the present Protocol, particularly as there was no document of a similar nature attached to the English Treaty.

Under these circumstances, and more especially as I considered myself as acting in support of the French Minister who was proceeding under the formal instructions of his Government, I abstained from any further discussion upon the subject, and I took part in the signature of the Protocol under the impressions which are reported in my despatch No. 203 of the 24th ultimo, and with the remark which I made confidentially to your Lordship, that I had taken upon myself to assent to this Protocol, and to put my name to it without any official instructions, and without submitting the document to your Lordship, as by the tenour of your letter of the 9th of May, I felt confident you would approve my doing so.

I have read to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch above alluded to, No. 191 of the 21st ultimo, and I have drawn his attention to the disappointment you express at the non-presentation of the Additional Article of the Austro-Prussian Treaty.

His Excellency remarked that the presentation of this document had never been contemplated by M. de Bourqueney, with whom the idea of submitting the Treaty to the Conference had originated, and for the reasons stated at that Conference he had not supposed that it could be required, as the only value of

the communication of these documents was to establish the fact of their being recognised by the Four Powers, as tending to carry out the objects of the engagements which had been taken by them in the Protocol of the 9th of February, but in no way as binding all the parties to carry out the distinct and separate stipulations which they contained.

I also read to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 190 of the 24th ultimo, in which you recapitulate the observations you had made to Count Colloredo upon the general bearing and objects of the Austro-Prussian Treaty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 252.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12, 7 P.M.)

Berlin, June 12, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Minister President informs me that the interview of the two Sovereigns is likely to produce good results, and that the firm but reasonable language of the Emperor of Austria on the Eastern question has made a favourable impression upon the King of Prussia. Austria and Prussia have decided upon the form of answer to be made to the communication which the small German States lately agreed to at Bamberg, and expect not only to have a majority at the Diet, if the question of adherence to the Treaty of April 20th is brought before it, which it will not if there is any doubt on the subject, but think that Bavaria and Saxony will ultimately agree to it.

No. 253.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 724.)

Paris, June 10, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING been informed that M. de Hübner had made a communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of the despatches addressed by the Austrian Government to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, with a view of obtaining the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, I inquired this afternoon of M. Drouyn de Lhuys what impression these documents had made upon him.

He replied, that if the communication which had been made to him had been confined to the first of the series of papers addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, he should not have been dissatisfied, but he thought the reserved despatch likely to produce lamentable consequences. He had stated as much to M. de Hübner, though unable then to confirm his own opinion by that of the Emperor, as he had since been empowered to do. He described his reasoning to M. de Hübner, as follows:

That if Russia accepted the Austrian summons to retire behind the Pruth without making any conditions, as required by the Austrian summons, it would only be done as a lure to keep Austria quiet, to gain time, and to sow dissension among the four Powers. Russia had refused more advantageous terms on more than one occasion; was it likely that she would *bonâ fide* accept now, that which she had with so much arrogance refused before?

With regard to the suggestions contained in the reserved despatch to Count Esterhazy, as to the way in which Russia might proceed, if she wished to offer any propositions in consequence of the demand made by Austria; M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarked, in the first place, upon a serious contradiction to be found between the patent and the reserved despatch. In the former Count

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Buol says, that if Russia attempts to make the evacuation of the Principalities depend upon the operations of the allies, he cannot listen to her, as he has nothing to say to those operations. In the latter, he suggests that Russia should retire behind the Pruth, if the allies engage not to cross the Danube. This was a manifest contradiction? Besides, Austria ought to suggest nothing to Russia which she is not certain would be accepted by the allies. On what authority does she assume that her suggestions will be listened to by the allies? And if they are not, what line does she propose to take? Will she, after the public record of her opinion of the conduct of Russia, take part with her, or will she endeavour to maintain her neutrality? Either course would in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' opinion be fatal to her. In the former case, France and England would be justified in seeking allies against her where they could. In the latter, they would leave to Austria the responsibility of the continued occupation of the Principalities by Russia, and of all the consequences which it might entail. But supposing even the allies to be willing to accept her suggestions, what was to become of the Principalities? There was no authority, no Government in either of them. They would probably become a nest of robbers. What Austria proposed was simply an impossibility.

M. de Hübner said, that Austria might occupy the Principalities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys inquired whether M. de Hübner seriously thought that Russia would consent to such an arrangement, or that if forced to consent to it, she would not seize on the earliest opportunity to make Austria feel the full weight of her resentment.

Speaking of France, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that the French Government never could enter into the suggestions of Austria. They would certainly look to be indemnified for the expenses of the war in any arrangement they might make for peace.

Such was the substance of the observations which M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me he had made to M. de Hübner. They had been ratified by the Emperor, and he was about to address an instruction on the subject to M. de Bourqueney, which when finished he would show to me.

I observed that I trusted that more would be insisted upon by the French Government than indemnities for the expenses of the war, for there would be but little advantage in accepting a peace on terms which did not ensure the lasting settlement of the Eastern question, and that it might be advisable to inquire categorically of Count Buol on what basis he proposed to negotiate for peace at the Congress or Conferences which he suggested should be opened after the signature of an armistice. I remarked also, that if the Congress was to settle the future position of the Christians in Turkey, they were putting themselves in the situation from which they would with so much difficulty have driven Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he would call M. de Bourqueney's attention to these points.

I beg to remark that I have not seen the Austrian despatches, but as your Lordship must have received a communication of them from Count Colloredo, you will understand to what passages M. Drouyn de Lhuys' remarks apply.

M. de Hübner read likewise to M. Drouyn de Lhuys some extracts from a private letter of Count Buol, referring to the same subject, which his Excellency considered the most satisfactory part of the communication, as in it Count Buol said that he did not expect Russia to obey the summons, and that Austria would then have exhausted every effort to preserve peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 254.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 205.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch addressed by Count Buol on the 3rd instant to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh, stating that in the existing crisis the Emperor of Austria has resolved to make a fresh appeal to the Emperor Nicholas on the urgent necessity of devising some means for putting an end to a state of things in every respect so threatening; that it was impossible to doubt that the occupation by the Russian forces of the two Danubian Principalities, was one of the chief causes of the alarming proportions which the existing contest had assumed, and that it was that measure which more than any other had caused the failure of all the attempts which have been made to effect a pacific solution.

The silence observed by Russia with reference to the summons addressed to her by the Western Powers to evacuate the Provinces, brought her into collision with those Powers, and extended to such a degree the sphere of the contest, as to render it impossible to form any estimate of the disastrous consequences which may result from it.

It is impossible that the Emperor Nicholas should be ignorant of the extent to which the political, commercial, and industrial interests of the Austrian Empire, and with them those of Germany at large, have suffered from this prolonged occupation, and it is equally clear that all these evils must increase in proportion to the expansion given to the limits of the theatre of war.

On these grounds the Emperor of Austria has felt himself compelled, out of regard for the interests of his people, to enter by the Protocol of the 9th of April into engagements from which he cannot recede.

The Emperor Nicholas, weighing in his wisdom those considerations, will appreciate the importance attached by the Emperor of Austria not only to the Russian armies not pushing any further their operations on the other side of the Danube, but also to obtaining from His Imperial Majesty positive assurances as to the period, it is to be hoped not far distant, when the occupation of the Principalities will be brought to an end.

The Emperor Nicholas is doubtless desirous of peace, and therefore he will seek the means of putting an end to a state of things which daily threatens Austria and Germany with still further calamities. He will be unwilling either by an indefinite prolongation of that occupation, or by attaching to the evacuation of the Provinces conditions which it would not rest with Austria to fulfil, to impose upon the Emperor of Austria the imperious obligation of seeking for himself the means of protecting the interests which the present state of things so seriously compromises.

The despatch concludes by instructing the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh to press for an early and precise answer, which by calming the anxiety of Austria for her own interests, might at the same time afford an opening for putting an end to the horrors of war.

Count Colloredo also read to me a confidential despatch addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy for his guidance, but which was not to be communicated to Count Nesselrode, recommending that the Emperor of Russia should be satisfied with the resolution of the three Powers in favour of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, as recorded in the Vienna Protocol of the 9th of April; that His Imperial Majesty should no longer require any formal declaration on the part of the Porte, which the Sultan could not in fact give, and which the Western Powers could not permit; and that in return for any concession the Emperor might make to Austria, he should not require the withdrawal of the allied fleets from the Black Sea, as England and France would not agree to such a demand.

Count Buol then proceeds to suggest that the Russian forces might quit the Principalities, and retire behind the Pruth, on condition that neither the Turkish nor allied armies advanced north of the Danube; that negotiations for peace might then be resumed in a Congress, and the terms of an armistice

agreed to, when some arrangement would probably be made respecting the fleets in the Black Sea.

I expressed to Count Colloredo my great regret that Count Esterhazy had been instructed to make these suggestions, as they would probably be used to further the main object of Russian policy at this moment, which was to detach Austria from England and France, and that Austria might find herself much embarrassed by the acceptance of the proposals originating with herself, which could not put an end to the war between the belligerent Powers, and would give Austria no guarantee as to the peace which they may ultimately conclude.

The Porte, I said, at the recommendation of the four Powers, had consented to an armistice, and to conditions upon which a peace honourable to Russia might have been made; but as they had been contemptuously rejected by the Emperor, and war had been declared against Russia by England and France, the former state of things was altogether changed: the two great maritime Powers had become principals in the contest, and the honour and the interest of both required that they should not lay down their arms until the peace of Europe was secured on a solid and lasting foundation by an effectual check upon the aggressive policy of Russia. It was useless, therefore, to propose, negotiations unless we had reason to know beforehand that they would secure the object we had in view, which object, I begged to observe, Austria was more interested than England and France in attaining, for to no Power in Europe would a return to the *status quo* be more injurious than to Austria. By her measures of self-defence she had already earned for herself the enmity of Russia; and if old Treaties were renewed, and no restrictions were placed upon Russia, and if the enormous army of Russia was still kept on foot, and large additions were made to her navy, whereby an increased facility of transporting troops would be acquired, Europe might have cause bitterly to regret that the present favourable conjuncture of circumstances had not been turned to proper account, but Austria would probably be the Power first to feel the consequences of such neglect.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 255.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 335.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government learn with regret the changes in the Turkish Ministry, reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 269 of the 30th of May, and that the Sultan's service is sacrificed to intrigues and personal convenience at a moment when all the strength and stability which union and well-directed zeal can impart are indispensable.

I take this opportunity of stating to your Excellency that from various quarters information has reached Her Majesty's Government of the bitter hostility of the Seraskier against Omer Pasha, which is manifested by depriving him of the necessary supplies, by retaining in store at Constantinople the clothing and munitions required by the army of Omer Pasha, and by intrigues against him among his own officers at Shumla.

This cannot be endured; the matter is of such grave importance, the consequences of Omer Pasha's resignation or defeat may be so disastrous to the allied armies, and our right to interfere is consequently so indisputable, that your Excellency will take the measures which you may judge most advisable for insisting either that the unworthy conduct of the Seraskier shall undergo a complete change, or that a successor shall be found for him who will prefer the Sultan's cause to the gratification of his own passions or the furtherance of some personal intrigue.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 256.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 206.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has shown me the draft of a Convention which the Austrian Government has proposed to the Porte, and which has for its object to regulate the terms on which the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia may be occupied by Austrian troops in the event of war between Austria and Russia.

The preamble states, that recognising the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present limits as necessary for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, and the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is one of the essential conditions of the integrity of that Empire, the Emperor of Austria is prepared to concur by the means at his disposal in the measures calculated to ensure the object of the understanding established between Austria and the Courts represented in the Conference of Vienna; which offer being accepted by the Sultan, the Treaty goes on to define the manner in which the cooperation shall be effected.

The Emperor of Austria engages to exhaust all means of negotiation and all other means in order to effect the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, and, if necessary, to employ a sufficient number of troops for that purpose, in which case, however, the Austrian General would have the sole direction of the operations of the Austrian army, though making the Turkish Commander acquainted with his operations.

The Emperor of Austria engages as far as possible to reestablish in the Principalities the legal state of things, as derived from the privileges granted by the Porte in regard to their administration, but the local authorities on being restored will not be authorized to control the Imperial army; and His Imperial Majesty engages not to enter into any Treaty with Russia which shall not have for its basis the sovereign rights of the Sultan and the integrity of his Empire.

The Austrian troops will evacuate the Principalities as soon as the object of the Convention shall have been effected by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between the Porte and Russia.

The local authorities are to give their aid for facilitating the movements and providing for the subsistence of the Austrian army, and strict discipline in every respect is to be maintained by the Austrian troops.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 257.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 161.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 326 of the 7th instant, relative to the summons addressed by the Austrian Government to the Government of Russia to evacuate the Principalities, I have to observe that Her Majesty's Government would have been much surprised if the Austrian Government, in calling upon Russia to evacuate the Principalities, had made any allusion, as the King of Prussia appears to have desired, to the combined fleets retiring from the Black and Baltic Seas.

The Austrian Government, however, appears to have been aware that it would have been useless to propose such a condition to England and France, and that to propose it, without their consent, to Russia, would have been improper.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 258.

Mr. Grey to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 136. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, June 6, 1854.*

M. LOBSTEIN, the French Minister at this Court, had on the 29th ultimo the honour of an audience of the King, in order to present letters of condolence from the Emperor of the French upon the death of His Royal Highness the Duke of Sodermania.

M. Lobstein profited by this opportunity to renew with His Majesty the subject upon which he had already spoken, namely, the cooperation of Sweden with the Western Powers against Russia. He held out the hopes to His Majesty of subsidies, and the assistance of France in reconquering the dominions which were formerly under the Swedish Crown, provided the King would take the field with an army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, his fleet, and his gun-boats. M. Lobstein further said that no guarantee for the future could be given, but that Sweden must take her share in the good and evil fortune attendant on the war.

The King appeared to be prepared for this communication, but did not receive it as warmly as was expected, though at the same time he by no means gave a final refusal. His Majesty said that the course which Austria pursued must be his guide, and further he remarked that as it appeared that England and France intended to push matters to extremities, whereas Austria professed to desire to restore the *status quo ante bellum*, he wished to know whether Austria would agree to all that was proposed by the Western Powers, before he took any decisive step.

I have very good reason for believing that His Majesty's desire is to take part in the war against Russia, and I am equally sure that if the cooperation of Austria is secured, there will be little difficulty in obtaining that of Sweden. But I should conceal the truth from your Lordship if I were not to state my firm conviction that in order to obtain the cooperation of Sweden it will be necessary to press her, and that the King will be grateful for the application of that pressure. I do not venture to state this view to your Lordship solely on my own opinion, or without having consulted the experience of other persons who have every means of knowing, not only the feelings of the King himself, but also those of the country at large. With regard to the latter, there can be no doubt as to the tendency of their sympathies. They are all against Russia, and no opportunity is lost of showing that such is the case. Even the Ministerial paper, from which I inclosed so violent an article in favour of the neutrality of Sweden in my despatch No. 89, appears to be coming round, and the argument which it now puts forward is that "the moment" is not yet come for Sweden to abandon that course of policy which she has adopted.

I am bound, however, to observe to your Lordship that the general opinion here is, that if Sweden is to declare against Russia, it must be done at once, and without loss of time. The summer and autumn in the north are short, and if matters are not speedily decided, even the most eager partisans of England and France in this country will advocate delay and the maintenance of the neutrality till next spring.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. GREY.

No. 259.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 337.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 13, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 329 of the 7th instant, inclosing the analysis of a memoir drawn up by M. von der Pfordten, and submitted to the Conference at Bamberg, I have now the honour to inclose a translation of the identic notes which have been addressed by the Ministers of these States to the

Representatives of Austria and Prussia residing at their Courts, in answer to the communication of the Treaty of Berlin of the 20th of April, and the invitation to accede to it.

Your Lordship will also find annexed the translation of a draft of resolution which these States intended to propose to the Diet at Frankfort.

At the late meeting at Tetschen, Count Buol and Baron Manteuffel agreed on the reply which should be returned to this communication, and I understand from Baron Manteuffel that the only delay in forwarding it is that they have not yet settled the date to be affixed to the document.

His Excellency said that in consequence of the difference of opinions prevailing at this moment amongst the German Governments, collective action could scarcely be expected; that each State would be invited to give its opinion separately; and that the matter would not be brought before the Diet until Prussia and Austria were sure of two-thirds of the votes, which there was no doubt of their obtaining, for that several of the Powers were already beginning to hesitate, and some had already given in their adhesion.

Your Lordship will perceive in the inclosed note of the States represented at the Bamberg Conference that under the plea of protecting the interests of Germany, of securing the freedom of navigation of the Danube, obtaining a general guarantee for the liberties of the Christian populations in Turkey, and for the maintenance of the Kingdom of Greece, the German dynasty of which country must ever awaken the sympathies of Germany, there is an attempt to establish a basis for future negotiations, and a right of active interference to which Austria and Prussia can never be disposed to agree.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 259.

Project of Federal Resolution.

LA haute Diète ayant pris en considération la communication qui lui a été faite par les Gouvernements d'Autriche et de Prusse du Traité d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive conclu entre elles à Berlin le 20 Avril de cette année, et ayant pris encore en considération la demande d'accession qui y était jointe; considérant l'accord complet et constaté par ce fait des deux hauts Gouvernements ci-dessus en leur qualité de Grandes Puissances Européennes; pénétrée de la haute mission de garantir de tous côtés les intérêts généraux de l'Allemagne; et prenant en une considération pleine de confiance la proposition faite par les hauts Gouvernements d'Autriche et de Prusse, ainsi que les déclarations y annexées, de même que les assurances y contenues sur le but, le texte et l'exécution de l'alliance du 20 Avril, la haute Diète arrête:

1. D'accéder au Traité Offensif et Défensif, et notamment aux Articles I, II, III, et V du dit Traité, ainsi qu'au complément de l'Article II contenu dans les paragraphes 1 et 2 de l'Article unique de l'Acte Additionnel du dit Traité conclu entre l'Autriche et la Prusse pour toute la durée de la guerre qui a éclaté entre la Russie, d'une part, et la Turquie, la France et l'Angleterre, de l'autre.

2. Les mesures nécessaires à l'exécution de la présente résolution demeurent réservées à une délibération spéciale de la Diète, et le comité spécial choisi dans la séance du 24 Mai sera chargé de faire en temps et lieu les propositions nécessaires pour arriver à ce but.

Inclosure 2 in No. 259.

Answer of the Bamberg Conference to the Representatives of Austria and Prussia.

LE Soussigné n'a pas manqué de transmettre à Sa Majesté le Roi son gracieux Souverain la très honorée note du de ce mois et les annexes qui y étaient jointes; note par laquelle le Représentant de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique (de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse) a bien voulu communiquer au Gouvernement, d'après les ordres de sa très

haute Cour, le Traité d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive conclue le 20 Avril entre l'Autriche et la Prusse, ainsi que les déclarations du Cabinet Impérial (Royal) qui s'y rapportent.

Sa Majesté a pris connaissance avec grande satisfaction et reconnaissance de l'ouverture qui lui a été faite et elle a chargé le Soussigné d'y répondre de la manière suivante.

Par la conclusion du Traité du 20 Avril le Gouvernement Royal a vu se réaliser l'espérance qui devait animer et soutenir tous les Gouvernements de l'Allemagne dans les sérieuses complications du moment. L'entente intime de la Prusse et de l'Autriche a été scellée de nouveau. C'est avec pleine sécurité que le Gouvernement Royal partage la conviction que l'alliance qui a été contractée tournera à la gloire de la patrie commune, en développant l'union, la fidélité et la force Allemandes.

La volonté qu'exprimèrent les Hautes Parties Contractantes de protéger les droits et les intérêts de l'Allemagne contre toute atteinte, ne manquera pas de réunir tous les confédérés sous la bannière commune de l'indépendance de l'Allemagne. Le Gouvernement Royal salue dans la Convention avec une satisfaction particulière un nouveau gage, l'idée qui ne réduit pas le territoire des intérêts et des obligations Allemandes aux étroites limites des possessions purement Allemandes des deux premières Puissances confédérées.

Le Gouvernement Royal a vu dans l'invitation d'adhérer qui lui a été faite conformément à l'Article II, un témoignage précieux des dispositions amicales de ses confédérés. Il croit en conséquence devoir répondre avant tout à cette invitation par une déclaration expliquant le vote qu'il déposera à la Diète, à laquelle sans doute on ne manquera pas de soumettre la Convention. Le Gouvernement Royal croit cette dernière supposition justifiée par le renvoi contenu dans l'Article II à l'Article XLVII de l'Acte Final de Vienne, qui se trouve en corrélation avec l'Article XL de cet Acte, prescrivant le mode de voter dans l'Assemblée Fédérale. Elle se justifie également par l'Article III, qui impose aux Etats qui adhèrent des obligations auxquelles, d'après le Pacte Fondamental, ils ne peuvent souscrire qu'avec l'assentiment de la Diète.

Partant de ce point de vue le Gouvernement Royal a dû examiner si les dispositions obligatoires de la Constitution Fédérale étaient en harmonie avec la Convention qui lui a été soumise. Il s'est convaincu que l'éventualité prévue dans l'Article II du Traité, ainsi que celle déterminée dans l'Article Séparé, n'étaient pas prévues par le Pacte Fondamental, et qu'au contraire, d'après les dispositions de l'Article XLVI de l'Acte Final de Vienne, l'exécution de la Convention Austro-Prussienne, ainsi que l'ont reconnu les hautes Cours, étendrait les obligations fédérales.

Le Gouvernement Royal, et assurément la totalité de ses confédérés, ne peuvent avoir aucun doute sur ce point. Le but de la Convention énoncé par les Hautes Parties Contractantes dans l'Article II, et dont l'importance est encore augmentée par la gravité du moment, oblige la Diète et ses membres, alors que l'intérêt de l'Allemagne entière paraît menacé, à ne plus s'en tenir à la lettre des Lois Fondamentales, mais à envisager leur tâche d'un point de vue plus élevé. Ce sera à la Diète de décider si et jusqu'à quel point cet intérêt rendra nécessaire le sacrifice d'obligations plus étendues.

Sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Royal ne peut s'empêcher d'élever des doutes, et notamment sur le point de savoir si les dispositions exprimées dans le premier paragraphe de l'Article unique que la Prusse et l'Autriche ont concertées entr'elles, en leur qualité de Grandes Puissances Européennes, répondraient à la position et à la tâche de la Confédération Germanique, dans le cas où la sommation ayant pour but la retraite de l'une des parties belligérantes, n'aurait pas pour conséquence la suspension simultanée des hostilités, sur terre et sur mer, et la retraite des autres Puissances.

En égalisant les positions de cette façon on faciliterait le rétablissement de la paix, on sauvegarderait les intérêts Allemands en Orient, en même temps que le rejet de la sommation aux conditions ci-dessus mentionnées justifierait l'intervention Allemande. Le Gouvernement Royal se laisse volontiers aller à l'espoir que les Hautes Cours Contractantes se trouveront en état de faire des ouvertures à ce sujet à l'Assemblée Fédérale qui permettront aux autres Gouvernements de se déclarer également pour cette partie de la Convention.

Le Gouvernement Royal a vu, par le second paragraphe de l'Article unique, avec une satisfaction toute particulière, que la réponse dont il y est question, et

qui décidera de la conduite ultérieure, sera pour les deux Cabinets l'objet de délibération, et que par là il sera offert à la Diète accédante une participation suffisante.

Le Gouvernement Royal admet d'avance, comme chose s'expliquant d'elle-même, que la Diète, en ayant adhéré au Traité, sera représentée, en sa qualité de corps politique, par des Plénipotentiaires propres à toutes les négociations ultérieures, de même aussi qu'une participation analogue aux négociations de paix qui auront lieu à la fin de la guerre, doit être sans aucune doute considérée comme garantie par l'Article XLIX de l'Acte Final de Vienne.

Le Gouvernement Royal espère que la participation de la Diète contribuera à sauvegarder, non-seulement l'équilibre Européen, mais aussi les intérêts Allemands, qui comprennent en partie le bien-être matériel de la patrie commune, la prospérité du commerce et de l'industrie Allemands, et qui en partie reposent sur les sentiments religieux et nationaux.

Le Gouvernement Royal compte, parmi les premiers de ces intérêts, la complète liberté de la navigation et du commerce sur les eaux qui conduisent à la Mer Noire. Il range parmi les seconds une garantie générale et réciproque des populations Chrétiennes vivant sous la domination Turque ; et en première ligne le complet maintien du Royaume de Grèce, dont la dynastie Allemande a de justes titres aux chaleureuses sympathies de l'Allemagne—maintien qui du reste est conforme au principe de l'intégrité territoriale en Orient.

Le Gouvernement Royal, en attendant qu'on veuille bien soumettre à la Diète la Convention du 20 Avril de cette année, avec une déclaration concernant les principes développés dans cette note, exprime l'espoir sincère de voir se consolider, au milieu des dangers du présent, par une prompte adhésion, la parfaite entente et l'union intime de l'Allemagne entière.

Quelque disposé que puisse être le Gouvernement Royal à porter les sacrifices qui seront jugés nécessaires, il ne s'unit pas moins à l'espoir exprimé par les Hautes Cours Contractantes de pouvoir éviter toute participation à la guerre actuelle, et de contribuer en même temps au rétablissement de la paix générale.

Il maintient fermement l'espérance que les efforts qui seront faits par l'Autriche et la Prusse dans ce but, auront le succès désiré si elles mettent dans la balance de la médiation la puissance unie de leurs Etats, ainsi que celle de la Confédération Allemande, et si elles offrent aux parties belligérantes, qui elles-mêmes se déclarent animées d'intentions pacifiques, un compromis équitable de tous côtés.

Le Soussigné prie M. le Ministre de vouloir bien porter la déclaration ci-dessus à la connaissance du très-haut Gouvernement, et saisit, &c.

No. 269.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 339.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June* 13, 1854.

TO judge from Baron Manteuffel's account of the late interview of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, at Tetschen, the principal political matter discussed seems to have been the proceedings of the Bamberg Conference and the policy of the small German States, rather than the general bearing of the Eastern question ; but his Excellency has assured me that the meeting at Tetschen cannot fail to do good, for the firmness of the Emperor of Austria, and his calm and reasonable, but very determined, language had made a deep impression on the King. The Emperor appears to have said to His Prussian Majesty that the days of phrases were past, and that we must now prepare for other things. His Imperial Majesty did not, however, enter into any details with the King as to military cooperation, and has left to his Ministers the task of carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty of the 20th of April; and these negotiations are now being pursued here under the direction of General Meyerhofer, who has laid the Austrian plans before Baron Manteuffel and explained the dislocation of the different troops.

There is some little stir in the Prussian War Department, but there is the greatest anxiety to avoid giving offence to Russia ; little or nothing is said on

the subject, and up to the present moment the loan of 30,000,000 dollars has not been raised. The Minister of Finance is desirous that it should, according to usage here, be advertised on the exchange and given to the parties who offer the most advantageous terms; but Baron Manteuffel is desirous that it should be given to the Rothschilds, who have sent agents with fair offers, for his Excellency says that the sum of 30,000,000 dollars will soon be expended if the army is mobilised, and that a fresh loan will have to be raised in a few months, and would probably be obtainable from them on better terms than from any other parties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 261.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 340.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 13, 1854.*

IT appears that after my conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the 7th instant, reported in my despatch No. 326 of that date, the King of Prussia must have given orders to postpone the departure of the instructions which it was intended to send to St. Petersburgh in support of the Austrian summons to evacuate the Principalities, until after the interview at Tetschen, for they have not yet been dispatched, and only leave Berlin to-morrow.

They are to be conveyed by Colonel Manteuffel, one of the King's aides-de-camp, who is probably charged also with verbal explanations, the purport of which however I have been unable to ascertain.

Baron Manteuffel has told me that the instruction which he has addressed to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires to support the summons is a short and plain statement, expressing the hope of the King that the Emperor of Russia will, at this last moment, listen to the appeals addressed to him from Vienna, and save Prussia from the painful position in which she will be placed by a refusal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 262.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 341. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 13, 1854.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL, mentioned to me to-day that, in addition to the official instructions which had been addressed to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in support of the Austrian summons, he intends writing a private letter to Count Nesselrode, in which he should explain the painful relations between the two countries which would result from the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to entertain the Vienna proposals. His Excellency added, that he felt it a duty to leave no means untried to endeavour to stop the war, but that he feared his letter would be of little avail, for he had heard from several sources that the Chancellor's influence at St. Petersburgh, and that of the German and moderate party, was nearly gone; that the Russian party were on the ascendant, and that the Emperor was now completely in their hands. I said to Baron Manteuffel that if this was the case, and that the fanatical party directed the affairs of Russia, it was useless to expect any concessions from that quarter, and therefore nothing, in my opinion, was left but to prepare for eventualities; and that the selection of Prince Gortchakoff as special Envoy to Vienna at the present critical moment, seemed to me like the embassy last year of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople, and likely to have no other result. His Excellency said that he was told Count Nesselrode had done everything in his power to prevent this mission, but that he had not been listened to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 263.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, June 12, 1854.*

THE project of answer agreed upon in the Bamberg Conference, to the communication about to be made to the Diet by Austria and Prussia of the Treaty of Berlin, has been confidentially communicated to me, and I have the honour to forward a translation.

The Diet held no sitting in the last week, and Thursday next being a holiday, their day of meeting for this week will be either on Wednesday or Friday next. My information relating to the Bamberg Conference amounts to this: that there was an unanimous resolution come to by the Plenipotentiaries of the States there represented, that is, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Saxony, Hanover, the two Hesses, Baden, and Nassau, not to accept the Treaty of Berlin separately, but only in their confederate capacity, when it was laid before the Diet.

The form in which this acceptance should be notified was matter of considerable discussion; but the project I have herewith the honour to inclose was finally agreed upon.

I am credibly informed that, together with the acceptance of the Treaty in the form inclosed, it was mooted at Bamberg that the Diet should require that, at the same time as the renewed summons was addressed to Russia to evacuate the Principalities, England and France should be required simultaneously to withdraw from the Black Sea and from Constantinople. If this intention is persevered in, it will have somewhat the effect of *moutarde après dîner*, seeing that the demand made upon Russia by Austria, in pursuance of the Berlin Treaty, has not only been made without any reference to such a corollary, but that it is not impossible that the answer from St. Petersburgh may have reached Vienna before the Diet has held the sitting in which the Treaty will be laid before that Assembly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure in No. 263.

Project of Federal Resolution.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 259.]

No. 264.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 16, 1854.*

THE Convention proposed by Austria to the Sultan for the eventual occupation of the Principalities in case of their evacuation by Russia, has been accepted.

No. 265.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 187. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, June 14, 1854.*

IN the course of a confidential conversation with M. de Bluhme some days ago, I expressed my regret at its being generally believed that Denmark would use her influence at Frankfort to prevent the accession of the Diet to the

Austro-Prussian Convention, and I observed that such a course would not only offend the great German Powers, but that it could not fail also to occasion dissatisfaction in England.

M. de Bluhme replied that no one had a right to say that Denmark would take an active part on one side or the other in this question, and that the German Powers could have no just cause of complaint against the Danish Government, because, as they had already made a public and formal declaration of their intention to remain neutral in the war between Russia and the West of Europe, it would be unbecoming in them to put themselves forward in the Diet as the advocates of a different system of policy; though the King would fulfil his obligations to the Confederation, and give such support as could be required of him for carrying out any decision which might be legally adopted at Frankfort. Unless therefore, said his Excellency, you wish us to abandon our neutral position entirely, you cannot expect us to act otherwise than we are doing.

I rejoined that I had no instructions from your Lordship to invite Denmark to throw over her neutrality; but, as he had mentioned the subject, I might express my personal opinion that the time was approaching when it might not be the interest of Denmark to remain neutral, and when indeed it would be almost impossible for her to do so; but even if this opinion were not well founded, it could not be the interest of Denmark in the present question to offend the Governments of Austria and Prussia. I said that the Representatives of those Powers had both expressed great indifference on the subject of the answer which had been given to their proposals, observing that if their Governments might to a certain degree be disappointed at not obtaining the moral support of Denmark, it might eventually prove to be more advantageous for them to have their hands free, and to be entirely unembarrassed by Danish interests. I said that such expressions might proceed from personal feeling at having failed in a negotiation, but that the language of foreign Ministers might be generally supposed to reflect more or less the sentiments of their Governments, and it was certainly imprudent in Denmark to set herself wrong with the great Powers of Germany on the eve of a general war, the result of which might possibly affect the territorial arrangements of Europe; for I supposed his Excellency would agree with me that it was not to be expected, if all Europe took up arms to repress the aggressive policy of Russia and curtail her power, that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh would have much influence to exert in favour of its friends in the negotiations which would eventually take place for the reestablishment of peace.

His Excellency seemed somewhat disconcerted at my observations, and endeavoured to prove that the position of Denmark was perfectly understood and fully appreciated by Germany; so much so indeed, he said, was this the case that the Government had received no invitation from the smaller States of the Confederation to take part in the Conferences at Bamberg. He maintained therefore that their duty was to assume a passive part, and to be guided by the decision of the Diet; and on my asking whether the vote of Denmark was not to be given against an accession on the part of the Confederation to the Austro-Prussian Convention, and whether to give such a vote could be considered a passive part, he replied that the vote of Denmark would be withheld until it was clear how the other States intended to act, at least such I understood to be his Excellency's manner of explaining the matter.

The subject of Denmark's neutrality being thus brought under discussion, I ventured further to observe that the policy which the Government was pursuing at Frankfort appeared to me to be extremely shortsighted; because, if military operations should eventually take place on a great scale in the north of Europe, Denmark might find it impossible to avoid giving her support to them. I said that I was without any official information on this subject; that every one, however, formed his own opinions on coming events; and it seemed to me that if all the Great Powers became parties to a war undertaken in support of the general interests of Europe, and the Baltic Provinces of Russia were consequently invaded, Denmark could scarcely expect to maintain her neutrality.

M. de Bluhme asked whether I meant that troops could not be employed in the Baltic without positions being occupied in Denmark. I replied that I did not mean to express any opinion of the kind; but that if military operations were undertaken in the northern provinces of Russia, I thought, in the first place, it would only be natural for the Western Powers to look for the support

of the States whose interests would be most advanced by the success of their arms; and, in the second place, as neutrals might become enemies, it might perhaps, be considered prudent to secure the alliance of a State which, from its geographical position, might embarrass the operations of an army in the field.

M. de Bluhme then said that danger being apprehended from Denmark by an Anglo-French army acting against Russia, was out of the question; that the policy of Denmark was clearly defined; and that the same principles which regulate the conduct of the present Government would be adopted by their successors, if the King should think fit to change his Ministers; "that policy," his Excellency said, "was strict neutrality as long as it can be maintained; no war with Russia as long as it can be avoided; war with France and England, never!"

No one, he continued, could accuse the Government of not having hitherto acted a strictly neutral part, or of not having fulfilled their engagements in an honest and friendly spirit towards the Western Powers; and as he inquired whether I could controvert this statement, I said that, personally, I made no accusation against Denmark; but since he had put a direct question to me, I thought it right to state that I had heard, from several private sources, that it was generally believed in England that the country was entirely Russian in its feelings and sympathies. His Excellency said such an erroneous impression must have proceeded from the Augustenburg Princes, or other persons who bore ill-will to Denmark; and he asked whether I entertained such an opinion of Denmark, and whether I considered his conduct to be influenced by Russian sympathies. I replied that I would say nothing of himself, and that I felt assured the country was not Russian, but that he could not deny that some of his colleagues had strong Russian predilections. He at once said that I probably referred to Counts Molke and Criminil; and after insinuating that the former sometimes expressed opinions for the sake of argument, he added, that whatever might be the personal feelings of some members of the Government, their acts could not be found fault with, and that they would therefore expect to be treated with justice. As to justice, I said, he should remember that if military operations took place in the Baltic, the Great Powers might think it no more than just that the parties most interested in the success of these operations should assist in securing it. He then stated that a war with Russia would prove ruinous to Sweden, and that neither she nor Denmark had anything to fear from Russian ambition. I therefore reminded him that this view of the case was not quite consistent with information which I had received from him some months ago, respecting a hint thrown out by the Emperor, that with an offensive and defensive alliance between Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, he would be strong enough to close the Baltic; and I said if the Emperor really entertained such an opinion, the time might come when he would be able to impose upon his neighbours the alliance of which he now only spoke as an object to be desired.

M. de Bluhme replied that the war which had been undertaken for the defence of Turkey, was a sufficient guarantee against any Emperor of Russia, possessed of common sense, attempting to coerce the Scandinavian Powers. Which means in other words, I rejoined, that it is only by the protection of Europe that Sweden and Denmark are secure against Russian aggression; and if you acknowledge this, you ought not to be surprised, when the Great Powers are making immense sacrifices to obtain guarantees for the future rights and liberties of Europe, and the safety of the minor States, if they should think something might be done by Denmark for the common cause.

In the course of this conversation, I took great care to impress upon M. de Bluhme that I only expressed my own opinions, assuring him most positively that I had no instructions from your Lordship to hold such language to him. I said, that the information on which my opinions were founded, was at his reach as well as mine, and that I thought it would be wise for Danish statesmen to look before them, and admit the probability of their neutrality becoming impolitic, if not impossible.

His Excellency appeared much disconcerted notwithstanding my assurances, and I have no doubt he will think seriously on the subject of our conversation. He carefully abstained from stating what influence a declaration of war by Sweden might have upon his policy; but it may safely be assumed he will not abandon his present system without considerable pressure from abroad. Indeed, many

well-informed persons are of opinion, that if he were to decide on entering into an active alliance with the Western Powers, Counts Molke and Crimmil would retire from the Government—a step on their part which would not improbably lead to its entire dissolution, as it would be extremely difficult for M. de Bluhme to find colleagues to replace them.

These gentlemen and, I fear I must add, Prince Christian, from the moral influence which an heir to the throne cannot fail to exercise, will prove formidable opponents to the adoption of an anti-Russian policy by Denmark. General Hansen, the Minister of War, though not participating in their infatuated idolatry for the Emperor Nicholas, or faith in the eventual ascendancy of Russian power, is also supposed to entertain strong opinions against the expediency of acting in concert with the Western Powers, and to have an extreme repugnance to under- taking anything in common with the German Confederation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 266.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 19.)

(No. 226.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June* 14, 1854.

I REPORTED to your Lordship by my telegraphic despatch of the 7th instant, that Count Buol had been called by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor to Prague, in order that he might accompany him to the meeting which was to take place at Tetschen, on the frontier of Bohemia, with the King of Prussia.

This meeting took place on the 9th instant, when the King of Prussia and the King of Saxony were received by their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor and the Empress, at the residence of Count Thun, at Tetschen, near Bordenbach. The King of Prussia was accompanied by Baron Manteuffel, and Count Alvensleben had proceeded to meet His Majesty from Vienna.

Count Buol returned to Vienna on the evening of the 11th, and the Emperor, accompanied by Her Majesty the Empress, arrived here yesterday evening.

Count Buol has stated to me that the interview which took place between the Emperor and the King of Prussia had been satisfactory; that the determination to maintain the engagements which had lately been entered into between the two Governments, had been confirmed; and that the King of Prussia had fully adhered to the communication which had been transmitted on the 4th instant from the Court of St. Petersburgh, and had appointed his aide-de-camp, Colonel Manteuffel, to be the bearer of his sentiments to the Emperor Nicholas in support of that document.

A complete understanding had also been come to between their Majesties, as to the identic answer which was to be transmitted to the communications which had been received from the Governments of Central Germany who had lately been represented at Bamberg; and the despatch explaining the views of the two Governments had, during the meeting, been drawn up and approved.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 267.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 19.)

(No. 284.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June* 2, 1854.

I HAD an interview last night with the principal members of the Turkish Council. The Grand Vizier and heads of the chief departments were present, with the exception of Fethi Ahmet Pasha, Master of the Ordnance, who was unwell, and of Namick Pasha, Minister of Commerce, who was not invited. It was on my requisition that the meeting took place. The French Chargé d'Affaires obliged me by attending it.

The object of the Conference was common to us both. We had reason to complain of the slow and imperfect manner in which our applications on behalf of the auxiliary armies were carried into effect. It was necessary that a strong impression should be made on the Turkish Ministry, and I thought that by summoning the whole Cabinet, or at least all its principal members, to an interview with both Representatives, the object would be attained.

It was at Chekib Pasha's country-house that we met, and, in conformity with the inconvenient usages of the Ramazan, our meeting took place at night, and occupied nearly the whole of it.

I will not put your Lordship's patience to too severe a trial by entering into the particulars of our long conversation. It may suffice for every essential purpose to state that I urged the importance of union in the Councils of the Ministry, the duty, and indeed the necessity, of supporting Omer Pasha, their sole reliable commander, to the full extent of the Government's resources, of rendering his army as efficient as those resources would allow, and of giving every available facility and assistance to the auxiliary forces. This last indispensable point was pressed on the attention of the Turkish Ministers by M. Benedetti and myself with all the earnestness which its importance required at our hands.

We concurred, moreover, in advising that a considerable reinforcement of Artillery should be sent to Omer Pasha, that sufficient means for paying up the arrears of the army should be forthwith placed at his disposal, that clothes and shoes for the soldiers should also be forwarded in greater quantities, that a portion of Turkish troops and Artillery should be attached to each of the allied armies in Bulgaria, that the troops at Batoum should be transferred to Sbumla, with the exception of 1,000 or 2,000 for maintaining the lines of the place, that further supplies of all kinds should be dispatched without delay to the army at Kars, that the services of General Yusuf, Colonel Beatson and others should be accepted for training the irregular bands, and that a wider door should be opened for employing such foreign officers as were prepared and qualified to take command in the Sultan's army.

We further availed ourselves of the opportunity to insist upon the urgency of endeavouring to obtain, by means of a loan, the funds required for prosecuting the war with vigour; and, alluding to the late incursion of Montenegrins into the Herzegovina, we advised that immediate measures should be taken to restore tranquillity, and that, in case of need, the assistance of Austria should be solicited with the degree of confidence warranted and claimed by the present attitude of that Power.

We did not separate without reminding the Turkish Ministers of the advantage which they would not fail to derive from European science, applied to the establishment of a telegraphic wire, or semaphore, between Constantinople and Shumla, and to the construction of a flying bridge over the Bosphorus, a plan of which had already been submitted to the proper department.

The Turkish Ministers were finally reminded that, together with such things as were indispensable for making head against the common enemy, objects of a deeper and lasting importance claimed their most serious attention. The time, I remarked, was fully come when the Porte might with much advantage, dignity and opportuneness, complete its system of improvement, and realise the enlightened policy so frequently proclaimed by its Government. Whatever was now done by the Porte in that sense, either with respect to its Rayah population, or for the encouragement of trade and industry with the aid of foreign science, would tell with peculiar force not only on its own population, but on the nations in alliance with Turkey, and even on their common enemy. Its Christian subjects, who had resisted every excitement to rebellion, and who, notwithstanding their fidelity, had suffered so cruelly from the Sultan's irregular troops, had increased their claim to relief from unjust and degrading laws. No better return could be made to the Christian allies, whose fleets and armies were employed for the protection of Turkey, than a sincere adoption of measures calculated to secure their fellow-Christians in this country from injustice and oppression. Few things would tend more effectively to deprive Russia of every shadow of excuse for her unwarrantable aggression, and consequently to facilitate the restoration of peace, than a prompt abolition of those partial laws, or rather a complete removal of those flagrant abuses, under which, though in some respects relieved, the Rayah population in Turkey continued to groan.

The Ottoman Ministers, after ascertaining that our communications were terminated, retired, with our consent, to another apartment, where they consulted together as to the answers which it might be proper and competent for them to make. Returning after a short interval, they assured us that the Government was perfectly united; that they fully agreed in the importance of supporting Omer Pasha; that they would continue to send him all necessary supplies; that they had no complaints to make of him in a military sense; that a financial officer had been dispatched, as his Highness desired, to control the expenditure of the army, which had fallen into some entanglement; that measures were in operation for securing supplies and means of transport to the auxiliary armies; that a commission invested with the requisite authority for that purpose was appointed to fix itself at Varna; that seventy-five pieces of cannon, completely mounted, had been drawn from Sophia by Omer Pasha; that a regiment of four battalions, with its proportion of Cavalry and Artillery, was annexed to the two auxiliary armies; that more Artillery could not be forwarded without the assent of the Ordnance Department; that the Turkish troops attached to the two armies might, however, be increased hereafter; that the army at Batoom might be transferred to Bulgaria if the allied Generals thought it best; and that the army at Kars amounted, with the new Redif, to 35,000 men, and about 10,000 Irregulars.

On the subject of finance the Turkish Ministers announced their intention of sending two merchants of high respectability, Mr. Black, an Englishman, and M. Durand, a Frenchman, with all convenient expedition to Paris and London for the purpose of negotiating a loan to the amount of 3,500,000 on the best terms they could obtain, after consulting the respective Governments, and obtaining the formal sanction of the Turkish Representatives in those capitals to their agreement.

With respect to the incursion from Montenegro, they would give instructions to Korshid Pasha, the Governor of Bosnia, in the sense proposed, and authorize him, in case of need, to apply for military aid to the Austrian General in command on the neighbouring frontier.

They declared, moreover, their readiness to accept the services of any British or French officer willing and qualified to serve in the Sultan's army, and also of General Yusuf and Colonel Beatson for training the irregular bands or Bashi-Bazouks, with the concurrence of Omer Pasha, to whom those officers were referred.

Lastly, they professed their willingness to entertain the plans submitted to them for constructing telegraphs and a flying bridge.

So far all was satisfactory, if reliance could be placed on assurances accompanied or to be followed up with corresponding measures.

What remained was the question of reform, as applicable in part to the Rayahs, and in part to foreigners desirous of employing capital, industry, or science, in the Sultan's dominions.

On these very important matters there was little appearance of conviction or cordialty. The Ottoman Ministers spoke in general terms of their inclination to meet our wishes in so far as certain inherent difficulties would permit. They offered no objections; but their manner was cold and their expressions reserved.

Conceiving that a good opportunity would be lost if the Representatives of France and England appeared by their silence to acquiesce in so discouraging a reply, I did not hesitate to express my surprise at the coldness with which our benevolent and useful suggestions had been received. The discussion which naturally ensued was carried on with no small degree of warmth, and some occasional asperity, especially when reference to the atrocious and hitherto unpunished and unrepressed cruelties of the Bashi-Bozouks, induced the Grand Vizier to palliate their conduct by citing outrages of equal abomination committed by the brigands from Greece.

I disclaimed every thought of dictation on matters which belonged of right to the Sovereign; but I complained without reserve of those contradictions which were allowed to subsist between the professions of the Porte and its measures, between the tenour of its ordinances and the manner of their enforcement. I appealed in particular to those among the Ministers who recognized the abuses complained of and the importance, as well as the justice, of redressing them. In acknowledging the merits of that firman which had

recently placed the evidence of Rayahs on an equality with that of Mussulmans in criminal procedure, I lamented the slowness with which it had been promulgated and the still existing reluctance to follow it up with other indispensable measures, such as the abolition of the haratch — that odious, degrading ransom-tax — and the regulation of property on principles corresponding with the Sultan's proclamations and well-known personal disposition.

In this part of the Conference, as well as in those which preceded, I am happy to acknowledge the frank and judicious cooperation of M. Benedetti; and although we did not succeed in obtaining any additional assurances of a positive nature, it is not easy to believe that our arguments, founded as they were in truth and inspired by friendly sentiments, were entirely thrown away, or that the concurrent recommendation of France and England, speaking through us, could leave no trace on minds open at least to the impressions of danger and prudence, if not, as largely as we could wish, to the suggestions of humanity, justice, and sound administrative policy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 268.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 286.)

Constantinople, June 5, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the terms of your Lordship's instruction No. 268 of this year, I directed Mr. Pisani to express to Reshid Pasha the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the Turkish army at Kars should be placed under the command of General Guyon. His Highness replied that he thought it would be difficult for the Porte to accede to that suggestion, but he advised M. Pisani to submit your Lordship's recommendation to the Seraskier.

M. Pisani waited in consequence, by my direction, on that Minister, and also on the Grand Vizier. Both the one and the other declined, with expressions of regret, to promote General Guyon to the command of the army at Kars. They grounded their refusal on want of confidence in the General's capacity for carrying out the duties of so important a charge.

M. Pisani's report is inclosed herewith in original.

It is observable that if the Turkish Ministers have declined the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government in the present instance, they have done so on grounds which would not preclude their consent to a similar suggestion in favour of some foreign commander entitled, in their opinion, to more confidence in point of ability and experience.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 268.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, June 4, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Excellency's verbal instruction of this day, I communicated to the Grand Vizier, to Reshid Pasha, as well as to the Seraskier, Lord Clarendon's despatch No. 268 of the 23rd ultimo, which recommends that the command of the army at Kars should be given to General Guyon.

These three Ministers observed that they regret they cannot comply with the Earl of Clarendon's request, not having sufficient confidence in this officer, and considering him unequal to the task of Commander-in-chief. The Grand Vizier furthermore added, that from the personal knowledge he had of General Guyon, who served under him in Syria, he could not take upon himself the responsibility of confiding to him such an important command.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 269.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 287.)

Constantinople, June 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I LEARN from the Austrian Internuncio, and also from Reshid Pasha, that the correspondence, such as I have already sent it in copy to your Lordship, which has passed between them relative to the entrance, if needed, of Austrian troops into Turkey from the side of Dalmatia, is regarded by both parties as complete.

Agreeably to the advice which I have offered to Reshid Pasha and his colleagues, as well by myself as in concert with the French Chargé d'Affaires, instructions are destined for the Pasha of Bosnia; and according to their tenour, General Mamula will be invited, if necessary, to cross the frontier and act against the marauders from Montenegro.

Instructions for concluding a Convention preparatory to the eventual entrance of Austrian troops into the Principalities are expected by Baron Bruck.

That Minister informs me that orders had been received at Bucharest from St. Petersburgh, for the march of the Russian troops in that quarter eastward; and that they were subsequently countermanded, on the ground of those troops being wanted to make head against any hostile force which might chance to threaten them.

I learn from the same authority, though in the guise of private conversation, that although the Cabinet of Vienna would not, in case of a negotiation between Russia and the Porte, be contented with the *status quo ante bellum*, yet the aim at improvement does not appear to extend beyond the Danube, and its deliverance from the impediments laid by Russia on the free navigation of that river, particularly as regards Sulina and the quarantine establishment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 270.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 347.)

Berlin, June 16, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MEUSEBACH, who has lately returned from the Danubian Principalities, called upon me yesterday, and I endeavoured to learn his impressions as to the present amount and position of the Russian forces which have invaded Turkey, and are now acting near the Danube.

My first object was to hear what he believed of the rumour which has been current for some days, that Prince Paskiewitch had determined on removing his head-quarters to Jassy, and he seemed to think it might be so, and that the plan of the campaign might be changed in consequence of the threatening attitude of Austria; but he observed that the Prussian Government had not yet received sufficiently well-founded intelligence to form any positive opinions on the subject, and that it was not impossible but that the journey of Prince Paskiewitch was in consequence of an attack of fever from which he was suffering; that, however, up to the present moment there was no reason to believe that anything had occurred which could be considered as the precursor of a retreat from the Danube.

Baron Meusebach afterwards gave me the following account of the present effective force of the Russians on the Danube and in the Dobrudscha, which he considers to amount in round numbers to something over 100,000 men.

He said their force in the Principalities consisted of 137 battalions, or 108,000 Infantry; 156 squadrons of Cavalry, at 140 each; 21,800 horses;

between 5,000 and 6,000 Cossacks; 408 pieces of Fort Artillery; 60 pieces of Horse Artillery; and 24 pieces of Siege Artillery.

This, he said, was the force acting near and within reach of the Danube; and that the army of reserve stationed beyond the Pruth was composed chiefly of recruits, and amounted to about 350,000 men.

Baron Meusebach said that the Russian flotilla on the Danube consisted of two steamers, the "Pruth," and the "Ordinaretz," each armed with four 36-pounder carronades. At Silistria there were six gun-boats armed with three 24-pounder carronades each, and four falconets, and that there were ten or twelve more boats, of the same size, and similarly armed, lower down the Danube.

With regard to the condition and *morale* of the Russian troops, Baron Meusebach was disinclined to say much on this our first interview, but I shall hope to obtain further details from him, and shall not fail to report them to your Lordship without loss of time; but he seems to have no great opinion of the Russian soldier, except as to his patience and powers of endurance. He said that at the commencement of the campaign their losses from sickness had been comparatively trifling, but that men and horses were suffering greatly at this moment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 271.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 306.)

Constantinople, June 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in copy, a despatch just received from Admiral Dundas at Varna.

The Admiral complains of inattention to the Turkish Admiral's requisition, addressed, I presume, to the Porte, at the urgent request of Admiral Hamelin and himself, for troops to maintain possession of Redoute-Kaleh.

Much as I regret their disappointment, I think it right to record that no application of the kind has been made, either through this Embassy or with its knowledge. I shall, nevertheless, hasten to bring the matter before the Turkish Cabinet with the least possible delay.

I am at a loss to conjecture what is meant by the concluding paragraph of Admiral Dundas's despatch, but I propose to remove all doubts by inquiry.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 271.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Furious," Varna, June 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE just received a despatch from Captain Dacres, of Her Majesty's ship "Sanspareil," in which he informs me a body of 6,000 Russians are in front of Redoute-Kaleh; he has done all that is possible to secure the place, but troops are required, and the Turkish Government have never answered to the requisition made by Admiral Ahmed Pasha (at the urgent request of Admiral Hamelin and myself), that if troops could not be spared from Constantinople, a few hundred from Sinope, Trebizond, &c., might be ordered to embark when ships called for them.

This delay may cause the loss of Redoute-Kaleh, which is a post much

valued by Russia, and which Selim Pasha attaches great importance to. On my return to Baltchik, I will endeavour to get Ahmed Pasha to send some of his people, trained to musketry, on board one or two of the Turkish vessels and proceed to Redoute-Kaleh; but I despair of his doing anything without orders from Constantinople.

Admiral Hamelin and I both regret that the Turkish fleet was not stationed as we first recommended, when our opinion was asked.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 272.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 307.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 10, 1854.*

PART of the French division commanded by Prince Napoleon is arrived here. The Prince himself, if not actually arrived, is expected from day to day.

I learn from Lord Raglan, that Marshal St. Arnaud, who has been to Varna, returned this morning, and that he is now prepared, as it appears, to advance his troops beyond the Balkan at once, according to the original plan.

Another division of Her Majesty's army is to proceed to Bulgaria in three or four days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 273.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 347.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 21, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 284 of the 2nd instant, reporting what passed in a Conference which you and the French Chargé d'Affaires held with the principal members of the Sultan's Government, on the night of the 1st of June; and I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings on that occasion, and the able manner in which you urged upon the Turkish Ministers the several points which, as you will learn by my recent despatches, have latterly engaged the anxious attention of Her Majesty's Government.

It is hardly necessary to point out to your Excellency that the promises you have received are no guarantee for their performance, and that unceasing vigilance will be required in order to secure due attention to the service of the Sultan and his allies.

If the Turkish Ministers were animated by a proper spirit they would be aware that reforms and relaxations in favour of the Rayahs would be well received by Christian Europe, and viewed as the best return that the Porte could offer for the great sacrifices made by the allies in behalf of the Sultan, at the same time that it would deprive Russia of all pretext for continuing the war and all claim to interference at the conclusion of peace.

Some allowance must, however, be made for the ignorance and fanaticism of the people, and the fear of abating the national enthusiasm that the Ministers may probably entertain.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, while desiring that the Porte should be informed of their dissatisfaction at the manner in which your Excellency's

suggestions on this important subject were received, leave it entirely to your judgment and discretion as to whether it should be further and authoritatively pressed at this moment.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 274.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 348.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 21, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 286 of the 5th of June, notifying the refusal of the Porte to appoint General Guyon to the command of the Turkish army at Kars, I have to observe that, considering who the men are that have hitherto been appointed to the command of the army at Kars, and that they have been distinguished only for their rapacity and cowardice, and the demoralization of their forces, Her Majesty's Government can only consider the refusal to promote General Guyon as a proof that the same deplorable system is to be persisted in, unless some officer of greater capacity, and really more deserving of confidence, be forthwith appointed.

Her Majesty's Government have no predilection in favour of General Guyon, but they have a desire and a right to insist that the army at Kars, with which the allies may shortly have to cooperate, shall not, as hitherto, be abandoned to an incompetent General, and be found in a disorganized and useless condition.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 275.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir J. Milbanke.

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 21, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government have read with extreme surprise the document drawn up by M. von de Pfordten and presented to the Conference at Bamberg, in which the hostility of Bavaria to England and France is recorded in terms not to be mistaken or forgotten.

Her Majesty's Government have no claim and no desire to interfere with the undoubted right of the German Powers to deliberate and decide upon their own affairs, nor do they complain, however much they may regret, that those Powers should constitute themselves the advocates of Russian policy; but Her Majesty's Government do complain, and they resent the manner in which the Bamberg Conference has been invited by the Bavarian Minister to interfere in matters of which it was not competent to judge, and to prescribe conditions to England and France respecting the war in which they have been compelled to engage by the unjust and aggressive policy of Russia.

This war may become general; it may be of long duration; it may entail a great European crisis; during the war there is little doubt that Austria will be closely united with England and France, and at its conclusion it may become the duty of those Powers to take measures for rendering the opposition they now meet with from the German Courts harmless hereafter.

It is for M. von der Pfordten to consider whether the course he is now pursuing will promote the future interests of Bavaria, or tend to consolidate the Bavarian dynasty on the throne of Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 276.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Forbes.

(No. 24.)

Foreign Office, June 21, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 36 of the 15th instant, and I have reason to believe that the information contained therein is correct, and that the Governments represented at Bamberg will receive the answer that befits their ill-advised interference.

I have to instruct you to inform M. de Beust that Her Majesty's Government having the welfare of Saxony sincerely at heart, cannot but regret that in her the policy of Russia should find a strenuous advocate, for that policy is now, as it always has been, to sow dissension in Germany, and to excite terror of revolution among the German Powers; but this phantom has been dispelled by the events of the last few months. True it is that at the commencement of the war between Russia and Turkey, the enemies of order were hopeful, and great preparations were made for carrying out their schemes. Their hopes, however, were founded on the conviction that the two great German Powers would range themselves on the side of Russia; but now that Austria is found in close alliance with England and France, and acting in accordance with public opinion, the disappointment of the revolutionary party is complete and notorious; they admit the total failure of their schemes, and Europe has never been in less danger from revolution than at the present moment.

Whatever danger of this kind may exist, is solely caused by Russia, whose agents in Greece and Hungary and elsewhere are endeavouring to promote discontent and insurrection, and are pursuing the course which the Emperor has always denounced as criminal in the highest degree, and against which his efforts were hitherto supposed to have been honestly directed.

It is strange that this tortuous policy and the reckless ambition which does not hesitate to plunge Europe in all the horrors of war, should be admired and supported by any German Powers; but it is deeply to be deplored that those Powers should sacrifice German interests to Russian intrigues, and be blind to the fact that in a great European crisis all minor jealousies should be laid aside, and that union and decision will best secure domestic tranquillity and the respect of foreign Powers.

The course that Austria has now adopted is founded upon a wise consideration of her own interests; they cannot be at variance with the interests of Germany, and the opposition offered to Austria by the Conference at Bamberg, is therefore on every account ill advised, because, however unavailing, it has been injurious to Germany by displaying the weakness of disunion, and it will be remembered hereafter and will be found an impediment to that greater freedom of action which the minor German Powers are naturally desirous of obtaining.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—You will communicate this despatch to M. de Beust.

No. 277.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 22.)

Vienna, June 22, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

BARON BRUCK, writing from Constantinople on the 15th, informs Count Buol of the signature of the Convention between Austria and the Porte for the eventual occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia. This Convention, transmitted by post, will arrive in Vienna on the 24th. Part of the Duke of Cambridge's Division left Scutari for Varna on the 13th. Lord Raglan was expected to proceed thither on the evening of the 15th.

No. 278.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 353.)

Foreign Office, June 22, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 298 of the 10th of June, inclosing a draft of projected Treaty between Austria and the Porte, and the copy of an instruction to Baron de Bruck from Count Buol, respecting the eventual occupation of the Principalities by an Austrian army, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which you adopted in advising the Turkish Ministers to accept that draft of Treaty.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 279.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 782.)

Paris, June 22, 1854.

My Lord,

YESTERDAY Count Hatzfeldt communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the despatch dated the 12th instant, by which the Prussian Government announced to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh their adhesion to the demand made on the 3rd instant by Austria, that the Russian troops should quit the Principalities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed the satisfaction at the general contents of this despatch, provided always that the paragraph alluding to the circumscription of the war within certain limits was to be considered in the light of a desire expressed by the Prussian Government, and not of a condition attempted to be imposed upon the allies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 280.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 234.)

Vienna, June 20, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING learnt from Baron Bourqueney that he had communicated a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Buol which commented upon the despatch that that Minister had addressed on the 3rd instant to Count Esterhazy at St. Petersburgh, as well as upon the confidential despatch which accompanied it, and having also been informed by Count Buol that he had received a despatch from Count Colloredo which reported the language your Lordship had held to him upon these documents, I thought I should best fulfil your Lordship's wishes by reading to Count Buol your despatch No. 205 of the 13th instant, in which you detail the substance of that conversation.

Upon your Lordship's first remark to Count Colloredo that the suggestions which Count Esterhazy had been instructed to submit to Count Nesselrode would probably be used by Russia to detach Austria from England and France, and that Austria might so be embarrassed by the acceptance of proposals originating with herself, Count Buol stated that Count Esterhazy was not instructed to make those suggestions to Count Nesselrode unless the Chancellor should put forward any proposals of a nature not likely to be accepted by the allies; and as evidence that Count Esterhazy had understood this intention with regard to the additional document, he does not even mention it in the report he makes to Count Buol of having communicated to Count Nesselrode the ostensible despatch.

With regard to your Lordship's statement that these suggestions were proposals originating with Austria, Count Buol remarked that he could not in any way consider them in that light; that they were not proposals, but suggestions, as to the mode in which the Emperor Nicholas might consider the resolution which the four Powers had taken with respect to the Christians in Turkey, accompanied by a notice that any concession His Majesty should make as to the evacuation of the Principalities should not be accompanied by the demand of any corresponding concession on the part of England or France; but Count Buol stated these suggestions were neither binding upon Austria nor upon her allies, they were only to be presented to Count Nesselrode in case Count Esterhazy was satisfied it was the intention of the Russian Government to propose a negotiation, after the principle of the evacuation of the Principalities had been admitted; and if that negotiation was so proposed the terms of it would be submitted to the allies, would be discussed by them in common, and there was nothing in the suggestions which could divert the Austrian Government from the fixed purpose they proposed to themselves of acting in perfect concert with the allies in any decision which should be taken upon the proposals which might be made to them.

With regard to the suggestion that the Russian forces might retire behind the Pruth, on condition that neither the Turkish nor the allied armies advanced north of the Danube, Count Buol stated that he had mentioned this merely as a condition which he conceived it would be natural to make, and equally natural for the allies to comply with; for he could not suppose that it could be expected that an army engaging to evacuate a considerable extent of territory, should be exposed, during this operation, to be followed by a hostile force and to be harassed and pursued during the whole of its movement.

What Count Buol considered it was natural for both parties to propose in the present instance, and which seemed already to have been accepted by the Government of the Sultan, was that the Austrian army should occupy the positions as they were abandoned by the Russian forces, replacing successively (as the portions of territory were evacuated) the legitimate authorities, and thus securing the order and tranquil government of the country. Count Buol begged me to request your Lordship to believe, that he made this suggestion with no intention whatever of calling upon the other allied Powers to adhere to it; that he had considered it as the most likely mode of carrying out a most difficult arrangement, and that it was with the view of allowing the Governments of England and France greater liberty in their decision with regard to it, that he did not previously submit it to them, but if any other suggestion was proposed by the other Powers he was perfectly ready to consider it, and to adopt it, if found to be more advantageous. There could therefore be no possible reason for apprehending, that upon the rejection of this proposal, Austria would take part with Russia, or charge herself with the responsibility of the continued occupation of the Principalities and all the consequences it might entail.

With respect to the suggestion, that after the evacuation of the Principalities a negotiation for peace might be resumed in a Congress, Count Buol conceived that as it neither engaged Austria, and certainly not her allies, to accept any proposal to this effect which might be made by Russia, it was simply the suggestion of a mode of proceeding which, at some time or other, must take place, and if it was attended to, it would furnish the allied Governments with the opportunity of replying to whatever proposals were made, by the declaration of those engagements and stipulations upon which they would consent to treat.

With respect to the conditions of peace, Count Buol admitted that since the declaration of war by England and France, by which these Powers had become principals in the contest, the former state of things had altogether changed; the Protocols, by which this change of position amongst the allies had already been signalised, had defined the objects for which the alliance was continued, and they were truly described by your Lordship, as being destined to secure the peace of Europe on a lasting foundation, and it would rest with the allies to reject any proposals which they did not consider as calculated to secure that object.

The stipulations by which this object was to be obtained would be considered, whenever (after the evacuation of the Principalities had taken place) any proposal was made by Russia for a negotiation. It would seem impossible to

decide upon them beforehand, and more particularly in the uncertainty as to whether the Emperor Nicholas would consent to the evacuation of the Principalities or would propose to negotiate. If these objects were not attained, a totally new state of relations among the allies as to their position towards Russia would be created, which must naturally affect the conditions of any negotiation which might hereafter be undertaken; even the state of war, which at present existed, might at any moment change the nature of the stipulations which would be required or consented to.

The observations which your Lordship made in your conversation with Count Colloredo, both as to the enormous army which Russia might still keep on foot, and as to the additions which she might make to her navy, whereby an increased facility of transporting troops might be acquired, as well as the claim put forward by M. Drouyn de Lhuys that France should be indemnified for the expenses of the war, were all of them objects of great interest to obtain; but Count Buol stated they must be fought for, and secured by success, and until the principal Powers who had taken part in the war had engaged in action, or had obtained those successes, it might be premature to discuss the terms of the concessions which might be required.

While giving this opinion Count Buol stated that he desired in no way to prejudge any pretensions which might, under the various circumstances which it was probable, would arise, be brought forward, he foresaw great difficulties in obtaining the reimbursement of the expenses of the war; but he should enter into any negotiation which was proposed with the firm purpose of maintaining every engagement he had taken, and of adhering to the alliance which, to the great advantage of those Governments which were parties to it, was happily established.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 281.

Report respecting the Feeling towards the Russians in Bulgaria.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, June 24.)

Bucharest, May 21, 1854.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Warsaw has suddenly issued, from Kalafat, a summons to the inhabitants of Bulgaria, which seems to have been published immediately after the investment of Silistria.

This summons was printed in Bulgarian only, and not in Russian also, as the usage has been hitherto. I have the honour to inclose to your Excellency a French translation. The person who gave this to me had the printed Bulgarian text before him, and he had thus an opportunity of making this version, which is more literal than elegant.

It is plain from this that the present war is represented as one of religion, and that Russia wishes for the cooperation of the orthodox Bulgarians, in order to effect their speedy liberation from the hereditary foe to the Christians.

The same motive was alleged by Prince Paskiewitch, when he asked the Conseil Administratif here, the day before yesterday, to place the Wallachian soldiery at his disposal. This demand met with a strong resistance, not indeed in the Conseil Administratif, but in the body of the officers, and among the men generally. The former talked of resignation, the latter of desertion. In order to prevent mutiny, like that of the border-watch of Giurgevo and Turun Mogurelli, where the people, notwithstanding that every fifth man had been subjected to military punishment for refusing to serve, immediately threw away their arms and went over to the Turks, Baron Budberg has made known this day to the Great Vornick that the Field-Marshal does not insist upon the soldiers standing before the enemy with the Russian troops beyond the Danube, but only that they do garrison duty.

As for other matters, I learn from Constantine Csokau, who, as a farmer of the Customs' dues here, is in close connection with Bulgarians, that no symptoms of a popular rising in favour of the Russians have hitherto been perceptible. Much as they wish to be free from the Turkish yoke, they would

prefer any other Christian liberator to the Russians, whose harsh conduct, which they have suffered from in previous invasions, is yet fresh in their memory. The Bulgarians residing in Wallachia as colonists—of whom there are about 300,000 or 400,000—also find that by the long sojourn of the armies in Wallachia, they too are reduced to beggary, and they do not cease to warn their brethren on the other side against a similar fate.

As the means of conveyance are rare in Bulgaria, carriages from this side have been compelled to go over there. Many drivers left their vehicles, and of a greater number the carriages are broken, and the cattle dead. These unhappy people were seen with packs on their backs, in which they were bringing back the little iron-work of their broken carriages, begging their way from the Danube.

Such scenes, unhappily, increase from day to day, and are the more distressing inasmuch as it is known that the poorest of them all find their families as completely deprived of all as they are themselves. The inhabitants of Little Wallachia are therefore considered lucky; the Turks, they say, force nobody from his house; take nothing without paying ready money for it; do not prevent field-labour; and drive neither man nor beast to foreign lands, where they meet all the perils of war, without troubling themselves for their maintenance, or return home again.

The reproach is made against the Russians that they, notwithstanding all the great sacrifices made for them, all the complaisance and politeness shown to them, even to the verge of servility, yet complain that attempts are made to cheat and deceive them; and that whenever any one makes a complaint, however well founded, or ventures on disapproval, he is threatened at once with arrest, corporal punishment, and exile. Neither rank nor age protects the most honourable Boyard from open neglects, insults, suspicion, and unfounded reproaches.

The general feeling is, therefore, one of irritation, and wholly hostile to the Russians, which is dangerous for the army even, so that a fear is manifested of confessing the evacuation of the Principalities. For although Baron Budberg, eight days ago, solemnly assured the whole of the Boyards, "that Little Wallachia would be evacuated for a short time only, and Great Wallachia not at all," yet it is plainly seen that an ostentatious retirement is commenced, which every one is now able to see already.

It is seen, for instance, that General Liprandi has dispatched all the provisions from Slatina to Fokschani, keeping back only just so much as he wanted for twelve days' subsistence; and further, that the Commissariat here goes to Jassy; that the sick and wounded are also conveyed there; that the provisions recently called for are to be delivered in at Buseo and Fokschani; that the districts lying on this side of Bucharest have but little provision; and that the divisions still remaining here could not be provided without the utmost exertion, and for a short time only.

Everything required for the army before Silistria must be brought from Wallachia, for very little comes from Moldavia and Bessarabia, barely sufficient for the troops engaged in the Dobrudscha. Prince Paskiewitch collects troops and provisions, where he wishes to strike a blow, in such masses that one is tempted to assume that he doubts the courage of the army, or that his genius consists in vanquishing only by means of numerical superiority.

There are now, in fact, 90,000 bayonets beyond the Danube, in the district of Silistria, which, according to Russian reports, has only 17,000 or 18,000 men in garrison altogether; and notwithstanding this, he has put a stop to the siege until he can be strengthened by fresh succours, and even by Staurolores [fighters for the faith?], or perhaps the Wallachian militia.

But if, after the capture of Silistria, the troops should be obliged to march westward along the Danube, there is nothing left for him to feed them with but the provisions which are brought on waggons, with incredible labour, to Kalarash and Oltenitza; and this will inevitably occasion fresh tortures on the peasantry, and the characteristic frauds of the Russian management of matters.

Receive, &c.

Inclosure in No. 281.

Address.

Envers les co-religionnaires et mes frères qui habitent les Provinces Turques.

D'APRES la volonté de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, je suis entré dans le pays habité par vous avec l'invincible et aimée de Dieu armée, pas comme ennemi, pas comme conquérant, mais avec la croix dans les mains et le saint étendard, du but qui plait à Dieu et qui nous amène dans le combat.

Le seul but de mon fidèle envers Dieu et miséricordieux Empereur est pour protéger l'Eglise de Jésus-Christ, et pour vous protéger aussi fils de la même religion orthodoxe, qui êtes foulés par ces Turcs enragés.

Plus d'une fois le sang Russe a coulé pour vous, et avec la sainte bénédiction il n'a pas coulé en vain; de ce même sang sont marqués les droits acquis par quelques-uns de vos frères, dont la vie n'était pas oppressée comme la vôtre. Enfin, le temps est venu aussi pour vous autres Chrétiens d'acquérir les mêmes droits en action.

Qu'il soit connu à chacun parmi vous que la Russie n'a pas d'autre but que de protéger le salut de l'Eglise, notre mère commune, et son assistance, et d'empêcher l'attaque et l'oppression des autres, d'après leur volonté.

Frères! au nom de Jésus-Christ, qui a ressuscité pour le salut de l'humanité, venez avec nous au combat général, qui est pour la foi, pour nos droits. L'action est sainte, Dieu est avec nous, et celui-ci nous aide.

(Signé) GENERAL FELD-MARECHAL PRINCE DE VARSOVIE.
COMTE PASKIEWICZ ERIVANSKY.

No. 282.

Report respecting the apprehended Peasant Insurrection in Lesser Wallachia.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, June 24.)

(Translation.) *Bucharest, June 7, 1854.*

BY the telegraphic despatch of the 11th ultimo, Z 52, and by the subsequent report of the 26th, Z 76, I had the honour to inform your Excellency that men of the insurrectionary party had entered Little Wallachia with the Turkish troops, and their efforts were to instil socialistic ideas into the country people; also that this circumstance had given the greatest umbrage to the Boyards.

In that report I reserved for another inquiry whether, and to what extent, the Turkish Commanders protect these principles, and the apostles who propagate them.

In the course of the last week very alarming accounts have come unfortunately from Little Wallachia. The landholders apprehend, if not a peasant-war, at least a definite and determined refusal of the compulsory and other services of their peasants. The farmers and managers have fled from some districts of Little Wallachia, in fear of ill-usage from the peasantry. They stated that neither payments in kind nor money payments could be obtained from them by other than forcible means. They had not only declared the fields and meadows assigned to them by the recent landlord and peasant regulations to be their own unburthened property, but they said that the payments in kind and money, promised by way of compensation to the landlords, had been unjustly imposed upon them, and they were determined to liberate themselves from burdens unjustly imposed.

The question as to the support or aid afforded by the Ottoman Commanders to this insurrection has every appearance of being answered in the affirmative, for the proclamations and notices are circulated, together with the "Journal of Krajova," under their eyes.

In regard to the tendency of this journal, I have the honour to remark that it is very injurious, because it appeals to passions which, when once roused, it may be difficult to appease.

In order to tranquillize the rich, and all those who have anything to lose, it

would be expedient to give a serious warning to Herr Charalambi, the publisher of the "Journal of Krajova," through Selim Pasha, that, under the present exceptional circumstances, a double degree of moderation ought to predominate in his editorial duty.

Receive, &c.

No. 283.

Reply to the Bamberg Answer to the Invitation to the German Courts to adhere to the Austro-Prussian Treaty.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, June 24.)

Vienna, June 16, 1854.

(Translation.)

YOUR , through the despatch of the instant, has transmitted a note, in which the Government has given its answer to our invitation to join the offensive and defensive alliance concluded on the 20th April last between Austria and Prussia.

We have made no delay in carefully considering the statements made in that note, and in deliberating upon it, together with the Prussian Cabinet; more especially as a similar view of the state of things lies at the bottom of the recent deliberations of the other German Governments. After having had the gratification of assuring ourselves that our views were in accordance with those of Prussia, I am directed by His Majesty the Emperor, &c. to communicate to your the following observations, in order that they may be brought to the knowledge of the Government.

His Majesty has been most sincerely gratified to perceive not only that his German Confederates have been satisfied with the Convention made between Austria and Prussia, in which their accordance upon so serious a complication has found its expression, but also that they approve of that point of view which makes the interests and obligations of Germany available beyond the limits the Confederation.

In this conviction the Government has expressed to us its wish that an address should be made to the Federal Assembly, inviting the accession of the whole body; and Austria and Prussia have already unmistakeably made known their readiness to do this eventually. But both the High Courts agree in the opinion that, by Article XI of the Act of Federation, individual German Courts have the right to accede to the alliance tendered to them; and the two Cabinets, in consequence, proceeded forthwith to make such tender, partly that they might thus be enabled to anticipate the result of a later proposition to the whole Confederation, and partly, if such proposition should not ultimately be made, that they might act in accordance with such States as decided upon acceding, as has in fact been done by several Governments.

The Government will thus understand that there is no practical difficulty in this formal side of the question, and the only thing to be done appears to be this—to secure a sufficient agreement of opinion upon the question itself, in order to draw up a federative resolution.

In reference to this, the first observation to be made is, that according to the view of the Government, the invitation to evacuate the Principalities, as provided in the Additional Article, was to be completed by the proposal to put a stop simultaneously to the land and sea operations, and therefore by a withdrawal on the part of the other Powers. The Government will certainly have no doubt that a withdrawal from the theatre of war by all parties would be in accordance with the wishes and efforts of the two German Powers, and has really been kept in view by them, as far as it appeared practicable at the time, as will be seen from the accompanying copies of despatches sent to St. Petersburgh, in the tenour of the resolution of the Additional Article; one from Austria, and the other, in aid of the same, from Prussia.

We hold fast by the hope that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will, in his wisdom, appreciate the address of his ancient allies, which is the expression of their deep convictions, and that he will put them, by his reply, in a condition to effect a pacific understanding between the belligerent Powers; and it is hardly

necessary to observe, looking to the object of the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, that his reply will not only undergo their conscientious examination, but that they will then make it their duty to treat in confiding unison with those German Governments also who shall have acceded to the alliance, and eventually with the Federal Assembly, in so far as it shall have declared its adhesion.

In reference to the supposition expressed by the Government in connection herewith, that the Confederation in the further negotiations will be represented in due form as a party to the alliance, the two Courts willingly respond to this supposition, the realisation of which certainly does not depend on them only, so far as possible under the circumstances; they will, at all events, strictly fulfil the precept of Article XLIX of the Vienna Resolution.

The Imperial Cabinet would cherish the hope that the Government will feel itself induced, by the above-given explanations, to evince at once, by an unreserved and complete adhesion to the offensive and defensive alliance concluded between Austria and Prussia, its often-shown confidence in these two Powers, and its readiness to make sacrifices for the patriotic interests which it recognizes. The Government in its note accurately depicts the objects it wishes Germany to attain; and it enumerates among them, the entire freedom of the trade and navigation of the Danube, and an effectual protection to the Christian populations living under Turkish rule, to be secured by all parties. The Government will certainly not shut itself from the conviction that the more powerfully, unanimously, and promptly, the members of the German Confederation unite together for the success of those objects, the more surely can Germany look for their attainment.

The lively interest testified by the Government in the maintenance of the Kingdom of Greece in its position as secured by Treaties, is the more agreeable to His Majesty the Emperor, &c., inasmuch as he sincerely shares in this interest, and looks upon it as inseparably united with the maintenance of the territorial condition of the East.

It will be especially satisfactory to us, to be very soon assured, by the answer of the Government to the present communication, that its Representative in the Federal Assembly will be empowered to vote without reserve for the adhesion of the Confederation to the alliance of the 20th of April, as we should not, without the deepest regret, renounce the hope of seeing the work of union completed by a Federal resolution, and of securing that influence which belongs to it, to the body thus powerfully constituted as an entire whole. But if we must renounce this hope, the proposal to accede to the alliance will naturally not be moved in the Federal Assembly; and Austria and Prussia would then be in a condition to come to an understanding with those Governments only which have either already acceded as parties to it, or will hereafter do so.

Your is empowered to communicate to a copy of the present communication.

Receive, &c.

No. 284.

Review and Remarks on the Wishes of the Bamberg Conference.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, June 24.)

Vienna, June 17, 1854.

(Translation.)

OUR reply to the joint note drawn up at Bamberg, evinces the high value which we put upon a sincere understanding. We agree to the greater part of the wishes of our fellow federalists, in so far as they are compatible with the spirit of the alliance, the adoption of which was the point in discussion, and with the objects joined thereto.

It is hoped that the Governments will clearly understand the grounds on which it was especially inadmissible to entertain the proposition that simultaneously with the demand made to Russia, that the Principalities should be evacuated, the Western Powers should be required to refrain from hostilities by

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

sea and land, and consequently to withdraw from the scene. To make such a demand of France and England, would be to abandon the position we hold through our share in the affairs of Europe, and our alliance with Prussia. It would be putting Germany in the alternative; either, to subordinate the preservation of her interest in the East to the resolves of her Western neighbours, or to enter into a conflict with the naval Powers, which could not be justified. It would be either allowing Russia to possess the Danubian territory for an indefinite period, or else it would be the assumption of an armed mediation for peace, for which every basis admitted by the Law of Nations would be wanting to us.

Let us first ask the question, can the co-existence of these two wishes be logically maintained?

Russia has taken possession of the Principalities, with the declaration that she holds them as a security until Turkey shall accede to her demands. On the other hand, Turkey, after fruitless attempts to cause them to be evacuated by peaceful representations, has looked upon this possession as a *casus belli*; she has called upon her allies; the troops of the Western Powers, are now in the Turkish territories under this character; their fleets are in waters which no Treaty debars them from navigating; and a definite term is settled by agreement, for the return of the auxiliary troops after the conclusion of peace.

What analogy can we see here between the two cases? what logic is there in requiring one and the same thing from the uninvited intruder and the invited ally?

How, in fact, could this be done by Austria, whose eventual cooperation has just been accepted by Turkey for her Adriatic Provinces, and who offers her aid to her, also, for the maintenance of her sovereignty in the Danubian Principalities?

Let us further see what right we have to make such a demand on the naval Powers on the occasion of our demand upon Russia?

We ground our conduct in St. Petersburgh upon our own wants, we see our own interests touched. How can we now require a third party to give a compensation for what is granted to us? How can we demand of belligerent Powers, so long as we contract no obligations towards them and remain ourselves at peace, that they should limit the sphere of their warlike operations, in order that their opponents may be credited on account of a demand which we have put forth?

We further ask, is there any probability that such demands would be listened to?

France and England have made great efforts to arrive at the theatre of war. Will they, because Germany considers it to be for her interest, accept a truce, the advantages of which would obviously be on the side of Russia? Would they assent to a withdrawal, so long as they have no reasonable guarantees that a peace will be obtained in some measure commensurate with their claims?

But, finally, could we really consider the mere withdrawal of the naval Powers as securing the general interests at the same time with those of Germany? We wish the trade of the Danube to be made safe, crying abuses to be removed; we want an arrangement which may insure us, in some measure, from a repetition of such encroachments. Now, could we expect such results from a mere magnanimous resolve of Russia? Should we really facilitate this by the effected withdrawal of the French and English troops and fleets?

It appears from what we have stated here, that it is impossible for us to assume the principle of reciprocity in the way in which it seems to be understood from the note of the Central States. But, although we certainly could not allow ourselves to make such a demand on the naval Powers, we would not, therefore, deny that at some time or other that principle might have a practical application, if only Russia shall first seriously manifest a desire for a pacific accommodation. If such principle were now held out, it would only lead to fresh complications. But, if Russia clearly expresses a wish to enter upon negotiations for peace, this may lead to a cessation of hostilities, and such stoppage of arms may then result in a modification of the attitude held by the fleets of the naval Powers. Intimations of this tenour have been sent to St. Petersburgh confidentially, and we shall certainly communicate the expected reply, willingly to the States which shall join us.

The only object of the present writing is to lay more exactly before your

our convictions in reference to that point of the Note of Bamberg which is of the most importance, and to enable you to make the necessary confidential communication to

Receive, &c.

No. 285.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 26.*)

(No. 236.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 21, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the replies to the German Governments lately represented at Bamberg have been forwarded to their respective addresses by the Austrian Government, drawn up in the identic form to which I had the honour to allude in my despatch No. 226 of the 14th instant, as having been determined upon at the meeting between the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia at Tetschen.

The document in question expresses in courteous terms the regret felt by the Governments of Austria and Prussia at their former communication having failed to obtain the adhesion to the Austro-Prussian Treaty of the Governments to which it had been addressed, and reiterates the hope that after the explanation now given that adhesion would be obtained. Should this hope be realized, the present proposition would be brought before the Diet at Frankfort, for the decision of that assembly; in the contrary event, however, the Imperial Cabinet announces its intention to treat separately upon the subject with such of those Governments as showed themselves favourably inclined to it.

Count Buol stated to me that as soon as this question of the adhesion of all or part of the States of Germany to the policy of Austria and Prussia, as set forth in the Treaty, was decided upon, the Imperial Government would be anxious, in concert with Prussia, to call upon these Governments to put a part of their contingents, as settled by the Act of Confederation, upon a war footing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 286.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 26.*)

(No. 237.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 21, 1854.*

THE Swedish Minister at this Court having been instructed to report to his Government, in as far as he was able, the general views of the Imperial Government as to the complications at present existing in the affairs of the East, Count Buol informs me that he replied to him by a communication of all the important documents which had taken place on this subject with the Governments represented in the Conference of Vienna; and likewise that, in consideration of the friendly manner in which the Swedish Government had expressed themselves towards Austria, he had now directed the Treaty with Prussia of the 20th ultimo, as well as the documents which had since been concerted between the two Governments, to be communicated to the Cabinet of Stockholm, and he would continue, henceforward, to pursue the same courtesy towards that Cabinet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 287.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 26.*)

(No. 351.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 23, 1854.*

AS your Lordship may not be in possession of the ostensible despatch addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy on the 3rd instant, or of the one addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, in support of the Austrian summons to evacuate the Danubian Principalities, I have the honour to inclose herewith copies of these two papers, for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have not yet been able to obtain a copy of the reserved despatch addressed to Count Esterhazy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 287.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.

Vienne, le 3 Juin, 1854.

EN face de la grande crise que maintient l'Europe dans une attente pleine d'anxiété, l'Empereur notre auguste Maître s'est décidé à faire un nouvel appel aux sentiments élevés de l'Empereur Nicolas, en l'engageant à prendre en considération l'urgente nécessité à parvenir à un moyen de mettre enfin un terme à une situation si menaçante pour toutes les positions et tous les intérêts. Impossible de se faire illusion que c'est la prise de possession des deux Principautés Danubiennes par les forces Russes qui a été une des causes principales du développement alarmante de la lutte actuelle, et que c'est encore cette mesure qui, surtout, a faite avorter toutes les tentatives ayant pour but de préparer les voies à une solution pacifique. C'est par le silence opposé à la sommation de la France et de l'Angleterre tendant à amener l'évacuation de ces provinces que la Russie s'est constituée en état de guerre avec les deux Puissances Occidentales, en donnant par là à la lutte une extension nouvelle au point de dérober à tout calcul les conséquences désastreuses qui pourraient en dérouler.

L'Empereur Nicolas ne saurait se dissimuler non plus jusqu'à quel point les intérêts de l'Empire d'Autriche identifiés à tant d'égards avec ceux de l'Allemagne toute entière, ont déjà, au point de vue politique, commerciale, et industriel, souffert par cette occupation si prolongée. Il est tout aussi évident que ces maux augmenteront dans une progression proportionnée à l'extension qui sera donnée au théâtre de la guerre.

Dans une conjoncture aussi grave l'Empereur, s'inspirant des devoirs que lui imposent les intérêts de ses peuples, s'est vu dans le cas de prendre, par le Protocole ci-joint en copie, des engagements devant l'accomplissement desquels il ne saurait reculer.

L'Empereur de Russie, en pesant dans sa sagesse toutes ces considérations, appréciera la valeur que l'Empereur notre auguste Maître doit attacher à ce que les armées Russes ne poussent pas plus loin leurs opérations dans les pays trans-Danubiens, et à obtenir de sa part des indications positives sur l'époque précise, et nous l'espérons pas trop éloignée, où il sera mise un terme à l'occupation des Principautés.

L'Empereur Nicolas, nous n'en doutons pas, veut la faire. Il arrivera par conséquent aux moyens de faire cesser un état de choses qui tend tous les jours davantage à devenir pour l'Autriche et l'Allemagne une source intarissable de calamites.

Il ne voudra pas, par une durée indéterminée de cette occupation, ou en rattachant l'évacuation à des conditions dont l'accomplissement serait indépendant de notre volonté, imposer à l'Empereur François-Joseph le devoir impérieux

deviser lui-même aux moyens de sauvegarder les intérêts que la situation actuelle compromet si gravement.

Vous voudrez, M. le Comte, en donnant lecture et copie de cette dépêche à M. le Comte de Nesselrode, appuyé sur le prix particulier que nous attachons à recevoir de sa part des explications promptes et nettes, et qui en nous rassurant sur nos propres intérêts puissent en même temps servir d'autre acheminement à mettre un terme aux horreurs de la guerre.

Receive, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 287.

Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther.

Berlin, le 12 Juin, 1854.

LE Cabinet de Vienne vient de nous communiquer la dépêche ci-jointe en copie que le Comte de Buol, d'ordre de l'Empereur, a adressée à l'Envoyé d'Autriche à St. Pétersbourg, pour en donner lecture et copie à M. le Chancelier de l'Empire.

Nous retrouvions dans cette dépêche au sujet de l'occupation des Principautés Danubiennes par les troupes Russes, des vues que comme vous le pressentirez, M. le Baron, d'après mes communications antérieures, le Roi mon auguste Maître partage.

C'est avec un profond regret que Sa Majesté a vu rester jusqu'ici infructueux tous les efforts que son Cabinet a faits pour mettre fin à un état de choses que non seulement est une des principales causes du développement de plus en plus alarmant de la lutte actuelle, mais dont les conséquences désastreuses doivent nécessairement augmenter en proportion de son étendue et sa durée.

Si dans une conjonction qui touche de si près à tant des positions et à tant d'intérêts, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche a fait un nouvel appel aux sentiments élevés de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies pour prévenir les imminens dangers d'une complication ultérieure, le Roi notre auguste Maître ne saurait que prêter tout son appui à cette démarche du Cabinet de Vienne.

D'ordre de Sa Majesté, je vous invite donc, M. le Baron, à porter également le Protocole ci-joint en copie du 9 Avril à la connaissance de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, en exprimant à son Excellence notre confiance que Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas y puisera de nouveaux motifs pour soumettre à une appréciation impartiale la haute valeur que comme Sa Majesté l'Empereur François-Joseph, le Roi notre auguste Maître doit attacher à ce que les armées Russes ne poussent pas plus loin leurs opérations dans les pays trans-Danubiens, et qu'un terme pas trop éloigné soit mis à l'occupation des Principautés par ses armées.

Le Roi ne saurait se départir de la conviction que son auguste Beau-frère n'aura qu'à suivre dans sa sagesse une ligne qui s'accorderait autant avec ses propres intérêts qu'avec ses déclarations antérieures pour replacer les questions litigieuses par des assurances conformes à la juste sollicitude des Cours de Berlin et de Vienne, sur un terrain qui offrit des points de départ pratiques, afin d'en acheminer une solution satisfaisante en abrégeant et en circonscrivant l'action guerrière de part et d'autre.

Notre auguste Maître espère donc que la présente démarche trouvera près Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un accueil conforme aux sentiments qui l'ont dictée, et que la réponse qu'ainsi que le Cabinet de Vienne nous attendons avec le haut intérêt qu'exige son importance, soit de nature à soustraire le Roi aux douloureux nécessités que lui imposeraient ses devoirs Royaux et ses engagements.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 288.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 353.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 23, 1854.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL has gone to meet the King at Bromberg, and is to return this night to Berlin with His Majesty.

I saw his Excellency yesterday before his departure, and endeavoured to learn if anything had occurred at the meeting at Gumbinnen of the King with the Russian General Grünwald, who had been sent to compliment His Majesty on the frontier, which would throw any light on the decision likely to be taken at St. Petersburgh on the late communications of the Austrian and Prussian Governments, but it did not appear that any positive information on the subject had reached Baron Manteuffel.

He told me that he believed General Grünwald had made no communication of a political tendency, and the only intelligence of any importance was the first impression made on the Emperor of Russia by the Austrian despatches, which, as reported by Count Münster (who had also come from St. Petersburgh to see the King), was that the greatest irritation had been produced, and that it was not thought that His Imperial Majesty was disposed to make any concessions. However it is not expected that the answer of the Imperial Cabinet will be prepared until after the arrival of Colonel Manteuffel, and we are therefore not likely to know anything further for a week.

I asked Baron Manteuffel if the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh had, as he gave me to understand a few days ago, really communicated to Count Nesselrode the reserved despatch of Count Buol of the 3rd instant as well as the ostensible one, and he replied that he could not state that he was positively informed of its having been read to the Russian Chancellor, or that a copy of it had been sent to him from any quarter, but that he had every reason to believe that he was aware of its contents, which if not communicated by Count Esterhazy might have been reported by Baron Meyendorff.

I replied that it seemed strange that this reserved despatch should have been so made known, as Her Majesty's Government had understood that it had been drawn up solely for the use and guidance of Count Esterhazy, and that we must naturally desire that it would not become the basis for negotiations, as in any arrangement of peace it must be essential that England should be satisfied, for nothing would be gained to Europe if we did not approve of what was done, and further that there were certainly to be found in this reserved despatch many points of which Russia might take advantage.

Baron Manteuffel rejoined that he had very little expectation that the Emperor of Russia would yield to these fresh appeals from Berlin and Vienna, but that nevertheless he would not attempt to prejudice a question which must be decided in a few days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 289.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 26, 1854.*

WITH respect to the telegraph of this day from Belgrade, Count Buol has received confirmation of the raising of the siege of Silistria, and the retirement of the Russians from Wallachia.

The Emperor of Austria, in compliance with the Convention lately signed with the Government of the Sultan, as to the occupation of the Principalities, has directed the army commanded by General Coronini to proceed into Wallachia, and to occupy the country as he advances, reestablishing the legitimate authorities.

An Austrian officer, Colonel Kulich, will be immediately dispatched by

General Hess the Commander-in-chief, to Omer Pasha, for the purpose of combining with him the movements of the Austrian troops, and he will also be directed to proceed to the head-quarters of Lord Raglan and of Marshal St. Arnaud for the same purpose, in as far as may be required.

No. 290.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 790.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 26, 1854.*

I HAVE read with much interest a despatch from M. de Bourqueney dated the 21st instant. Passing in review the different phases which the Russian answer might bear, M. de Bourqueney says that, if evasive, as feared by Count Buol, he had that Minister's assurances that it would not stay the march of Austria. If the evacuation of the Principalities was accepted, and Russia showed at the same time a disposition to treat for peace, Count Buol said that it would be for England and France to lay down the terms for peace.

M. de Bourqueney adds that, although he has never discussed with Count Buol what those terms were to be, he has taken great pains never to conceal from him the conditions on which France would insist, and that no objection had ever been raised to them by Count Buol. M. Drouyn de Lhuys again enumerated these conditions to me: Free navigation of the Black Sea; free navigation of the Danube; guarantees against Russian encroachments for the future; and indemnity for the expenses of the war.

These were the principles on which France would insist, subject to discussion as to details.

M. de Bourqueney refers to the activity displayed in the War Department, and does not doubt that by the end of July, Austria will be ready either to meet an attack, or to march into the Principalities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 291.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 221.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, giving an account of a conversation which he had held with your Lordship, in consequence of your having mentioned to him that a doubt had arisen in my mind whether possibly, from the enrolment in a common Act of the Conventions concluded between France and England on the one hand, and between Austria and Prussia on the other, the inference might not be deduced that France and England participated in the mutual guarantee of the existing state of territorial possession stipulated between Austria and Prussia by Article I of the Treaty of April 20th.

Count Buol states that he had not hesitated to reply to your Lordship that, according to his opinion, to admit this view of the matter would be singularly to pervert the meaning and signification of the Protocol of May 23rd.

It is true, he adds, that by the mutual communication of the two separate Conventions, the Four Powers have established that these Conventions tend, in the respective situations, to assure the maintenance of the principles sanctioned by the former Protocols of the Vienna Conferences; but by declaring this opinion in conformity with the engagement taken by the Four Powers to consult as to the means most adapted for realising the object of their concert, France and England have in no manner become Contracting Parties to the Treaty of April 20th, any more than the Treaty of the 10th of the same month has become obligatory upon Austria and Prussia.

I thanked Count Colloredo for the communication, and expressed my satisfaction at finding that Count Buol's opinion coincided entirely with my own upon

this question, which had not been mooted because Her Majesty's Government felt any doubt about it, but simply in order that we might be able to give a complete contradiction to rumours in an opposite sense that had been circulated.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 292.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon—(*Received June* 27.)

(No. 313.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June* 15, 1854.

THE military Convention between Austria and the Porte was signed by Baron de Bruck and Reshid Pasha the night before last, and I inclose a copy of it herewith.

I understand that two alterations in the original draft were proposed by the Turkish Plenipotentiary. Baron de Bruck accepted the one and rejected the other.

The one he accepted is that clause in Article III, which is composed of these words, now inserted: "d'un commun accord avec le Gouvernement Ottoman." That which his Excellency rejected relates to the commencement of Article V. Reshid Pasha proposed to word the passage so that the conclusion of peace, instead of being described as the object of the Convention, should have appeared as detached from that object, though equally marking the time at which the arrangements for withdrawing the Austrian army from the Principalities should be made. It is not easy to perceive why the one Plenipotentiary should have proposed, or the other rejected, a modification of so little apparent consequence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 292.

Convention between Austria and the Sublime Porte, signed June 14, 1854.

[See Eastern Papers, Part XII.]

No. 293.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 28.)

(No. 315.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June* 15, 1854.

I HAVE not yet succeeded in obtaining the necessary instructions for Omer Pasha to carry into effect the organization of a body of Irregular Cavalry, or Bashi-Bozouks, under the command of Colonel Beatson. The general proposition is, however accepted, and what remains to be effected concerns the leading details of the measure.

Colonel Beatson has already forwarded a proposal for paying the men to be placed under his command, with the assistance of Her Majesty's Government. He forwards by this opportunity a proposal for supplying them with carbines obtained from the same source.

That the men, in order to be serviceable, must have arms and pay is evident, and I greatly fear that the Porte is at present unable to furnish them efficiently with either. How far it may suit Her Majesty's Government to supply the deficiency it is not for me to determine. But I am free to declare my conviction, that real advantage, in point of military service and of humanity, may be derived from the proposed enrolment, but that no advantage can be secured therefrom in either respect unless Colonel Beatson be made the channel through which the wild marauders to be brought into order are made to look to

him, not only for control and punishment, but also for their means of living independent of plunder.

I am informed that the French are prepared to act upon that principle with respect to the Bashi-Bozouks destined to be placed under the command of General Yussuf. It appears probable that each individual enrolled will have a franc and a ration *per diem*, together with arms, comprising a sword, a lance, and a carbine.

I cannot conclude this despatch without doing justice to Colonel Beatson's anxiety to enter without delay upon the field of his arduous duties.

The delay which is experienced arises solely from the habitual tardiness of the Turkish Ministers in transacting business during the month of Ramazan, and at a time of unusual pressure and official occupation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S. I receive information this moment from the Porte that the arrangement for placing Colonel Beatson at the head of a corps of Irregular Cavalry, and the instructions to Omer Pasha, are actually in preparation, with every prospect of their obtaining the Sultan's formal sanction in the course of three or four days.

S. DE R.

No. 294.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 28.)

(No. 317. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June* 15, 1854.

IN a preceding despatch No. 306, dated June 10th, I apprised your Lordship of my intention to request Admiral Dundas to explain more particularly the meaning which he intended I should attach to the closing paragraph of his despatch to me of the 8th instant, already forwarded to your Lordship in copy.

Having had occasion to refer to our correspondence, I perceive his intention with sufficient clearness to relieve me from the necessity of referring to him for explanation; but as he has complained more than once of the Porte's inattention to his advice respecting the entrance of the Turkish squadron into the Black Sea, I beg to submit herewith to your Lordship an abstract of what has passed between the Admiral and myself on that subject.

As the whole correspondence has been sent home, I run no risk of misleading your Lordship by a partial view of the case.

It appears that Admiral Dundas did not originally object to the entrance of the Turkish squadron into the Black Sea, but merely to its advancing beyond a certain locality in the first instance. He manifests, indeed, in one of his despatches, a willingness to see the squadron extend its cruise to the coast of Circassia, after the intended operations should be completed there.

It may be further remarked that the Turkish squadron left the Bosphorus with the declared intention of seeking the allied fleets, and following the advice of the two Admirals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 294.

Abstract of Correspondence between Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Vice-Admiral Dundas.

From Vice-Admiral Dundas, March 27.—IT would be very desirable for one or two steamers to be sent to this squadron commanded by officers who might communicate with the Circassians, &c.

From Admiral Dundas, April [qu. *March*] 27.—Sir Edmund Lyons is going to visit the shores of Circassia, and if the Turks cannot send a steamer, they would do well to send some officers.

To Admiral Dundas, April 6.—Would there be any advantage in stationing two or three Turkish men of war at Varna?

From Admiral Dundas, April 9.—Yes. A ship of the line, a frigate, and a steamer.

Also one of the best Turkish steamers to accompany the squadron to Georgia, and another steamer to attend on the fleets.

Another frigate and steamer to run along the coast of Anatolia.

"When the communication is open with the Circassians, the Turkish navy may be employed to operate with them, but until then they should not extend their cruise beyond the coasts of Europe."

To Admiral Dundas, April 19.—Paragraph 2. The Porte will be prepared in a few days to send into the Black Sea a squadron of nine sail of the line, and to act under your or Admiral Hamelin's direction.

Paragraph 3. Let me know your views on this.

From Admiral Dundas, April 22.—For reply to preceding paragraphs 2 and 3, see my letter of the 9th instant as to the employment of the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons in the Black Sea. "Those squadrons should not extend their cruise at the most beyond Varna, and should be distributed as Admiral Hamelin and I proposed; but from confidential letters I have received from Mr. Wyse, ships are required on the coast of Greece to blockade the different harbours, and also to prevent piracy; there the Turkish men-of-war would be far more useful than cruising in the Black Sea."

To Admiral Dundas, May 2.—The Porte is so desirous of sending a considerable portion of its fleet into the Black Sea that I have not thought it right to oppose the measure, especially as they are to act under your directions. If you like to station a part of them off Varna it will be complied with.

In like manner your opinion will guide the Admiral Ahmed as to any operations on the coast of Circassia. Persons qualified to assist, &c., are, I am assured to accompany the squadron.

To Admiral Dundas, May 2.—The Turks are unwilling to expose their larger ships to danger from fire-ships in the Archipelago.

To Admiral Dundas, May 4.—The Porte, instead of six, sends nine sail of the line into the Black Sea, from what cause I know not.

"I conceive, however, that it remains with you and Admiral Hamelin to detain the ships in company with the combined fleets, or to advise the return of a part or of the whole of them, according to the view which may be taken of what is best for the service."

No. 295.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 324.)

Constantinople, June 19, 1854.

My Lord,

IN order to give effect to your Lordship's instruction respecting Omer Pasha's title to the confidence and consideration of his Government, the punishment of the late culpable Commanders of the Turkish army in Asia, and the appointment of General Guyon to the command of that army, I directed Mr. Robert Chabert to wait upon the Grand Vizier, Reshid Pasha, and the Seraskier, when assembled together, to communicate to them the substance

of your Lordship's despatch, and to report their answer for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have now the honour to inclose herewith in original Mr. Chabert's official report, and your Lordship will perceive that the Turkish Ministers, while assenting to your Lordship's views with respect to the two first points, repeated their reasons for objecting to your Lordship's suggestion concerning General Guyon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 295.

Mr. R. Chabert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Péra, le 19 *Juin*, 1854.

My Lord,

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que j'ai dûment communiqué à leurs Altesses le Grand Vizier Réchid Pacha et le Séraskier, l'extrait ci-joint des instructions qu'elle a reçues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Au premier point ces trois Ministres ont répondu qu'il n'est nullement de leur intention de causer de la peine à Omer Pacha en diminuant l'indépendance de son commandement tel qu'il lui a été conféré dans le principe par la Porte, et que cela ne saurait avoir lieu que dans le cas où les Commandants-en-chef des deux armées et les Représentants des deux Puissances n'en signalent d'un commun accord la nécessité.

Au second point ils m'ont assuré que les officiers qui ont abusé de leur autorité et qui se sont mal conduits dans l'armée sont sous procès, que les interrogatoires et les examens tombent à leur fin, et qu'un jugement va être prononcé bientôt.

En fin, au troisième point, ces trois Ministres ont répondu unanimement que le Général Guyon n'a pas, d'après les informations qu'ils ont eues de personnes qui le connaissent, et qui sont à même de juger de ses mérites stratégiques, la capacité voulue pour que le commandement de l'armée de l'Asie puisse lui être donné.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) ROBERT CHABERT.

No. 296.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 329.)

Constantinople, June 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of further correspondence with Vice-Admiral Dundas, relative to the distribution and employment of the Turkish naval forces in the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 296.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *off Baltchik, June* 9, 1854.

My Lord,

VICE-ADMIRAL HAMELIN and I having again consulted as to the most desirable mode of employing the Turkish squadron now anchored off Kavarna, and which is at present the cause of considerable embarrassment to our movements, I have the honour to request that you will be pleased to make known to the Turkish Government our opinions on this subject, and to beg that orders may be given in accordance therewith; viz.,

1. That two ships of the line, with as many boats as can be spared, should be stationed at Varna for its protection, and to assist in landing troops, stores, &c., for the armies; and also that two small steam-boats should be employed running between Varna and Constantinople to keep up the communication.

2. That two large steam-boats should be stationed on the coasts of Georgia and Circassia.

3. That two sailing frigates or corvettes should cruize between the Bosphorus and Varna to convey and protect the vessels going between those ports.

4. That the rest of the fleet should be employed in the Bosphorus to assist in the proposed blockade of the Russian ports, or sent to such points of the Archipelago as may be necessary.

Lastly. That should any other steam-vessels than those before-mentioned be available for service in the Black Sea, it would be very desirable that they should be so employed attached to the combined fleets.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 296.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, June 14, 1854.

Sir,

I INCLOSE herewith, in original and translation, a despatch from the Seraskier to Selim Pasha, ordering the latter to furnish one or two battalions for the additional defence of Redout Kaleh, and to embark them on your requisition in any vessels which may be sent from the allied fleets for that purpose.

I have ascertained the readiness of the Ottoman Council to accept your proposals, concerted with Admiral Hamelin, for establishing an effective blockade of all the Russian ports in the Black Sea; but I think it advisable to refer for instructions to Her Majesty's Government on one or two points of international law affecting neutrals.

Admiral Ahmed's letter, addressed to the Captain Pasha, on the joint requisition of yourself and Admiral Hamelin, was not received here, as I am assured, till the 11th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 296.

Riza Pasha to Selim Pasha.

June 14, 1854.

(Translation.)

I HAVE received your despatch stating that, in pursuance of my instructions, a battalion of Regulars, with artillery, had been embarked on board the vessels of the English and French fleets which had come to Tchouroukssou, and that they had proceeded to Koumbal.

The British Ambassador has now represented, that in the event of the Admirals requiring another battalion, according to the exigency of the case, for stationing at Redout Kaleh, in that neighbourhood, your Excellency should be authorized to furnish later, an additional battalion still.

In addition, therefore, to the battalion given for Koumbal, two more battalions are to be detached from the troops under your command, and, at the request of the Admirals and their sending steamers, you will furnish one or two battalions, and properly equipped, as before.

Inclosure 4 in No. 296.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, June 15, 1854.

Sir,

THE Porte has agreed to your suggestion respecting the destination of the Turkish naval forces now in the Black Sea.

Two Turkish ships of the line, with as many boats as can be spared, will be stationed off Varna for the purposes specified by you.

Two small steam-boats will be appointed to keep up the communications between Varna and Constantinople.

Two large steam-boats will be stationed on the coast of Georgia and Circassia.

Two sailing frigates or corvettes will be ordered to cruize between the Bosphorus and Varna for the protection of vessels passing on that line.

The rest of the fleet will be employed in the Bosphorus or Archipelago.

Such, in substance, are the requisitions which I have addressed to the Porte in virtue of your suggestions, and such the official assurances which have been conveyed to me by Reshid Pasha through the regular channel of communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 296.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, June 19, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE already done myself the honour to inform you that the Ottoman Council has consented to the distribution, as proposed by yourself and Admiral Hamelin, of the Turkish squadron in the Black Sea; but, with respect to the proposed blockade, I have found it necessary to refer to Her Majesty's Government.

The Sultan's formal sanction not having yet been given to what concerns the distribution of the squadron, I am still unable to write to you definitely on that subject. My object in writing now is merely to request your assistance in clearing up what appears to me a paragraph of rather doubtful meaning, in the note subscribed by you and Admiral Hamelin under date of the 9th instant.

I presume that your intention is to draw a distinction between such vessels as take out clearances for a Russian port, and those which clear for a Turkish port, stopping the former altogether by means of Turkish vessels stationed at the northern entrance of the Bosphorus, and allowing the others to pass after producing their papers, and having a notice that they are not to go into any Russian port of the Black Sea written upon them.

Another point is this. You propose "to forbid all neutral vessels being cleared out from Constantinople for the Russian possessions in the Black Sea," but it does not appear by what means you propose to effect this prohibition—whether by an order from the Porte, or by a notification from Her Majesty's Embassy.

You will greatly oblige me by stating with precision whether my conjecture in the former instance is correct, and what I am to understand as to the latter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 297.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July 2, 4 P.M.*)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 25 Juin*, 1854.

LE siège de Silistrie fut levé le 22 courant. L'armée de siège s'est retirée au delà du Danube, et la garnison a détruit leurs tranchées. Cette nouvelle est officielle.

No. 298.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July 3.*)

(No. 244.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 28, 1854.*

I REPORTED to your Lordship, in my telegraphic despatch of the 26th instant, the retreat of the Russian forces from the siege of Silistria, which took place on the 22nd instant, as well as the determination of the Imperial Government, which has been announced to me by Count Buol, to order a division of the Austrian troops at present assembled under General Coronini in the neighbourhood of Semlin and in the south of Hungary, to proceed to Wallachia to occupy, in pursuance of the stipulations of the Convention lately agreed to between the Austrian and Turkish Governments at Constantinople, the portions of that Principality which have been evacuated by the Russian forces, and to replace therein, under the sanction of His Majesty the Sultan, the legitimate authorities.

Count Buol stated that the order for this movement of the Austrian troops had been given immediately upon the receipt of the intelligence of the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian army, as it was not thought advisable to wait the answer to the requisition to that effect which had been transmitted to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. The Imperial Government considered it more consonant to the position they had taken upon this subject towards Russia, to adopt the measure it had decided upon, irrelatively to any communication they might receive from St. Petersburgh.

The 1st division of the Austrian troops (25,000 men) will proceed immediately to Giurgevo, and thence to Bucharest; the 2nd division will follow as soon as it is ready to move. These troops have been selected with the view of not interfering with the concentration of the Austrian forces which is taking place on the frontier of Transylvania and Gallicia, and which are in a position to observe the Russian forces which are collecting in considerable numbers in the Principality of Moldavia and on the Russian frontier of Gallicia.

Count Buol, in directing Baron Bruck to bring under the consideration of the Cabinet of the Sultan the measure which, in compliance with the Convention upon this subject, has now been adopted by the Austrian Government, and in concerting with the Turkish Ministers the various dispositions which they may think it advisable should be adopted to insure the good government of the Principality, has instructed him to offer as a recommendation that the Hospodar Prince Stirbey should be replaced in his authority; and Prince Stirbey has written a letter to his Sovereign congratulating him upon the signal success which has attended his arms, and has requested His Majesty's permission to return to his post and to resume his functions.

In communicating these decisions, Count Buol stated that, in adopting the present measure, as relating to Wallachia, it was the firm intention of the Austrian Government to resist any attempt on the part of the Russian troops to reoccupy that Principality; and that if the Austrian troops entered Moldavia, they would uphold the same determination, and that if the Porte consented to the return of the Hospodars for the government of those provinces, it would not

be considered in any other light than as a measure taken in accordance with the desire of the Porte, and not dependent upon any previous stipulations.

Count Buol contemplated the possible advance of the Turkish and allied forces through the Principalities towards the Russian frontier.

General Baron Hess, the newly appointed Commander-in-chief of the Austrian armies Nos. 3 and 4, has dispatched an officer of his staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Kalich, to the head-quarters of Omer Pasha, for the purpose of announcing to him, and of concerting with him, the march of the Austrian troops under General Coronini; and Count Buol, on the part of the Emperor, requested me to furnish this officer with a letter of introduction to Lord Raglan, in order that he might confer with him as to the movements of the respective troops, and I have complied with this request, and herewith inclose a copy of my letter. The same desire was expressed to Baron Bourqueney for an introduction for Lieutenant-Colonel Kalich to Marshal St. Arnaud, with which he has complied.

In closing this despatch I cannot but congratulate your Lordship upon the signal success which has thus been obtained for the cause of Turkey and of her allies, by the total failure of the whole policy of dictation which, by the occupation of the Principalities, the Russian Government had adopted towards the Porte, and by which they have involved Europe in the present war, during which they have themselves sustained so many reverses by the armies of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—At the request of Count Buol, the Turkish Ambassador has appointed one of the superior attachés of his Embassy to accompany Lieutenant-Colonel Kalich to the head-quarters of Omer Pasha. He will proceed with him to-morrow by the Danube steamer to Giurgevo.

W.

Inclosure in No. 298.

The Earl of Westmorland to General Lord Raglan.

My dear Raglan, *Vienna, June 27, 1854.*

THIS letter will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Kalich, who is charged with a mission from General Baron Hess, the Commander-in-chief of the third and fourth Austrian armies, at present assembling in Transylvania and Gallicia, to the Commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces, Omer Pasha, for the purpose of announcing to him, and of concerting with him, the march of a division of Austrian troops under General Coronini into Wallachia, for the purpose of occupying, in conformity with the Convention lately signed at Constantinople, the portions of that Principality which have been evacuated by the Russian troops, and of re-establishing therein the legitimate authorities.

Count Buol, by the desire of the Emperor, has requested that I would introduce Colonel Kalich to you, and would ask you to consider him as being charged by General Baron Hess to enter with you in the most confidential manner upon all subjects relating to the movements of the troops under General Coronini, which, not being belligerents, are at present charged only with the maintenance of the established Government as sanctioned by His Majesty the Sultan, but in carrying out which object General Hess will be desirous of acting in conformity with your wishes, and of receiving from Colonel Kalich the sentiments and intentions which you may desire should be communicated to him.

M. de Bourqueney has equally furnished Colonel Kalich with a letter of introduction to Marshal St. Arnaud. It is the present intention of the Austrian Government that the first division of General Coronini should move upon Giurgevo and thence to Bucharest, and that it should be followed by a second division.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 299.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 365.)

Berlin, June 30, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 355 of the 23rd instant, inclosing an analysis of the reply made by the Prussian Government to the Governments who were represented at the Bamberg Conference, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies, in original and in translation, of the original text of that document.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 299.

Prussian Answer to Bamberg Conference.

(Translation.)

YOUR has in the report of the ultimo, with which you have favoured us, transmitted the note in which the Government has replied to our invitation to become a party to the offensive and defensive alliance concluded between Prussia and Austria on the 20th April last.

Our promptitude has been the greater to examine attentively the exposition contained in this note, and to confer thereon with the Imperial Austrian Cabinet, as the replies of several other German Governments are founded on a similar view (Auffassung) of the situation of things.

After having had the satisfaction to convince ourselves of the coincidence of our views with those of Austria, I am commanded by His Majesty the King to communicate to your the following remarks in order that they may be brought to the knowledge of the Government.

It has afforded to His Majesty the King the sincerest satisfaction not only to see the conclusion of the Treaty expressive of the good understanding between Prussia and Austria in such a serious complication, greeted with joy by their allies, but also to see that they duly estimate the point of view in which German interests and obligations are to be considered likewise beyond the frontiers of the Confederation. If, under this conviction, the Government, on the one hand, has expressed to us the wish that the adhesion of the entire Confederation should be effected by means of an invitation to be addressed to the German Diet, Prussia and Austria, on the other hand, have likewise both expressed in the clearest terms their eventual readiness to accede thereto.

The Courts of Prussia and of Austria are both, however, of opinion, that according to Article XI of the Confederation Act, the separate German Governments have also the right to be parties to the alliance offered to them, and the two Cabinets have therefore first applied to them partly to be able to precominate the result of a later proposal to the Confederation, partly for the contingency if no proposal was made to act in concert with those States that may have declared their adhesion, which has already taken place on the part of several Governments.

The Government will perceive from the above, that on this formal side of the question there appears to exist no practical difficulty, and the chief point seems to be to ensure a sufficient unanimity in case of a resolution being being brought before the Confederation.

In this respect it is worth mentioning that, according to the view of the Government, the summons contained in the Supplemental Article to evacuate the Principalities should be accompanied by the condition of the simultaneous cessation of hostilities by land and by sea, and the reciprocal retreat of the other Powers.

The Government will certainly be convinced that the eventuality

of a general withdrawal from the seat of war would correspond with the views and the exertions of the two German Powers, and therefore, in so far as it appeared admissable at the time, was kept in view by them when the two despatches, of which copies are inclosed, were sent according to the terms of the Supplementary Article to St. Petersburgh, the one by Austria, and the other in support of the same by Prussia.

We adhere firmly to the hope that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will in his wisdom duly appreciate the language of his ancient allies, the result of a deep conviction, and that he will by a satisfactory reply place them in a position to prepare the way for a peaceful understanding between the belligerent Powers; and it is scarcely necessary to remark, that this reply, as regards the object in view, will not only be submitted to the most conscientious scrutiny by the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, but that they will also make it their duty immediately to enter into confidential communications with those German Governments that may have joined their alliance, and eventually with the German Diet, in case it may have declared its adhesion to the alliance.

With regard to the conditions expressed by the Government in connection herewith, that the Diet shall be represented in due form in the further negotiations that concern it as a party to the alliance, the two Courts will use their best endeavours, as far as circumstances will admit, to realise this expectation, which, however, they alone have in fact not power to do, and will, at all events, see to the strict execution of the terms of Article XLIX of the Vienna "Schluss Acts."

The Royal Cabinet indulges the hope that the explanations above given will induce the Government to confirm, by unreservedly and completely according to the offensive and defensive alliance between Prussia and Austria, its oft expressed confidence in these two Powers, and its devotion to the national interests as recognised by itself.

The Government points out in its note the objects that it wishes Germany to gain, among which it specifies the complete freedom of trade and of navigation on the Danube, and an effectual protection guaranteed on all sides to the Christian population living under the Turkish sway.

The Government will certainly be open to the conviction that the sooner, the more unanimously and the stronger the members of the German Confederation bind themselves together for the promotion of these objects, the surer are the prospects of Germany of obtaining them.

That the Government should at the same time have testified its lively interest in the preservation of the Kingdom of Greece, in the state guaranteed by Treaty, is the more gratifying to His Majesty the King our most gracious Master, as His Majesty participates sincerely in this interest and cannot divest himself of the solicitude for the preservation of the territorial proportions of the East.

It will afford us peculiar satisfaction to be assured by a prompt reply from the Government to the present communication that its representative in the German Diet will find himself empowered to vote without reservation for the participation of the Confederation in the Treaty, as it would cause us the deepest regret to abandon the hope of seeing the work of union completed by a resolution of the Diet and the influence due to the thus formed powerful whole secured.

Should we be obliged, however, to give up this hope, then the proposal for the alliance would naturally not be made in the Diet, and Prussia and Austria would find themselves in the situation to come to a further understanding only with those separate Governments which have already stepped forward as parties to their alliance, or which may still join the same.

Your is empowered to communicate a copy of this document to

I take, &c.

Berlin, June 16, 1854.

No. 300.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 370.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 30, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 172 of the 27th instant, inclosing copies of two despatches which you addressed to Her Majesty's Ministers at Dresden and Munich, Nos. 24 and 41 of the 21st instant, on the subject of the Bamberg Conference, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I took these papers with me to-day, when I called on Baron Manteuffel, and conceiving that a knowledge of their contents could not fail to be interesting to his Excellency, I read them to him.

He thanked me for this communication, and seemed well pleased at the manner in which your Lordship had expressed your opinion of the late conduct of the Saxon and Bavarian Governments.

Baron Manteuffel mentioned that he had now received intelligence from all the small Courts, except Stuttgardt and Darmstadt, and that he had reason to expect that they would declare their adhesion to the Treaty of the 20th of April, when communicated to the Diet. His Excellency added, that the Court of Wurtemberg was the only one, in fact, about which he had any doubt, and he gave me to understand that he believed that Court to have been the principal instigator of the opposition to the two Great German Powers in this matter.

He then told me that Colonel Issakoff, one of the Emperor of Russia's aides-de camp, had passed through Berlin on his way to the different Courts of the Bamberg coalition, and was the bearer, as he had been informed, of complimentary communications to them in return for the support which the policy of the Emperor of Russia had received at their hands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 301.

Sir J. Hilbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 40.)

My Lord, *Munich, June 24, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translation of an article which had appeared in some of the German journals, giving the substance of the note addressed to the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets, by which the Governments represented at the Bamberg Conferences, announce the results of their deliberations; and I also inclose a French analysis of the memorandum which M. von der Pfordten presented to the assembled Plenipotentiaries, and which seems to have served as the basis for their resolutions.

Although the delay which has occurred will have deprived the communication of these documents of much of the interest which would have attached to them had it taken place a fortnight earlier, they may nevertheless still be of service in aiding your Lordship to form some appreciation of the views and sentiments which prevailed at the Conference in reference to the Eastern policy of the two great German Powers; and above all, when the results are compared with the previous pretensions so loudly proclaimed by the Bavarian Government, it will at once be evident how little reason it had to be satisfied with the support it received from the smaller States, upon whom it conceived it could most count, and to lead whom is the great object of its ambition. In the place of a guarantee of the Crown of Greece to the present dynasty, which was announced as the *conditio sine qui non* of the accession of this country, at least to the Berlin Treaty of the 20th of April, all it appears to have been able to obtain, consists of a vague expression of sympathy for the dynasty, and that only on the ground of its German origin.

A more complete failure upon this point, on which so much stress was laid beforehand, it would be difficult to imagine; but it is marvellous how M. von

der Pfordten could ever have entertained the idea that Austria and Prussia would accept such conditions, since they would in practice, supposing Germany to be able to give effect to such a guarantee by securing the King of Greece from all possibility of loss, put him in a position to prosecute with impunity his aggressive designs against Turkey, and thus, indirectly, make them abettors of the insurrection.

I need not enter into any examination of the other propositions contained in M. von der Pfordten's memorandum, which I have reason to believe has given rise to bitter offence, and sharp reproaches on the part of the French Cabinet; whilst, on the other hand, his whole conduct in connection with the Bamberg Conference has been severely censured by the two great German Powers.

In the meantime, the reply to the smaller States has been transmitted to their respective Governments. Here, the communication of it was made a few days ago; and although in reality it concedes but little, it is drawn up in measured language, and in terms calculated to make it as unpalatable as possible. Austria and Prussia declare in it, that they would not be indisposed to receive the accession of the other States in Germany through the channel of the Diet; but they agree to this course solely upon the understanding that it shall not be clogged with conditions or demands for explanation of any kind whatsoever; and they give those States distinctly to comprehend that, in the event of any attempt being made to create further difficulties, they are fully resolved to pursue their own interests in conjunction with such of the smaller States as may deem it for their advantage to act with them. That portion of the note which bears upon the question of an armistice, and the reciprocity called for in the summons to be addressed to the belligerent Powers, had previously been practically answered by the demand for the evacuation of the Principalities made by Austria, on the 3rd instant, to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

The Confederation can undoubtedly, under the provisions of the final Act of Vienna, claim to participate in any negotiations for peace which may follow a war in which it has been engaged in its federal character; but, independently of the interpretation which other Powers, not belonging to the Confederation, might be inclined to put upon that Act, in cases involving interests not purely German, the admission of Plenipotentiaries named by the Diet and acting under its instructions, would, in all probability, render such negotiations interminable, and serve to perpetuate uneasiness and confusion among all the smaller States of Germany.

The only mode of escaping such dangerous complications would, it strikes me, be for the Confederation to confer upon the Austrian and Prussian Plenipotentiaries, who must necessarily take part in any transaction of this description, full powers to conclude peace in its name; but I much question whether any proposal to this effect would meet with support from this country, which aims at the exercise of a leading influence over its weaker neighbours, and which might, and in all probability would, on such an occasion, lay claim to represent the remaining members of the Confederation. Should such a case occur, I cannot very clearly see what the smaller States will have gained, for they would simply have lent themselves to the furtherance of the ambitious purposes, perhaps of one individual, but at all events of a Government of which they are all more or less jealous.

From all that has reached me on this subject, I can scarcely doubt that ultimately, all these apparently refractory States will make a virtue of necessity, and accede to the Treaty unconditionally. The only two which might be expected to make a show of opposition are Saxony and especially Wurtemburg; but I am disposed to think, that they will hardly push matters to extremity, when they take into consideration that on the present question it is not necessary that the vote in the Diet should be unanimous. That all of them should have felt themselves neglected and aggrieved at the persevering silence of the two great Powers in a matter on which their concurrence was not altogether indifferent, is perhaps natural; but if any proof of the prudence of the course pursued were required, it is I think to be found in the conditions sought to be imposed upon them in M. von der Pfordten's memorandum; one of which, at any rate, would go far to overthrow the principles laid down in the different Protocols signed at Vienna, in which a positive distinction is drawn between the aggressive and defensive positions of the belligerent parties, to whom M. von der Pfordten would have transmitted the like summons to retire, on the ground that it would

be unjust to call upon Russia to evacuate the Ottoman territory whilst the fleets of the maritime Powers were in possession of the Baltic and Black Seas, and their military forces occupying points of the Turkish territory.

M. von der Pfordten can hardly have supposed that such a parallel could be admitted for an instant by the two High Contracting Parties, or that they would consent to reopen a discussion on a once established principle, and upon the basis of his modifications, even at the risk of not obtaining the accession of this country to their Convention. It appears to me, therefore, that so far from having improved and strengthened the attitude of the smaller States, the Bamberg Conference has in reality produced exactly the opposite result; for they now find themselves exposed to the unpleasant alternative, either of signifying their pure and simple accession to the Treaty, if I except the trifling concession accorded in the form of so doing, or of submitting to a position of isolation which it would be perfectly impossible for them to sustain for any length of time. A very small amount of reflection would, it seems to me, have sufficed to convince the Governments represented at the Conference, that such must be the inevitable consequence of their feeble attempts at opposition, in the event of the two great Cabinets declining to yield to their pretensions.

To your Lordship, the tortuous efforts of these petty States to exercise a preponderating influence in European politics, must appear inexplicable and almost devoid of interest. Unfortunately, however, they are, by the embarrassment they cause to those who are called upon to decide grave questions of international rights and policy, not entirely without importance.

The events of late years, and particularly the rivalry between Austria and Prussia, have contributed to awaken in them the idea, that if they can but manage to bring all political questions, affecting what they denominate German interests, within the range of the Diet, they would, thus united, constitute a third great Power, possessing sufficient vitality and force to hold the balance between the other two. This notion, which will remind your Lordship of the so-much-talked-of "Trias" of some years ago, has always been most earnestly and passionately advocated by the Bavarian Ministers, because they flatter themselves that Bavaria would, in the capacity of the third State of Germany, be entitled to the direction of the policy of the weaker Governments. Nothing but a firm resistance to this preposterous combination can save the two great German Powers, not to say Europe itself, from the most fatal complications and embarrassments; and in support of this view I need, I think, only appeal to the doctrines laid down, and the hostility evinced towards England and France, in M. von der Pfordten's unlucky memorandum, which at the same time shows a somewhat singular appreciation, on his part, of the value of solemn treaty engagements. But it is inconceivable that Austria and Prussia could ever commit so great a political blunder as to allow the Diet to take the direction of the foreign policy of Germany out of their hands, or even to submit to be partially and indirectly hampered by the ambitious activity of some of the statesmen to whose guidance, for their misfortune, the smaller States have confided their affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

Inclosure in No. 301.

Analysis of the Bavarian Memorandum that served as Basis of the Bamberg Deliberations.

MALGRE la satisfaction que l'entente de la Prusse et de l'Autriche a causé aux Etats Allemands, des motifs sérieux les déterminent à ne pas adhérer purement et simplement à la Convention du 20 Avril, qui est de nature à leur imposer des efforts et des sacrifices.

La Convention dépasse la limite des obligations fédérales. On y adhérera néanmoins, mais avant de se déclarer formellement, on provoquera de la part de la Prusse et de l'Autriche certaines explications. Ces explications devront porter sur les points suivants:

1. Les priviléges des Chrétiens en Orient sont la cause première de la lutte actuelle. Ce serait une honte pour l'Allemagne de participer à cette lutte, si elle ne prenait pas fait et cause pour ses coreligionnaires.

L'Allemagne ne doit pas dorénavant les laisser à la merci des Pachas Turcs. Il faudra que le Sultan garantisse les droits des Chrétiens par des hatti-chérifs, que la Porte promette par des notes adressées aux Grandes Puissances Européennes de maintenir les priviléges concédés, et qu'elle leur accorde un droit de surveillance.

D'un intérêt non moins grand pour l'Allemagne sera la garantie du Royaume de Grèce, dont la population est Chrétienne. Il importe que l'existence de la Grèce, et son intégrité sous la dynastie actuelle, soient également garanties par toutes les Grandes Puissances.

2. La liberté de la navigation du Danube est d'une haute importance commerciale pour l'Allemagne, mais il est pour elle d'une importance plus grande encore que les forts des Dardanelles ne tombent pas entre les mains d'une Grande Puissance Européenne qui ne poursuivrait que ses intérêts exclusifs, et particulièrement qu'ils ne tombent pas entre les mains de la France et de l'Angleterre.

En ce qui concerne les embouchures du Danube, la garantie de l'exécution des Traités existants est suffisante. Il ne reste plus à désirer que la création d'un établissement Autrichien à l'embouchure de la Sulina. Pour ce qui regarde les Dardanelles il serait à souhaiter qu'on put s'entendre sur un plan formel.

3. La Prusse et l'Autriche ont déclaré qu'elles feraient leur possible afin de ne point prendre part à la guerre, et que tous leurs efforts tendraient au rétablissement de la paix. La Convention fait mention de propositions de paix qui n'ont point été communiquées. Les Etats Allemands n'en connaissent donc pas la teneur. Il s'agit de se convaincre si les propositions [angemessen] étaient convenables et si elles n'exigeaient pas de la Russie des choses injustes. Il serait injuste, par exemple, de demander à la Russie d'évacuer le territoire Ottoman aussi longtemps que les flottes alliées seraient dans la Mer Noire ou dans la Baltique et des troupes Anglaises et Françaises sur le territoire Turc.

De même aussi on ne saurait exiger de la Russie qu'elle renonce à ses anciens Traités avec la Turquie.

On empêchera que la Russie n'abuse de ces Traités pour s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures de la Turquie, en réglant d'une manière convenable les points mentionnés dans le § 1 du mémorandum.

La Russie fera une guerre d'extermination plutôt que de renoncer à ces Traités.

L'Allemagne pourra dans toute cette question contribuer puissamment au rétablissement de la paix. L'Allemagne est une Puissance qui compte 70,000,000 d'habitants, placée entre les parties belligérantes et pouvant par conséquent rendre la guerre impossible. Si l'Allemagne fait à la Russie des propositions équitables, nulle doute qu'elle ne les accepte. Dans le cas où la France et l'Angleterre se refuseraient d'y souscrire, il faudrait leur déclarer qu'on restera dans une stricte neutralité, qu'on n'aura en vue que ses propres intérêts, et alors, aussi la France et l'Angleterre céderont [Würden sich fügen].

4. Si enfin les Etats Allemands en accédant à la Convention s'engagent à faire des sacrifices, il faudrait qu'ils eussent également le droit de participer aux négociations de paix auxquelles cependant il faudra en venir.

Une participation de cette nature ne convenant pas à beaucoup d'Etats Allemands, on aurait recours à la Diète, qui nommerait aussitôt des Plénipotentiaires pour des négociations de paix.

Ce sont les Etats moyens surtout qui ne sauraient consentir à prendre des engagements dépassant leurs obligations fédérales au profit de la politique particulière des deux Grandes Puissances Allemandes.

La Bavière propose donc aux Etats Allemands de s'exprimer leur satisfaction au sujet de l'entente de la Prusse et de l'Autriche, de remercier les deux Puissances Allemandes de leur communication et de se déclarer prêts à adhérer à la Convention, mais de demander préalablement des explications sur les points ci-dessus mentionnés.

No. 302.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Munich, June 28, 1854.*

MY despatch No. 40 of the 24th instant was already written when I became aware of the publication, *in extenso*, of the note which emanated from the Bamberg Conference, the translation of a summary of which, as it appeared in the German press, was therein inclosed. Since then I have also received your Lordship's despatches bearing upon the proceedings of the smaller German States which took part in the Conference; and, in conformity with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 42 of the 21st instant, I have communicated to the Bavarian Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of that marked No. 24, addressed by your Lordship, under the same date, to Her Majesty's Minister at Dresden.

After perusal of that despatch, M. von der Pfordten inquired if I wished for an answer upon it; to which I replied that it depended entirely on him whether he chose to make any observations on it or not. His Excellency then observed that he could not admit, either that the Conference at Bamberg had been ill-advised, or injurious to the interests of Germany; and, above all, he denied that the German Powers had made, or intended to make, any sacrifice of their interests to Russian intrigues; adding, that had the despatch been intended for him, I presume, in his capacity of Bavarian Minister, he should have considered its language in the light of an insult ("injure" was the term he made use of).

He then proceeded to vindicate the right of the German States to express their opinion on their own internal affairs; of the best mode of managing which, he maintained they were the most competent judges, and in which they would not admit any foreign interference. The exercise of this right, which I told him no one disputed for a moment, so long as it was not converted into an officious meddling with great questions of European policy, which, as in the present case, involved other interests besides those purely German, had been, his Excellency said, the principal object for which the Bamberg Conference had been summoned; and the readiness shown by the two Great Powers to comply with the wishes of the States represented at it, were a sufficient proof of the good understanding and union prevailing among all the German States.

These observations led to a long and desultory conversation, or rather, argument, upon the value of the concessions made by Austria and Prussia, which, M. von der Pfordten was at some pains to convince me, amounted to all that had been required. To this, however, with the knowledge I possessed of the answers returned to the Bamberg Resolutions by the two Great Powers, it was impossible for me to assent; and I pointed out in particular the pretensions put forward in his memorandum about Greece, and the summons to withdraw their forces from the scene of action, which he appeared to wish to be simultaneously addressed to both belligerent parties.

The first of these remarks was passed over in silence; but his Excellency sought, by a comparison of dates, to establish the impossibility of a compliance with the second, although the course suggested was approved in principle. Upon this point, however, he explained that some misapprehension prevailed, inasmuch as he had only contended that it would be unjust to call upon Russia to make a retrograde movement, except upon the previous understanding that, from the moment when it began, the other Powers should desist from further hostilities, and make preparations for following her example. On the whole, his Excellency professed himself to be highly pleased with the manner in which the results of the Bamberg Conference had been responded to by Austria and Prussia. He dwelt, I thought, with peculiar satisfaction on the prospect held out, that the Diet would be consulted upon, and allowed to participate in, the negotiations and deliberations to which the expected answer of the Emperor of Russia to the Austrian summons, sent to St. Petersburgh on the 3rd instant, must give rise under the provisions of the Additional Article of the Treaty signed at Berlin on the 20th of April. Should these assurances, which I confess appear to me rather vague, be carried out to their full extent, the

smaller States will have achieved a triumph; and should the Emperor of Russia, as we are led to believe he will, comply with the desires of the two Great German Powers, and withdraw his forces beyond the Pruth, they will immediately, under the pressure of Russian influence, be again most actively at work to detach Germany from all connection with the views of England and France as to the conditions upon which peace ought to be concluded. That upon this point serious differences of opinion will manifest themselves, is, I fear, beyond all doubt; and I could not dissent from a remark made by M. von der Pfordten, that the evacuation of the Principalities was only a first step towards a solution of existing difficulties, but by no means to be looked upon as necessarily leading to an early or final arrangement of the Eastern question, although he does not seem to hope that it may contribute to hasten the assembly of an European Congress for that object.

Before terminating our interview I took occasion to notice to M. von der Pfordten the just cause of complaint furnished by the hostile and mistrustful insinuations contained in his memorandum relative to the ulterior designs of the allied Powers. His Excellency's reply was, that, even with the knowledge of the effect produced by the course he had pursued, if he were again called upon to pronounce himself upon these questions, he should give utterance to the same sentiments and in the same words.

Not being informed as to the exact position in which the British and French Governments stand in respect to the Austrian Cabinet, I am unable to judge in how far the latter may be swayed by the tendencies of the smaller States; but I must repeat that if they are permitted to exercise that decisive influence over the future conduct of the two Great German Powers, which they are in great hopes they are on the point of acquiring, any negotiations which may be commenced, will, in my opinion, be troubled by their intrigues; and, if terminated at all without a further appeal to arms, will, in all probability, present but incomplete results.

I have heard from another source that on the arrival of the Emperor of Russia's answer, a joint note from the Diet to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh is in contemplation, but I have been unable to obtain any positive information as to details, and I presume it would only be sent in support of the summons from the two Great German Powers in the event of a refusal on the part of His Imperial Majesty to comply with their demands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 303.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 380.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 3, 1854.*

THE Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have communicated to me a copy of a letter addressed to your Excellency on the 9th of June by Vice-Admiral Dundas, detailing the manner in which he and the French Admiral wish the fleet of the Sultan to be employed; and I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the disposition of that fleet as proposed in Admiral Dundas's letter above mentioned.

I have therefore to instruct your Excellency to urge the Turkish Government to lose no time in carrying out as far as possible the suggestions offered by the Admirals.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 304.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

No. 381.)

Foreign Office, July 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 329 of the 20th ultimo, and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the steps taken by you to induce the Porte to adopt the suggestions of the British and French Admirals respecting the distribution and employment of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 305.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 384.)

Foreign Office, July 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 324 of the 19th of June, reporting that the Divan had refused to appoint General Guyon to the command of the Turkish army in Asia.

The state of the Sultan's army at Kars has been under the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government. That army has from the first moment of its formation been delivered over to the command of men whom the Emperor of Russia could most desire to see in the places they have so unworthily filled. They have vied with each other in rapacity, cowardice, and ignorance so notorious as to leave little room for doubt that they owed their appointments either to some treacherous design against the Sultan's cause, or to the intrigue and corruption which poison the whole system of administration in Turkey.

The only man who has displayed energy under the most adverse circumstances, and who in fact has saved the army from total dissolution, is General Guyon, and Her Majesty's Government therefore recommended that the chief command should be confided him, not, as I informed your Excellency in my despatch No. 348 of the 21st of June, from any particular predilection for that officer, but because he was on the spot and had already rendered good services, and because he had earned for himself the confidence of the army.

Her Majesty's Government would have been equally pleased if any other General possessing the requisite qualifications had been appointed in the place of the ignorant officer in command.

Her Majesty's Government learn with surprise and displeasure, by the report of Mr. Chabert to your Excellency of the 19th of June, that the Turkish Ministers, relying upon the opinion of persons acquainted with the strategical merits of General Guyon, consider that he has not the capacity required for commanding the Sultan's army in Asia; but those Turkish Ministers neither admit that the army is ill commanded, nor do they indicate any intention of appointing a proper officer to that most important and responsible post.

The Asiatic territory of the Sultan is now about to become the chief theatre of the war, and it is not to be endured that the Turkish army upon which the cooperation of which the allies must depend, should be left in its present demoralized and useless condition, or that the constant representations of Her Majesty's Government should be perseveringly disregarded; and I have, therefore, by the unanimous desire of the Cabinet, to instruct your Excellency to spare no efforts with the Turkish Government, and if necessary to address your remonstrances to the Sultan himself, in order to secure that the army at Kars shall be placed under the command of an efficient and experienced General, and that immediate measures shall be taken for supplying its wants and improving its organization.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 306.

Mr. Forbes to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 38.)

Dresden, June 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour of receiving on the 25th ultimo your Lordship's despatch No. 24 of the 21st of this month.

I did not see M. de Beust until yesterday, and said at once that I had received a despatch which I was instructed to communicate to him, but that knowing he understood English, it would be easier for him if he read it than if I read it to him. He took your Lordship's despatch, and read it twice over with the greatest attention, but with more agitation than I have often seen him evince, for generally speaking his self-possession is very remarkable. His first remark was, "Je crois que je serai dans le cas de répondre à tout ceci, et très nettement; mais qu'avez vous donc écrit?"

I could not help smiling, but said the principal point of my despatch had been, that Austria and Prussia were resolved to act with those who became parties to the Treaty, and without those who declined, and that he knew this was correct.

He said that at all events he must defend his principle, which was, that as this was a purely Federal question, the other Governments could not admit the right of Austria and Prussia to present or offer them the Treaty otherwise than through the Diet, and through which they were ready to accept it.

(I know that on Monday last, the 26th, he received a telegraphic message from Munich, advising him to keep quiet, and to make no more stir in this affair.)

He said that for some time back he was accused of being under Russian influence, but that when a few years ago he was not, and had opposed the ambitious plans of Prussia, supported by Russia, against other German States, he defied any one to find in the Saxon or Russian archives such a lesson as was contained in the despatch I had placed in his hands; and as to his being a friend to revolution, he appealed to me whether he had not given the strongest proofs of the contrary.

I answered that I knew him to hate democracy as much as I did, but that all might be mistaken in measures, and that at a moment when, with the exception of a very few individuals, all Germany—I meant the intelligent classes—were unanimous in their hatred of Russia and of the heavy hand she wanted to lay upon its States, he surely should be on his guard as to taking a line, in all things, great as well as small, as would compromise his talents; for that now, when the Turks—not the English nor French—had resisted and beaten the Russians, he must see that neither he nor any other Minister could restore a prestige of their invincibility as completely destroyed.

He said, "Mais, mon Dieu, je ne suis pas Russe;" and I answered, "Then the enemies as well as friends of Russia are equally unjust in their opinion of you."

He said that he had never but the one object in view, to secure the independence of his country as long as possible.

I answered that no one wished for the independence of Saxony more than I, but that it would be better assured by remaining Germans, not Russians, and that your Lordship had put the question in its proper light by stating that this was the worst moment for showing disunion to the world.

He said they were eight Powers of the same opinion; that the answer they had received from Austria and Prussia was, "tout ce qu'il y avait de plus convenable;" and that they would all accept the Treaty through the Diet.

I remarked that this last was in fact what the two great Powers wished to ascertain before they presented their Treaty at Frankfort, for they understood the anomaly of having first concluded it, and then in a manner beginning it again there; that they had offered it to their acceptance individually on the same footing as they themselves had made it as independent Powers, which position their Bamberg Conference seemed to decline or at least to hesitate as to accepting its responsibility, and that I thought on reflection that it would have been better left alone.

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M. de Beust seemed to wish to terminate this conversation, and was evidently so excited that I preferred to leave him, without quoting a number of minor proofs as to his Russian inclinations.

The Minister of War is the only member of the Government who enters into his views, but these two possess the King's confidence. However, it must be admitted, that as affairs in the East now stand, with Austria and Prussia having taken so decided a line, and with the undeniable proofs that the Russians had miscalculated everything in regard to Turkey and the Eastern question, his Excellency has sufficient cause for irritation, and it is to all this that I attribute his having so completely lost his command of himself as in this last interview.

The part of your Lordship's despatch which attracted his greatest attention was the last paragraph, in which the injury of disunion to all Germany, and particularly to the minor Powers, is so ably stated; but he is daily receiving such severe commentaries on his policy from Berlin, Paris, and Vienna, that he must feel the inutility of his efforts, although a continuance of them increases the difficulty of an alteration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS R. FORBES.

No. 307.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July 5.*)

(No. 253.)
My Lord, *Vienna, July 1, 1854.*

THE intelligence which Count Buol has received through Berlin from St. Petersburgh, which has been transmitted to him in part by Count Esterhazy, leads him to believe that the Emperor Nicholas was inclined to the acceptation of the requisition to evacuate the Principalities which had been addressed to him by the Austrian Government, backed by that of Prussia. It appears that Colonel Manteuffel had been well received by the Emperor Nicholas, and the message of which he was the bearer from the King of Prussia, that "he gave his entire support to the Austrian communication, and that if it was not successful, with however great and sincere regret, he must act in support of it," had been received by him without any declaration of animosity.

Count Esterhazy, in his despatch, states that in a confidential communication with Count Nesselrode, that Minister had not disguised from him, that in his individual opinion the Provinces, under the actual circumstances, ought to be evacuated.

While these impressions are conveyed by the intelligence from St. Petersburgh, it is also stated that the party designated as the Russian party was making every exertion to prevent any concession from being made.

Under these circumstances, Count Buol has decided to make a communication to the Governments of England and France, in which he will develop the position in which he conceives the Austrian Government to stand both as to Russia and as to the allies.

If the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should announce, in reply to the requisition from Austria, that they had complied with the conditions required, by stopping all advance of their armies beyond the Danube, and by ordering the evacuation of the Principalities to be carried out, then Count Buol would consider the objects of the Austro-Prussian Treaty to have been obtained; but the Protocols by which Austria was bound to England and France for the attainment of a peace between the Porte and Russia, which should secure the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and establish those guarantees which would fulfil the conditions particularly laid down in the Protocol of the 9th of April, would remain to be carried out, and the Austrian Government would consider themselves as completely united with those Governments to effect those objects.

In the case of the Russian Government stating, that having already arrested their advance beyond the Danube, they would be ready to treat as to the evacuation of the Principalities, the Austrian Government would find themselves in the position of being obliged to look upon this declaration as unsatisfactory,

and of announcing that their army would receive orders to advance into these Provinces, and if they should be called upon to carry out the stipulations entered into by the 1st Article of the Convention with Turkey of the 14th ultimo, by the employment of their troops, and should meet with a Russian force, it would depend upon the resistance that force might offer whether hostilities would take place, and a state of war between the two countries be established.

The third case would be the acceptation of all the points contained in the Austrian requisition, and the offer on the part of Russia to treat for peace. Count Buol would then communicate this proposal to the allied Governments, and would discuss with them the terms to be required for the re-establishment of that peace, and in which he hoped that the views and intentions of the Austrian Government would not be found discrepant with those of the English and French Governments.

I state these circumstances to your Lordship merely in anticipation of the communication which you will receive from Count Colloredo, and which will more distinctly explain the position of this Cabinet, which I have been only thus, in a very hurried form, able to transmit to you.

General Hess has this day left Vienna in execution of the important duties imposed upon him as Commander-in-chief of the Austrian armies assembling on the eastern frontier. He will proceed, in the first instance, to the corps under the orders of General Coronini, whose troops will be in readiness to advance in the course of a few days, and General Hess being upon the spot, is entrusted with the authority to decide upon their march, as it is expected that by the time of his arrival upon the frontiers of Wallachia, he will learn that the Russian troops have already evacuated Bucharest.

I have the honour of inclosing the original and translation of the proclamation to the army under his command, which has been issued by General Hess.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 307.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

THE Commander-in-chief of the 3rd and 4th Armies, Baron de Hess, has issued the following order to the army, which will find a loud echo in the heart not only of every soldier, but of every Austrian.

Order to the Army.

His Majesty the Emperor has, by an Imperial Decree of the 21st of June, graciously pleased to intrust me with the command on the eastern frontier of his Empire:

While I shall seek to deserve this confidence of my Emperor and Master by the most unlimited submission to His Majesty's person and service, and while, led by the experience of nearly fifty years spent in an active soldier's life, I trust at the same time with full confidence to the old invincible spirit which has always inspired our army, that spirit of discipline, of order, of bravery, and of self-sacrifice which so honourably distinguishes the Austrian soldier and officer, as well as to the intelligence and courageous steadfastness in their duties of all superior leaders; but, above all, to the excellent direction of their troops on the part of those Generals who command the armies and corps d'armées, whom I see with unbounded confidence at the head of them; and I am convinced that they, as long and valued companions in arms and battles, will certainly in every position stand as true and efficient by my side.

(Signed) HESS.

Vienna, June 25, 1854.

No. 308.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 844.)

Paris, July 4, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received this morning a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, dated the 30th ultimo, containing the details of a conversation of some importance which that Minister had just held with Count Buol.

The latter had received despatches from Count Esterhazy of the 22nd ultimo. Colonel Manteuffel had arrived at St. Petersburgh, and had been cordially received by the Emperor. His Majesty's language, however, on the subject of the summons was cold, and gave no indication of what his answer would be.

Still, Count Buol said that he would not await its arrival in order to inform the Representatives of France and England of what the attitude of Austria would be, under the only three contingencies which could happen:

1. If the Russian troops retired behind the Pruth, without the Emperor's expressing a desire to treat for peace, the object of the Convention signed between Austria and Prussia would have been attained, and the Treaty would consequently become a dead letter. But, in the Protocols signed by the four Powers, the necessity of assuring the future integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire had been laid down. This must still be provided for, and must form the subject of further discussion between the four Powers.

2. The answer might be a direct refusal. In this case, Austria would proceed to occupy not only Wallachia, but Moldavia also, and her troops would attack any Russian troops that might endeavour to prevent the occupation.

3. Russia might evacuate the Principalities, expressing at the same time a desire to treat for peace. Should this be the course followed, Austria would communicate that desire to the belligerent parties, and invite them to acquaint her with the conditions on which they would be willing to make peace. Count Buol did not think that there was any likelihood of a divergence of opinion between Austria and the Western Powers as to the conditions to be imposed, and M. de Hübner would shortly receive a despatch in which those already communicated to him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, would be discussed.

The despatch concludes with the following remarkable paragraph: "What Count Buol now said, applied only to 1854. If the spring of 1855 found the Eastern question still unsettled, it would then be war to the knife."

After hearing this despatch I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I felt convinced that Count Buol would never have made, in the second hypothesis put by him, so strong a declaration, unless he had reason to know that the Russian answer would not be a direct refusal. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that the despatch had left the same impression upon his mind.

He then read to me a despatch from Berlin, dated the 1st instant. M. de Moustier recounts a conversation with M. de Manteuffel, who had just received letters from his brother. The latter's account of his reception at St. Petersburgh differs from that given by Count Esterhazy. He found the Emperor out of spirits and very desirous of peace, ready even to make concessions, provided they were not religious concessions, to obtain it. No answer need be expected at Vienna before the 6th or 7th. He could not tate in what sense it would be couched. Count Nesselrode was for yielding, but the violent Russian party for refusing all concession.

Baron Manteuffel observed to M. de Moustier that he looked upon this state of things as likely to end in a refusal. Nevertheless, the King of Prussia appears to have construed the expression that the Emperor would make concessions for peace, as a great advantage gained, and orders had been sent to Colonel Manteuffel to press for further explanations.

M. de Moustier mentions in the same despatch that M. de Manteuffel had assured him that the Prussian army would be shortly mobilized.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY

No. 309.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 236.)

Foreign Office, July 5, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that the accounts which daily reach him from Wallachia leave little doubt that the Russian troops have received orders to evacuate Greater Wallachia.

The troops, as they retire, carry with them the judicial and administrative officers, and also the local treasure-chests and archives. The prospect of the total anarchy with which these measures threaten the country has thrown the population of Bucharest into consternation, and pressing entreaties reach Vienna from that capital for the intervention of Austria, in order to preserve the people from the misfortunes to which they would be exposed, if they were abandoned to their fate.

The Emperor is accordingly disposed to send a force into Wallachia, although the answer of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to the Austrian communications of the 3rd of June has not yet arrived.

In taking the military measures requisite to carry out this intention, the Austrian Government believes that it is serving the common interest, because it has no other object in view than to maintain order in countries suddenly deprived of the protection of all authority, to preserve them from a fresh invasion, and to reorganize there as soon as possible a regular administration, in concert with the Suzerain Power.

I told Count Colloredo that I had no objection to make on the part of Her Majesty's Government to the course which Austria was about to pursue, and which might be now necessary, in consequence of the evacuation of Wallachia by the Russians, and the state of anarchy in which they had left the province; but I could not admit that the entry there of Austrian troops was in accordance with the Convention lately signed between Austria and the Porte, unless it was the preliminary step to ulterior measures.

The Emperor of Austria, according to that Convention, stipulates by means of negotiation to obtain the evacuation of the Principalities, and to employ, if required, the necessary number of troops for that purpose; and, if the entry into Wallachia is preparatory to driving the Russians out of Moldavia, it would appear to be a well-judged operation, and likely to prove embarrassing to Russia: but if, the Russians having quitted Wallachia of their own accord or under the pressure of necessity, Austria is to occupy that province, while Russia keeps quiet possession of Moldavia, I must observe that the Convention did not authorize such a proceeding.

I assured Count Colloredo that I was induced to offer these remarks solely from a desire that no future misunderstanding should arise respecting the grounds on which a portion of the Sultan's territory was occupied by Austrian troops.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 310.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland

No. 237.

Foreign Office, July 7, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO read to me yesterday a despatch from Count Buol, announcing the course that the Cabinet of Vienna will be prepared to pursue upon the receipt of the Russian answer to the demands made by Austria.

Count Buol states three cases:

1. If Russia complies with the summons and evacuates the Principalities they will be occupied by Austria, and a position will be taken to guard against attack, and to prevent the return of the Russian troops. Austria will then be governed by the Protocols of Vienna, she will come to no separate under-

standing with Russia; she will endeavour to obtain effectual guarantees for the future, and, so long as Russia refuses such arrangements, the obligations that bind together the allies will exist, and require them to act together.

2. If Russia refuses to evacuate the Moldo-Wallachian Provinces, the course of Austria will be clear. She will obtain what she has required by force or by strategical position. She will not regard her entry into the Principalities as an act hostile to Russia; but it will depend on the latter Power to declare war against her, in which case the Convention with Prussia will come into operation, and the assistance of England and France will be relied upon.

3. If the answer is evasive, and offers conditions that the belligerent Powers alone can grant, Russia will be reminded of the warning given to her that acquiescence in Austrian demands was not to be made dependent on terms with which Austria had no means of complying; but the Cabinet of Vienna will make these terms known to the English and French Governments, and it will be for them to determine whether they are acceptable or not. If not, then Austria will, *de gré ou de force*, take possession of the Principalities, and prevent their being again occupied by Russia.

I thanked Count Colloredo for this communication, which I considered satisfactory; and, as there could be little doubt that the third case contemplated by Count Buol would arise, viz., that of an evasive answer, I expressed a hope that no further time would be lost in communicating with the Russian Government, about conditions that the belligerent Powers would not accept. With reference to the probable evacuation of Wallachia, and the continued occupation of Moldavia by Russia, I asked Count Colloredo if the intentions of his Government applied to both provinces alike.

Count Colloredo said that no distinction was made, and that the determination of the Austrian Government was to expel the Russians from both provinces.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 311.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 238.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 7, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO read to me yesterday a despatch addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Minister at Paris, with reference to a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Baron Bourqueney, communicating the views of the French Government as to the conditions upon which a solid and durable peace might be concluded.

The Cabinet of the Tuileries, Count Buol observes, will not consent to a general armistice, implying a suspension of hostilities by sea, unless it has previously the assurance that Russia will accept the conditions of peace which the French Cabinet deems indispensable.

Nevertheless, in the event of Russia determining to evacuate the Principalities, and declaring herself at the same time ready to open negotiations for peace, the belligerent Powers might, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, without any inconvenience, consent in the first place to an armistice by land in Turkey in Europe.

Upon the opening of negotiations, and after the basis of peace had been agreed upon, the armistice might become general by land and by sea.

In discussing the conditions of a solid peace, the French Government was disposed to admit that, if Russia were ready to make peace at the present moment, the re-establishment of the territorial *status quo ante* might be assented to, but that the political *status quo ante* was impossible.

Count Buol then proceeds to examine, one by one, the guarantees of future peace, which Europe would have a right to demand.

1. Opening of the mouths of the Danube.

In the opinion of the Austrian Government this might be regulated by means of a Convention, to which Russia would naturally be a party, and which should place under the control of Europe the cessation of all hindrances to the commerce and navigation of the Danube.

2. The protectorate of the Danubian Principalities to be entrusted to some other Power than Russia.

It appears to the Austrian Government that this object would be attained by substituting the safeguard of Europe for that of the Power which has notoriously abused the exclusive influence which she had appropriated to herself.

Austria, in her quality of bordering Power, might be charged with the new organisation of the Moldo-Wallachian Provinces that has now become necessary. The Convention between Austria and the Porte, of the 14th of June, contains the germs of the mission which might thus be confided to Austria.

3. The cessation of the religious protectorate of Russia in Turkey.

The Austrian Government is of opinion that the pretension of Russia to exercise an exclusive protection of the schismatic Greek Christians in Turkey, would be deprived of all pretext from the moment that there shall be secured to the Christian subjects of the Porte, to whatever creed they may belong, perfect equality of rights and independence in the administration of their spiritual affairs according to the particular laws of each communion, and which should be watched over by all the Christian Powers.

4. The opening of the Black Sea, and the establishment on some part of its coast of a military port and naval station for the maritime Powers.

Count Buol thinks that this implies a cession of territory which would be at variance with the principles hitherto laid down regarding Turkey. At all events the Austrian Government cannot doubt that no territorial cession ought to be imposed upon the Porte, and that such a sacrifice ought to be entirely spontaneous on its part.

Count Buol observes that according to the confidential communications which have passed between Count Colloredo and myself, the British Government does not appear to have any intention of acquiring a port in the Black Sea, or of establishing there a permanent naval station. The guarantees aimed at by the British Government would appear to consist rather in stipulations by which Russia, in common with all other maritime Powers, should be forbidden to have more than a certain number of ships of war in the Black Sea.

An arrangement of this nature would appear to the Austrian Government a more efficient guarantee for the future against attack upon the integrity and independence of Turkey, but it necessarily involves a revision of the Treaty of 1841.

5. As to the question of the expenses of the war, the Austrian Government expects an opposition on the part of Russia too insurmountable for them to be able to engage to support a demand of this nature.

After thanking Count Colloredo for this communication, and assuring him of the value and importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to the friendly interchange of opinions with the Cabinet of Vienna, I said it was satisfactory to find that upon several essential points the two Governments were agreed.

I observed that the complete freedom of navigation on the Danube was now an European interest; that it must henceforth be guarded by the Great Powers of Europe; and that Russia must never again be allowed to obstruct that navigation as she had hitherto done.

It was equally out of the question, I said, that Russia should retain any right of interference in the Principalities, which, as Count Buol proposed, should be placed under the safeguard of Europe; but with respect to the new organisation to be given to the Moldo-Wallachian provinces, I remarked that great care must be taken—first, to uphold the legitimate authority of the Sultan in that portion of his dominions; and next, that one military occupation should not be substituted for another, which might be equally opposed to the independence of the Ottoman Empire.

Count Colloredo observed that the proposal went no further than that Austria should be charged with superintending the work of reconstruction; and I replied that if Austria would consider herself as acting on behalf of the other Powers, and that nothing was to be done without their previous sanction, satisfactory arrangements might probably be made.

With respect to the pretensions of Russia to exercise an exclusive protectorate over the Greek subjects of the Porte, there could not now be two opinions; but the rights and privileges of all Christians throughout the Turkish dominions must be secured and placed under the safeguard of the Five Powers.

Her Majesty's Government looked forward to the accomplishment of this great work as their best reward for the expense and inconvenience of the war; and they had no doubt it could be effected without impairing the independence and sovereign rights of the Sultan.

With respect to the opening of the Black Sea, and the establishment there of a military port and naval station for the maritime Powers, I admitted that it involved a cession of territory by the Porte, and was therefore open to the objection raised by Count Buol, although it would be necessary for the defence of Constantinople, if Russia was allowed not only to keep up her present naval force in the Black Sea, but to increase it to any amount she pleased. It was however to the limitation of that force that Her Majesty's Government looked as the guarantee for future peace in the East. Russia could only maintain her present large fleet in the Black Sea for purposes of aggression, and she must therefore be required to reduce it to the number of ships that will be consistent with the safety of Turkey, and that number should also be the limit of the naval force that other maritime Powers should at any time be permitted to have in the Black Sea.

As regarded the expenses of the war, their reimbursement, I said, would undoubtedly be desirable, and Her Majesty's Government had therefore made no objection to the claim which the French Government were disposed to put forward; but in the present state of the war with Russia, Her Majesty's Government did not regard such indemnity as a condition *sine qua non* of peace.

There was another condition, however, upon which I said Her Majesty's Government would be disposed to insist, viz., the independence of Circassia. We were at this moment arming and encouraging the Circassians, and inviting their aid in the war; and we would never abandon them to the vengeance of Russia when peace was concluded.

Count Colloredo appeared to agree in the propriety of this intention; but he asked whether our views extended to Georgia and the territory which Russia possessed, and which had been recognized by Treaties.

I said that the fate of Georgia, as well as that of the Crimea, would depend on the events of war, and the success that might attend the arms of the allies.

Your Lordship will point out to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government, in considering the securities to be obtained for Turkey against future aggression on the part of Russia, must examine the dangers to which she is exposed:

1st. Russia might, as in 1833, occupy the Principalities, and advancing by Silistria and the Balkan, march against Constantinople.

2nd. Russia might largely reinforce her army, and, advancing to Erzeroom, take advantage of that commanding position to extend her conquest to Constantinople, and would place the destiny of Asia Minor in her hands.

3rd. Russia might embark 30,000 or 40,000 men at Sebastopol, and, landing them at Bourgas or in the Bosphorus, attack Constantinople by sea and land at the same time.

It is against these dangers, so clearly pointed out by the position of Russia and her aggression of 1853, that we have to guard. The free navigation of the Danube is a great interest for Germany and for Europe, and it must be secured; but the first duty of Her Majesty's Government is to obtain securities for the integrity and independence of Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 312.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July 8.*)

Vienna, July 7, 1854.

(Télegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL appointed to see me this morning. He said that Prince Gortchakoff came to him yesterday and left with him a copy of the despatch addressed to him by Nesselrode. He had in haste submitted this despatch to the Emperor of Austria, who had taken it with him to the country, and he had not been able to discuss it with His Majesty, and learn his impression regarding it. As soon as he had done so, he would communicate the result to me. He

then gave me this despatch to read, that I might form my own opinion with regard to it. My impression is unfavourable, as is that of the French Ambassador, to whom the same opportunity was given. The proposal [?] to accept a general negotiation, without allusion to the conditions, for the re-establishment of peace. The three points mentioned in the Protocol of the 9th of April, namely, secular jurisdiction, the evacuation of the Principalities, the general guarantee for the religious communities, are agreed to; with respect to the evacuation, certain securities are required. The language of Prince Gortchakoff is reported as expressing a desire for peace more marked than appears to be borne out by the despatch he has communicated.

No. 313.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July 8.*)

(No. 345.)

Constantinople, June 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a despatch received this instant from Lieutenant-Colonel Neale. I learn from its contents that the siege of Silistria is raised, and I may add, as Lord Raglan's opinion, that the whole Russian army before that fortress has recrossed the Danube.

Whether this glorious event be attributable to Austrian intervention or to Ottoman courage, sustained by British example, I venture to offer your Lordship my hearty congratulations, and the more so as the importance of succouring Silistria had induced Omer Pasha to commence operations attended, I believe, with considerable risk.

Marshal St. Arnaud embarked for Varna last night. He was preceded by Prince Napoleon, and the troops of His Imperial Highness' Division.

Sir Richard England, with the greater part of his Division, is going up the Bosphorus at this moment.

The Turkish regiment destined for Lord Raglan is on the move, together with the Artillery attached to it.

Lord Raglan's despatches are forwarded by the present messenger to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle under flying seal through Lord Cowley.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 313.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, June 24, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that by intelligence received this afternoon from Shumla, Lord Raglan has been informed that the siege of Silistria was raised on the night of the 22nd instant. His Highness Omer Pasha purposed proceeding to Silistria in person to thank the garrison for its gallant defence of that place, and there concert his future movements. It was yet doubtful whether the whole of the besieging force had crossed the Danube, or whether their retrograde movement was into the Dobrudscha. Some squadrons of British Cavalry will, I understand, be detached early to-morrow morning towards Bazardjik to watch the movements of the enemy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 314.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 857.)

Paris, July 7, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO will no doubt have made a communication to your Lordship similar to one made by M. de Hübner to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in which the Austrian Government examines the different conditions put forward by the French Government as those on which they should insist before making peace with Russia, and I only allude to it to enable me to say, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys is on the whole satisfied with the tenor of Count Buol's despatch.

He is equally satisfied with a report which he has received this morning from M. de Bourqueney, giving an account of an interview which he (M. de Bourqueney) had had with the Emperor of Austria, during which His Imperial Majesty had said that he hoped to see the Austrian and allied troops united under one flag, as the Governments had been united in conference.

His Majesty questioned M. de Bourqueney as to the amount of the allied troops at Varna. He said also that he had still some difficulties to overcome in Germany; but that even if they proved insuperable, which he was not disposed to think, they would not prevent him from carrying out his resolutions.

Your Lordship will recollect that in my despatch No. 844 of the 4th instant, I reported the substance of a conversation which M. de Bourqueney had had with Count Buol, in which the latter had stated the course which the Austrian Government was prepared to take in each of the three contingencies which the Russian answer might bring about. I inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether M. de Hübner had said anything to him upon this subject. His Excellency replied that M. de Hübner had not made him any official communication, but in the course of conversation he had expressed himself, though less explicitly, exactly as Count Buol had expressed himself to M. de Bourqueney.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 315.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 259.)

Vienna, July 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Convention between Austria and Turkey, by which the former is empowered to occupy the Danubian Principalities, was ratified at Count Buol's on the 3rd instant, and immediately transmitted to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 316.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 379. Confidential.)

Berlin, July 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to report to your Lordship, by the telegraph to-day, the substance of the communication made to me by Baron Manteuffel respecting the intelligence received yesterday from St. Petersburgh.

His Excellency said as little as was possible, observing that it was not from a wish to conceal from me the contents of the Russian answer to the late communications from here, for they would probably be made known hereafter to Her Majesty's Government; but because he had written to Vienna to learn the impressions that had been made by Prince Gortchakoff, and did not wish to pronounce an opinion on the subject until he was aware of the intentions of the Austrian Cabinet.

It was in vain that I endeavoured to learn some details from him as to the plans of Russia, and her military projects; upon these he merely said that there was no allusion to the maintenance of the position on the Sereth, and that there even appeared a disposition to evacuate the Principalities, and to negotiate for an armistice.

Before leaving his Excellency I asked what I should tell your Lordship from him on the subject of these communications; and he said that he was unwilling to pronounce any opinion on them until he heard from Vienna, that his desire was to act with Austria, and that the two Governments should adopt a similar line of policy.

It is impossible for me to say more at this moment as to the impressions produced here by these communications than that I am assured that they have given satisfaction to the King of Prussia, and that His Majesty sees in them a conciliatory spirit which will make the cooperation of Germany with Austria unnecessary, and which will ultimately lead to the restoration of peace.

He hopes no doubt that circumstances will soon arise which will absolve him from his liabilities to be called on to participate in the war, and I believe that there is no subterfuge that he will not have recourse to to extricate himself from his engagements with Austria and with the Western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 317.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 384. Confidential.)

Berlin, July 7, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the despatches which I have this day addressed to your Lordship, upon the subject of the communications from St. Petersburgh, I have the honour to inform you that I have learned from a private and confidential source, to which I have every reason to attach credence, that a telegraphic message was sent to Vienna yesterday by Baron Manteuffel, stating that the Russian answer had been received and was generally approved of, and that the Austrian Cabinet was consequently requested to take it into favourable consideration. I understand that Count Buol's answer was that he proposed submitting the Russian communication to the Conference.

A reply was immediately returned to Vienna that the Prussian Government disapproves of such a proceeding, declaring it to be in opposition to the Convention signed between Prussia and Austria.

Your Lordship will no doubt be more perfectly informed of this affair by the Earl of Westmorland, but I think it my duty to report this intelligence, in proof of the incessant efforts of this Government to thwart the objects of our alliance with Austria.

It is to be hoped that the Imperial Government will follow a course independent of Prussia, and it appears to me that the only chance of forcing Prussia to act with us, is, that Austria, when she has assured to herself the cooperation of the smaller States of Germany, should threaten her with isolation —a position in which, I cannot but think, is one in which she would not willingly find herself placed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 318.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 390.) *Berlin, July 7, 1854.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a translation of the answer of the German States represented at the Bamberg Conference, to the note which was addressed by Austria and Prussia, inviting their adhesion to the Treaty of 20th April.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 318.

Answer of Bamberg Conference to Austro-Prussian Note.

Monsieur,

VOUS avez eu connaissance de la réponse que le Gouvernement Royal a fait en date du 3 instant, à l'invitation qui lui a été adressé par les hauts Gouvernements d'Autriche et de Prusse, d'accéder à leur Convention d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive du 20 Avril. Vous trouverez ci-joint copie de la dépêche identique qui a été envoyée sous la date du 16 aux Ministres de Prusse et d'Autriche accrédités près de notre Cour en réponse à notre communication.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'est empressé de soumettre cette réponse à l'examen le plus attentif, et j'ai été autorisé par le Roi, notre très gracieux Maître, de vous faire les communications suivantes, que vous aurez à porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement Royal Prussien.

C'est avec une haute satisfaction que Sa Majesté s'est convaincue que le point de vue sur lequel le Gouvernement Royal s'est placé dans sa déclaration du 3 instant, à savoir, le stricte maintien aux obligations fédérales à l'effet de sauvegarder les intérêts collectifs de l'Allemagne, a trouvé chez les hauts Gouvernements de Prusse et d'Autriche l'accueil le plus amical et un assentiment complet.

Une entente complète de vues subsiste maintenant entre les très hautes Cours de Berlin et de Vienne, et le Gouvernement Royal, tant sur la communication à faire à la Diète du Traité d'Alliance du 20 Avril de cette année, avec l'invitation d'y adhérer, que sur la participation extérieure de la Confédération aux négociations futures sur les buts vers lesquels les efforts de l'Allemagne auront tendu à l'effet de sauvegarder ses intérêts collectifs.

Le Gouvernement Royal se laisse volontiers aller à la confiance atteste, que les deux Grandes Puissances réussiront en unissant leurs efforts à assurer à la Confédération une représentation indépendante aux prochaines négociations, et plus complète que celle qui aurait lieu par les deux Cours de Vienne et de Berlin. L'exécution de l'Article XLIX de l'Acte final de Vienne préparera la voie à cette représentation indépendante.

Le Gouvernement Royal a reçu avec un vif intérêt la communication des deux dépêches qui ont été, l'une par l'Autriche et l'autre par la Prusse, lui servant d'appui, adressées à St. Pétersbourg, d'après les dispositions de l'Article Séparé du Traité du 20 Avril de cette année.

Si les dépêches ne font pas ressortir d'une manière formelle l'éventualité d'une retraite simultanée du théâtre de la guerre, la déclaration que viennent de donner les deux Hauts Gouvernements Contractants que cette éventualité répondrait à leurs vœux et à leurs efforts, cette déclaration permet d'espérer que leurs démarches, auxquels le Gouvernement Royal se joindra volontiers, quand il s'agira de s'entendre sur la réponse qu'on attend du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, amèneront une entente pacifique entre les Puissances belligérantes, et qu'en tout cas elles sauvegarderont entièrement les intérêts collectifs de l'Allemagne.

Sa Majesté le Roi, notre très gracieux Souverain, n'hésitera donc pas d'après cela à donner à son Représentant à la Diète l'ordre de voter sans réserve pour l'accession de la Confédération au Traité d'Alliance Austro-Prussienne du 20 Avril de cette année, aussitôt que les deux hauts Gouvernements d'Autriche et de Prusse auront soumis à l'Assemblée Fédérale l'invitation d'adhérer avec les explications et déclarations contenues dans la dépêche identique du 16 de ce mois.

Quant à la rédaction de l'arrêté fédéral le Gouvernement Royal pense qu'on admettra celle du projet ci-joint. Ce projet ne préjudicie en rien le rapport que fera la Commission nommée à la séance du 24 Mai de cette année, mais il a pour but de répondre au désir des deux Cabinets de connaître d'avance les votes qui seront données au sein de la Diète. Vous êtes autorisé à laisser copie au Baron de Manteuffel.

No. 319.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)

Vienna, July 10, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Austrian Government have decided to forward the answer which they have received from St. Petersburgh for the consideration of the French and English Governments. If this answer had not contained the stipulation of a cessation of arms for the required evacuation of the Principalities Count Buol would not have forwarded it to the Governments; but as it acknowledges and accepts as a basis on which to treat the three propositions upon which the engagements between the allies are founded, he has considered himself bound to submit the proposals, so that the allied Governments may exercise their judgment with regard to them. In transmitting this decision to St. Petersburgh, Count Buol has stated to the Russian Government that he maintains all his original demands.

No relaxation whatever will take place in the military preparations of Austria, and the same preparations are expected from Prussia for the maintennce of the stipulations of the Treaty with Austria.

Count Buol will forward to-morrow or the next day by messenger to London an explanation of the views of his Government, together with copies of the documents relating to present transactions.

No. 320.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 351.) *Constantinople, June 28, 1854.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of the latest correspondence which has passed between Vice-Admiral Dundas and myself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 320.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, June 26, 1854.

Sir,

INCLOSED herewith for your information is a translation in French of the copy transmitted to me in Turkish from the Porte of the instructions addressed by his Excellency the Captain Pasha to Vice-Admiral Ahmed, Commanding-in-

chief the Turkish squadron in the Black Sea, for carrying into execution the arrangements recommended by yourself and Admiral Hamelin.

I observe only one deviation, and that is explained in the instruction itself, from the tenour of your suggestions; and I shall be happy to learn that the orders now given to Ahmed Pasha on my recommendation are calculated to meet the present requirements of the combined service.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 320.

Instructions to Ahmed Pasha.

(Traduit du Turc.)

29 *Rumazan*, 1270. (24 *Juin*, 1854.)

Excellence,

LE service que les flottes doivent rendre à présent dans la Mer Noire, consiste à bloquer l'arsenal et la flotte Russes, et à protéger les côtes et la mer—service pour lequel les flottes des deux Puissances alliées seront suffisantes. Ainsi des bâtiments de la marine Impériale Turque qui se trouvent dans la Mer Noire, il faut laisser à Varna deux vaisseaux de ligne pour la protection du pays, et la nombre de chaloupes dont on peut disposer pour aider au débarquement des troupes de terre, et au transport des munitions et autres objets; destiner deux petits bateaux-à-vapeur pour les communications entre Varna et Constantinople, et deux grands bateaux-à-vapeur pour croiser sur les côtes de la Circassie et de la Georgie; employer deux frigates à voiles, ou deux corvettes à voiles avec mission de croiser entre le Détroit de la Mer Noire et Varna, pour la protection des bâtiments qui vont et viennent, et employer le reste des bâtiments dans les Bosphore et dans la Mer Blanche. Voilà ce que les Amiraux des deux Puissances ont représenté.

En conséquence, on a délibéré dans un Conseil des Ministres sur ce qu'il y aurait à faire à cet égard, et voici le résultat de ces délibérations.

D'après l'état dans lequel les Russes se trouvent quant à leurs forces de mer, et à juger des dispositions prises par les Puissances alliées, il n'y a pas de probabilité qu'un grand combat naval aura lieu dans ce moment-ci dans la Mer Noire, et les côtes sont en sûreté; ainsi, la flotte Impériale n'a pas beaucoup à faire là. Venons à l'état des choses dans l'Archipel, la plupart des bâtiments Hellènes se sont, suivant leur habitude, livrés à la piraterie; ils ont fortement compromis la sûreté et la tranquillité de l'Archipel, et ils commettent des actes de brigandage dans les Iles, et au préjudice des voyageurs. Il est, par conséquent, de devoir du Gouvernement de poursuivre ces pirates. Mais quoique des bâtiments faisant partie de la flotte Impériale, et quelques bateaux-à-vapeur des Puissances alliées soient occupés de la poursuite des pirates dans l'Archipel, comme le nombre des bateaux pirates est très grand, et que l'Archipel est plein d'abris et de criques, les bâtiments en activité ne sont pas en nombre suffisant pour les poursuivre. Et puis, l'Ile de Crête devenant de plus en plus intéressant par rapport à sa situation, il est nécessaire d'assurer la tranquillité de cette île, et de déployer toujours une force imposante aux yeux des partisans des Hellènes qui se trouvent dans l'île. Les bâtiments légers qui se trouvent déjà dans l'Archipel s'occuperont toujours de la poursuite des pirates, mais en même temps, si une division navale composée de grands bâtiments y croisait aussi, il est clair que cette démonstration ferait un tout autre effet et une plus grand impression. C'est pourquoi la présence d'une partie de la flotte Impériale croisant actuellement dans l'Archipel en corps réuni est jugée d'une nécessité urgente, et par conséquent il faut détacher de la flotte Impériale, conformément aux représentations des Amiraux, les bâtiments destinés pour Varna, pour la croisière entre cette place et le Canal de la Mer Noire, et pour les côtes de la Circassie, et fixer leur station. On fera venir le reste de la flotte à Constantinople, et les plus grands bâtiments seront établis, comme mesure de précaution, dans le Canal de la Mer Noire; de ce qui en restera on enverra le nombre nécessaire dans l'Archipel, afin de déployer aussi une force maritime.

Votre Excellence aura le commandement de la division de la flotte qui doit rester dans la Mer Noire. On fera venir son Excellence Hassan Pacha, qui sera nommé Commandant de la division des bâtiments qui seront envoyés à l'Archipel.

On a représenté qu'il faudrait destiner deux bateaux-à-vapeur pour les communications entre Constantinople et Varna; mais il est indispensable qu'il y ait des bateaux-à-vapeur avec la flotte Impériale. Il est vrai que, sous les auspices de Sa Majesté Impériale, il y a assez de bateaux-à-vapeur à l'arsenal; seulement, comme on a besoin pour les employer ici et ailleurs, et que la distance d'ici à Varna est peu considérable, il a été jugé à propos de faire faire le service des communications à un seul bateau-à-vapeur, et d'employer l'autre à un autre service. Sa Hautesse a également trouvé cette disposition à propos, et donné les ordres en conséquence.

Par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale votre Excellence destinera pour être stationnés à Varna, les vaisseaux de ligne "Techrifié" et "Peiki Messeret;" pour les côtes de la Circassie, les bateaux-à-vapeur "Feizi Bahre" et "Medjidiyé;" pour être de garde entre Varna et le Canal de la Mer Noire, la frégate Egyptienne "Bahiré" et le brig "Djai Ferah;" pour les communications entre Varna et Constantinople, le bateau-à-vapeur "Peiki Fidjaret."

Le reste de la flotte Impériale sera retenu au Détroit de la Mer Noire, d'où l'on fera venir à Constantinople ceux des bâtiments qu'il convient d'expédier à la Mer Blanche.

Il a été jugé nécessaire que votre Excellence combine avec les Amiraux des Puissances auxiliaires la rédaction des instructions à donner aux capitaines des bâtiments qui doivent rester dans la Mer Noire. Conformément aux ordres de Sa Majesté Impériale, votre Excellence aura soin d'établir les bâtiments susmentionnés de la manière ci-dessus énoncée; elle restera à Varna avec les vaisseaux de ligne ci-dessus désignés; elle enverra ici le reste, ainsi que la division Egyptienne; elle combinera, comme il a été dit plus haut, avec les Amiraux susmentionnés, les instructions qu'il faudra donner aux capitaines des bâtiments qui doivent rester dans la Mer Noire; et elle enverra à la Sublime Porte copie de ces instructions; étant à ces fins que j'écris cette dépêche à votre Excellence.

Inclosure 3 in No. 320.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *off Baltchik*, *June* 26, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the "Sanspareil" returned this morning from the coasts of Circassia and Georgia. Captain Dacres reported to me that Soukhoum Kaleh is only held by about 100 Irregular Cavalry; that Selim Pasha has no troops to assist in defending that place (especially since his late defeat); and, as the Circassians appear to have no idea of forming part of the garrison of any fort, and the Mingrelians being decidedly hostile, Soukhoum Kaleh, and even Redoubt Kaleh, which Selim Pasha considers of far greater importance than any other place on the coast, are exposed to almost certain recapture by the Russians, unless reinforcements are sent from Constantinople or elsewhere.

The assistance rendered by our ships has been very great, and doubtless has hitherto contributed very much to the security of those places; but without proper garrisons they cannot be maintained, and it will become a serious question whether, under such circumstances, the guns, &c., should not be effectually destroyed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

No. 321.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 355.)

Constantinople, June 28, 1854.

My Lord,

IT must be admitted that the Turkish Ministers and the Turkish officers are, for the most part, anything but what we could desire at the present juncture. In quieter times their deficiencies were evident enough; and much have I laboured, sometimes with and sometimes without instructions, to remedy evils of which the consequences were so easy to foresee, and so greatly to be apprehended. The time is now come when the neglect of friendly admonitions and the loss of opportunities are severely felt, and rendered the more apparent as their effects stand out in contrast with the superior qualities and more effective modes of operation exhibited by the Sultan's Christian auxiliaries. Even the strongest motives of action,—impending danger, unusual competition, and necessity that takes no refusal,—produce comparatively but little effect on those who exercise authority in the Turkish Empire. All such stimulants are in a great measure neutralized by confirmed personal habits and inveterate vices of administration, fatal alike to efficiency and to improvement. We have not to reproach the Ministers with a want of ability or ill-will, so much as with ignorance and apathy, mistrust of each other, and dread of responsibility. Those other just causes of complaint which prevail in the provinces and armies, are unfortunately rooted in the remains of a system effete for every good purpose, and almost for every good quality, except courage, itself tainted deeply with fanaticism, and sometimes degenerating into recklessness and cruelty.

Under these circumstances, I fear we must be content, in wading against the stream, to thank Heaven that we are not hurried off our legs, and to secure for our use such portions of what we require as either float loosely on the surface, or may be detached by repeated efforts from the bottom. It has been well said, that we are not fighting for the Turks, but for Turkey; and the pregnant truth contained in these words may serve not only to sustain us amidst the hazards and sacrifices of war, but also to guide us hereafter through the labyrinths of negotiation. Up to the present time, in spite of difficulties and delays on the one side and some disasters on the other, Her Majesty's Government, in concert with France and Turkey, have advanced steadily towards their object; and while the allies unite more closely, and display more actively their means of attack, the common enemy becomes more visibly insulated in position, with a vast expenditure, no inconsiderable losses, and consequently a diminished power of raising fresh supplies out of the mass of his resources.

As sequel to these remarks I venture to remind your Lordship, with respect to the movement of Her Majesty's forces, that after all, the principal objects required of the Porte have either been obtained, or are now in progress, notwithstanding the whole series of delays, uncertainties, and obstructions. Lord Raglan's army is actually on the scene of action in almost complete force, and, whatever may still be wanting to complete it, is referable, I believe, to causes independent of the Porte.

The army, while it was here, occupied the best barracks possessed by the Turkish Government. All due facilities were afforded for the accommodation of the several military departments, no less than for those of the fleet. Every suitable attention and complimentary distinction was shown to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge. The hospitals indicated by Lord Raglan have been appointed for the reception of our sick and wounded. Four battalions of the Sultan's regular troops, with more than three field-batteries, and six squadrons of Cavalry, have been attached to Her Majesty's army, and are preparing to join. The services of Colonel Beatson and of the officers appointed to act under him are accepted by the Porte, and orders are given to Omer Pasha for their employment in disciplining a corps of Irregular Cavalry, intended to amount to 4,000 men. Offers of service from other British officers desirous of fighting under the Sultan's standard are accepted, so far as their individual qualifications extend. Omer Pasha, who is necessarily responsible to the Porte, has lately entrusted Colonel Cannon with the command of a Turkish brigade,

and the duty of introducing succours into Silistria. He has uniformly received British officers with kindness and confidence, nor has he given slight proof of his willingness to listen to the suggestions of so young, though intelligent, an adviser as Captain Simmons of the Royal Engineers.

It is but just to bear in mind that the Porte and its Commander-in-chief, while called upon to meet the advances of England with corresponding testimonies of goodwill and confidence, had also to provide for similar requirements on the part of its French ally; nor can I in fairness omit to mention the various instances in which, during the last few months, the Sultan and his Ministers have acted agreeably to my counsels, though having occasionally to overcome preconceived opinions, and to encounter serious aggressions with limited and imperfect means. It may be added in the same spirit, that when I have met with much opposition or evasion, there has been no lack of real difficulty in the nature of the case. I allude more particularly to the financial embarrassments, to the injudicious selection of public functionaries and officers, to the outrages committed by the Bashi-Bozouks, to the deficiency of supplies for the army, to the various questions of coal mines, telegraphs, and railways. In all these matters, the Government is most assuredly to blame for want of foresight and energy, for want of knowledge and want of confidence in those who can supply their deficiencies; but the mischief is of old standing, and its ramifications form a barrier outside the Government, which must be taken into the calculation, and which it sometimes exceeds the power of any administration to penetrate without a subterfuge or a compromise.

Perseverance, respecting its efforts, and watchful of opportunities, can alone make head against this host of difficulties, named or unnamed; but western knowledge and western energy, now brought into immediate contact with the Government and people of these countries, and cooperating with the pressure of necessity, can hardly fail to work out a great, though gradual, change. Two, if not three large friendly armies, are now occupying portions of the Sultan's Empire. Are they likely to leave it as they find it? Is it conceivable that their presence, their example, their intercourse with the inhabitants, will pass away like a dream, and leave no permanent impression?

If the Crusaders on their return from Syria enriched Europe with the spoils of a civilization superior to their own, can we doubt that the enlightened armies of Christendom, now swarming into Turkey, will infuse into its barbarous population a part at least of that knowledge and spirit of improvement which raise them equally above the Christians of a former and the Mahomedans of the present age?

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 322.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 356.)

Constantinople, June 29, 1854

My Lord,

I HAVE stated elsewhere in my correspondence with your Lordship that a Turkish regiment of four battalions, accompanied with twenty pieces of field artillery and six squadrons of Cavalry, had been attached to Her Majesty's army under Lord Raglan's command. Yesterday I received from his Lordship a despatch (copy inclosed herewith), reminding me of the Seraskier's promise, and intimating some degree of surprise that nothing had been heard at Varna in fulfilment of it, after an interval of nine days.

I could not but share his Lordship's disappointment, having myself been present when the Seraskier engaged his word, and I therefore lost no time in making the necessary inquiries.

The accompanying copies of Mr. Calvert's report and of my reply to Lord Raglan will acquaint your Lordship with the explanations afforded by Riza Pasha, and show what prospect there is of the embarkation and early arrival at Varna of the troops in question.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

I have applied to Rear-Admiral Boxer on the chance of his having transports at his disposal, but I have little expectation of his being able to meet my wishes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—Inclosed is a copy of Admiral Boxer's answer, just received.
S. DE R.

Inclosure 1 in No. 322.

General Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, June 27, 1854.

My Lord,

ON the 11th instant your Excellency was so good as to communicate to me a letter addressed to you by Mr. S. Pisani, to the effect that considering the number of troops he had destined for the auxiliary armies was insufficient, the Seraskier Pasha was preparing another regiment of Infantry and twenty guns fully equipped to be exclusively attached to the British army. It was stated on the same occasion that the Infantry and Artillery were at Constantinople, and would be ready to proceed by sea to Varna in ten days, and the Cavalry was already at Adrianople and prepared to move in any direction I might desire.

At the conference which took place between your Excellency, the Seraskier Pasha, and myself on the 19th instant, he repeated what had already been reported to you by Mr. Pisani, and his Excellency requested I would say where I wished to have these troops, and I begged that the two former might be landed at Varna, and the Cavalry marched to Pravadi.

Nine days having since elapsed, and no tidings having reached me with respect to the movement of any portion of this force, I venture to recall the circumstance to your recollection, and to solicit your good offices with his Excellency, with a view to hasten its arrival at the places fixed upon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RAGLAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 322.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to General Lord Raglan.

Therapia, June 29, 1854.

My Lord,

ON the receipt of your despatch dated yesterday from Varna, I applied immediately to the Seraskier for an explanation of the delay, which has greatly surprised your Lordship and thrown a doubt on the fulfilment of his Excellency's promises, with respect to the Turkish troops attached to your army.

According to Mr. Chabert's report, which is inclosed herewith in copy, the Seraskier made no attempt to question the correctness of your Lordship's statement, but accounted for his delay in forwarding the troops by simultaneous requirements of the French army, and the insufficient means of steam conveyance at his disposal.

As the Seraskier asserts that the Artillery and Infantry are now in a complete state of readiness for embarkation, waiting only for steam-vessels to carry them to Varna, your Lordship might hasten the operation by sending steam-vessels from the squadron, if the Admiral commanding it can spare the whole or even a part of the number requisite for that purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 322.

Mr. R. Chabert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Péra, le 28 Juin, 1854.

My Lord,

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que j'ai dûment communiqué au Seraskier Pacha la dépêche ci-jointe de Lord Raglan, et je lui ai demandé l'explication des causes pour lesquelles l'Infanterie, la Cavalerie, et l'Artillerie qui doivent être attachées à l'armée de Sa Majesté n'ont pas encore été expédiées aux places indiquées par Lord Raglan.

Le Seraskier Pacha a convenu que tout le contenu de la dépêche est fort exact; et tout en faisant des excuses pour le retard de l'expédition de la force promise, il a voulu le justifier en disant qu'indépendamment de ce que les chevaux de l'Artillerie n'ont pu être complétés que tout dernièrement, le manque de bateaux-à-vapeur pour le transport de l'Artillerie et de l'Infanterie à Varna a fait qu'il n'a pas pu en faire l'expédition jusqu'à présent.

Que les vingt canons sont aujourd'hui complètement équipés et tout prêts, que l'Artillerie est également en état de s'embarquer, mais que les bateaux lui manquent.

Il y a, dit-il, depuis quelque temps que deux Turcs dont il peut disposer pour ces expéditions à Varna, et ces bateaux sont employés au transport de la Cavalerie, de l'Artillerie, et de l'Infanterie qui ont été attachées à l'armée Française. De celles-ci, il y a un reste que les deux vapeurs transporteront au plus tard après demain à Varna, et qui fait le complément de cette force.

Au retour de ces bateaux il commencera l'expédition de l'Infanterie et de l'Artillerie qui doivent être attachées à l'armée de Sa Majesté, ce qu'il ne croit pas pouvoir faire avant de compléter celle déjà commencé sans donner lieu à quelque confusion.

Il espère que Dimanche prochain, ou, au plus tard, Lundi, il pourra commencer l'expédition des forces qui doivent se joindre à celles de Lord Raglan.

Quant à la Cavalerie, il dit qu'il y a trois jours qu'il lui a envoyé à Andrinople l'ordre de partir immédiatement pour Pravadi et d'expédier de suite à Lord Raglan l'avis qu'elle est à sa disposition et qu'elle attend ses ordres pour les mouvements qu'elle aura à suivre.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) R. CHABERT.

Inclosure 4 in No. 322.

Rear-Admiral Boxer to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Constantinople, June 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of this date, requesting me to forward four battalions of Turkish Infantry and and twenty pieces of Artillery to Varna.

All the steamers at my disposal are now coaling, and making good defects to their machinery, but I will inform Lord Raglan, who will, no doubt, send steamers for their conveyance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD BOXER.

No. 323.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)

(Private and Confidential.)

Constantinople, June 29, 1854.

My dear Lord,

ALTHOUGH no official account of the incident has yet reached me, there can be no doubt that the Turkish army near Batoum, under Selim Pasha, has undergone a signal defeat. Her Majesty's Consul at Trebizond has sent me all the information he had been able to collect upon the subject, and I forward herewith a copy of his letter, to which he has given a private form.

Reshid Pasha, who acknowledges that an officer had arrived at the Porte with news of the battle, assures me that Selim Pasha had no instructions for making a forward movement. My recommendation, before the season for military operations began, was that a defensive system should be maintained along the Asiatic frontier, in so far as the armies of Batoum and Kars were concerned.

For your Lordship's further information, I transmit in copy a letter which, though dated the 25th ultimo, has only just reached me. It contains some particulars relating to Selim Pasha's army and the attack on Redoubt Kaleh, which are by no means destitute of interest. The author is an emigrant Cavalry officer in the Turkish service.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 323.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Trebizond, June 22, 1854.

My Lord,

THREE days ago some boats from Batoum brought intelligence of another battle having been fought on Thursday, the 15th instant, near Choorookseo. There are numerous versions of the affair in circulation here, but the following details are those meriting the greatest confidence.

On the day mentioned Selim Pasha, with five battalions of his best Regulars (Arabistan Nizams and Imperial Guards), was at Ladova, a village situated midway between Arzoghetta and Choorookseo—having, it appears, quitted Arzoghetta, discovered to be untenable in the event of the Russians attacking—when a considerable force (the exact number is not mentioned, but which, it is presumed, consisted of not less than 10,000 Russian troops and Georgians) arrived by a circuitous route and attacked the Redifs and Bashi-Bozouks, which were in the rear of the village, ready to march to Choorookseo; a number of these Irregulars fell, upon which the rest fled to the hills. It is said 2,000 were killed before giving way. The Russians having thus cleared the road to the village, entered it, and attacked the Regulars, who fought well, but some 3,000 were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. The other 2,000 then retreated to Choorookseo. In the midst of the engagement two field-batteries, consisting together of fourteen guns, were ordered by Selim Pasha to quit their station at the entrance of the village, on the Turkish side, and to come to his assistance by a round-about way. These reached the spot where they were required, but through some stupid error, no ammunition came with them, and not only proved useless, but finally fell into Russian possession without opposition. I am not able to state what losses the Russians suffered; but they must have been considerable. Selim Pasha was slightly wounded in the wrist, and Haggi Ahmed Pasha, Commander of the Irregulars, had two horses killed under him, and was himself seriously wounded in the shoulder.

Selim Pasha is at present encamped at Choorookseo, with the wreck of his army, consisting of about 7,000 men, and is trying to rally his Irregulars and Militia. This unfortunate affair has thrown a gloom all over Trebizond.

It is evident the Russians evacuated altogether to entice Selim Pasha to it, and thus bring him clear of the dense forests, which, while he remained at Choorookseo, rendered the operations of the Russians difficult and dangerous.

We are hourly expecting a steamer from Batoum, and I reserve reporting the above intelligence to your Lordship officially till after her arrival, in hopes of receiving more accurate details.

I am told that on Friday last Her Majesty's ship "Sanspareil" was at anchor at Choorookseo, but has since departed. The "Highflyer" was at Redoute-Kaleh on the 14th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS S. STEVENS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 323.

Colonel L. Wepler to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Usuryette, ce 25 Mai, 1854.

Excellence,

EMPLOYE par la grâce de votre Excellence comme Colonel de Cavalerie dans l'armée de cet Empire il y a cinq mois, j'ai tâché de me rendre digne de sa haute protection en m'occupant de prime abord après mon arrivée à Choorookseo de l'étude de la langue Turque et des Ordonnances Françaises traduites en Ture et en usage de la Cavalerie Ottomane.

Quant à cette dernière arme, il n'y en a dans le corps de Batoom qu'un seul escadron d'un régiment de Cavalerie d'Anatolie, pas même de la Cavalerie Irrégulière—grande manque d'une troupe qui peut-être sous peu de temps doit combattre un ennemi dont la force principale consiste en Cavalerie.

Toutes nos forces consistent en douze bataillons d'Infanterie et vingt-quatre pièces de canons, en tout 8,000 hommes de troupes régulières, et ensuite à peu près en 10,000 Bashi-Bozouks.

Ces soldats Irréguliers ne valent guère grande chose; car à la seule exception du corps de Hassan Bey, qui jadis a seul pris le Fort St. Nicolaya-Czevketel aux Russes et qui est composé de Georgiens, le reste est seulement bon pour piller et voler, mais incapable d'être conduit au feu et en même temps sans ordre et sans discipline.

On a beaucoup parlé et écrit des exploits de nos troupes et de leurs Commandants, mais, à vrai dire, nous n'avons encore rien fait; car jusqu'à présent les Russes ont abandonné de leur propre volonté quelques positions sans combat, surtout des forts situés sur la côte de la Mer Noire, où encore dernièrement j'ai pris part à une expédition entreprise par Sir Edmund Lyons, Amiral Anglais, contre Redoute-Kaleh ou Kemhel.

C'était le 17 de ce mois que l'escadre Anglo-Française, consistant en deux vaisseaux et trois brigs-à-vapeur, était venu mouiller dans la rade de Choorookseo dans l'intention de prendre des troupes Turques, pour les descendre à Redoute-Kaleh.

Sur la demande de son Excellence l'Amiral Sir Edmund Lyons je m'embarquai avec un bataillon d'Infanterie et quatre pièces de canons.

Arrivé en face de Redoute-Kaleh, le Commandant Russe ne voulant pas se rendre sur la sommation lui étant envoyée par l'Amiral Commandant l'escadre, celui-ci commença par le feu du vaisseau de ligne "Agamemnon," tandis que nous autre fûmes descendu dans les barques et dirigé vers la terre. Après avoir mis pied à terre, je pris avec la première compagnie le commandement de l'avant-garde, et marchant contre les fortifications Russes je m'apperçevais bientôt que celles-ci étaient déjà abandonnés par l'ennemi. Tout d'un coup tournant à droite dans le but de poursuivre l'ennemi, qui ne pouvait encore être loin, nous échangeâmes quelques coups de fusil avec l'arrière-garde Russe, mais sans résultat. Cette dernière, coupant les cordes d'un pont de bateaux communiquant avec le rive opposée d'une grande rivière, nous échappa ainsi, tandis qu'en même temps une immense incendie nous prouva que la belle ville Kemhel était en proie des flammes.

Dans cette dernière affaire, qui n'était pas importante, je fus convaincu que les soldats Tures son très bons et braves, mais sans aucune instruction militaire, tandis que les commandants sont lâches et ignorants.

Il y avait le Colonel Ibrahim Bey, commandant le 2me Régiment de Redifs, et le chef de bataillon Mustapha, dans cet expédition, mais jamais dans ma vie, ni même dans l'affaire la plus meurtrière durant la guerre dans l'Hongrie, je n'ai vu trembler de peur un seul soldat tel que ces deux commandants durant

notre trajet du vaisseau-amiral jusqu'à terre, et plus tard aussi étaient-ils les derniers de tout le bataillon qui entrèrent dans la ville avec une précaution qui me faisait rire. Plus tard, dans mon rapport à Selim Pacha, notre Commandant-en-chef, j'ai tâché de faire comprendre à celui-ci combien il serait nécessaire de faire fusiller quelques-uns de ces misérables Commandants au lieu de leur accorder des décorations.

Il serait donc indispensablement nécessaire de réorganiser les troupes Turques, et pour y parvenir il nous faudrait ici quelques régiments Anglais; car les Russes réuniront leurs troupes sur un point, et nous attaqueront de vive force sans que nous serions en état de leur opposer beaucoup de résistance et point de réserve.

Si je me suis adressé à votre Excellence, en lui apprenant les faits ci-dessus mentionnés, je l'ai cru mon devoir, parceque c'est uniquement par la grâce de votre Excellence que je suis employé; et de l'autre côté il est pressant que, par l'influence de votre Excellence auprès de la Sublime Porte, des ordres sévères soient donnés ici pour que la lâcheté devant l'ennemi soit punie, et que les abus dans l'administration soient abolis.

Parmi les Généraux Turcs il serait difficile à trouver un meilleur que Selim Pacha, si celui-ci n'était pas entouré d'intriguants et d'ignorants qui l'influencent entièrement.

L'administration se trouve entre les mains d'un Mustechar qui, étant le plus grand voleur, a fait mourir de faim une partie de nos soldats et chevaux—un homme qui n'a jamais distribué des souliers aux soldats qui, presque tout l'hiver, se promenaient les pieds nus; et aux hôpitaux, les soldats sont plutôt morts de froid que leurs maladies. On parle de l'organisation des cavaliers Tzerkesses dans des régiments, et dans ce cas-là votre Excellence serait priée très humblement de daigner à faire employer les officiers Hongrois, et en même tems de me faire prendre part à cette organisation, où je me trouverais en état de prouver, qu'avec une expérience militaire, acquise durant dix-neuf ans de service dans la Cavalerie Autrichienne, et dans vingt batailles durant la guerre en Hongrie, je serais à la portée de me rendre digne de la haute protection que votre Excellence a daigné de me prouver en me faisant employer.

Si votre Excellence permettra que je lui donne des nouvelles de temps en temps, que j'ai cru mon devoir de faire dans ce moment-ci, je la prie très humblement de vouloir bien me faire parvenir ses ordres à cet égard, et pardonner gracieusement la liberté que j'ai prise en lui adressant ces lignes.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) LOUIS WEPLER.

No. 324.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 357.) *Therapia, June* 30, 1854.

My Lord,

THE despatches forwarded to-day from General Rose and General Beatson having passed under my eyes, I am encouraged to express a hope that the opinion declared by those officers, in favour of securing a regular and sufficient pay to the Turkish Irregular Cavalry, to be organized and commanded by the latter, may meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

It requires no military experience to be convinced that such daring and unprincipled characters as the Bashi-Bozouks can never become useful in service without discipline, nor be rendered capable of discipline without pay. If this be true, even with respect to their own Government, and to commanders of their own nation and religion, it must be still more unquestionable with respect to foreign commanders, alien to them in language and race, as well as in creed, and classed by their prejudices among those for whom they entertain habitual aversion and contempt.

The example afforded by the French is also of much force, not only as making it difficult for us to act otherwise, but also as being a result of their own experience elsewhere.

There is some reason to suppose that Omer Pasha is not altogether favourable to the experiment which General Beatson is now authorized, by an Imperial firman, to make; and as he has an interest in restraining the Bashi-Bozouks, and very insufficient means of paying them, he would, probably, be reconciled to the plan by feeling himself at once relieved from annoyance and expense by their receiving pay from a foreign Power.

It is also to be borne in mind that humanity is as much concerned in this question as military advantage.

Should it finally be alleged that the Porte, though now embarrassed, may soon have funds wherewith to pay any irregular force, a great and salutary boon would still be conferred on this country if Her Majesty's Government were merely to advance the payment through General Beatson, subject to recovery at a future and more favourable period.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 325.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 43.) *Munich, July* 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 45.

The adhesion of the Bavarian Government to the Berlin Treaty of the 20th of April has been, signified to Austria and Prussia in a despatch addressed to its Representatives at the Courts of the two High Contracting Parties, which was sent off from hence a very few days ago. I understand that this despatch contains a pure and simple accession, without any question whatsoever of conditions; and that moreover it expresses the gratitude of this Government for the concessions which it still professes to think have been made to the wishes of the Bamberg Conference by the two great German Powers.

If any faith is to be put in the reports which reach us here, some of the other small States, and especially those more closely allied to Russia by family ties between the reigning families, have not shown so much readiness to emancipate themselves from the apprehensions entertained at Bamberg, and it is not unlikely, should this prove to be true, that some delay may yet occur before the Treaty can be laid before the Diet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 326.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July* 12, 1854.

COUNT BUOL has just informed Baron Bourqueney and myself that after serious deliberation he thought it would be more regular, and of greater weight, to convoke the Conference and lay before it Prince Gortchakoff's despatch, than to transmit it directly to the belligerent Powers. The Representatives of England and France would, he supposed, declare themselves to be without the necessary instructions to accept that document, and would apply to their Governments for them. The motives which might provoke a refusal on the part of the allied Governments to accept it, or the guarantees on which they might insist as the condition of their accepting it, would be communicated by their Representatives to the Conference, which would take formal notice of their answers. The Protocol to be drawn up on this occasion, would afford the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the opportunity of giving explanations which would test the sincerity of its proposals.

This mode of proceeding, Count Buol thinks, has the advantage of concentrating the negotiations on the spot where the dangers of disunion make themselves most promptly felt. It would exercise a salutary influence on Prussia.

Russia having acknowledged in its last communication the authority of the Conference, Count Buol thinks there is the more reason for permitting it to act.

Count Buol has communicated to us Prince Gortchakoff's despatch, to transmit it most confidentially to our Governments, as, by the plan which he proposes, this document should be first taken cognizance of by the Conference. I will send it by messenger this day. I beg you to let me know as early as possible your decision as to the proposed communications to the Conference which I have now submitted to you.

No. 327.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 262.) *Vienna, July* 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to announce to your Lordship, in my despatch No. 244 of the 28th of June, the determination taken by the Austrian Government, upon learning the intention of the Russian forces to evacuate Giurgevo, Bucharest, and the Principality of Wallachia, to order the force under General Coronini to occupy the portions of that Principality so evacuated. I also stated in my letter to Lord Raglan, a copy of which I had the honour to inclose in that despatch, that the Austrian troops employed on this service, not being belligerents, were at present charged only with the maintenance of the established Government as sanctioned by the Sultan. I further stated in the same despatch, that Count Buol contemplated the advance of the Turkish and allied forces through the Principality. There seemed, therefore, no reason to apprehend that in consequence of the Austrian occupation of Wallachia, the Russians should be left in quiet possession of Moldavia: on the contrary, having lost the advantages afforded them by their positions in Wallachia, they would have been exposed to be attacked by the Turkish and allied armies—the event contemplated by Count Buol, in which operation the English and French troops would certainly not have remained passive spectators: the Turkish and the allied armies would have passed through the Principality under the protection of the Austrian army, whilst the Austrian Government had expressed the firm intention to resist any attempt on the part of the Russian troops to re-occupy the positions they had abandoned.

It is true that by the occupation of one only of the Principalities, the whole object of the 1st Article of the Convention with Turkey of June the 1st would not have been attained; but, in obtaining the evacuation of that province by means of the representations addressed by the Austrian Government to the Emperor Nicholas, the Imperial Government considered that they would have rendered an essential service to Turkey and to the allies. The circumstances, however, under which the occupation of Wallachia by Austrian troops was determined upon, have now completely changed; the Prussian Government remonstrated against the measure—a remonstrance which, although it was not altogether attended to, necessitated a delay until explanations had taken place between the two Governments: and since then it has been ascertained that the Russian forces have not been withdrawn from Bucharest or Giurgevo, that, on the contrary, the garrisons of those places have been reinforced, and that many other points on the Danube, which had been evacuated, have been re-occupied.

Upon these grounds, therefore, the Austrian Government have given up the intention of immediately occupying the Principalities, and Count Buol is in the anxious expectation that the Turkish and allied armies, which were reported to be ready on the 5th of this month to advance against the Russian troops for the relief of Silistria, will not hesitate to follow their enemy across the Danube and drive them out of Wallachia. He would have been happy to have obtained this object by more peaceable means; but as his original proposal, respecting the propriety of which even your Lordship seems to have entertained a doubt, has now been put an end to by the attitude assumed by Russia, the opportunity will be afforded to the allies to act immediately against the left wing of the Russians, and to enter upon a contest which, should the reports in circulation respecting

the intention of the allies to employ their armies on some distant operation prove correct, would fall exclusively on Austria, who would be left unsupported, even by Prussia, to engage in it single-handed. Count Buol is, therefore, most anxious for intelligence as to the movements to be decided upon by the Turkish and allied armies, along the line of the Danube.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 328.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 17.)

(No. 265. Confidential.) *Vienna, July* 12, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of my telegraphic despatch in cypher, dated the 10th instant, relating to the answer brought from St. Petersburgh by Prince Gortchakoff, and of that dated this day upon the same subject; together with a copy of the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, to which my telegraphic communication refers.

Count Buol wished that this despatch should be communicated most confidentially to your Lordship, as, according to the plan he proposes, which is detailed in my telegraphic despatch of this day, official cognizance of this document would only first be taken by the Conference.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 328.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, July 10, 1854.

[See No. 319.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 328.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, July 12, 1854.

[See No. 326.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 328.

Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff.

St. Pétersbourg, le 17 *Juin*, 1854.

Mon Prince,

LE Comte Estérhazy m'a communiqué la dépêche par laquelle son Cabinet nous engage à mettre un terme à la crise actuelle, en évitant de pousser plus loin nos opérations trans-Danubiennes, et en évacuant les Principautés dans un temps aussi rapproché que possible.

En motivant ce désir sur les intérêts Autrichiens et Allemands, que compromettrait la prolongation et l'extension de la lutte sur le Danube, M. le Comte de Buol s'appuie sur ce que notre occupation des Principautés a été la cause principale de la guerre. Nous lui demanderons la permission de faire à cet égard quelques réserves.

L'occupation des Principautés n'avait pas empêché les négociations de

s'ouvrir et de se poursuivre. Ce n'est point elle qui a provoqué l'abandon de la note de Vienne, le sujet des propositions faites à Olmütz avec le concours et l'approbation de l'Autriche, non plus que le changement complet de toutes les bases antérieures de négociations; et si tous les essais de conciliation ont avorté depuis lors, le Cabinet Autrichien ne saurait méconnaître que cela a tenu à des incidents et à des motifs beaucoup plus complexes sur lesquels nous aimons mieux nous taire aujourd'hui, pour éviter des récriminations fâcheuses. Nous avons répondu par le silence à la sommation de la France et de l'Angleterre, parcequ'elle était d'une forme blessante précédée de provocations ouvertes et dépourvue de toutes conditions de réciprocité; et, si la guerre s'en est suivie, il serait juste d'en imputer la cause moins à la nature de notre réponse qu'au ton et aux termes qui l'ont provoquée.

Quoiqu'il en soit, si dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Autrichien l'occupation prolongée des Principautés a été le motif de la guerre, il devrait en résulter que cette occupation venant à cesser, la guerre cessera par le fait même, vu que les hostilités seront suspendues. Le Cabinet de Vienne est-il en mesure de nous en donner l'assurance?

Il ne saurait échapper à son attention que depuis le premier moment où la Porte nous a déclaré et fait la guerre, depuis surtout que le cercle de cette guerre, transporté hors de Turquie dans nos mers et sur nos côtes, a été démesurément aggrandi, l'occupation des Principautés, quelqu'ait pu être son caractère original, n'est plus devenu autre chose pour nous qu'une position militaire dont le maintien ou l'abandon sont avant tout subordonné à des considérations stratégiques. Il est simple dès lors qu'avant de nous dessaisir volontièrement, par égard pour la situation de l'Autriche, du seul point où, poussant l'offensive, il nous reste quelques chances de rétablir en notre faveur l'équilibre qui est partout ailleurs contre nous, nous sachions au moins quelles sécurités l'Autriche peut nous offrir. Car, si les hostilités continuent, si les Puissances, dégagées de toute appréhension en Turquie, demeurent libres, soit de nous poursuivre sur le territoire évacué, soit d'employer toutes leurs forces disponibles désormais, à envahir notre littoral Asiatique ou Européen, afin de nous imposer des conditions inacceptables, il est évident que l'Autriche nous aurait demandé de nous affaiblir moralement et matériellement par un sacrifice en pure perte. Exiger de la Russie qu'elle se mette entièrement à la merci de ses ennemis, quand ceux-ci ne dissimulent point l'intention d'abattre ou de diminuer sa puissance; l'exposer à toutes les attaques qui leur conviendra de lui porter en la réduisant partout à la défensive; lui ôter enfin, au nom de la paix, tout moyen d'obtenir que cette paix ne soit pas pour elle ruinante et déshonorante—serait un acte si contraire à toutes les lois de l'équité, à tous les principes d'honneur militaire que, nous nous plaisons à le croire, pareille pensée n'a pu entrer un moment dans l'esprit de Sa Majesté l'Empereur François-Joseph.

En nous communiquant le Protocole du 9 Avril, la Cour de Vienne appuie auprès de nous sur l'engagement positif qu'elle a pris envers les Puissances Occidentales, d'amener par tous ses moyens l'évacuation finale des Principautés; mais, en prenant cet engagement, l'Autriche n'a pu s'interdire le choix du moyen qui lui paraîtrait le plus propre à remplir ses obligations—celui de mettre la Russie en état de procéder à l'évacuation avec honneur et sécurité pour elle. L'obligation même qu'elle a contracté, lui donne au contraire le droit d'insister auprès des Puissances pour qu'elles n'entravent pas par leurs exigeances le succès de ses efforts. Il en est de même des intérêts de commerce Autrichiens et Allemands, invoqués contre la prolongation ou l'extension de nos opérations militaires. Ils autorisent le Cabinet de Vienne à user auprès des deux Puissances des mêmes raisons qu'auprès de nous; car, si les intérêts de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne entière peuvent souffrir momentanément de nos opérations sur le Danube, à plus forte raison souffrent-ils, et bien plus gravement encore, comme ceux de tous les Etats neutres, de la situation amenée par les opérations maritimes de la France et de l'Angleterre dans l'Euxine, la Mer du Nord, et la Mer Baltique.

Que le Gouvernement Autrichien veuille donc bien, en pesant mûrement ces considérations, s'appliquer vis-à-vis de nous au sujet des garanties de sûreté qu'il peut nous donner; et l'Empereur, par déférence pour les vœux et les intérêts de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne, serait disposé à entrer en négociation sur l'époque précise de l'évacuation. Le Cabinet de Vienne peut d'avance être persuadé que Sa Majesté partage au même degré que lui, le désir de mettre au

plutôt un terme à la crise qui pèse en ce moment sur toutes les situations Européennes. Notre auguste Maître veut encore, comme il a toujours voulu, la paix. Il ne veut, nous l'avons répété et le répétons encore une fois, ni prolonger indéfiniment l'occupation des Principautés, ni s'y établir d'une manière permanente, ni les incorporer à ses Etats, encore moins renverser l'Empire Ottoman. Sous ce rapport, il ne fait aucune difficulté de souscrire aux trois principes déposés dans le Protocole du 9 Avril. Intégrité de la Turquie: ce point-là n'a rien que de conforme à tout ce que nous avons énoncé jusqu'ici, et il ne sera point menacé par nous aussi longtemps qu'il sera respecté par les Puissances qui occupent en ce moment les eaux et le territoire du Sultan. Evacuation des Principautés: nous sommes prêts à y procéder moyennant les sécurités convenables. Consolidation des droits des Chrétiens en Turquie: partant de l'idée que les droits civils à obtenir pour tous les sujets Chrétiens de la Porte sont inséparables des droits religieux, comme le stipule le Protocole, et deviendrait sans valeur pour nos coreligionnaires si ceux-ci, en acquérant de nouveaux priviléges, ne conservaient pas les anciens, nous avons déjà déclaré que, s'il en était ainsi, les demandes que l'Empereur a faites à la Porte seraient remplies, le motif du différend écarté, et Sa Majesté prête à concourir à la garantie Européenne de ces priviléges. Telles étant les dispositions de l'Empereur sur les points capitaux indiqués dans le Protocole, il nous semble, mon Prince, que pour peu qu'on veuille la paix, sans arrière-pensées qui la rendent impossible, il ne serait pas difficile d'y arriver sur cette triple base, ou du moins d'en préparer la négociation au moyen d'un armistice. C'est l'espoir que votre Excellence voudra bien exprimer au Cabinet Autrichien, en lui donnant communication de la présente dépêche.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 329.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 363.)

Therapia, July 4, 1854.

My Lord,

THE defeat of Selim Pasha, commanding the Turkish army at Batoom, is confirmed by an official account of the principal circumstances, received from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Trebizond.

A copy of Mr. Stevens' despatch is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 329.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Trebizond, June 26, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to address you a private letter on the 22nd instant, containing the details, such as we had received them, of a battle which was fought at a village near Choorooksoo on the 15th instant. The arrival to-day of the Ottoman steam-frigate "Saik-Shadi" enables me to give your Lordship the exact details which have been communicated to me by a Colonel attached to Selim Pasha's staff, who is proceeding to Constantinople with the Commander-in-chief's despatches, and confirmed by the second officer of the above-mentioned frigate.

The battle took place on the morning of the 16th instant (Friday), and not Thursday the 15th, as was stated. The Russian force, which attacked in three columns, consisted of 25,000 Infantry, 1,500 Mounted Cossacks, and 10,000 Georgians, with 4 guns. Selim Pasha's strength was about 6,000 Regulars, and 12,000 Irregulars and Militia, supported by two battalions of 6 field-pieces each. The greatest portion of the Turkish Irregulars and Militia gave way in the very commencement of the action, and fled to the mountains. The Regulars fought

bravely, as did the Artillery; in fact, the former only ceased their fire when their ammunition was expended. The latter also fell short of shot, and continued to fire for a while with blank cartridge; but the Russians soon found it out, threw all the Mounted Cossacks on the guns, and captured them. Selim Pasha lost 400 Regulars, and 1,800 Irregulars and Militia are unaccounted for, but chiefly supposed to have been slain; moreover, 1,500 Regulars and Irregulars wounded, whom the Turkish frigate arrived to-day conveyed from Choorooksoo to Batoum, whence they will be transported to Khoppa, where a hospital is being organised for the summer months, and to which place all the medical officers have been already removed. Both Selim Pasha and Haggi Ahmed Pasha are said to have displayed the utmost courage and *sang froid*. The overwhelming force of the Russians on this occasion compelled Selim Pasha to leave in its possession all his tents and camp baggage, mules and horses. The loss of the Russians was positively very great; as many as 6,000 killed and 3,000 wounded. It took them two days to bury their dead, and carry away their wounded. I am assured General Andronikoff, the Commander-in-chief, retired from the field with two wounds. The Russians made a few prisoners, amongst whom, a Colonel of Artillery and three Subalterns.

Portion of the Russian force retired to Kiska, leaving the residue, some 20,000 men, in Arzoghetta.

Selim Pasha, with about 9,000 men, is at Choorooksoo. He is trying to rally his Militia and Irregulars. Selim Pasha is in want of everything, especially tents. The poor troops are on bread and water for want of better; but as the Ramazan is over, I am in hopes our Pasha will resume his former activity, and send down supplies forthwith.

I have communicated the above details to Lord Raglan, by the Turkish steam-frigate, on departure to-day for Varna, through which channel I forward this to your Lordship, reserving to myself the honour of transmitting a duplicate by the first steam-packet direct for Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. A. STEVENS.

No. 330.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July 17.*)

(No. 364.) *Therapia, July 4, 1854.*

My Lord,

VICE-ADMIRAL DUNDAS and Lord Raglan having written to me respecting the exposed state of the ports of Soukoum-Kaleh and Redoute-Kaleh, on the Circassian coast, I applied to the Porte, recommending the adoption of their remedial suggestions.

The result appears from the answers which I addressed respectively to the two Commanders-in-chief. The whole correspondence is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 330.

General Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, June 28, 1854.

My Lord,

VICE-ADMIRAL DUNDAS and Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons called upon me yesterday, in company with Captain Daeres, R.N., of the "Sanspareil," and they pressed upon me the necessity of establishing a sufficient garrison in Soukoum-Kaleh, which is held only by about 100 Irregular Cavalry, in such urgent terms, that I would beg to submit for your Excellency's consideration that there representation should be brought under the early notice of the Porte.

Captain Daeres, who has recently been there, informed me that the Turkish had sent there a considerable equipment of field artillery,

30,000 stand of fire-arms, an immense quantity of prepared ammunition, and at least twenty tons of lead; and these valuable stores he believes to be at the mercy of any detachment of Russian troops which may think fit to move down upon the place.

The Circassians, Captain Daeres considers to be quite unfit to form part of the garrison. They have no idea of working or firing a cannon; and notwithstanding that the large store of warlike supplies is within their reach, no one of them has evinced a disposition to possess the arms, or to do anything in cooperation with the Turks.

The wandering mode of warfare to which the Circassians are accustomed is the only one that suits them, or to which they are willing to subject themselves.

Captain Daeres also represented, that the garrison of Redoute-Kaleh is in great want of an officer of Engineers to suggest, and superintend the execution of, any works that may be necessary.

I shall be happy to provide an officer for this duty, if it should be desired by the Turkish Government.

In that case I would recommend that the officer I may name, may be provided with a letter of introduction to the Commandant of the Fort.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 330.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Baltchik, June 28, 1854.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 26th instant, I have now the honour to inclose for your information extracts from letters I have just received from Captain Jones of the "Sampson," who has been some time employed on the coasts of Georgia, &c. Captain Daeres, of the "Sanspareil," who has also been actively employed in repairing the batteries, gun-carriages, mounting guns, &c., and otherwise placing Redoute-Kaleh in a state of defence, fully concurs in the absolute necessity of that fort, and Soukoum-Kaleh, being fully garrisoned, as well as sufficient forces being sent not only to repel the Russians and the hostile Mingrelians, but also to aid and encourage the Circassians and others favourable to us, in cutting off the Russian forces in that part of the country.

In urging on your Excellency the great importance that the Porte should send speedy and numerous reinforcements to that country, I beg to suggest, as one means of obtaining the necessary troops, that the crews of some of the Turkish ships of the line, now lying here, might be landed for duty at Constantinople, and thus render a number of disciplined troops available for this service.

By securing the forts of Soukoum-Kaleh and Redoute-Kaleh, and reinforcing Selim Pasha's army, the Russian communication might be cut off, and a most advantageous blow struck against their southern armies. By the latest accounts, Captain Brock has not yet been enabled to place himself in direct communication with Schamyl, but I expect daily to have intelligence from that quarter; it is, however, reported, but requires confirmation, that the Russians had abandoned several of their forts south of the Kuban.

In conclusion, I acquaint your Excellency that orders have been given to discourage as much as possible the exportation of slaves of every description, which, I also believe, has been forbidden by Schamyl.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 330.

Captain Jones to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Redoute-Kaleh, June 10, 1854.

(Extract.)

IT seems to me that the Turks have no troops to spare; they can hardly manage to keep this place, and even here have not, in reality, half the number that they pretend to have; the same applies to St. Nicolai and Choorooksoo.

The Circassians, Abassians, and the country people do not generally show any desire to occupy the seaports permanently; they come down to Soukoum-Kaleh for a few days, amuse themselves walking about and riding out, and in taking their guns to pieces and putting them together again, but as to working at the fortifications or putting the lines in a state of defence, they will not do it, there is no keeping them at work. I mention this with the view of coming to some decision as to what is to be done with the Circassian forts, for at present I cannot help thinking that they are in a most unsatisfactory state.

In many of these forts there are from twenty-four to thirty guns, merely spiked and easily cleared; there are large quantities of shot, and empty shells which have been fitted with wooden fuses. (As a specimen of the nature of the guns, I send you the return from Soukoum-Kaleh.)

It is evident as the forts remain, and, so far as the Turks or natives are concerned, are likely to remain, the Russians may return by land whenever it suits them, to Gelendjik on the north, and Soukoum-Kaleh on the south; this is, of course, supposing that we have no naval force on the spot: the intermediate forts may probably be guarded by the natives.

Then, Sir, looking forward to the probability of a cruizing squadron on this coast during the winter, would it not be desirable to put Gelendjik and Soukoum-Kaleh in a state of defence, both by sea and land, as safe and secure rallying points against all contingencies.

Soukoum-Kaleh I should think would be a healthy place, without much work, but Gelendjik is a muddy swamp, and would require a good deal of labour to make the ground dry and habitable for winter. Materials are abundant, that is to say, sea-beach, and sand, and planks, and building stone.

There are lots of good guns in the eleven abandoned intermediate places between Soukoum-Kaleh and it, but all are without carriages.

Report states that the Russians have eleven sailing-boats on the river, each mounting a small gun; that they are at a place called Orline, twelve hours distant by land, but that they are on the southern branch of the Ilhassi. In the coasting chart this branch is not sufficiently marked. It is as large, nearly, as the other; it turns off at right angles about 1,000 yards from the mouth, and at a mile and a-half south approaches to within 200 yards of the beach, thence goes away east right up the country.

The Russian map does not notice this branch at all.

I have urged Ibrahim Bey to use every means he can devise to find out whether these boats exist or not, for, in the absence of a ship, this position depends so materially on the fact of whether he is subject to attack by a descent on the river; such an attack might carry the place.

The weather up to the end of last week has been everything we could desire, excepting not quite wind enough for sailing-ships; on the night of the 7th or 8th, however, we had a strong breeze east-south-east right off shore, the air hot and dry; barometer having fallen to 29° 55', it moderated gradually, going round to south and west, and became very humid; a good deal of surf on the bar, and landing dangerous.

To-day we have had heavy rains, with the wind fresh in puffs, and very variable, a swell coming in from the south-west, but nothing to prevent passing the bar if requisite.

Length and Diameter of Guns at Soukoum-Kaleh, May 29, 1854.

Nature of guns.	Weight.	Length.	Diameter.	Number.	Remarks.
		feet. in.	Inches.		
		10 5	6·0	3	
		9 4	5·5	2	In the Fort. Serviceable.
		8 6	4·8	8	
		6 10	3·8	4	
		9 0	5·5	6	
		8 0	4·9	1	Old guns.
		5 3	6·0	1	
Thrown over the Wall.					
		8 6	4·8	1	Serviceable.
		6 10	3·8	3	
Battery outside Fort.					
		8 6	4·8	1	Serviceable.
		5 3	6·0	2	
Outer Battery.					
		10 5	6·0	1	
		9 4	5·5	1	Serviceable.
		8 6	4·8	4	
		Total	.. ..	38	

Inclosure 4 in No. 330.

Captain Jones to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

(Extract.)

IN the course of the night, Selim Pasha and garrison from Asourjet arrived and this morning (June 14th) I had a long interview with him.

I may mention as an instance of want of candour, and in illustration of the amount of dependence to be placed on information even from the fountain-head, that Selim Pasha never told me of the defeat he had met, and avoided acknowledging that he had been worsted in his attack on Soupson Ghour, but the facts elicited from other quarters clearly showed that he had been defeated with considerable loss, stated to be from 500 to 2,000 killed.

It appears the Georgians had deceived him, by offering to join against the Russians, and that he sent a considerable force out under Halil Pasha in command of the Regulars, and Hassan and Hamet Boys in command of the Bashi-Bozouks; that when near Soupson they were caught in an ambush and defeated, losing two guns, the Georgians joining against them in the woods. Selim Pasha merely said that he had retreated from Asourjet because he found it too straggling a place to defend, and requiring so many points to be guarded, and that he was going to make his present position strong and secure; he showed great anxiety for me to express my approbation of the movement.

I fully approved of the object, and said, if I had any doubt I should even

move further back so as to improve the facilities of communication with St. Nicolai and Choorookson.

We then went on the subject of Redoute-Kaleh and Soukoum-Kaleh. He is fully alive to the importance of these places, but said it was impossible for him to send a man until reinforced himself, and that all he could do at present would be to send two more guns to Redoute-Kaleh; that he had already written to Constantinople urging the necessity of more regular troops.

I offered to take him along the coast, but he said he could not leave the camp until he had seen the defences complete, and that in six or seven days he hoped to have everything finished, and would then be at liberty. He said that he had written to Ibrahim Bey, to exert himself to get Redoute-Kaleh in a proper state of defence, and desiring him to seek the advice of the English officers, and do everything they told him.

Inclosure 5 in No. 330.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Buyukdere, July 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report, that having, in pursuance of your Excellency's instructions, communicated both to Reshid Pasha and to the Grand Vizier, the substance of what the Commanders-in-chief of Her Majesty's land and sea forces at Varna concur in recommending strongly to the Porte, respecting the establishment of a sufficient garrison in Soukoum-Kaleh and Redoute-Kaleh, the protection of the stores of artillery, muskets, ammunition, lead, &c; I beg to inform your Excellency that the Porte have decided upon sending the General of Division, Mustapha Pasha, with a Regiment of Infantry, to reinforce the garrisons of the above-mentioned places. Mustapha Pasha will be furnished with special instructions as to the use he is to make of the artillery stores, ammunition, muskets, &c., which were sent to that neighbourhood some time ago by the Porte.

With reference to the reinforcement, in general, of the Turkish forces in Asia, the Grand Vizier observed that the Porte has at present no troops which she can dispose of; but as soon as the affairs in Thessaly take a pacific turn, so as to render the presence of the troops there of little use, the largest portion of them will be removed to Asia.

The offer of Lord Raglan to send an Engineer officer to Redoute-Kaleh, has been received with gratitude by the Porte, and the Grand Vizier will provide him with a letter of introduction to the Commander of the fort.

Mustapha Pasha's departure will take place as soon as practicable, that is to say, as soon as they can dispose of the steamers now employed to convey troops to Varna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 6 in No. 330.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to General Lord Raglan.

Therapia, July 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I CANNOT better reply to your Lordship's despatch respecting the fort of Redoute-Kaleh and other objects relating to the shore of Circassia than by inclosing herewith a copy of Mr. Pisani's report addressed to me, after communicating by my orders with the Grand Vizier and Reshid Pasha on these important matters.

Your Lordship will find that the Porte assents to all the proposals submitted to its Ministers on this occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 330.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Therapia, July 4, 1854.

My Lord,

IN reply to your despatches respecting the forts of Redoute-Kaleh and other objects of interest on the shore of Circassia, I have the honour to send you herewith, in copy, an official report addressed to me on those matters by Mr. Pisani after he had communicated with the Grand Vizier and Reshid Pasha concerning them.

You will perceive that the Porte assents to all the proposals suggested jointly, through me, by yourself and Lord Raglan.

The Turkish Ministers are not, however, disposed to act upon your suggestion that a part of the crews of the Ottoman squadron should be disembarked to replace any number of soldiers who might be spared by that expedient for service elsewhere. In explanation of this decision on the subject, they allege that the men now serving in the fleet cannot be employed on shore without prejudice to the service on board.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 331.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 399. Confidential.)

Berlin, July 14, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has mentioned to me, in strict confidence, that Baron Budberg had communicated to him yesterday a despatch from Count Nesselrode, containing allusions to the proceedings of the late Conference at Bamberg, and expressions of satisfaction at the sentiments entertained by the Governments which were there represented.

His Excellency did not say that Count Nesselrode had called the attention of the Prussian Government to these proceedings for the purpose of inviting them to alter their present policy, and to place themselves at the head of this party in Germany, and I was unable to learn from him the avowed object of the communication; but he said that the King had been greatly displeased and irritated at it, and he declined to say anything more.

I told his Excellency that this communication ought to open the eyes of the King as to the objects of Russia, which could be no other than to encourage His Majesty to separate from Austria, to emancipate himself from his engagements with her and with the Western Powers, and to adopt a policy of neutrality, which might facilitate his uniting hereafter with that of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 332.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 401.)

Berlin, July 14, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, in German and in translation, copy of a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg, the Civil Governor of Wallachia, which has been published in the Berlin journals, and which bears the marks of authenticity.

The language here used concerning the Principalities presents a strong contrast with that of the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, of which a copy is inclosed to your Lordship in the Earl of

Westmorland's despatch No. 265 of the 12th instant. I may observe to your Lordship that the one to Baron Budberg is dated the $\frac{11}{23}$ ultimo, whereas that to Prince Gortchakoff is of the $\frac{17}{29}$, only six days later.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 332.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg.

(Translation.) *St. Petersburgh, June* , 1854.

M. le Baron,

HIS Majesty the Emperor of Russia desires you at the earliest opportunity to express to the Wallachians the displeasure which His Imperial Majesty cannot but feel at the extraordinary attitude assumed by them, and more especially by the Boyards, towards the Russian troops who entered the Principalities, with the object of freeing them for ever from the insupportable yoke of Turkey.

The Emperor does not consider it right that under existing circumstances His Imperial Majesty's co-religionists should remain under other than a Christian Government.

Although the Wallachians do not understand this, because they are too much under the influence of the Western schismatics, nevertheless, the Emperor cannot leave unfulfilled the task which is confided to him by Heaven, as chief of the faithful Christians; namely, to deliver for ever the members of the true Greek Christian Church from Turkish rule.

These thoughts have occupied the Emperor since the beginning of his glorious reign, and now the time has arrived for His Imperial Majesty to execute his long settled plan, notwithstanding the interference of the other powerless States of unbelieving Europe.

We are with God, God is with us, and victory is on our side.

His Majesty the Emperor desires you, M. le Baron, to reproach the Boyards severely, and the other high Wallachian functionaries, for their disloyal conduct towards our troops.

The time will come when these refractory Wallachians, who have excited His Majesty's indignation in the highest degree, will bitterly atone for their disloyalty. Only act severely, M. le Baron, the more severely the better against these lawless Wallachians; this is the desire of the Emperor.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 333.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 17.)

(No. 402.) *Berlin, July* 14, 1854.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I had to-day with Baron Manteuffel, his Excellency was indisposed to converse on the last communications from St. Petersburgh or Vienna, and I was unable to learn from him anything which could throw a light on the intentions of Austria or Prussia.

He said that he had expected by this time to have received from Count Buol an indication of the wishes of the Austrian Government, but that nothing had yet reached him.

I asked his Excellency if it were true, as I had been told, that he objected to the communication to the Conference of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Prince Gortchakoff? He replied that personally he wished the Conference to take cognizance of it, but that he did not know whether he should be able to obtain the King's consent to it; and that unfortunately Count Alvensleben was opposed to the communication on account of the discussions that must ensue, for he felt that Baron Bourqueney, upon this occasion as upon previous ones,

would take the lead, and that he would probably make proposals which it might be inconvenient to adopt.

I endeavoured to show to Baron Manteuffel the ill effect that would be caused if the Representative of Prussia did not attend the Conference, and that it would be immediately inferred that the policy of the King was changed, and that His Majesty wanted to be freed from his engagements. He replied, that as far as he was concerned he was most desirous that the Austrian and Prussian Governments should be fully agreed and act together, and that he hoped it would still be so, but that until he heard further from Vienna he could not say what Prussia would do.

It appears to me from what his Excellency said, and from what I have heard from other quarters, that we are on the eve of a serious crisis; that the King is not disposed to go the lengths desired by Count Buol; that His Majesty fears another step might involve him more deeply; and that as he is resolved, if possible, not to depart from his peace policy, His Majesty will, if pressed, retire altogether from the Vienna Conference and from the connection with the Western Powers, though he will not on that account consider himself released from his engagements with Austria.

These I believe to be the opinions held by the Prussian Government at this moment, and if they were to separate from the Conference, there is no doubt that such defection would be viewed with the highest satisfaction at St. Petersburgh.

Prussia desires neutrality more than ever, and will, I apprehend, take any step likely to insure her not being called on to adopt active measures against Russia; at the same time I cannot believe that she will willingly separate from Austria, but will use her best endeavours to induce Austria so to modify her policy that the two Governments may continue to act together on the Eastern question. I understand indeed that the Prussian Government is most anxious to correct impressions that have gone abroad as to a difference of opinion existing between the two Governments, and that an instruction has been sent to M. de Bismark, at Frankfort, to declare that the policy of Austria and Prussia continue unchanged.

The communication of the Treaty of the 20th of April to the Diet will probably be made very shortly. Darmstadt has sent in its adhesion to it, and Wurtemburg stands now alone in her opposition to the measure; but it is believed that when the time comes she will also yield, and accede to the Treaty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 334.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 18.)

Vienna, July 17, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Prussian Government announces by telegraph that they still persist in refusing to attend the Conference proposed by Count Buol. Their motives will be transmitted by Colonel Manteuffel, who will arrive here this evening. Count Buol will wait his arrival, but with the determination to proceed to call the Conference and to act in concert with the three Powers only, if Prussia still persists in refusing to take part.

No. 335.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 805.) *Paris, July* 17, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS showed me this morning a copy of the despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, in answer to the demand made by Austria on the Russian Government to evacuate the Danubian Principalities. He communicated to me, at the same time, the draft of a Protocol which he proposed should be signed by

the Conference at Vienna, as the answer of the four Powers to that despatch. I understand that a copy of this draft was sent last night to London for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I ventured to observe to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I doubted either of the German Plenipotentiaries signing such a Protocol. Prussia, it might be expected, would certainly refuse, and it was more than probable that Austria would excuse herself, under the plea of not wishing to put herself in contradiction with Prussia. As the object which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had in view was to record in a more solemn and public shape the declarations made to the English and French Government of the opinions which Austria entertained as to the terms on which peace might be concluded, would not that object be more easily attained by instructing the English and French Plenipotentiaries to state to the Conference, among the reasons why their respective Governments refused to enter into any discussion of the Russian despatch, that that despatch did not give any one of the securities for the future tranquillity of the East, which Austria, herself, had voluntarily admitted to be necessary? These securities might then be enumerated. The Austrian Plenipotentiary could not refuse to listen to his English and French colleagues, nor could he decline to bear witness that the Protocol faithfully recorded what had passed in Conference, though he might make what observations he pleased in return, which would also be taken down. Nothing, at the same time, would prevent him, if he preferred it, from proposing a Protocol, such as that which had been sent in draft to London.

I permitted myself to remark, further, that I thought it unwise to invite Austria to communicate the observations of the Conference to the Russian Government. By so doing, further subterfuges would be furnished for continuing her neutrality. She would naturally say that she could not be a mediator and belligerent at the same moment. I conceived that England and France could not be too peremptory at Vienna, in declining negotiations on such terms as those put forward in the Russian despatch.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that he considered my observations worthy of attention, and that he should be ready to adopt the alterations which I had suggested, if they were approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 336.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 428.) *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have read with much regret the report which your despatch No. 363 of the 4th of July gives of the defeat of the Turkish army under Selim Pasha, near Choorookoo.

Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the Porte has complied with your Excellency's application, that immediate and effectual succour should be sent to Redoute-Kaleh and Soukoum-Kaleh, and thereby prevent another and still more grave disaster.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 337.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul-General Foublanque.

(No. 7.) *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE to instruct you to state to the Servian Government that Her Majesty's Government have learned with regret that extensive armaments are kept on foot in Servia; and that the position taken up by the Government of that country is incompatible with the duties which it owes to the Porte, and with the consideration which the Governments of England and France are

entitled to expect from all faithful vassals of the Porte, for the policy in which they are engaged in support of the Sultan's Throne. It is clear that these armaments in Servia, if not maintained with a view to eventual cooperation with the common enemy, must necessarily distract the attention of the Porte and its allies from the main object which they have in view; and by rendering it necessary for them to prepare to resist any misapplication of those armaments to purposes hostile to their policy, cripple, in some degree, their operations against the Russian forces.

You will point out to the Servian Government the little probability there is that the result of the war will leave the power and influence of Russia in the bordering provinces of Turkey on the same footing on which they have hitherto rested: and you will suggest whether the eventual interests of Servia are not more likely to be provided for by present deference to the wishes of the Porte and its allies, than by an obstinate adherence to a system which is eminently displeasing to them all.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 338.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 272. Confidential.) *Vienna, July* 15, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL having requested Baron Bourqueney and myself to call upon him together on the 13th, he went into further explanations of his views as to the present position of the relations of Austria with Russia and with the allies, than he had done the previous day. It appeared to Baron Bourqueney and myself that the first impression of Count Buol, regarding the answer from St. Petersburgh, was more favourable than his present one. This arises from his sense of the difficulties which will attend the negotiation which may now be undertaken as to the guarantees which the Governments of England and France will ask for, which are the abdication of all the exceptional positions which, for years past, have been held by Russia in the East; and this Count Buol feels, as does the Emperor, that Russia, under present circumstances, cannot accept.

Count Buol says: England and France may refuse to negotiate, and we shall still be bound to carry out our engagements. We feel that we shall have great embarrassments and difficulties with Prussia and Germany, but we shall act; we call upon you, however, to consider our position, and, by moderation of language, to spare us as far as you are able from these difficulties, and to seek to lessen, if you cannot avert them. Now, it is not probable that any Government will *brusquement* reject a proposition of peace. You may indicate, therefore, the guarantees which you consider as necessary, and without which a peace would not now be accepted: but you may do this in the most courteous form. All the discussions as to these points must necessarily take a certain time, during which your operations will not stop either by sea or land, and Austria, during that time, will be engaged in completing her most extensive military preparations, and will weigh upon, and influence all, the plans and operations of the Russians. If Russia, on being acquainted with all the guarantees you require, rejects them, we (Austria), according to the engagements by which we are bound, must enter Moldavia, to carry out our demand for evacuation; and, if resisted, we do not disguise that it is, for us, war. So, in the two cases, by agreeing to the proposal to enter into the Conference for the purpose of discussing the Russian answer, you neither have diminished the chance of the successful conduct of the war and of the operations you have determined upon, nor of obtaining a peace such as you desire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 339.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 20.)

Vienna, July 19, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COLONEL MANTEUFFEL is arrived here, to explain to Count Alvensleben the decision of the Cabinet of Berlin to decline taking part in the conference which had been proposed. Count Buol represented to Count Alvensleben the urgency of obtaining a contrary decision. Count Alvensleben consequently wrote to his Government by telegraph, and had received for reply that his communication will be answered by Baron Manteuffel from Berlin in the course of to-morrow. Count Buol has therefore begged Baron Bourqueney and myself to adjourn our meeting till this answer is received—he being then decided to act with the three Representatives alone, if Prussia should still persist in then refusing to join the conference.

No. 340.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 20.)

No. 371.) *Therapia, July* 10, 1854.

My Lord,

ON the 6th instant Baron de Bruck sent his interpreter to read me a despatch addressed to his Excellency by Count Buol de Schauenstein. The same communication had been previously made to Reshid Pasha, and also to the French Chargé d'Affaires. The prominent points of the despatch were, that, although the answer of the Russian Government to the summons of the Court of Vienna had not been received, it was intended to prepare at once for a forward movement of the Austrian army into Wallachia, in proportion as the Russian force withdrew; that with this view the Porte was expected to act in concert with the Commander of the Austrian army, for the purpose of restoring legal order in the Principalities, and of reinstating the chief local authority there in the persons of the absent Hospodars, whose immediate return to their respective posts would be ordered by the Porte; that an Austrian Colonel would be sent to the head-quarters of Omer Pasha, and also to those of Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan, authorized to communicate with each, and to fulfil the wish, partaken by all the parties, of establishing mutual relations among them.

I have the honour to inclose herewith an extract, which I have received from Baron Bruck, of that part of Count Buol's instruction which relates to the last-mentioned point. Communications, similar in purport to the inclosed extract, have been made to Marshal de St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan; nor is it at all unlikely that Lieutenant-Colonel Kalieh, the officer selected on this occasion, will reach Varna to-day.

The reinstatement, as required by Austria, of the Hospodars at Bucharest and Jassy, has occasioned some discussion between the Internuncio and Reshid Pasha. The latter was somewhat startled, and not unnaturally, by the peremptory manner in which the return of the Hospodars appeared to have been prescribed by the Austrian Cabinet; and the Porte might naturally hesitate to reinstate with authority functionaries who, like Prince Stirbey, had shown so much reluctance to obey its commands, when directed in the Sultan's name to retire, and so much inclination to keep on terms with His Majesty's usurping enemy.

The question was not, perhaps, of a nature to require any formal interference on my part, though I could not but sympathize with the Turkish Ministers in their first view of the matter. To say the truth, I made no concealment of my impressions in holding conversation respecting it with Reshid Pasha on the one side, and with Baron Bruck on the other. Fortunately the importance of excluding, as much as possible, any subject of disunion between the two Cabinets at such a juncture, has had its weight with both parties; and it appears to be agreed, that while the Hospodars may be allowed to return on the invitation of the Porte's Commissioner, in order to mark the difference between a violent and a legal occupation, the Commissioner is to be instructed to institute a local inquiry, and the return of the Hospodars would seem to depend upon the nature of his subsequent communication to the Austrian Commander-in-chief.

For the particulars of this arrangement I beg to refer your Lordship to the copy, inclosed herewith, of M. Pisani's official report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 340.

Instruction.

(Extrait.)

L'ENTREE des troupes Autrichiennes dans le territoire de la Turquie rendant nécessaire d'établir un concert avec le Commandant-en-chef de l'armée Ottomane, comme avec ceux des troupes auxiliaires, Sa Majesté l'Empereur a résolu d'envoyer au quartier-général en Bulgarie un officier supérieur, dans la personne du Lieutenant-Colonel Kalich, qui aura à se mettre en rapports tant avec le Généndissime Omer Pacha qu'avec les Commandants Français et Anglais.

Vous êtes chargé, M. le Baron, à donner connaissance au Maréchal St. Arnaud et à Lord Raglan de la susdite intention de notre auguste Maitre. Le premier s'étant ouvert envers vous et le second envers moi par l'organe de Lord Westmorland sur leur désir d'entrer prochainement en relations avec l'armée Autrichienne, ils voudront bien reconnaître dans cette mesure la preuve combien ce désir est partagé par le Gouvernement Impérial.

Inclosure 2 in No. 340.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Buyukdere, July 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report, that in the Cabinet Council which was held to-day at the Porte, it was unanimously decided that Prince Stirbey is to return to his post, and resume his functions as Hospodar, on the invitation on the part of the Porte's Commissioner who is to be sent into Wallachia. The Porte, however, declared its intention that the Commissioner about to proceed into Wallachia shall be instructed to inquire into the Prince's former conduct, reserving to itself the power of dismissing him, should the case require it.

A communication in the above sense will be made to the Cabinet of Vienna through the Porte's Ambassador.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 341.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 372. Confidential.)

Therapia, July 10, 1854.

My Lord,

REFERRING to that part of my despatch No. 371 of this date, which relates to the return of the Hospodars to Bucharest and Jassy, I have the honour to state that, on perceiving the inconveniences likely to arise out of that question, in whichever way it might be settled, I was anxious to obtain a previous reference to Her Majesty's Government and to that of France. I am

entitled to obtain this reference, because the Porte consulted me as to the retirement of the Hospodars, and acted on my advice. At the same time, while I wish the Turkish Government to consult their own rights and essential interests, I cannot shut my eyes to the importance of their avoiding any difference with Austria, under circumstances of so extremely delicate and critical a nature as the present. Why the Cabinet of Vienna should have required the return of the Hospodars without leaving the Porte any discretion upon the subject, remains to be explained. The peremptory tone of Count Buol's despatch in that respect is remarkable; and I perceive, in talking with Baron de Bruck, a settled objection on his part to the acknowledgment of a provisional state of things in the Principalities after the retirement of the Russians. How far this objection may point to the principle of negotiation intended by Austria hereafter, is matter for your Lordship's consideration. Sufficient delay may easily arise out of the appointment and proceedings of the Sultan's Commissioner to allow of time for your Lordship's instructions to reach me before the Hospodars can be actually authorised to return to their respective posts; and it will be a great relief to me to be made acquainted in time with the opinion of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 342.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 904. Confidential.)

Paris, July 19, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS showed me yesterday the draft of a despatch, commenting on the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff on the 17th ultimo, which he proposed writing to M. de Bourqueney, should it meet with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

I said that as the draft was to be submitted to the appreciation of Her Majesty's Government, it did not behove me to say anything on the subject, but that I could not resist stating my personal regret that the despatch was to be communicated to the Conference. I feared, as I had already stated, that it might give rise to discussions which would afford an excuse to Austria for prolonging her neutral position.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys would not admit the possibility of this hypothesis, and in order to show that such was not his intention, he put into my hands the copy of a confidential letter which he had addressed to M. Baudin, in sending him the draft of the proposed despatch. I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith.

I replied to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that it was not his intention which I doubted, but the effect which the communication to the Conference of his despatch might have upon the conduct of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 342.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. Baudin.

Paris, le 17 Juillet, 1854.

Monsieur,

IL faut bien nous entendre sur ce que nous allons faire à la Conférence de Vienne. La communication de la réponse Russe doit clore et non entretenir les pourparlers avec Pétersbourg; nous la discutons non pour l'amender, mais pour la rejeter. Nos Représentants déclareront qu'elle n'est point satisfaisante et qu'elle laisse chacun en présence de ses engagements. Ils prendront acte des

conditions reconnues comme indispensables par la note de M. de Buol, communiquée à Londres et à Paris, et rappeleront ce que l'Autriche et la Prusse avaient demandé à la Russie; ils constateront que la réponse Russe ne satisfait ni à ces conditions ni à cette demande, et ils concluront que l'on doit passer outre sans continuer avec la Russie un inutile et dangéreux dialogue.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 343.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Bourqueney.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Baudin, July 20.)

Paris, le Juillet, 1854.

M. le Baron,

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale a prêté toute son attention à la réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et je m'empresse de vous faire connaître le résultat de cet examen.

Je n'objecterai que peu des mots au début de la dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode. La Russie persiste à rejeter sur les Puissances Occidentales la responsabilité d'une crise qu'elle a seule provoquée; elle s'en prend à la forme de leur sommation et voit dans une démarche, que ses actes avaient rendue nécessaire, la cause déterminante de la guerre. C'est oublier un peu trop vite la série de longues et laborieuses négociations qui ont rempli l'année dernière; c'est ne pas tenir assez de compte des avertissements multipliés que la France et l'Angleterre avaient fait, sous toutes les formes, parvenir au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; c'est enfin ne vouloir pas s'avouer que du jour où les armées Russes avaient envahi les Principautés du Danube, la paix était tellement compromise que les efforts les plus loyaux et les plus patients n'ont pu la sauver. Aussi, M. le Baron, me bornerai-je à rappeler que la dépêche de M. le Comte de Buol à M. le Comte Esterhazy, celle même à laquelle répond M. le Comte de Nesselrode, a rétabli comme il le fallait la vérité des rôles, et que la Conférence de Vienne, dans le Protocole du 9 Avril, a solennellement reconnu que la sommation adressée à la Russie par la France et l'Angleterre était fondée en droit. L'Europe a donc prononcé son jugement, par ses organes les plus accrédités, et cela nous suffit.

J'arrive maintenant à la partie politique de la communication qui nous est faite. Ce qui me frappe tout d'abord, c'est qu'en n'attribuant même à la démarche de conciliation tentée par l'Autriche et soutenue par la Prusse qu'un caractère purement Germanique, ces deux Puissances ne sauraient se montrer satisfaites de la réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. La dépêche de M. le Comte de Buol à M. le Comte Esterhazy mettait en relief les deux points suivants:

1. La nécessité d'évacuer dans un court délai les Principautés du Danube.

2. L'impossibilité de subordonner cette évacuation, réclamée au nom des intérêts essentiels de l'Allemagne, à des conditions indépendantes de la volonté de l'Autriche.

Or, la Russie ne fixe aucune limite à l'occupation de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, et elle considère la proclamation d'un armistice comme la condition *sine qua non* de la retraite de ses armées au-delà du Pruth. La préjudice que la Russie, d'après la témoignage de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, porte à la Confédération Germanique, en ne rentrant point dans ses limites territoriales, subsiste donc tout entier, et il s'aggrave, non-seulement par sa durée, mais par la fin de non recevoir dont les légitimes réclamations qu'il avait soulevées viennent d'être l'objet.

Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, il est vrai, adhère, dit-il, aux principes posés dans le Protocole du 9 Avril: mais la présence des troupes Russes sur le sol Ottoman enlève déjà à cette déclaration que je me propose d'examiner de près, la plus grande partie de sa valeur. L'évacuation des Principautés est en effet la condition première de l'intégrité de l'Empire Turc; et le fait de leur occupation constitue une violation flagrante du droit Européen. La crise qui trouble le monde, nous le répéterons d'autant plus que l'on cherche à la contester, a son origine dans le passage du Pruth, et la Russie ne peut plus aujourd'hui subordonner aux exigences d'une position dans laquelle elle s'est mise volontairement, la réparation préalable d'un acte que l'opinion générale a

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condamné. La France et l'Angleterre ne sauraient d'ailleurs consentir à une suspension d'armes sur les vagues assurances données par M. le Comte de Nesselrode, touchant les dispositions pacifiques du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Les sacrifices qu'ont fait les Puissances alliées sont trop considérables, le but qu'elles poursuivent est trop moral, pour qu'elles s'arrêtent en chemin, avant d'avoir la certitude qu'elles ne seront pas obligées de recommencer la guerre. Les conditions particulières qu'elles mettront à la paix, dépendent de trop d'éventualités pour qu'elles aient aujourd'hui à les indiquer; elles suspendent à cet égard leur opinion.

Toutefois, M. le Baron, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, ne demandent pas mieux que de faire connaître dès à présent quelques-unes des garanties qui leur paraissent indispensables pour rassurer l'Europe contre le retour d'une nouvelle et prochaine perturbation. Ces garanties résultent de la situation même qui a fait ressortir les dangers en leur absence. Ainsi la Russie a profité du droit exclusif de surveillance que les Traités lui conféraient sur les rapports de la Valachie et de la Moldavie avec la Puissance Suzeraine, pour entrer dans ces provinces comme s'il se fût agi de son propre territoire. La fermeture hermétique de l'Euxin lui a permis de fonder dans cette mer des établissements et d'y développer un appareil de forces navales qui, par le manque de tout contrepoids, sont une menace perpétuelle pour l'Empire Ottoman. La possession sans contrôle de la principale embouchure du Danube par la Russie, a créé à la navigation de ce grand fleuve des obstacles moraux et matériels qui affectent le commerce de toutes les nations. Enfin, les Articles du Traité de Kutchuk-Kainardji relatifs à la protection religieuse, sont devenus, par suite d'une interprétation abusive, la cause originelle de la lutte que soutient aujourd'hui la Turquie.

Sur tous ces points, M. le Baron, il y a de nouvelles règles à établir, et d'importantes modifications à apporter au *statu quo ante bellum*.

La Conférence reconnaîtra, je me plais à l'espérer, qu'aucune des idées que je viens d'exprimer, ne s'écarte du Protocole du 9 Avril, et qu'il était même difficile de renfermer dans des bornes plus modérées la recherche que la France, l'Autriche, la Grande Bretagne, et la Prusse, s'en sont à cette époque engagées à faire en commun au sujet des moyens les plus propres à consolider l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman, en la rattachant à l'équilibre général de l'Europe. Or, M. le Comte de Nesselrode a évité, avec un soin extrême de faire la moindre allusion à celui de tous les passages du Protocole du 9 Avril qui méritait le plus de fixer son attention, et le seul, à notre avis, qui ait une importance capitale, puisqu'il implique la nécessité d'une révision Européenne des anciens rapports de la Russie avec la Turquie. J'ajouterai que l'adhésion donnée par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg aux autres principes proclamés par la Conférence de Vienne, n'est nullement de nature à la satisfaire. Je ne comprends pas, je l'avoue, ce que M. le Comte de Nesselrode a voulu dire en annonçant que l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman "ne sera point menacée par la Russie tant qu'elle sera respectée par les Puissances qui occupent en ce moment les eaux et les territoires du Sultan." Quelle parité existe-t-il entre l'envahisseur et le protecteur? En quoi la présence de troupes alliées, réclamée par la Sublime Porte, autorisée par un Acte diplomatique, dont les effets doivent cesser d'un commun accord, a-t-elle une analogie quelconque avec l'entrée violente de l'armée Russe sur le territoire Ottoman?

Je n'ai plus à reparler des conditions que la Russie prétend mettre à l'évacuation des Principautés, et j'arrive au paragraphe de la dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode qui concerne la situation des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan. Ou je me trompe fort, M. le Baron, ou le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg place au nombre des anciens priviléges que les Grecs du rit Oriental devrait conserver, toutes les conséquences du protectorat à la fois civil et religieux qu'il revendiquait sur lui; et, en admettant que ce protectorat dût se fondre dans une garantie Européenne, je cherche en vain comment l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la Sublime Porte pourraient coexister avec un semblable système.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale ne veut pas dire assurément que l'Europe puisse se montrer indifférente à l'amélioration du sort des Rayahs; il pense, au contraire, qu'elle doit couvrir les populations de son active sollicitude, et s'entendre pour mettre à profit les généreuses intentions du Sultan; mais il croit fermement que les réformes dont le régime auquel sont soumises les diverse communautés de l'Empire Ottoman est susceptible, ont besoin, pour être

efficaces et salutaires, de procéder de l'initiative de la Sublime Porte, et que si leur accomplissement comporte une action étrangère, c'est une action bienveillante, se manifestant par un concours de leurs conseils, et non par un ingérence basée sur des Traités qu'aucun Etat ne saurait souscrire sans abdiquer son indépendance.

Telle est, M. le Baron, la réponse qu'après un concert préalable avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, l'Empereur m'a ordonné de faire à la communication de la dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode. Vous voudrez bien remettre une copie de cette réponse à M. le Comte de Buol, et le prier de réunir la Conférence pour qu'elle en entende aussi la lecture.

En résumé, le document émané du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne change absolument rien aux situations respectives, et dans l'opinion de Sa Majesté Impériale, il ne servira même qu'à les dessiner davantage.

Puisque la Russie en est encore à faire connaître ses intentions d'une façon pratique et positive, la France et l'Angleterre persistent dans leur attitude de Puissances belligérantes, et puisque les Principautés n'ont point été évacuées, la Prusse et l'Autriche jugeront, sans doute, que les obligations résultant du Traité du 20 Avril, et fortifiées, en ce qui concerne le Cabinet de Vienne, par son accord particulier avec la Sublime Porte, subsistent dans toute leur intégrité, et sont arrivées à leur échéance.

Inclosure in No. 343.

Substitute.

LA Conférence reconnaîtra, je me plais à l'espérer, qu'aucune des idées que je viens d'exprimer ne s'écarte du Protocole du 9 Avril, et qu'il était même difficile de renfermer dans des bornes plus modérées la recherche que la France, l'Autriche, la Grande Bretagne et la Prusse se sont, à cette époque, engagées à faire en commun, au sujet des moyens les plus propres à consolider l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman, en la rattachant à l'équilibre général de l'Europe. Or, M. le Comte de Nesselrode a évité avec un soin extrême de faire la moindre allusion à celui de tous les passages du Protocole du 9 Avril qui méritait le plus de fixer son attention, et le seul, à notre avis, qui ait une importance capitale, puisqu'il implique la nécessité d'une révision Européenne des anciens rapports de la Russie avec la Turquie. J'ajouterai que l'adhésion donnée par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg aux autres principes proclamés par la Conférence de Vienne n'est nullement de nature à la satisfaire. Je ne comprends pas, je l'avoue, ce que M. le Comte de Nesselrode a voulu dire en annonçant que l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman "ne sera point menacée par la Russie tant qu'elle sera respectée par les Puissances qui occupent, en ce moment, les eaux et le territoire du Sultan." Quelle parité existe-t-il entre l'envahisseur et le protecteur? En quoi la présence de troupes alliées, reclamée par la Sublime Porte, autorisée par un Acte diplomatique dont les effets doivent cesser d'un commun accord, a-t-elle une analogie quelconque avec l'entrée violente de l'armée Russe sur le territoire Ottoman.

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No. 344.

Austrian and French Projets and Contre-Projets of Treaties and Notes respecting the Triple Alliance.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Baudin, July .)

(No. 1.)—*Projet de Traité.*

Préambule.

DÉSIR commun des Hautes Parties Contractantes de réunir tous leurs efforts pour ramener le prompt rétablissement de la paix sur des bases propres à garantir l'Europe contre le retour des complications qui viennent de troubler si malheureusement son repos.

ARTICLE I.

Engagement mutuel de ne pas entrer en arrangement avec la Cour de Russie, tant qu'elle n'aura pas accepté sans réserve les bases de paix qui lui seront présentées par notre intermédiaire.

ARTICLE II.

Dans le cas où la Russie n'accepterait pas ces bases, ou du moins ne procéderait pas immédiatement à l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes, l'Autriche s'engagerait à entrer sur le champ en action pour donner exécution à la Convention conclue avec la Porte Ottomane sous la date du 14 Juin dernier.

ARTICLE III.

Si, par suite de cette action, la guerre éclatait entre nous et la Russie, la France et l'Angleterre s'engageraient à faire cause commune avec nous, en employant à cet effet, selon les nécessités de la guerre appréciées d'un commun accord, des forces dont le nombre, la qualité et la destination seraient déterminées par des arrangements subséquents.

ARTICLE IV.

Au cas spécifié par l'Article III, les bases de paix mentionnées à l'Article 1 ne seront plus applicables. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'entendront dans cette éventualité sur les nouvelles bases propres à opérer le rétablissement de la paix générale.

ARTICLE V.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes recevront avec empressement dans leur alliance, pour coopérer au but proposé, celles des autres Puissances de l'Europe qui voudront y entrer.

(No. 2.)—*Projet de Note.*

LE Soussigné (Autriche) a l'honneur d'annoncer à (la France / la Grande Bretagne) qu'il a reçu de son Gouvernement l'ordre de constater dans la présente note qu'il résulte des pourparlers confidentiels échangés entre les Cours de Vienne, de Paris, et de Londres, conformément au passage du Protocole du 9 Avril dernier par lequel l'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne se sont, en même temps que la Prusse, engagées à rechercher les moyens de rattacher l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre général de l'Europe, que les trois Puissances pensent également que les rapports de la Sublime Porte avec la Cour Impériale de Russie ne pourraient pas être rétablis sur les bases solides et durables, si :

1. Le Protectorat exercé jusqu'à présent par la Cour Impériale de Russie sur les Principautés de Valachie, de Moldavie, et de Servie ne cesse à l'avenir, et si les priviléges accordés par les Sultans à ces provinces dépendantes de leur Empire ne sont pas, en vertu d'un arrangement conclu avec la Sublime Porte, placés sous la garantie collective des Puissances sans qu'aucun droit particulier d'ingérence appartienne désormais à l'une d'elles plutôt qu'aux autres ;

2. Si la navigation du Danube à ses embouchures n'est point délivrée de toute entrave, et soumise à l'application des principes consacrés par les Actes du Congrès de Vienne ;

3. Si le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, n'est pas révisé de concert par toutes les Hautes Parties Contractantes dans un intérêt d'équilibre Européen ;

4. Si la Russie ne revendique plus le droit d'exercer un Protectorat officiel sur les sujets de la Sublime Porte, à quelque rit qu'ils appartiennent, et si la France, l'Autriche, la Grande Bretagne, la Prusse, et la Russie, ne se prêtent leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des priviléges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes, et mettre à profit, dans l'intérêt commun de leurs coreligionnaires, les généreuses intentions manifestées par Sa Majesté le Sultan, sans qu'il en résulte aucune atteinte pour la dignité et l'indépendance de sa Couronne.

Le Soussigné est, en outre, autorisé à déclarer que son Gouvernement conçoit que la France et l'Angleterre n'entrent pour le moment avec la Cour Impériale de Russie dans aucun arrangement qui n'impliquerait point de la dite Cour une adhésion pleine et entière aux quatre principes ci-dessus énumérés, et qu'il accepte pour lui-même l'engagement de ne traiter que sur ces bases, en se réservant toutefois la libre appréciation des conditions qu'il mettrait au rétablissement de la paix s'il venait lui-même à être forcé de prendre part à la guerre.

(No. 3.)—*Projet de Note.*

LE Soussigné (France / Angleterre) s'empresse d'accuser réception à (Autriche) de la note qu'il lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser en date du de ce mois, et de constater, à son tour, qu'il résulte des pourparlers confidentiels échangés entre les Cours de Vienne, de Paris et de Londres, &c.

1. Si le protectorat exercé, &c.

2. Si la navigation du Danube, &c.

3. Si le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, n'est pas, &c.

4. Si la Russie ne revendique plus, &c.

Le Soussigné est autorisé à déclarer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français (la Reine du Royaume Uni,) &c., tout en se réservant de faire connaître, en temps utile, les conditions particulières qu'il pourrait mettre à la conclusion de la paix avec la Russie, et d'apporter à l'ensemble des garanties ci-dessus spécifiées telle modification que la continuation des hostilités rendrait nécessaire, est décidé, pour le moment, à ne discuter et à ne prendre en considération aucune proposition du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg qui n'impliquerait point de sa part un adhésion pleine et entière aux principes sur lesquels il est déjà tombé d'accord avec les Gouvernements de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche et (*illegible*).

(No. 4.)—*Projet de Traité.*

SA Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, animées du désir d'abréger le plus possible la durée de la guerre actuelle et de contribuer par leurs communs efforts au rétablissement de la paix sur des bases qui donnent à leurs propres Etats et à l'Europe entière toute garantie contre le retour des complications qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos, ont résolu de conclure entr'elles un Traité d'Alliance, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Lesquels s'étant réciproquement communiqué, &c., ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivants :

ARTICLE I.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'obligent réciproquement à n'accueillir de la part de la Cour Impériale de Russie aucune ouverture ni aucune proposition tendant à la cessation des hostilités, et à n'entrer, jusqu'au rétablissement de la paix générale, dans aucune arrangement avec la dite Cour, sans faire des conditions qu'elles y mettraient l'objet d'une délibération en commun.

ARTICLE II.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche s'engage, pour le cas où la Russie ne procéderait pas immédiatement à l'évacuation des Principautés, à passer, sans autre retard, à l'exécution de la Convention conclue avec la Sublime Porte sous la date du 14 Juin dernier.

ARTICLE III.

La guerre venant à éclater, par suite de cette action de l'Autriche, entre elle et la Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, se promettent mutuellement leur alliance offensive et défensive contre la Russie et emploieront à cet effet, selon les nécessités de la guerre appréciées d'un commun accord, des forces de terre et de mer dont le nombre, la qualité, et la destination seront déterminés, s'il y a lieu, par des arrangements ultérieurs.

ARTICLE IV.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes porteront ensemble le présent Traité à la connaissance des autres Cours, et accueilleront avec empressement dans leur alliance celles qui voudraient coopérer au but qu'elles se proposent.

ARTICLE V.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications échangées à dans l'espace de quinze jours.

En foi de quoi, &c.

Fait, &c.

No. 345.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 433.) *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1854.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 371 of the 10th of July, respecting the demand made by Austria on the Porte, that the Hospodars of the Danubian Principalities should be reinstated, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government consider it judicious on the part of the Porte not to have agreed to the unconditional restoration of Prince Stirbey.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 346.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 434.) *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to what is contained in your Excellency's confidential despatch No. 372 of the 10th of July, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France consider that any arrangement made under present circumstances for the administration of the Turkish Danubian Principalities should be of a temporary character.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 347.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 407. Confidential.) *Berlin, July* 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I DO not understand that any decisive intelligence has been received from Vienna since I had the honour of writing to your Lordship by the last messenger, but rumours having reached the King of Prussia that the Imperial Cabinet entertained serious doubts as to the propriety of pursuing the policy recommended from Berlin, and His Majesty being apprehensive that it was better disposed to adopt the views of the Western Powers on the communications which had been brought by Prince Gortchakoff, and becoming impatient at the silence of Count Alvensleben, the Prussian Envoy, he suddenly decided on despatching Colonel Manteuffel, one of his aides-de-camp, who has lately returned from a mission to the Emperor of Russia to Vienna, and he has proceeded thither, charged with a letter for the Emperor Francis Joseph.

Baron Manteuffel is absent at his country-seat, and I have consequently

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been unable to learn from an authentic source the nature of the communications thus sent to Vienna; but I am informed that Colonel Manteuffel has no instructions from the Foreign Office, and that the object of the Royal letter with which he is charged, is to engage the Emperor to entertain the last Russian propositions, and to admit Colonel Manteuffel to an audience, at which he would be allowed an opportunity of explaining the pacific disposition and moderate views of the Emperor of Russia, whom he had so lately seen.

Colonel Manteuffel is only to remain a few days at Vienna, and is ordered to meet the King of Prussia at Munich, and there report to His Majesty the result of his mission.

The King and Queen of Prussia leave this for the Bavarian capital on the 24th instant. It is believed that the Queen will go on from thence to Ischl. The King returns here before the end of the month, and proceeds to Putbus, in the Island of Rügen, for sea-bathing, and will remain there till about the 20th of August.

The King's opinions continue, I believe, unchanged, and His Majesty is as much resolved as ever to avoid taking an active part in the war. The chances of his joining us appear to diminish every day, and I have reason to believe that he is about to renew all his efforts at Vienna to prevent the Austrian Government taking a decision which would force him either to depart from his pacific intentions or to separate himself from the policy of the Imperial Court.

Baron Werther, the new Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh, is to proceed to his post to-morrow, and it is said that he is directed to assure the Emperor of Russia that, under no circumstances, will he ever wage war against him, except to protect Germany from invasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 348.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 22.)

Vienna, July 21, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE French Minister and myself met this day at Count Buol's, who stated that the answer from Berlin not having arrived, the Emperor had decided that a courier bearing the Russian reply, with a communication from the Cabinet of Vienna, should start this evening to London and Paris. Count Buol feels it would be unadvisable, and an act of too much responsibility, if, acting now as a Conference of three, we were to establish [unintelligible] concern of the four Powers. He feels that the conduct of Prussia calls for the strongest representations from England and France, and he wishes to conform to the language they should adopt in these remonstrances, and in calling upon the Cabinet of Berlin to declare whether they intend to join the Conference in future or not. The answers of the English and French Governments [?] to the Russian reply that you will not have sent from Vienna to St. Petersburgh (subject to the decision Prussia should come to), acknowledged either through the medium of the Conference of the four or without the concurrence of Prussia, should she persist in her present views. All Count Buol's views upon this subject are detailed in the despatch sent to-day to [you], which he has read to the French Ambassador and myself.

No. 349.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 22.)

(No. 273. Confidential.)

Vienna, July 18, 1854.

My Lord,

IN a conversation which took place yesterday with Count Buol, relative to the mode of convoking the Conference, he held to Baron Bourqueney and myself a language too important not to be faithfully reported to your Lordship. It is the most decided indication we have yet received of the serious intention of the

Austrian Government, under the circumstances contemplated, to take an active and decisive part towards obtaining the general objects of the alliance.

Count Buol stated in this conversation, that he raised no objections generally to the conditions which you specify as desirable to be obtained in your Lordship's despatch No. 238 of the 7th instant.

If you transmit these conditions, as the basis upon which you will consent to negotiate, in your Lordship's reply to the Russian note, which will be communicated to you through the Conference, Count Buol will forward them to St. Petersburgh; and, in case of their rejection, Count Esterhazy will be directed to require, in accordance with the demand already addressed to the Russian Cabinet, the order for the evacuation of the Principalities. If this be not complied with, he will be instructed, after a short delay, to announce to Count Nesselrode the decision of his Government that he should quit St. Petersburgh, after which the Austrian army will receive orders to enter the Principalities, with the view of obtaining their evacuation by the Russian armies. Count Buol looks upon this decision as leading at once to the commencement of hostilities, unless the Russian Government should conform to the requisition they will have received. He conceives, therefore, that in three weeks the Austrian army may be required to act, and he appeals to the English and French Governments to direct their forces to be ready to cooperate with those of Austria, in the operations which they will then be called upon to undertake.

Count Buol stated that he had received a telegraphic message from Belgrade, announcing the arrival there of despatches from Constantinople, which reported the nomination of Dervish Pasha as the Commissioner Extraordinary of the Porte for the Principalities, and the intention of the Porte to replace there the Government of the Hospodars.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 350.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 22.)

(No. 69.)

Frankfort, July 21, 1854.

My Lord,

THE long-deferred communication of the Austro-Prussian Treaty was made by the Plenipotentiaries of the two States to the Diet in the sitting of yesterday.

A Commission was named to prepare the reply, consisting of the Representatives of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony (Royal), and Mecklenburg.

It is expected that an extraordinary sitting will be convoked on Monday to receive the report which will be presented by M. de Schrenk, the Plenipotentiary of Bavaria.

The only positive declaration of non-accession made yesterday was from Denmark, and it was accompanied by such expressions of warm approval of the principles on which the two Powers have acted, as very much to weaken its appearance of dissent.

Wurtemburg made a rather equivocal declaration, to the effect that her adhesion might have been secured under certain conditions, but it is not thought that she will venture to record a decided dissent on the Protocol.

The objectionable pretensions of the Bamberg Conference will, I am positively assured, be altogether got rid of.

As I hope to obtain all particulars of the report of the Commission, I need not at present detain your Lordship further in the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 351.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 247.)

Foreign Office, July 22, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 262 of the 10th instant has been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government have read that despatch with feelings of surprise and disappointment. They see no reason to regret that the Austrian Government should have abandoned its intention of occupying Wallachia, which, so far from being in compliance with the stipulations of the Treaty lately signed between Austria and the Porte, as stated in your Lordship's despatch No. 244 of the 28th ultimo, would appear rather to have been in contravention of that Treaty.

Article I stipulates as follows:—"Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche s'engage d'épuiser tous les moyens de négociation et autres, pour obtenir l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes par l'armée étrangère qui les occupe, et d'employer même en cas de besoin le nombre de troupes nécessaires pour atteindre ce but."

In my despatch No. 238 of the 7th instant to your Lordship, I stated that great care must be taken "that one military occupation should not be substituted for another, which might be equally opposed to the independence of the Ottoman Empire;" and this would in fact have been the case, for it appears that Austria had not any intention of disturbing the Russian occupation of Moldavia—she simply meant to occupy the territory that was evacuated, and having no ulterior intentions, she was about to take up a position between the belligerents, and might at any moment have exercised an armed mediation. The true meaning and intention of the Convention would thus have been perverted, and it is therefore not a matter of regret that, owing to the reappearance of some Russian troops at Bucharest and Giurgevo (from which latter place they have been expelled by the Turks), the project should have been abandoned.

Your Lordship, in your despatch No. 244 of the 28th ultimo, mentioned incidentally, and without reference to the Austrian occupation of Wallachia, or to the military operations of the allies, that Count Buol contemplated the possible advance of the Turkish and allied forces through the Principalities, towards the Russian frontier; but by your despatch No. 262 of the 10th instant, it appears that Count Buol contemplated the attack of the Russians by the Turkish and allied armies, in which operation it is stated, not very intelligibly, that the English and French troops would certainly not have remained passive spectators, while the part assigned to the Austrian troops was that of protectors to the allies in their march through the Principality which the Russians had long before evacuated; such a movement, however, might for many and obvious reasons have been imprudent without previous concert with Austria, and the Austrian Government has hitherto declined to communicate with the allies upon military operations, or to act in concert with them.

Your Lordship states that in obtaining the evacuation of Wallachia by means of the representations addressed by the Austrian Government to the Emperor Nicholas, the Imperial Government considered that they would have rendered an essential service to Turkey and the allies; but Her Majesty's Government have no reason to think that the evacuation of the Principality was owing to the representations of Austria. On the contrary, they believe that the assumption could be disproved by dates, and that strategical purposes, as well as the pressure of want, were the real motives of the Russian retreat: but supposing the fact to be as stated, and that the Emperor Nicholas by evacuating one Principality had conceded half the demand addressed to him by Austria, can his immediate reoccupation of that Province be regarded in any other light than as a direct defiance to Austria? and upon these grounds your Lordship states that Count Buol expects the Turkish and allied armies will not hesitate to follow their enemy across the Danube, and drive them out of Wallachia.

But I would beg to recal to the recollection of Count Buol that by the various Protocols of Vienna, and more particularly by that of the 9th of April, the four Powers pledged themselves to obtain the evacuation of the Principalities, by declaring that "leurs Gouvernements restent unis dans le double but de maintenir l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, dont le fait de l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes est et restera une des conditions essentielles." That by the Additional Article to the Treaty with Prussia it was declared that "the indefinite continuance of the occupation of the territories on the Lower Danube under the sovereignty of the Porte, would endanger the political, moral, and material interests of the whole German Confederation." That by the note to the Diet, Austria and Prussia stated that "elles n'ont pas pu méconnaître que l'entretien continuel d'une force militaire sur le Bas-Danube compromettrait non seulement les intérêts de l'Autriche qui en est voisine, mais aussi ceux de l'Allemagne entière." That by the Treaty lately signed by Austria with the Porte, the evacuation of the Principalities was said to be one of the essential conditions of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That by the summons to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the occupation of the Principalities was said to be one of the chief causes of the alarming propositions which the existing contest had assumed, and that it was the measure which more than any other had caused the failure of all the attempts which have been made to effect a pacific solution. And, lastly, by the despatch of Count Buol communicated to me by Count Colloredo, the Austrian Government declared its intention to procure the evacuation of both Principalities, "de gré ou de force," in the event of the Russian answer being evasive. Count Buol is surely not, then, justified in calling upon the allies to follow their enemy across the Danube, and to drive him out of Wallachia, and, unaided by the two German Powers, to do the work that vitally concerns the whole of Germany, and which Austria even more than the allies is pledged to perform.

Count Buol further desires to know what are the movements to be decided upon by the Turkish and allied armies along the line of the Danube; but to this it is impossible to give a specific reply, as Count Buol does not even indicate what the policy or intentions of Austria may be, or whether the allies are to prepare for her neutrality or to expect her cooperation.

I have now explained to your Lordship the reasons of the surprise and disappointment of Her Majesty's Government on reading your despatch No. 262, and those feelings were increased by the reflection that the communication of Count Buol was made to your Lordship some days after his Excellency was in the receipt of the Russian answer, which evaded the just demands of Austria, and announced a determination to retain the Principalities by making their evacuation dependent upon conditions with which Austria had previously declared that she would be unable to comply.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 352.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 248.)

Foreign Office, July 22, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have attentively considered the answer of the Russian Government to the demands of Austria, and can arrive at no other conclusion than that it is evasive and altogether eludes those demands.

Austria required of Russia to evacuate both the Principalities within a short space of time, and not to make that evacuation, which was essential to the interests of the whole of Germany, dependent on conditions with which Austria had not the means of complying. The Russian answer fixes no time for the evacuation of the Principalities; it demands an armistice as the indispensable condition of withdrawing behind the Pruth, and requires from Austria the very concessions on the part of the belligerent Powers which Austria declared beforehand her inability to procure.

Russia affects to adhere to the Protocol of April 9, but she always proclaimed her intention to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, even while occupying by force a large portion of the Sultan's territory; and the manner in which she now alludes to the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte by no means indicates that she has abandoned her original pretensions, or that she views the question in the same light as the Powers who signed the Protocol of April 9; and Count Nesselrode passes by in silence the

most important point in that Protocol, viz., the pledge of the Four Powers to connect the Ottoman Empire with the general equilibrium of Europe. There is nothing in Count Nesselrode's despatch to lead to a belief that Russia will lend herself to any such arrangement, but without which, according to the opinion of the Austrian Government, no peace can be solid or lasting.

The answer then of Russia appears to be derogatory to the dignity and interests of the two German Courts which addressed these demands to Russia, and to contain nothing which merits the favourable consideration of England and France.

We have every reason to believe that Count Buol concurs with Her Majesty's Government, and that of the Emperor of the French, in considering as bases of peace—

1. A new organisation of the Principalities, calculated to substitute the Protectorate of Europe for the influence that has so long been abused in those provinces.

2. A revision of the Treaty of 1841, and the limitation of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea.

3. The freedom of the navigation of the Danube under the guarantee of the Great Powers of Europe.

4. The abolition of the Protectorate claimed by Russia over the Greek subjects of the Porte, and placing the different Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire under the safeguard of the Christian Powers, with due respect to the independence and sovereign rights of the Sultan.

The Austrian Government is aware that England and France, without precluding themselves from making other demands, adhere to the above stipulations as the indispensable bases of peace; and Count Buol will doubtless admit that, no overture with respect to an armistice or a Congress can be seriously entertained unless accompanied by the full and unreserved assent of Russia to the conditions already agreed upon between the maritime Powers and Austria.

In the meanwhile the season for operations is wearing away, and Her Majesty's Government deeply regret this prolonged indecision on the part of Austria. She has hitherto, as I have observed in my despatch No. 247 of this day's date, declined to make known her intentions, or to concert her military movements with the allies, upon the ground that her geographical position constituted an important distinction between her and the Western Powers; that if she had declared war at the same time as England and France, she would on the very next day have come into collision with Russia, single handed, and before her own preparations were completed, and that she must therefore wait until the allied forces were in a position, such as the Balkan, which would enable her to reckon upon their cooperation.

Her Majesty's Government did not altogether agree in these views, for by so doing, they would have admitted that the well-organized army of Austria was inferior to, or had anything to fear from any force that Russia could bring against it; but it was for Austria to determine upon the moment when she thought it expedient to take the field. The allied forces, however, have for some time past been at Varna. The effect of their arrival there must have operated in raising the siege of Silistria, and there can be no doubt that if the Russians had had the Turks in their front, the allied forces on one flank, and the Austrian army on the other, they would have been destroyed, or compelled to make a precipitate retreat, and a great step would thus have been made towards the reestablishment of peace.

England and France have given abundant proof of their desire to act cordially with Austria in defence of principles that are common to the three Powers, and for objects which may be said to affect Austria more immediately than they do the Western Powers; but England and France having at vast expense and inconvenience been forced into this war, are determined that it shall be prosecuted with unabating vigour; their honour is engaged in not laying down their arms until a just and honourable peace is secured; but their military operations cannot be made subordinate to indecision which they are unable to control, and the duration of the war, as well as the conditions of peace, must depend on whether England and France are to act alone or in conjunction with Austria.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 353.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 249.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1854.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt this day of your Lordship's telegraphic despatch, by which Her Majesty's Government learn that Prussia has declined to attend the Conference which Count Buol proposed to summon for the purpose of communicating the answer to the demands addressed by Austria to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and that it will in consequence be transmitted by Count Buol to Count Colloredo for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government, however, being already in possession of this answer, and having taken it into mature consideration, I shall no longer delay communicating to your Lordship the views which they entertain with respect to it.

It is unnecessary to dwell at any length upon the arguments by which Count Nesselrode endeavours to throw upon the Western Powers the responsibility of the war which Russia alone has provoked. Count Nesselrode objects to the form of the summons addressed to Russia by England and France, and maintains that this summons, rendered imperative by the acts of Russia, was the true cause of war; but he takes no account of the long series of negotiations during the past year, nor of the repeated warnings which were given to Russia by France and England, and he chooses to forget that it was the invasion of the Principalities by Russian troops which first disturbed the peace of Europe, and which has rendered abortive every effort for its restoration. The despatches of Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, to which Count Nesselrode's despatch is an answer, points out clearly upon whom the responsibility falls of the present state of things; and in the Protocol of the 9th of April the four Powers have solemnly recorded their opinion, that the summons addressed to Russia by England and France was founded in justice.

The opinion of Europe has been pronounced in favour of the course pursued by England and France, and it is needless therefore that they should defend themselves against the accusations of Russia. I proceed to examine the other points contained in the Russian answer.

In the first place, if the demands of Austria, supported by Prussia, are considered in a purely German sense, it is impossible that the answer of the Russian Cabinet can be considered satisfactory by the two German Powers. The main points put forward in Count Buol's despatch to Count Esterhazy were:

1. The necessity of a speedy evacuation of the Danubian Principalities;

2. The impossibilities of making this evacuation, required by the essential interests of Germany, dependent upon conditions which it was out of the power of Austria to ensure.

But Russia fixes no limit whatever to the occupation of the Principalities, and she looks upon an armistice as a previous condition *sine qud non* of the withdrawal of her armies beyond the Pruth.

The injury then which, in the opinion of Austria and Prussia, the Russian occupation inflicts upon the Germanic Confederation continues unabated; nay more, it is aggravated by the refusal of Russia to attend to the just demands of the two German Powers.

Count Nesselrode professes, it is true, to adhere to the principles laid down in the Protocol of the 9th of April, but this declaration is worth little as long as the Russian troops remain on Turkish soil.

In fact, the evacuation of the Principalities is essential to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and their occupation is in itself a flagrant breach of the public law of Europe. The crisis which disturbs the peace of the world had its origin in the passage of the Pruth, and it is impossible to admit the pretensions of Russia to make the reparation which she owes for an act unanimously condemned, dependent upon the exigencies of a position which she has voluntarily created for herself.

Nor can England and France consent to an armistice upon the vague

assurances given by Count Nesselrode of the pacific disposition of the Russian Government. After making such great efforts and sacrifices, and engaged as they are in a cause so just, the allied Powers will not stop in their course without the certainty that they will not again be called upon, after a short interval, to recommence the war. The particular conditions of peace must depend upon too many contingencies for it to be possible to lay them down definitively at the present moment. Her Majesty's Government have, however, no hesitation in stating the guarantees which, in their opinion and in that of the French Government, are essential to secure the tranquillity of Europe from future disturbance. These guarantees are naturally suggested by the dangers to guard against which they are required.

Thus, Russia has taken advantage of the exclusive right which she had acquired by Treaty, to watch over the relations of Wallachia and Moldavia with the Suzerain Power, to enter those provinces as if they were part of her own territory.

Again, the privileged position of Russia in the Black Sea has enabled her to establish in those waters a naval power which, in the absence of any counterbalancing power, is a standing menace to the Ottoman Empire.

The uncontrolled possession by Russia of the principal mouth of the Danube has created obstacles to the navigation of that great river which seriously affect the general commerce of Europe.

Finally, the stipulations of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, relative to the protection of the Christians, have become, by a wrongful interpretation, the principal cause of the present struggle.

Upon all these points the *status quo ante bellum* must undergo important modifications.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the Austrian Government will admit that these views are in accordance with the principles laid down in the Protocol of April 9, and that it would be difficult to restrict within more moderate bounds the inquiry which, by that Protocol, the four Powers engaged themselves to make in common, as to the means best calculated to maintain the Ottoman Empire, by attaching it to the general balance of Europe. But it is remarkable that, to this passage in the Protocol of the 9th of April, the only passage of capital importance, implying, as it does, the necessity of a European revision of the ancient relations of Russia with Turkey, Count Nesselrode carefully avoids making the slightest allusion.

In fact, the profession of the Russian Cabinet, that it adheres to the principles laid down by the Conference at Vienna, contains nothing which is of a satisfactory nature.

Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand the meaning of Count Nesselrode's declaration, that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire will not be menaced by Russia so long as that integrity is respected by the Powers who now occupy the territory and waters of the Sultan. What comparison can be drawn between the invaders and the defenders of the Turkish territory? What analogy can exist between the presence of the allied troops at the invitation of the Porte, under the authority of a diplomatic Convention, and the forcible invasion of the Ottoman territory by the Russian armies?

It is unnecessary to say anything further as to the conditions which are attached by Russia to the evacuation of the Principalities, and I come now to that paragraph in Count Nesselrode's despatch which relates to the situation of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

It amounts to nothing less than this: that the Russian Cabinet includes amongst the ancient privileges which are to be preserved to the Greek Church, the entire rights which flow from the Protectorate, civil as well as religious, claimed by Russia; but it cannot for a moment be supposed that the system established by such a Protectorate, even if it were based upon a European guarantee, could be compatible with the independence and sovereign rights of the Porte. Her Majesty's Government is very far from saying that Europe can be indifferent to the amelioration of the condition of the Christians in Turkey; on the contrary, they think that Europe ought to take an active interest in the welfare of the Rayah populations, and ought to come to an understanding as to the best mode of taking advantage of the generous intentions of the Sultan towards his Christian subjects, but, at the same time they are firmly convinced that the reforms which are needed in the government of the various Christian

communities in the Ottoman Empire can only be effectually and beneficially carried out by the Porte taking the initiative with regard to them, and that if such reforms are to be promoted by any foreign influence, it can only be by means of friendly counsel and advice, and not by an interference grounded upon Treaty engagements into which no State could enter without abdicating its independence.

In fine, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the respective situations of the different Powers are in no way whatever changed, they are only more clearly marked out, by the answer of the Russian Cabinet. England and France must therefore continue in the attitude of belligerents; on the other hand, as the Principalities have not been evacuated, Austria and Prussia will, no doubt, consider that the obligation of the Treaty of the 20th of April, strengthened, so far as Austria is concerned, by her separate engagement with the Porte, subsist in all their force, and that the time has now arrived for their fulfilment.

I have thus fully explained to you the views of Her Majesty's Government, which are entirely shared by the Government of the Emperor of the French, with whom Her Majesty's Government has been in constant communication upon this subject, and I have to instruct your Lordship to deliver a copy of this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 354.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23

(No. 413.)
Berlin, July 21, 1854

My Lord,

I HAVE seen Baron Manteuffel to-day, and found his Excellency as little disposed as at any of my late interviews, to enter into confidential conversation respecting the intention of the Prussian Government with regard to the last communication from St. Petersburgh. I inquired whether he had sent instructions to Count Alvensleben to attend the Conference which I understood Count Buol wished to assemble, to take cognizance of the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff on the $\frac{17}{29}$th of June. He replied that he had not done so, and on my asking what objection there could be to a conference of this nature, which after all, was a mere matter of form, he gave me to understand that there was as much hesitation on the subject at Vienna as here, but he would not enter into details as to the reasons which prevailed with the two Cabinets; and on my urging him further, on the plea that Count Buol had at all events originally proposed the Conference, and that but for the interference of the Prussian Government the communication would have long since taken place, he observed that I was not correctly informed when I believed that the difficulty rested solely with Berlin, for that Austria was far from being anxious to press for the immediate assembling of the Conference.

After exchanging these observations with his Excellency, I told him that I felt it my duty to call his attention to the impression which the late conduct of the Prussian Government had produced in England: that we had hoped to have found it acting in conformity with the engagements contracted in the Protocols of Conferences signed at Vienna, but that there were now evident symptoms of a desire, not only to thwart our policy in the Eastern question, but to encourage Austria to take a less active part than she wished to do; that Prussia was no longer pursuing even a system of neutrality, for her acts were, diplomatically speaking, hostile to us, and that he must not be surprised if Her Majesty's Government felt that they had good reason to complain of such conduct. Baron Manteuffel attempted to explain, that these proceedings were solely dictated by the King's desire for the restoration of peace, and that there was nothing hostile in his intentions towards England; when I observed that much as Her Majesty's Government desired peace, and I believed they desired it as ardently as the Prussian Government, it was useless to entertain the idea that we should be blinded by such flimsy proposals as those contained in Count

Nesselrode's despatch; that England was prepared to carry on the war with vigour, and would not stop until she saw an opening for negotiating an honourable and durable peace, and that in my opinion it would be wise for Prussia to desist from attempting to force upon the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, any proposals that did not hold forth a prospect of being favourably received; that we had not embarked in the war lightly, and that although we had been deceived in our expectations, that Prussia would have seen her interest in joining with us, and thus prevent the extension of the field of hostilities, that Prussia must not suppose, because she seemed more inclined to espouse the cause of Russian aggression, rather than the just one which we were supporting, that her defection would induce the least relaxation in our preparations; on the contrary, the conduct of Prussia might oblige us to increase them, and would force us to consider the necessity of adopting some new measures to meet the apparent desertion of a Power that we had heretofore looked on as an ally.

Baron Manteuffel persisted in the assurances that all that Prussia wished for was peace, and that the attainment of that point was the object of her policy.

Her Majesty's Government will be better able to judge than I can be, of the probable results of the efforts which have been made by Count Alvensleben and Colonel Manteuffel at Vienna, to prevent the assembling of the Conference, but I am credibly informed that Colonel Manteuffel had obtained an audience of the Emperor Francis Joseph, and that he had succeeded in obtaining the assurance from His Imperial Majesty, that he would endeavour to meet the desire of the King of Prussia on the subject, and I may add that the general impression amongst persons here, usually well informed, is that the Prussian arguments will prevail.

It is not unworthy of remark, that at a moment like the present one, Count Thun has taken leave of Baron Manteuffel for some weeks, and that the Austrian Mission is now in charge of Count Crivelli, the first secretary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 355.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 923.)

Paris, July 24, 1854.

My Lord,

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch, received last night from Berlin, informs M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the Austrian Minister had made a communication to the Prussian Government, expressive of the regret experienced by the Cabinet of Vienna at the refusal of the Prussian Plenipotentiary to take cognizance in the Conference of Count Nesselrode's despatch of the 17th ultimo. In deference, however, to the wishes of Prussia, Count Buol had sent that despatch to London and Paris, instead of submitting it to the Conference. In the opinion of the Austrian Government, it was unsatisfactory, and Austria would be obliged to enter the Principalities. He trusted that, under these circumstances, Prussia would act up to the engagements which she had contracted, and immediately begin her armaments.

Prussia, the despatch adds, had returned an evasive answer, stating that she must know the opinion produced in London and Paris by Count Nesselrode's despatch, before she could reply to Count Buol's communication.

After giving me this intelligence, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he was about to send to Berlin copies of the despatches which he had lately addressed to M. de Bourqueney upon the subject of Count Nesselrode's despatch, in concert with Her Majesty's Government, with orders that they should be communicated to M. de Manteuffel; and that he did not doubt that your Lordship would satisfy, in the same manner, the desire of the Prussian Government to know the opinion of the two Western Powers.

In a conversation which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had, a few days ago, with Count Brandenburgh, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires (Count Hatzfeldt having taken a few weeks' leave of absence), he told that gentleman that he must require a categorical answer from the Cabinet of Berlin as to their intentions in regard to the Conference. The allied Powers must know whether they could continue to depend on the concert of Prussia in the Eastern question or not. M. Drouyn de Lhuys is about to repeat this question through M. de Moustier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 356.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 925.)

Paris, July 24, 1854.

My Lord,

THE despatch concerted with Her Majesty's Government as that which should be sent to Vienna in answer to the confidential communication of Count Nesselrode's despatch of the 17th instant to the Cabinets of London and Paris, was forwarded to M. de Bourqueney yesterday. It was accompanied by another despatch in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave M. de Bourqueney clearly to understand that the French Government did not intend to enter into any discussion of the contents of the Russian despatch, but to consider Count Nesselrode's proposals, if they could be called such, as inadmissible. At the same time it is laid down that, such being the case, it is absolutely necessary that the allies should know the intentions of the Austrian Government, and whether the latter is willing, by joining the Convention of London or of Constantinople, or by replacing them by some equally binding instrument, to cooperate actively against Russia.

The allies would not have advanced to Varna, it is said, without the confident expectation of being aided by the Austrian troops. Public feeling in England and France will not brook any further inactivity in the allied camps, but the two Governments must know, and have a right to inquire into the degree of cooperation which they are to receive from Austria, as the plan of the campaign must in a measure depend upon the movements of the Austrian armies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 357.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 70. Confidential.)

Frankfort, July 22, 1854.

My Lord,

I BEG to forward a translation of the joint communication made to the Diet in the sitting of the 20th instant, by the Representatives of Austria and Prussia, of the Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance concluded at Berlin on the 20th of April.

I also subjoin the project of reply in adhesion, as it will be submitted by the two Governments parties to the Treaty, to the Commission, the nomination of which I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 69 of yesterday's date.

Both these papers have been confidentially communicated to me, but will, as I am told, be made public as soon as the Commission are agreed upon, and have made their Report, which as I have already stated to your Lordship is expected to take place in an extraordinary sitting on Monday (the 25th proximo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 357.

Communication made to the Diet by the Representatives of Austria and Prussia.

(Translation.)

Austria and Prussia.—The Envoys have been charged with the following communication:—

In their declaration of the 24th of May of this year, the Courts of Austria and Prussia have laid before their confederates their position in the present European difficulties, and added the expression of a wish, that by means of a constitutional declaration of will on the part of the Diet, a solid guarantee might be obtained for the agreement of the united Governments of Germany, amidst the dangers of the state of the world.

The Diet has by its resolution of the above-mentioned day, declared that it acknowledges the agreement of the two Powers to be the real foundation for the union of Germany, and for the preservation of common German interests. It has acknowledged it as requisite that the resolution of the members of the Diet vigorously and faithfully to cooperate, should obtain a suitable expression through the legal organ of the Confederation.

The more sincerely the Governments of Austria and Prussia rejoiced in this declaration, so much the greater will be the satisfaction in finding themselves now in the position to be able to lay before this assembly an agreement guaranteed in the appointed form of a Treaty, and comprising the whole range of German interests.

The Envoys have the honour herewith to transmit the authentic text of the Treaty concluded at Berlin on April 20th of this year, and since ratified by both parties, between His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria and His Majesty the King of Prussia, respecting the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance, as well as an Additional Article belonging to it and forming an integral part of the same, and to invite the German Diet in the name of their illustrious monarchs to accede to this Treaty.

They are commissioned to accompany this document with the following remarks and further communications:—

Austria and Prussia, in the negotiations which have led to the conclusion of the alliance, have followed out the leading idea, not only to strengthen the bonds of friendship and federal alliance which already exist between them, but also to procure for themselves still more extended pledges for the security of their States, and also for the common protection of the united interests of Germany. The provisions of the Treaty realize this elevated solidarity, inasmuch as they bind the Contracting Parties, for the continuance of the present war, to a common defence against every foreign attack on any part of their united possessions, and expressly extend this union to the case of one of the participators being obliged, for the protection of German interests, to take more active measures.

These obligations, when the Confederation unitedly gives its adhesion to this alliance, will be extended according to Treaty to the whole compass of the German territory of the Confederation, and to the non-German possessions of Austria and Prussia. Germany will then, by virtue of the provisions of the alliance, without deviating from the fundamental character of its Constitution, with a view to its preservation and defence, be able to fulfil its task with increased energy, of protecting, as a closely united integral Power, the common German interest, and at the same time of cooperating for the maintenance of the European balance of power, on which the safety of all States rests.

The principles which the chief instrument of the Treaty of the 20th of April establishes have, in the Additional Article, supplementary to Article II of the same, found a special application to the state of difficulties in the East, and the Envoys have the commission to lay before the Diet, at the same time, copies of those instructions which the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, in execution of the provision of this Additional Article, have addressed to their Missions at the Court of Russia.

The Government of Germany will certainly know how to appreciate the forethought which induced the Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia to determine that a further extension of warlike operations on the part of Russia on the right

bank of the Danube, as well as the continuance of the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia for an indefinite time, were incompatible with the great interests entrusted to their care. But also their Germanic confederates will not refuse acknowledgment and approbation of the spirit of moderation and love of peace, which the two Powers have not disowned in any of their proceedings. The restoration of a permanent peace remains the object of the wishes and the efforts of both Cabinets; and they cling firmly to the hope, that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will give heed to the language of his old allies, which springs from a deep sense of duty, and thus carry out the wish of a peaceable settlement, in order that in consequence of this changed position of Russia, and of the necessary practical influence of the same on those of the remaining belligerent Powers, the way for an understanding may be again opened; and that, obtained in the interest of Germany, be also made useful for the peace of Europe.

The Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin are submitting, in this moment, the answer of Russia to the most conscientious examination, and they will consider it as their duty to communicate this answer to the Diet, as soon as it shall have acceded to the alliance, and to enter into confidential relations with it thereupon in the spirit of the Treaty. They will also take care to ensure to the Diet its due influence in all further negotiations concerning it, as participator in the alliance; and as far as it depends upon the question of the form of its representation not to be separated from considerations of expediency, they will at present hold to the principle of the XLIXth Article of the Vienna Final Acts, and, at any rate, in the eventuality there pointed out, will see to the complete carrying out of this provision of the Laws of the Confederation.

The Governments of Austria and Prussia draw, from their confidence in the judgment and common sense of the Governments of Germany, the consoling conviction, that as regards the objects and the duties which are provided for the Germanic Confederation in the face of the events of the present time, a genuine union of feeling and fellowship reigns among its members. The resolution which the two Courts now look for, will make the united moral and material power of the great German Confederation serviceable for these objects and duties, and assure to this powerful confederacy, under all circumstances, its due influence; so that Germany, by the Divine help, will rise unshaken out of the most serious of political difficulties that have befallen Europe since the foundation of the German Confederation.

Inclosure 2 in No. 357.

Project of the Resolution about to be taken by the Diet.

(Translation.)

THE High German Diet, considering that His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the King of Prusssia, have laid before the Most Serene Germanic Confederation the offensive and defensive alliance concluded at Berlin on the 20th of April of this year, with an invitation to accede thereto:

In consideration and recognition of the grounds which have induced the two High Governments of Austria and Prussia to conclude this alliance, and to impart it to the constitutional organ of the Confederation;

Mindful of their high calling, to guard the united interests of Germany, even beyond the territories of the Confederation, with united force against every detriment;

Guided by the wish to employ German concord, fidelity, and strength for the good of the common fatherland, by the accession to the afore-mentioned Treaty,—

Resolves, on the ground of the IInd Article of the Act of the Confederation, and Articles I, XXXV, and XLVII of the Final Act of Vienna;

To accede to the Treaty regarding the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance, concluded between Austria and Prussia for the duration of the war between Russia, on the one side, and Turkey, England, and France, on the other, which Treaty runs as follows:

As well as to the amplification of Article II, contained in a Supplementary Article, the wording of which is as follows:

(Inseratur.)

In the name of the Most Serene Germanic Confederation, as testified by the present declaration.

II. The necessary measures for the execution of the above resolution remain reserved for special decision. The Select Committee, appointed in the sitting of the 24th of May of this year, is commissioned with the preparation of the same, with the authority to place itself in connexion with the Military Committee for this purpose.

No. 358.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 196.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BERNSTORFF called upon me at the Foreign Office the day after he had the honour of presenting his credentials to the Queen.

In reply to some general remarks of mine upon the present state of affairs and the policy of Prussia, which I thought most unfortunate as regarded both the interests of Germany and of Europe, Count Bernstorff stated that the policy of his Sovereign was peace, and that to the maintenance of peace all the efforts of His Majesty had been, and would continue to be, directed.

I said Her Majesty's Government did full justice to the King's intentions, but they had long been convinced that the course pursued by His Majesty, so far from leading to the result he desired, would only tend to enlarge the theatre and to protract the duration of the war, and that at this moment the position of Prussia could hardly be considered neutral, as she was the cause of the great embarrassment to Austria, who was preparing to act cordially with England and France, and a signal service was thereby rendered to the Power with which England and France were at war.

Count Bernstorff assured me that the King, so far from having any undue predilection for Russia, had grounds for dissatisfaction with the Emperor; but His Majesty looked only to the interests of Prussia, and thought they would be best served by avoiding war. I said that the King of Prussia could not be more desirous of peace than Her Majesty's Government; that our efforts to maintain it, as was notorious to the whole world, had been unceasing and sincere; but that, having been compelled to take up arms in a just and righteous cause, we were determined not to lay them down until we could make peace on terms that should afford a guarantee to Europe against the recurrence of events such as those by which the general tranquillity was now disturbed.

I further told Count Bernstorff that, when he had resided a little longer in this country, and had informed himself upon the true state of public opinion and the power it exercised here, he would agree with me that no Government, to whatever party it belonged, would venture, even in the most improbable event of being so disposed, to conclude a peace that was not just and honourable, and would not, therefore, deserve the approbation of the country.

I have since had another conversation with Count Bernstorff, and did not disguise from him my surprise and regret that the Prussian Minister had been instructed not to attend the Conference at Vienna, which Count Buol proposed to summon for the purpose of communicating to it the answer to the demands which Austria had addressed to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and which Prussia had supported.

Count Bernstorff said it was not exactly correct to say that the Prussian Minister had been forbidden to attend the Conference; but the King, not being altogether satisfied with the Russian answer, desired again to communicate with St. Petersburgh, in order, if possible, to procure terms that would be more acceptable to the Western Powers.

I said it was quite manifest, from the despatch of Count Nesselrode, that the Emperor of Russia had abated none of his former pretensions, and that, although under a new disguise, the old Menchikoff-note had actually been reproduced: all further communication, therefore, must be productive of nothing but delay; and, although His Prussian Majesty was free to make any communications, or to resort to any means, he thought proper, whether for gaining time or making peace, yet I must beg Count Bernstorff distinctly to understand, and to make it known at Berlin, that Her Majesty's Government were no parties to any such communications or negotiations, and that they would neither cause us to relax in the activity of our operations nor influence our determination as to the conditions on which peace should be re-established.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and to give his Excellency a copy of it, if desired.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 359.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 278.)

Vienna, July 22, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have learnt by my telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date, that Count Alvensleben, after expecting the answer of his Government to the question he had addressed to them as to whether it was their intention that he should take part in the Conference for the purpose of transmitting the answer from St. Petersburgh, accompanied by a Protocol, to the English and French Governments, had announced to Count Buol that this answer had not reached him.

Count Buol, in consequence, declared to Baron Bourqueney and to myself, that he should no longer delay the official transmission of that document to our respective Governments, together with the explanations with which he felt it his duty to accompany it; and with the object of placing us in possession of his views, he read to us the two documents he meant should be communicated to our Governments, first, the one which details the propositions brought by Prince Gortchakoff and submits them to their consideration, and the second, announcing that as the Prussian Plenipotentiary had not been authorised to take part in the Conference, he conceived that this important incident ought to become the subject of a serious explanation with the Prussian Government.

Count Buol requested that the representations which our Governments should make upon this subject to the Cabinet of Berlin should be communicated to him, in order that he might adopt the same language in the communication he would address to that Government.

He also stated in detail the reasons why he conceived it would be unadvisable, by acting as a Conference of three, to establish the dissolution of the concert of the Four Powers which had hitherto existed, and which he hoped by the representations to the Prussian Government might be reestablished.

Count Buol informed us that the Emperor had received a report from Colonel Kalich, announcing his arrival at Shumla; but as his original instructions referred only to the occupation of the Principalities after their evacuation by the Russian troops, he had been furnished with subsequent instructions from General Hess to enter into communication with the Commanders of the Anglo-French and Turkish troops as to the general operations which the different armies might at no distant date be called upon to undertake.

Count Buol took the opportunity of repeating to us that on the receipt of the answers of the English and French Governments to the present communications he would transmit them to St. Petersburgh, and if the terms of the allied Governments were not agreed to by the Russian Cabinet, he should instruct Count Esterhazy to require an immediate order for the evacuation of the Principalities. If this demand was not complied with, Count Esterhazy would announce to the Russian Government the order he had received, after a brief delay, to withdraw from St. Petersburgh.

Count Colloredo will state to your Lordship that Count Buol has adopted the idea which has been put forward by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of a Convention between the Governments of England, Turkey, and Austria, to which Prussia might be invited; but it is only in case the terms which have been suggested by Count Buol should be adopted, that it will now be brought under discussion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 360.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 251.) *Foreign Office, July 26, 1854.*

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO yesterday read to me a despatch from Count Buol, officially transmitting to Her Majesty's Government a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, in reply to the demand addressed by the Austrian Government to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh for the evacuation of the Principalities.

Count Buol expresses his regret that Russia should have attached to her compliance with this demand, conditions that Austria had not the power to grant; the strategical position of the Principalities upon which their continued occupation is defended, being a question that concerns the belligerent Powers, and not Austria: but Count Buol observes, with manifest satisfaction, that the Conference is recognised by Russia, and that she admits three points in the Protocol of April 9, viz., the evacuation of the Principalities; the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; and the placing the Christian subjects of the Porte under the safeguard of the Five Powers; and these three points being admitted, Count Buol says, a step is made towards recognising the fourth,—respecting the necessity of connecting Turkey with the general balance of power in Europe.

The Russian despatch should, therefore, in the opinion of Count Buol, be taken into consideration by the Governments of England and France, as containing the germ of a pacific arrangement.

I told Count Colloredo that I had listened with extreme surprise to this despatch, which entirely overlooked the real objections to the Russian answer, and went the length of recommending the English and French Governments to regard it in a light in which I was sure it could not be viewed by Count Buol himself.

I then pointed out to Count Colloredo the views and intentions of Russia, as displayed in Count Nesselrode's despatch; and I added, that all further discussion upon the subject would be useless, as your Lordship had already been instructed to inform Count Buol that it had not merited the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 361.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 379.) *Therapia, July 13, 1854.*

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Consul-General at Belgrade has no doubt informed you of serious offence given to the Austrian Government by the recent publication of a "memorandum," addressed some time ago to the Porte by Prince Alexander of Servia, and communicated at the same time directly to the Courts of London and Paris. It can hardly be denied that there are passages in the document complained of, which fully warrant a strong feeling of indignation on the part of Austria. Satisfaction has been officially demanded; and the Porte was prepared to direct that the Prince of Servia should send an agent to Vienna with suitable

apologies. The Internuncio has since required another and more substantial kind of reparation, namely, that the Servian Government should desist from those military preparations which, for some time past, have marked its mistrust of Austria, and awakened suspicions of some unavowed purpose. Considering the apparent removal of all just causes of alarm, whether proceeding from the neighbourhood of the Russian army to Servia, or from the menacing intimations of the Austrian Consul, the Porte could hardly object to a disarmament, which would free Servia from an unnecessary expense, and when accomplished, have a tranquillising effect in that quarter.

The Servian Agent in his conversations with me has manifested no small dislike to the proposed measure, though stating at the same time his persuasion that Prince Alexander would cheerfully reduce his warlike armaments in a considerable degree. I told him, that in my opinion a partial or reluctant measure would only serve to embarrass his Government, and to strengthen unfavourable impressions; that a recurrence to the state of national preparation which existed previously to the late alarming events, presented a good resting-point; and that if he apprehended that more would be ultimately required, it was better for his Government to take the reasonable step at once, and reserve its objections for a further requisition, against which they would tell with most effect. He assured me repeatedly, that the Prince's policy in this matter had no object but the maintenance of his country in a respectable position, removed alike from ambitious pretension and servile dependence.

Meanwhile, the Porte has written to its tributary in a tone partaking at once of instruction and advice, with the view of procuring a prompt, though general, compliance with the demands of Austria. A copy of Reshid Pasha's letter to Prince Alexander is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's confidential information. I further transmit a copy of my despatch to M. Fonblanque on the same subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 361.

Vizirial Letter to the Prince of Servia, dated July 13, 1854.

(Translation.)

WHEN it was agreed upon with the Austrian Minister that your Highness should be instructed to send a suitable person to Vienna to express regrets and afford explanations on the part of your Highness, with the view of removing the angry feelings entertained by Austria on account of the publication of the "memorandum," special instructions were received by the Internuncio stating that were the military preparations going on in Servia to be discontinued, it would denote the existence of a real confidence in lieu of the want of confidence displayed in the "memorandum," and would be, therefore, a means of satisfying the Austrian Government.

Whether it be the fault of the author or of the translator, there are, certainly, expressions contained in that memorandum of a nature to give offence to Austria, and there is no denying that she is entitled to a reparation; owing, moreover, to the reverses suffered by Russia, and to the present aspect of the question, there is no longer any danger of Russian troops entering Servia. Austria has from the beginning evinced real friendly dispositions towards the Porte, and has now entered sincerely into the alliance; no doubts can be thus entertained in that quarter. The Servians would be spared the natural consequences of prolonged preparations, and the season has come on when the people are engaged in their agricultural pursuits.

His Majesty the Sultan has in consequence ordered that it should be intimated to your Highness to use your best efforts for the discontinuation of the armament, with the view, likewise, of gratifying Austria.

I expect that your Highness will on this occasion also afford an additional proof of the justice and intelligence which characterise you on all occasions.

Inclosure 2 in No. 361.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Fonblanque.

Therapia, July 13, 1854.

Sir,

THE Austrian Internuncio informs me that his Government expects the cessation of the Servian armament as the only suitable atonement for the publication of that offensive memorandum which has naturally excited a strong feeling of concern and indignation at Vienna.

The Porte has written to the Prince of Servia recommending his compliance with the Austrian requisition, as stated to me by Baron Bruck.

The Servian Agent having apprised me of the Prince's intention to diminish his warlike preparations, I did not hesitate to advise a frank and complete return to the state of national defence which existed previously to the excitement occasioned in Servia by the Russian occupation of Wallachia, and the intimations of the Austrian Consul at Belgrade.

It is unnecessary for me to observe to you that whatever causes of alarm or uneasiness may have existed before, the respective positions of the Russian army and of the Austrian Cabinet have lately undergone a degree of change which leaves no pretext for their continuance.

I shall be glad to learn from you that the Servian Government, complying with the prudent recommendation of the Porte, has show a just appreciation of its interest and its duty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 362.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—*(Received July* 27.)

(No. 387. Confidential.)

Therapia, July 15, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's confidential information, is a translated copy of the instructions addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna on the subject of the state of things, intended to follow the entrance of the Austrian army into Wallachia, and of the course which the Porte is willing to pursue with respect to the Hospodars.

I have put in a claim to reserve for Her Majesty's Government the occasion of expressing an opinion on this important matter, and Reshid Pasha has assured me through M. Pisani that "the Porte has no intention to act precipitately, and without previously taking the advice of its allies."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 362.

Reshid Pasha to Arif Effendi.

(Traduction.)

LA Sublime Porte a fait savoir à son Altesse le Généralissime, ainsi qu'aux autorités sur les bords du Danube, que Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche a, conformément au Traité d'Alliance qui a été conclu entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Vienne, ordonné à une division de troupes Autrichiennes de se tenir prêt à entrer de suite en Valachie, qu'un officier Autrichien, M. Gallitz, a été destiné à se rendre au camp Impérial pour servir d'intermédiaire dans les communications entre son Altesse le Généralissime et les Commandants-en-chef Anglais, Français, et Autrichien.

Lorsque l'évacuation aura eu lieu, comme il ne sera pas convenable de laisser ces Principautés sans gouvernement et sans un gouverneur, son Excellence l'Internonce a communiqué une dépêche de sa Cour représentant

que la Sublime Porte ne devrait plus tarder à autoriser le retour des Princes à leurs postes.

Comme l'invasion faite par la Russie a annulé le système d'administration intérieure des deux Principautés, que c'est une chose conforme aux désirs de la Sublime Porte de rétablir complétement ce système administratif à la sortie des Russes de là; que ce rétablissement sera complété par le retour des Princes qui étaient à cette époque-là dans les Provinces; et que la Sublime Porte a beaucoup de considération pour cette demande de la Cour d'Autriche, Sa Hautesse a bien voulu accorder à ces deux Princes la permission de rentrer dans les Principautés.

Mais comme le temps n'est pas encore venu de s'occuper des affaires de la Moldavie, la Sublime Porte commence par envoyer un Commissaire en Valachie. Lorsque celui-ci y sera entré, il invitera Styr Bey à y venir aussi.

Et comme aux yeux de la Sublime Porte la conduite de ces Princes est suspecte, il faudra qu'une enquête à cet égard se fasse de la manière la plus équitable et la plus impartiale, et telle qui est nécessaire pour agir d'après le résultat positif de cette enquête, le Commissaire qui doit se rendre là-bas est aussi chargé de faire cette enquête de la manière la plus judicieuse sur tous les points nécessaires; et conformément à l'ordre des choses il s'empressera de communiquer le progrès et le résultat de l'enquête aux Commandants-en-chef de l'armée Autrichienne, ou en cas de besoin aux Commandants-en-chef des autres armées auxiliaires.

Des instructions conçues dans ce sens seront données au Commissaire qui va être nommé, et des communications dans le même sens ont été faites à l'Internonciature d'Autriche, et il faut par conséquent que votre Excellence tienne aussi le même langage.

Les ordres nécessaires ont été donnés à son Altesse Omer Pacha, ainsi qu'aux autres officiers supérieurs qu'il faut relativement à l'entrée des troupes Autrichiennes en Valachie, et votre Excellence lira cette dépêche à M. le Comte de Buol.

No. 363.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Bernstorff.—*(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Bernstorff, July* 27.)

Berlin, le 24 *Juillet*, 1854.

M. le Comte,

LE Cabinet de Londres a eu, dans le temps, connaissance de la dépêche que, sous la date du 12 Juin, j'avais adressée au Chargé d'Affaires du Roi à St. Pétersbourg pour arrêter les opérations trans-Danubiennes des armées Russes, et pour obtenir l'évacuation des Principautés dans un terme aussi rapproché que possible.

Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a répondu à cette communication par la dépêche ci-jointe en copie, adressé au Baron de Budberg, à laquelle l'instruction, également ci-jointe, que le Prince Gortchakoff allait porter à Vienne, était annexée.

Nous n'avons pas tardé, M. le Comte, à vouer à ses pièces toute l'attention que mérite la gravité de la crise sur laquelle elles nous semblaient appelées à exercer de l'influence. Nous n'avons pu refuser aux déclarations qu'on venait de nous soumettre, le témoignage qu'elles portent le cachet du sincère désir de tenir aussi largement que possible compte des demandes que, de concert avec le Cabinet de Vienne, nous venions d'adresser à celui de St. Pétersbourg, pour sauvegarder les intérêts spécialement confiés aux Puissances Allemandes.

J'ai consigné cette impression dans la dépêche ci-jointe en copie, dont le Baron de Werther, qui vient de se rendre à son nouveau poste, est le porteur. Veuillez, M. le Comte, la communiquer au Cabinet de Londres et exprimer à Lord Clarendon l'espoir qu'il appréciera les motifs qui ont dicté notre langage. Nous maintenons les points de vue indiqués dans une dépêche du 12 Juin, mais, en nous pénétrant de l'ensemble des dispositions pacifiques offertes par la Russie, nous croirions manquer à la tâche qui forment le but des constants efforts du Roi, notre auguste Maître, si nous ne nous attachions pas de toute notre influence à utiliser dans l'intérêt de la paix générale, les éléments d'entente que renferme la réponse Russe, et qui, indépendamment de ce que nous avions demandé à la Russie, méritent d'acquérir une valeur pratique.

En se déclarant prêt, soit à des négociations de paix, soit à un armistice préalable, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg s'est entièrement départi de ce caractère exceptionnel que jusque-là il a revendiqué pour l'occupation des Principautés par les armées Impériales. Il ne la considère plus que comme position militaire, et il est prêt à l'abandonner dès que certaines sécurités militaires lui seront garanties. Il n'en fixe point les modalités; il s'en remet à l'équité des Cabinets auxquels il répond. Pour sa part, le Roi, notre auguste Maître, ne saurait refuser son suffrage à ce procédé, qui lui semble à la fois dicté par la prudence et par l'honneur militaire. Mais en se faisant, auprès des Puissances Occidentales, l'intermédiaire de ces dispositions de la Russie, s'exposerait-il à n'avoir à lui transmettre qu'une simple fin de non recevoir? Nous ne saurions nous décider à la penser, parceque nous sommes d'avis que, quelque surexcités que soient les esprits de part et d'autre, quelque avancés que soient les parties belligérantes dans la voie des entreprises guerrières et des préparatifs militaires, il devrait leur importer à elles-mêmes de préciser les buts qu'elles poursuivent, les conditions qu'elles admettent, les garanties qu'elles demandent.

Nous aimons donc à espérer que le Cabinet de Londres pèsera avec calme et impartialité les dernières ouvertures de la Russie, et que, quelque soit le jugement qu'il en porte, il y puisera de suffisans motifs pour formuler de son côté les points dont il croit devoir faire dépendre un arrangement ultérieur, et pour contribuer ainsi à mettre au clair les véritables intentions des différents Gouvernements, et à tirer du vague les buts qu'on se propose d'atteindre par la guerre.

Nous nous croyons d'autant plus fondés à nous livrer à cet espoir, que la déclaration Russe, en tant qu'elle se rapporte au Protocole du 9 Avril, que les Cabinets de Berlin et de Vienne avaient communiqué à celui de St. Pétersbourg, ne laisse point de doute sur la sincère intention de ce dernier d'accéder au trois principes qui s'y trouvent consignés, à savoir: l'intégrité de la Turquie, l'évacuation des Principautés, et la consolidation des droits civils et religieux de tous les Chrétiens sujets de la Porte,—principes qui à eux trois forment la substance des garanties que le même Protocole recommande à la sollicitude des Puissances pour rattacher davantage l'existence de cet Empire à l'équilibre général de l'Europe.

Les observations qui précèdent suffiseront, M. le Comte, pour vous faire connaître le point de vue duquel le Cabinet du Roi envisage les dernières ouvertures Russes, et aimeront à les voir envisagées par celui de Londres. Veuillez donc, en portant la présente dépêche à la connaissance de Lord Clarendon, vous faire auprès de lui l'organe du haut prix que nous attachons à être munis d'une réponse qui nous prouve les considérations qui ont dicté notre démarche ont trouvé à Londres un accueil conforme à nos désirs, et de nature à augmenter les chances de l'acheminement à une paix juste et durable.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 363.

Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther.

Berlin, ce 17 Juillet, 1854.

M. le Baron,

VOUS connaissez déjà la dernière communication qui nous est parvenue du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, en réponse à ma dépêche du 12 Juin, par laquelle, d'ordre du Roi, notre auguste Maître, j'avais appuyé les demandes de l'Autriche, renfermées dans la dépêche au Comte d'Esterhazy du 3 du même mois. Je joins toutefois sous ce pli copie tant de la réponse faite au Cabinet de Vienne, sous forme d'une dépêche au Prince de Gortchakoff, que de celle qui était adressée au Baron de Budberg, et dont l'Envoyé de Russie m'a laissé prendre copie.

Votre séjour parmi nous, M. le Baron, a dû vous donner la conviction que le sincère et constant désir du Cabinet du Roi d'en arriver, malgré l'extrême tension de la situation, à un point de départ pour des négociations ultérieures, ne s'est point démenti dans l'examen consciencieux et impartial auquel nous avons soumis les déclarations du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Vous ne sauriez,

M. le Baron, mieux inaugurer les fonctions importantes auxquelles la confiance du Roi vous a appelé, qu'en vous faisant de vive voix, auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et de M. le Chancelier de l'Empire, l'organe de l'impression que les dernières communications Russes ont produite sur notre auguste Souverain. Le Roi reconnaît pleinement l'esprit de modération et de conciliation qui a présidé à leur rédaction; Sa Majesté apprécie à sa juste valeur le sincère désir dont le langage de M. le Comte de Nesselrode fait foi, de tenir compte aussi largement que possible des vœux et des engagements des anciens alliés de la Russie, ainsi que des intérêts qu'ils sont impérieusement appelés à sauvegarder. Aussi, guidé par cette appréciation satisfaisante, le Roi, tout en maintenant les points de vue indiqués dans ma dépêche au Baron de Werther du 12 Juin, s'appuiera-t-il sur la réponse Russe, pour renouveler tant à Vienne que, de concert avec la Cour d'Autriche, à Paris et à Londres, ses efforts, afin de gagner, sur des bases équitables et pratiques, de nouvelles chances d'entente et de pacification.

Nous ne nous dissimulons point que c'est une tâche hérissée de difficultés. Nous devrions la considérer d'avance comme impossible, si nous ne nous croyions pas en droit d'attendre de la sagesse et de la loyauté de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas, que les dispositions qui ont dicté les dernières déclarations de son Cabinet, présideront également à son attitude ultérieure, et mettront, en se traduisant en faits, les Puissances Allemandes en mesure de regarder comme suffisamment préservés de toute atteinte les intérêts qui leur sont confiés, et dont la défense fait l'objet de leurs engagements, soit entre elles, soit avec les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 363.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg.

St. Pétersbourg, le 18 Juin, 1854.

M. le Baron,

LE Chargé d'Affaires de Prusse a remis entre mes mains la communication que son Cabinet nous adresse en date du 12 Juin, n.s., pour appuyer la démarche que l'Autriche a récemment faite auprès de nous, dans le but de nous engager à accélérer la fin de la guerre actuelle en évitant de pousser plus loin nos opérations militaires en Turquie, et en retirant nos troupes des Principautés dans un temps aussi peu éloigné que possible.

Nous ne saurions mieux répondre, M. le Baron, à cette communication du Cabinet Prussien qu'en portant ci-près à sa connaissance le texte même de notre réponse à Vienne. Il y verra, que, sans pouvoir partager entièrement, au sujet de l'occupation des Principautés, les opinions qu'énonce l'Autriche, et que l'on partage à Berlin, néanmoins, prenant en considération les intérêts particuliers de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne sur le Danube et la nature des engagements que les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin ont contractés par le Protocole du 9 Avril envers les deux Puissances Occidentales, nous sommes prêts, moyennant les sécurités que nous demandons à connaître d'avance, à nous retirer des Principautés et à entrer en négociations pour la paix sur la base des trois principes capitaux déposés dans le Protocole, ou au moins à préparer les voies à cette négociation par la conclusion d'un armistice.

Sans reproduire ici les considérations d'une haute gravité qui nous font insister pour obtenir des sécurités préalables en échange du sacrifice volontaire que nous ferions aux intérêts de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne des positions militaires que nous occupons actuellement ou pourrions acquérir encore en Turquie, nous nous bornerons ici à recommander les réflexions au mûr examen de la Cour de Prusse, persuadés que Sa Majesté le Roi est trop équitable pour nous demander de consentir gratuitement à nous affaiblir moralement et matériellement, sans être sûre d'arriver à la paix ou même à un armistice. Nous voyons, du reste, avec satisfaction que le Cabinet Prussien semble lui-même pénétré de la justice de ce point de vue, puisque, en exprimant le vœu que les hostilités soient abrégées et circonscrites, il reconnaît par anticipation qu'elles doivent l'être de part et d'autre. En suite des dispositions conciliantes dont

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témoigne notre réponse, il dépend aujourd'hui de lui d'user de son influence à Vienne et ailleurs, pour nous procurer les garanties préalables qui nous sont indispensables. Nous nous croyons d'autant plus fondés à l'espérer de sa part, que c'est à lui en premier lieu que l'Empereur avait fait connaître son intention d'envisager la consolidation des droits religieux et civils des Chrétiens en Turquie, si l'on arrive à l'obtenir efficacement de la Porte Ottomane, comme satisfesant de fait aux demandes que nous avions adressées à celle-ci, et que, par notre adhésion à ce principe du Protocole, aussi bien que par l'accomplissement des deux autres qui résulterait de notre retraite volontaire des Principautés, nous offrons dès aujourd'hui à la Prusse comme à l'Autriche, un moyen de s'acquitter des obligations qu'elles ont contractées par cet Acte vis-à-vis des Puissances belligérantes.

Vous voudrez bien, M. le Baron, exprimer fermement cet espoir à M. le Baron de Manteuffel, en portant la présente dépêche à sa connaissance.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 363.

Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff.

St. Pétersbourg, le 17 Juin, 1854.

LE COMTE ESTERHAZY m'a communiqué la dépêche par laquelle son Cabinet nous engage à mettre un terme à la crise actuelle, en évitant de pousser plus loin nos opérations trans-Danubiennes, et en évacuant les Principautés dans un temps aussi rapproché que possible.

En motivant ce désir sur les intérêts Autrichiens et Allemands que compromettraient la prolongation et l'extension de la lutte sur le Danube, M. le Comte de Buol s'appuie sur ce que notre occupation des Principautés a été la cause principale de la guerre. Nous lui demanderons la permission de faire à cet égard quelques réserves. L'occupation des Principautés n'avait point empêché les négociations de s'ouvrir et de se poursuivre. Ce n'est point elle qui a provoqué l'abandon de la note de Vienne, le rejet des propositions faites à Olmütz avec le concours et l'approbation de l'Autriche, non plus que le changement complet de toutes les bases antérieures de négociation; et si tous les essais de conciliation ont avorté depuis lors, le Cabinet Autrichien ne saurait méconnaître que cela a tenu à des incidents et à des motifs beaucoup plus complexes sur lesquels nous aimons mieux nous taire aujourd'hui pour éviter des récriminations fâcheuses. Nous avons répondu par le silence à la sommation de la France et de l'Angleterre, parce qu'elle était d'une forme blessante, précédée de provocations ouvertes et dépourvue de toutes conditions de réciprocité; et si la guerre s'en est suivie, il serait juste d'en imputer la cause, moins à la nature de notre réponse qu'au ton et aux termes qui l'ont provoquée.

Quoiqu'il en soit, si, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Autrichien, l'occupation prolongée des Principautés a été le motif de la guerre, il devrait en résulter qui cette occupation venant à cesser, la guerre cessera par le fait même, vu que les hostilités seront suspendues. Le Cabinet de Vienne est-il en mesure de nous en donner l'assurance?

Il ne saurait échapper à son attention que depuis le premier moment où la Porte nous a déclaré et fait la guerre, depuis surtout que le cercle de cette guerre, transportée hors de Turquie dans nos mers et sur nos côtes, a été démesurément agrandi, l'occupation des Principautés, quel qu'ait pu être son caractère originel, n'est plus devenue autre chose pour nous qu'une position militaire, dont le maintien ou l'abandon sont avant tout subordonnés à des considérations stratégiques. Il est simple dès lors qu'avant de nous dessaisir volontairement, par égard pour la situation de l'Autriche, du seul point où, poussant l'offensive, il nous reste quelque chance de rétablir en notre faveur l'équilibre qui est partout ailleurs contre nous, nous sachions au moins quelles sécurités l'Autriche peut nous offrir. Car, si les hostilités continuent, si les Puissances, dégagées de toute appréhension en Turquie, demeurent libres soit de nous poursuivre sur le territoire évacué, soit d'employer toutes leurs forces disponibles désormais à envahir notre littoral Asiatique ou Européen, afin de nous imposer des conditions inacceptables, il est évident que l'Autriche nous aurait demandé de nous affaiblir moralement et matériellement par un sacrifice

en pure perte. Exiger de la Russie qu'elle se mette entièrement à la merci de ses ennemis, quand ceux-ci ne dissimulent point l'intention d'abattre ou de diminuer sa puissance; l'exposer à toutes les attaques qu'il leur conviendra de lui porter, en la réduisant partout à la défensive; lui ôter enfin, au nom de la paix, tout moyen d'obtenir que cette paix ne soit pas pour elle ruineuse et déshonorante—serait un acte si contraire à toutes les lois de l'équité, à tous les principes d'honneur militaire, que, nous nous plaisons à le croire, pareille pensée n'a pu entrer un moment dans l'esprit de Sa Majesté l'Empereur François-Joseph.

En nous communiquant le Protocole du 9 Avril, la Cour de Vienne appuie auprès de nous sur l'engagement positif qu'elle a pris envers les Puissances Occidentales, d'amener par tous ses moyens l'évacuation finale des Principautés. Mais, en prenant cet engagement l'Autriche n'a pu s'interdire le choix du moyen qui lui paraîtrait le plus propre à remplir ses obligations: celui de mettre la Russie en état de procéder à l'évacuation avec honneur et sécurité pour elle. L'obligation même qu'elle a contractée, lui donne, au contraire, le droit d'insister auprès des Puissances pour qu'elles n'entravent pas par leurs exigences le succès de ses efforts.

Il en est de même des intérêts de commerce Autrichien et Allemand, invoqués contre la prolongation ou l'extension de nos opérations militaires. Ils autorisent le Cabinet de Vienne à user auprès des deux Puissances des mêmes raisons qu'auprès de nous. Car, si les intérêts de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne entière peuvent souffrir momentanément de nos opérations sur le Danube, à plus forte raison souffrent-ils, et bien plus gravement encore, comme ceux de tous les Etats neutres, de la situation amenée par les opérations maritimes de la France et de l'Angleterre dans l'Euxin, la Mer du Nord, et la Baltique.

Que le Gouvernement Autrichien veuille donc bien, en pesant mûrement ces considérations, s'expliquer vis-à-vis de nous au sujet des garanties de sûreté qu'il peut nous donner, et l'Empereur, par déférence pour les vœux et les intérêts de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne, serait disposé à entrer en négociation sur l'époque précise de l'évacuation. Le Cabinet de Vienne peut d'avance être persuadé que Sa Majesté partage au même degré que lui le désir de mettre au plus tôt un terme à la crise qui pèse en ce moment sur toutes les situations Européennes. Notre auguste Maître veut encore, comme il a toujours voulu, la paix. Il ne veut, nous l'avons répété et le répétons encore une fois, ni prolonger indéfiniment l'occupation des Principautés, ni s'y établir d'une manière permanente, ni les incorporer à ses Etats, encore moins renverser l'Empire Ottoman. Sous ce rapport, il ne fait aucune difficulté de souscrire aux trois principes déposés dans le Protocole du 9 Avril. Intégrité de la Turquie: ce point là n'a rien que de conforme à tout ce que nous avons énoncé jusqu'ici, et il ne sera point menacée par nous aussi longtemps qu'il sera respecté par les Puissances qui occupent en ce moment les eaux et territoire du Sultan. Evacuation des Principautés: nous sommes prêts à y procéder moyennant les sécurités convenables. Consolidation des droits des Chrétiens en Turquie: partant de l'idée que les droits civils à obtenir pour tous les Chrétiens de la Porte sont inséparables des droits religieux, comme le stipule le Protocole, et deviendraient sans valeur pour nos coreligionnaires, si ceux-ci, en acquérant de nouveaux priviléges, ne conservaient pas les anciens, nous avons déjà déclaré que, s'il en était ainsi, les demandes que l'Empereur a faites à la Porte seraient remplies, le motif du différend écarté, et Sa Majesté prête à concourir à la garantie Européenne de ces priviléges.

Telles étant les dispositions de l'Empereur sur les points capitaux indiqués dans le Protocole, il nous semble, mon Prince, que pour peu qu'on veuille la paix, sans arrière-pensées qui la rendent impossible, il ne serait pas difficile d'y arriver sur cette triple base, ou du moins d'en préparer la négociation au moyen d'un armistice.

C'est l'espoir que votre Excellence voudra bien exprimer au Cabinet Autrichien, en lui donnant communication de la présente dépêche.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

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No. 364.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 71. Confidential.) *Frankfort, July 24, 1854.*

My Lord,

I AM enabled to report to your Lordship that the extraordinary sitting of the Diet, which by my despatch No. 70 of the 22nd instant, I stated as likely to be held this day, has taken place, and the accession of the Diet to the Austro-Prussian Treaty of the 20th April, has been voted with only one dissentient voice, which is that of Mecklenburgh.

The Danish Plenipotentiary for the Duchies declared himself without instructions; but that he expected shortly to receive them, and that they would be of a satisfactory nature.

A paragraph was added by the Commission to the project of reply which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my despatch No. 70 of the 22nd instant, to the effect that the adhesion of the Diet to the Treaty is given with reference to the XIth Article of the Act of its Constitution, and with the understanding that as the Treaty contemplated the contingencies of mutual defence for the portions of the two great States not forming part of the Confederation, so must it be understood that, the case arising, those States should be bound to protect the members of the Confederation with all their forces.

The dissent of Mecklenburgh is founded on the allegation that the Treaty contemplated objects beyond the scope of the Federal Constitution.

Wurtemburg, contrary to previous expectation, has adopted the views of the Commission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

P.S.—Messenger Wurling delivered to me on the evening of the 22nd your Lordship's despatches from No. 20 to No. 25 inclusive, and also Lord Wodehouse's despatches of the 7th and 18th instant.

A. M.

No. 365.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 28.)

Vienna, July 27, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE French Ambassador and I have given to Count Buol the copy of despatches almost identical which were addressed to us on the 22nd of July.

He admits the principles they lay down; but he does not consider them yet as a reply to his communication of the 21st July. In order to lose no time he begs us to request our Governments by telegraph to say is [he had] himself invited them to do, whether in case Russia should accept the proposed basis, they will consent to negotiate. They [?] should be preceded of course by the evacuation of the Principalities.

Until the reply of our Government to this question is received, Count Buol does not know what use he could make at St. Petersburgh of the documents we have given him. His wish, as ours, is to commence and end at once the discussion by demanding a simply reply of yes or no from Russia. Prussia will attend the Conference if it is called together.

No. 366.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 937. Confidential.) *Paris, July 27, 1854.*

My Lord,

ON the supposition that Count Colloredo would have made your Lordship, on the part of the Austrian Government, the same communications as have been made by M. de Hübner to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in respect to the correspondence relative to the Eastern question which has passed lately between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburgh, I should have abstained from doing more than making your Lordship acquainted with the language which the French Minister for Foreign Affairs has held to the Austrian Representative; but having now reason to suppose that a part of Count Buol's despatches may have been momentarily withheld from your Lordship for reasons which I shall have the honour of stating hereafter, I am induced to enter more largely into the subject of them than I should otherwise have thought necessary.

The object of Count Buol's despatches to M. de Hübner are threefold: to enable himself, by communicating to the French Government Count Nesselrode's despatch of the 17th ultimo to Prince Gortchakoff, to inform the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the impression produced on the French Government by that despatch; to engage the French Government to remonstrate with the Cabinet of Berlin against the desertion of the principles laid down by the Conference of Vienna, which the late refusal of its Plenipotentiary to meet the Plenipotentiaries of the other three Powers indicated; and lastly, to sketch the outline of a Treaty which he thought might be concluded between Austria, France, and England.

It is this latter object which I have reason to think may not have been communicated to your Lordship, and I do myself the honour therefore of giving in outline of Count Buol's despatch upon the subject.

It would appear from it that he had been pressed, through M. de Hübner, by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to sign a Treaty of the kind, and he says that although he cannot speak officially upon the matter until he has received the authorization of his Imperial Master, he has no objection that M. de Hübner should state to M. Drouyn de Lhuys his (Count Buol's) personal impression as to the bases on which such a Treaty might be made, and he empowered M. de Hübner to discuss them confidentially with him, and to reduce them to the form of a Treaty. The bases are, that the three Powers should not make peace with Russia until the latter conceded the four points which have already been an object of discussion between those Powers; that should Russia decline to agree to them, and, more particularly, should she refuse to evacuate the Principalities immediately, that an Austrian army should enter them and, if necessary, expel the Russians by force; that in the event of war between Austria and Russia being the consequence of this act on the part of Austria, the three Powers shall make common cause together, the manner and means to be decided hereafter by common consent; in that case, other terms may be imposed upon Russia than those contained in the four points; that the Treaty shall be left open for the adhesion of other Powers; lastly, that the dominions of Austria in Italy shall be guaranteed to her.

Count Buol goes on to say, that although Count Colloredo is made cognizant of this despatch, he is not instructed to enter upon the subject with your Lordship unless you invite him to do so; Count Buol considering that as the project originated with the French Government, it is the business of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to lay it before Her Majesty's advisers.

Such, my Lord, is the substance of the information imparted to me confidentially by M. de Hübner. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in giving me his account of the communication made to him, was not altogether so frank. He did not say that it was left by Count Buol to him to take the preliminary steps with Her Majesty's Government, and he did not state that a guarantee of the Austrian possessions in Italy formed an integral part of Count Buol's proposal, though upon the latter point he gave me to understand that he was apprehensive lest

the Austrian Government should ask such a guarantee of both England and France.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys described himself as having held the following language to M. de Hübner, subject to the approval of the Emperor. He had no observations to make on Count Nesselrode's despatch other than had already been communicated to M. de Bourqueney in the identic despatch of the two Cabinets of Paris and London. A copy of this despatch had been left with Count Buol. Count Buol could of course make what use of it he pleased, but it must not be considered as offering on the part of France terms of peace to Russia. The French Government considered the proposals of Russia to be inadmissible, and all discussion of them closed.

With regard to the second point, M. Drouyn de Lhuys had written and would write again, to demand a categorical explanation of the Prussian Government in refusing to assist at the Conference lately proposed by Count Buol, and to insist upon being informed what the intentions of the Prussian Government really were, and how far the allies could count upon her concert in carrying out those principles of European law to which Prussia had solemnly subscribed.

On the subject of the proposed Treaty, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he had occupied himself at once in giving a more regular form to Count Buol's sketch, and had changed some of the objectionable passages; that he was about to send the two to London for your Lordship's consideration. As, however, the consent of the Austrian Government to the four points which were to be the bases of any peace with Russia, had not been officially notified, he proposed that, before signing the Treaty, an exchange of notes should take place at Vienna between Count Buol and the Representatives of England and France, in which those points should be laid down as a *sine qua non* to peace, the belligerent Powers reserving to themselves, at the same time, the right of insisting on such further conditions as they might deem expedient; a draft of the proposed notes would accompany this draft of Treaty, and be given to your Lordship by M. Baudin.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he preferred this mode of proceeding to reuniting the Conference, which, after all that had occurred, was looked upon with some ridicule. I inquired of his Excellency whether, in requiring explanations of the Prussian Government, he did not intend to propose to resume the Conferences? He replied that such had not been the request made to him by M. de Hübner, and that he had confined himself, in his communications with the Prussian Government, to the demands which I have enumerated above.

To resume. The French Government will give no other answer to Count Nesselrode's despatch than that already transmitted to Vienna; Count Buol may make what use he pleases of that communication, but the French Government considers all discussion with Russia closed, and not to be reopened.

M. de Moustier will be instructed to require the Prussian Government to state clearly the position which Prussia intends to take for the future in the Eastern question.

The French Government desires that the four points on which the Governments of Austria, England, and France, are agreed as essential to peace, should be recorded by an exchange of notes, England and France reserving to themselves the power of insisting upon other conditions, if it so pleases them. On these notes being exchanged, the Treaty between the three Governments to be signed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S. M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me yesterday that he had received the Emperor's sanction to this form of proceeding. C.

No. 367.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 446.) *Foreign Office, July 28, 1854.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 379 of the 13th instant, I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the language which you held to the Servian Agent at Constantinople, and of the letter which you addressed to Mr. Fonblanque at Belgrade counselling the reduction of the Servian armaments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 368.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 29, 1854.*

WE can send no other answer upon the Russian despatch than that which you have given to Count Buol, and we cannot be parties to any communication, direct or indirect, with St. Petersburgh.

You will act upon M. de Bourqueney's instructions with respect to exchange of notes with the Austrian Government, and the project of Treaty.

No. 369.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 253.) *Foreign Office, July 29, 1854.*

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, expressing his regret that the Prussian Minister had been instructed not to attend the Conference summoned for the purpose of receiving the answer of Russia to the demands that Austria had made, and that Prussia had supported.

Count Buol states that Austria will be ready to join with the Western Powers in demanding an explanation upon this subject from Prussia, and in requiring to know her future intentions.

His Excellency appears to attach considerable importance to the reassembling of the Conference, and to its being attended by Prussia, in order to receive the answer of the English and French Governments to the Russian despatch, which has now been communicated to them; and Count Buol hopes that the answer will contain the four points on which England, France, and Austria are agreed, as the indispensable bases of further negotiation.

This answer Count Buol proposes to send to St. Petersburgh, and to demand its adoption by Russia; in the event of refusal, Austria will consider that negotiation is exhausted, and that the moment for acting has arrived.

I told Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government would be ready to join the Austrian Government in demanding an explanation from Prussia, but that I saw no use in endeavouring to alter the King's determination, that his Minister should not attend the Conference, nor any advantage, under present circumstances, in the Conference being reassembled for the purpose indicated by Count Buol.

The Russian answer, I said, was so evasive, and so certain to prove unsatisfactory to England and France, that the best course would have been, not to communicate it to the maritime Powers; but Count Buol determined to make it known to them through the medium of the Conference. Prussia, however, would not attend it; and after a fortnight had passed in fruitless attempts to induce her to do so, Count Buol, not wishing that the Conference should meet without the Prussian Minister, had sent Count Nesselrode's despatch to London and Paris.

In the meanwhile, and upon hearing of this last resolution, the English and French Governments had transmitted their opinions upon the despatch to Vienna. It was now in the hands of Count Buol, and there consequently appeared to be not only no necessity for assembling the Conference, even if Prussia would attend it, but that disadvantage to England and France might result from it, and the seeds of future misunderstanding might be laid; for Count Buol very fairly announced beforehand that he meant to send to St. Petersburgh the answers so communicated to the Conference, and England and France would thus become parties to a negotiation with Russia, founded upon an evasive reply to a demand made by Austria, and supported by Prussia, with reference solely to German interests.

Austria not being at war with Russia, was of course free to enter into any negotiations for the maintenance of peace; but the position of England and France was widely different: they were at war with Russia, after having exhausted every effort to avoid it, and they could not now sanction an indirect negotiation on their behalf, even if Count Nesselrode's despatch had not proved that Russia adhered to all her original pretensions.

Count Buol, I said, was now in possession of our views upon that despatch, and he might, if he thought fit, make them known at St. Petersburgh. We should not object to that course, but we could not authorize it, because England and France could not pledge themselves that at the end of a month or six weeks the point upon which they had the good fortune to agree with Austria, would be the bases of peace on which the belligerents might think it expedient to negotiate.

Russia might then, in the improbable event of agreeing to those bases, complain of having been led into error, and of bad faith on the part of England and France; a reproach for which Her Majesty's Government would never give just cause to any Power, whether England was at peace or at war with that Power.

I begged Count Colloredo to assure Count Buol that there was every disposition on the part of Her Majesty's Government to meet the wishes of Austria, and to accommodate themselves to their views; but, that as belligerents, our course was clear and distinct: we were bound to prosecute the war into which we had been forced with all the vigour and activity in our power, and not enter into any negotiation that we did not honestly believe would lead to an honourable and lasting peace, or without the direct and full participation of His Majesty the Sultan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 370.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Hloomfield.

(No. 201.) *Foreign Office, July 29, 1854.*

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government learned with regret that the Prussian Minister at Vienna had been instructed not to attend the Conference which Count Buol desired to assemble for the purpose of communicating to it the answer of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to the demands made by Austria and supported by Prussia for the evacuation of the Principalities.

It appears that the Austrian Government has in vain remonstrated against this determination of the Cabinet of Berlin, and although Her Majesty's Government is not acquainted with the nature of the communications that have passed, they attach far too great importance to the alliance of this country with Prussia to remain indifferent to a measure on the part of the Prussian Government which they are unable to explain, and which may be the forerunner of others still more serious.

Your Lordship has often been instructed to state to Baron Manteuffel the anxious desire of Her Majesty's Government that at this crisis of European affairs the relations between Great Britain and Prussia should be of the most friendly character, and you have also made known to his Excellency the conviction of Her Majesty's Government that the extent and duration of the war would depend upon the union of the four Powers, and the firm determination they might exhibit to resist the unjust aggression of Russia; and although the recent policy of Prussia has not, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, served to promote the objects which the four Powers have in common, yet Her Majesty's Government, believing that Prussia was guided by the same principles as Great Britain, France, and Austria, saw reason to expect that she would ultimately adopt the same line of action.

Her Majesty's Government remember with satisfaction that the summons addressed to Russia by England and France was supported by Prussia, and that upon the various questions on which the Conference has been required to deliberate, no difference of opinion arose between the Prussian Representative and his colleagues; while more recently the support of Prussia has been given to the just demands addressed by Austria to Russia; and Her Majesty's Government are therefore at a loss to conjecture why the Prussian Government should now no longer act with the the three Powers.

Her Majesty's Government, however, although unable to understand the motives which have actuated the Cabinet of Berlin in what they cannot but apprehend indicates a change of policy, yet, anxious that no misunderstanding should exist on a subject so important, do not hesitate to seek an explanation, and do not doubt that it will be given with the same spirit of frankness in which it is asked.

Your Lordship will assure Baron Manteuffel that in making this inquiry Her Majesty's Government disclaim all pretension to influence the policy of Prussia, which will necessarily be guided by Prussian interests; but as Great Britain is now at war with a powerful enemy, and as we are determined to carry on that war with unabating vigour and energy, it is of urgent importance for us to ascertain what support we may expect or what opposition we must be prepared to meet on the part of Prussia.

Your Lordship will read and give a copy of this despatch to Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 371.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July 31.*)

(No. 282.) *Vienna, July 26, 1854.*

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador has informed me that he had submitted to Count Buol the instructions he had received from his Government respecting the return, under certain conditions, of the Hospodars to the Principalities, upon the entry of the Austrian troops in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty lately concluded between Austria and the Porte. His Excellency said that Count Buol had expressed himself to be perfectly satisfied with the arrangement proposed by the Turkish Government, but stated that the position of affairs having altered, the reestablishment of the Government of the Principalities would now take place under circumstances which had not been contemplated at the time that those instructions had left Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 372.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July 31.*)

(No. 284.) *Vienna, July 26, 1854.*

My Lord,

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch addressed to Mr. Foublanque, No. 7 of the 18th instant, warning the Servians against the continuation of their armaments, and his Excellency begged me to report to

your Lordship the satisfaction which that despatch afforded him. I took also an opportunity of communicating this document to the Turkish Ambassador, who likewise expressed the gratification he derived from it, and his assurance that the Government of the Sultan would participate in the pleasure which this communication had afforded him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 373.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 286.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 26, 1854.*

THE decision of the Austrian Government to occupy the Principality of Wallachia, which was reported to be on the point of being evacuated by the Russian armies, referred to in your Lordship's despatch No. 247 of the 22nd instant, was taken during the period of suspense as to the reply which the Russian Government would return to the requisition of Austria to withdraw from both the Principalities. The Austrian Government, while waiting for that answer, could not by any act of hostility enter upon a course of action opposed to the means she had in the first instance adopted to endeavour to obtain that withdrawal and which were still in the course of being carried out. But during the period occupied by this proceeding, the evacuation of one of the Principalities appearing to be about to take place, the Austrian Government believed that they should obtain an important advantage to the allied cause by at once occupying that Principality, by reestablishing the former Government, by preventing the reoccupation of the country by the Russian troops, and by thus arriving immediately (whatever might be the answer to the Austrian requisition) at the permanent removal from one Principality of a Russian occupation.

The Austrian Government, being at that time precluded from taking a hostile part, believed that they were doing good service by rendering safe from future occupation a portion of that territory, the liberation of which it was the general interest to obtain.

Count Buol believed that the allied and Turkish forces were assembled in Bulgaria, not merely for the relief of Silistria, but for the expulsion of the Russian invaders from the Principalities, and although he was engaged and determined to obtain this object by peaceable representations, if that was possible, but if not, by force of arms, he was not aware that the allied and Turkish armies intended to subordinate their action to the longer process which, under the difficult circumstances of her position, Austria had felt herself obliged to adopt. It was under this erroneous impression that she declared that her occupation of the evacuated portion of the Principalities should not in any way interfere with the advance of the allied armies, and, although she expressed her belief that they would so advance, she in no way found fault with their not doing it; on the contrary, she would now regret that those armies should expose themselves to an operation against the great force of the Russian armies now assembled near Bucharest, until, if the Government of St. Petersburgh should still refuse the evacuation, Austria should be able to take part in that operation.

The Austrian Government never contemplated the possibility of its being supposed that she could have exercised any armed mediation. Her object by entering the evacuated portion of Wallachia was to place herself in an advanced position, from which to occupy at a later period the remainder of the Principalities, either by the consent of Russia, or by the more active employment of her troops.

The Austrian Government never regarded the evacuation of one of the Principalities as in any way a compliance with the demand they had addressed to St. Petersburgh; and should it have been so interpreted by that Cabinet, their demand would in no way have been swayed or restricted by such an insinuation.

Count Buol is entirely alive to the obligations taken by the Protocol of the 9th April, for the attainment of the evacuation of the Principalities, as well as

to those taken by the Treaty with Prussia; by the note to the Diet, and by the Treaty with the Porte; and he steadily maintains the declaration made to your Lordship by Count Colloredo, that his Government would procure that evacuation "de gré ou de force." His expectation that the allied armies would follow the retreating Russian armies, was founded in the belief that they would profit by a movement which, at the time, was reported as one of great precipitation, and which would have advanced the general cause for which the allies were united; but he in no way intended, by the expression of that expectation, to impose upon them a task the fair share in which (when the moment for action had arrived) his Government was prepared and willing to undertake.

The present inaction of Austria is imposed on her by the lapse of time which was necessary to enable her to communicate the Russian reply to the Western Powers, in compliance with the consent they had expressed to receive it for consideration; and this inaction will be brought to an end when she has transmitted their answers to St. Petersburgh, unless the Russian Government should at once comply with her reiterated demand for the evacuation of the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 374.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 421.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 28, 1854.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 200 of the 25th instant, instructing me to communicate to Baron Manteuffel the substance of your Lordship's despatches to the Earl of Westmorland, Nos. 247, 248, and 249, of the 22nd instant, on the subject of the policy of the Western Powers, with regard to Russia.

His Excellency being absent from Berlin, and not likely to return for a few days, I have made known the contents of the above-named despatches to M. Balan, who is charged with the duties of Under-Secretary of State.

My French colleague has also read the despatch addressed by his Government to Baron de Bourqueney on the same subject, but did not leave a copy at the Foreign Office, having been specially directed not to do so.

He received also instructions by telegraph yesterday to lose no time in making this communication, and to report the effect it had produced; and he believes that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had given him this direction in order that he might state to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, when he waited on him with the communication of the opinion of his Government on the late despatch from Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, that the answer was already at Berlin.

M. Balan said, that he should lose no time in informing Baron Manteuffel of everything I had said to him, and I requested him to state distinctly to his Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government considered the Russian answer as unworthy of the serious consideration of England and France, and that we had agreed with Austria on four points, which I detailed to him, as the proper bases for the negotiation of peace.

He immediately remarked that he now heard for the first time that Austria approved of these conditions, and he assured me that the Prussian Government had not received any intimation of the kind from Vienna, and he seemed evidently to doubt that Austria would be found disposed to give her serious support to them.

I asked if the Prussian Plenipotentiary would attend the next Conference at Vienna, and he gave me to understand that he would do so, and that he believed it would be assembled without delay; but that he hoped Her Majesty's Government would also communicate direct to the Prussian Government, a copy of the despatch to Lord Westmorland, the substance of which I had reported to him, and which he hinted might form the answer to the communication which will have been made this week to your Lordship by Count Bernstorff.

I replied, that I did not know what would be the instructions I might receive upon this point, but that he could not conceal from ourselves the injurious effect which the policy of Prussia inflicted on our arrangements with Austria; that her object seemed to be to gain time, so as to prolong the negotiations until the autumn, when military and naval operations would be impeded; that Prussia had caused nearly three weeks' delay in the official communication to London of the despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, which certainly was an unfriendly act towards us, and an important service to the Emperor of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 375.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 125.)

Berlin, July 28, 1854.

My Lord,

IN the absence of Baron Manteuffel, who left Berlin for his country seat on the day the King set out for Munich, I have read to M. Balan, the Acting Under-Secretary of State, your Lordship's despatch to me, No. 196 of the 25th instant, giving an account of two conversations which your Lordship had had with Count Bernstorff.

M. Balan said, that the Prussian Minister had exactly reported to his Government all your Lordship had said to him; but he observed, with reference to that part in which Count Bernstorff is represented to have stated, when speaking of the reasons which had induced the King to instruct his Minister at Vienna not to attend the Conference to receive the communication of the last Russian despatch, that it was owing to His Majesty's desire again to communicate with St. Petersburgh, in order to procure terms that would be more acceptable to the Western Powers, that it was true the Prussian Government would have been glad to obtain concessions in this sense, but he gave me to understand that they had no expectation of being able to postpone the meeting of the Conference until more favourable explanations could arrive from Russia.

After I had read the despatch, I proposed to deliver a copy of it, but M. Balan did not feel authorized to receive one. He will, however, report to Baron Manteuffel the substance of the communication which I have made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 376.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 220.)

Copenhagen, July 27, 1854.

My Lord,

FINAL instructions were sent yesterday to Baron Bulow to give the King's vote in favour of the resolution by which the German Confederation accedes to the Austro-Prussian Convention of the 20th of April last.

I understand, however, that the instructions set forth that His Majesty's accession is given to the Convention because it only contains engagements which are consistent with the spirit and character of the Confederation; and because His Majesty's accession for Holstein and Lauenburg does not, in any manner, affect the neutrality of the independent portions of the Danish monarchy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 377.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 205.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1854.

My Lord,

ON the 27th instant Count Bernstorff read to me a despatch to himself from Baron Manteuffel, another from Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther, and a third from Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg.

In the first despatch Baron Manteuffel states, with reference to the Russian answer to the demands made by Austria, that Russia having announced her readiness to negotiate, or to agree to an armistice, had entirely abandoned the exceptional character she had hitherto given to her occupation of the Principalities, which she now engages to evacuate upon certain military securities being guaranteed to her.

The King of Prussia, Baron Manteuffel adds, entirely approves of this condition, which he considers to be dictated by prudence and military honour, and His Majesty, in making himself the medium of communicating the overture of Russia, hopes that they will be impartially examined by Her Majesty's Government, in order that the objects which it is sought to attain by the war may be clearly made known.

Baron Manteuffel declares that there can be no doubt of the sincerity of the intentions of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to accede to the Protocol of April 9.

In writing to the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh, Baron Manteuffel says, that the King fully recognises the moderate and conciliatory spirit which dictated the Russian answer to Austria, and His Majesty engages to renew his efforts at Vienna, London, and Paris to arrive at a peaceful solution.

Baron Manteuffel further says, that this task would be impossible if full reliance were not placed on the wisdom and good faith of the Emperor Nicholas, and that His Imperial Majesty would enable the German Powers to feel that their interests were safe, as the defence of those interests was the object of the engagements entered into, whether with themselves or with the Cabinets of Paris and London.

Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Budberg is an abridgement of the one he has addressed to Prince Gortchakoff. He states that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, although not agreeing entirely in the opinions of Austria respecting the occupation of the Principalities, yet taking into consideration the particular interests of Austria and of Germany on the Danube, and the nature of the engagements contracted by the Courts of Vienna and Berlin with the Western Powers by the Protocol of April 9, Russia is willing to retire from the Principalities upon certain securities, and to negotiate for peace on the basis of the three principal points of the Protocol, or, at least, to prepare the way for negotiation by concluding an armistice. In this way, Count Nesselrode says, the means will at once be offered to Austria and Prussia to fulfil their obligations towards the belligerent Powers.

I thanked Count Bernstorff for these communications, and again assured him that Her Majesty's Government was fully alive to the pacific intentions of the King, and that as the Russian answer had been transmitted to us from Vienna it had been duly examined, and that the opinion formed of it here and at Paris differed entirely from that which was conveyed in Baron Manteuffel's despatch. That opinion, I said, had been transmitted to Vienna, and your Lordship had been instructed to communicate the substance of it to Baron Manteuffel.

I added that war had altogether changed the position in which England and France stood, when, in conjunction with Austria and Prussia, they recommended to the Emperor of Russia the terms of peace, alike honourable and advantageous to Russia, offered by the Porte; and that we could now accept of no mediation, nor, under present circumstances, be parties to any negotiation, direct or indirect, with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 378.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)

Vienna, July 31, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

I COMMUNICATED your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 29th to Count Buol and the French Ambassador, and in pursuance of its directions I joined with the French Ambassador in communicating to Count Buol the documents he had received from his Government of the 27th instant.

Count Buol entirely approves these documents, and adheres altogether to the text of the Treaty. He only wishes for some modifications of the expressions in the notes to be exchanged between us. One has reference to the first guarantee, and he proposes to reserve for a future understanding between the Porte and the other Powers the settlement of the questions of detail which may be raised by the collective protectorate of the Principalities.

The other modification has for its object to strengthen the adherence of Austria to the required guarantees.

The Emperor of Austria returns from Ischl on the 2nd of August. The whole matter will be submitted to His Majesty, and there is no reason to fear that he will not ratify the opinion of Count Buol.

Count Buol approves the despatch to M. de Moustier, and will support at Berlin the ideas it contains.

He has already instructed Count Esterhazy to do so.

I forwarded this information to Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary at Berlin, in case the Prussian Government should agree to the substance of the proposed notes.

Count Buol would prefer that it should be embodied in a Protocol of the Four Powers, but he does not insist on this.

It will probably be necessary to send me full power to sign the Convention.

No. 379.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 208.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BERNSTORFF called here yesterday, and, after placing in my hands a letter from the King of Prussia to Her Majesty, expressed a doubt as to whether he had said what I reported to your Lordship, respecting the reasons which had induced the King to forbid the attendance of his Minister at the Conference, and upon which matter it appears by your No. 425 that M. Balan spoke to your Lordship.

I reminded Count Bernstorff of what had passed between us, and told him that I adhered verbatim to the statement made in my despatch No. 196 to your Lordship.

In the course of conversation Count Bernstorff remarked, that Prussia had no intention of rendering service to Russia; and I answered that the intentions of the Prussian Government could be known only to themselves, but that the fact of great and continuous services being rendered to Russia by Prussia was beyond all doubt; and I thought, moreover, that if it had suited the interests of Prussia, or that the Prussian people would have consented openly to take part with Russia in the war, it would have been a great advantage to the Western Powers: we should then have had an avowed enemy with whom we should have known how to deal, but that now we had an enemy under the guise of an ally, who was inflicting upon us all the injury in his power, by paralyzing the action of Austria when she was prepared to identify her policy with that of England and France.

The Cabinet of Berlin, however, I said, might be assured, that we were under no delusion with respect to its proceedings, and that they would not be easily forgotten.

Count Bernstorff having stated that the Prussian Minister would now be allowed to attend the Conference at Vienna, I said it was too late; that if the Russian answer, immediately on its arrival at Vienna, had been communicated to the Conference, the proceeding would have been regular and in accordance with the course previously pursued; but the King of Prussia had thought proper to depart from that course, and the opinions of England and France had been asked and given upon Count Nesselrode's despatch, and now, after a lapse of three weeks, to assemble the Conference to take this despatch into consideration would, in addition to other objections, be attended with a degree of ridicule to which the Governments of England and France were not inclined to expose themselves.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 380.

Mr. Grey to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 189. Secret and Confidential.)

Stockholm, July 24, 1854.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 187 of the 21st instant I had the honour of informing your Lordship that the Commandant Blanchard had returned to this city from Paris. He was furnished with a private letter from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the French Minister, and brought also a most satisfactory report of some verbal assurances relating to Sweden, which had been given him by the Emperor of Austria, by whom he was received twice during his visit to Vienna. The letter from M. Drouyn de Lhuys instructed M. Lobstein to obtain an audience of the King for M. Blanchard, who was authorized to tell His Majesty that the conditions required by Sweden were agreed to (admises) in London and Paris, and consequently to urge the King to declare, without delay, against Russia.

Yesterday evening the French Minister and M. Blanchard were received at the Palace of Haga by the King, and remained in conference with His Majesty for nearly two hours. M. Blanchard proceeded, without delay, to lay before the King a report of his interviews with the Emperor of Austria, regarding which I am only able to state generally to your Lordship that assurances most satisfactory to Sweden, in the event of her declaring war against Russia, with the ultimate view of reacquiring possession of Finland, were given verbally by His Imperial Majesty. M. Blanchard then communicated the substance of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' letter, which I have mentioned above, to the King, who replied that he was "convaincu et rassuré" by the report of the Emperor's language. Still he, as a Constitutional Sovereign, must necessarily require more, or, in other words, the approval in writing on the part of Austria of the Treaty for an offensive and defensive alliance between England, France, and Sweden. After some discussion, during which M. Blanchard was the principal speaker, the King agreed to enter into official negotiations without delay, and to proceed at once to prepare troops (préparer des soldats); but His Majesty added that, before the 27th (the day upon which the steamer sails for Lubeck), he would himself draw up a statement of his views and conditions, which he should request M. Blanchard to carry to Paris in person.

M. Blanchard said that he should be only able to do so if His Majesty's statement was such as would meet the views of the French Government, and so justify his (M. Blanchard's) return to Paris, which was contrary to his orders.

I have above given your Lordship a summary of the result arrived at, not without some hesitation on the part of the King; but it seems that when once thus much was obtained from His Majesty, the whole question was very freely discussed. The King stated that he should be able to bring into the field a force consisting of 70,000 men, 4 line-of-battle ships, 2 frigates, 10 steamers, and 200 gunboats. The ships of the line would not, His Majesty said, be required, perhaps, with so large a fleet in the Baltic, but they would, at all events, be useful for transporting the troops. In addition to this, I will venture to remind your Lordship that a Swedish ship of the line carrying from 74 to 80 guns, does not draw more than 23 feet of water.

The subsidies which would be required for the above force would be

3,300,000 rix-dollars banco (about 275,000*l.*) a-month, and with regard to this the King spoke very decidedly. Less was out of the question; and His Majesty proceeded to point out the cheapness of a Swedish soldier, and the economy it would be for England and France to employ a Swedish army. To this may be added the consideration of the climate in the north, as regards which neither English nor French can be put in comparison with the Swedes. And I am informed by M. Blanchard that the King did not appear to shrink from the idea of a winter campaign.

The great difficulty in His Majesty's mind appeared to be to find a pretext for breaking with Russia, but that would be overcome if something was done by the fleet, and the expeditionary corps from France, which we presume is now on its way to the Baltic. The King said that some decisive blow (un fait d'armes), such as the taking of the Aland Islands, would so rouse the enthusiasm of the Swedish people, that he would be justified in saying to the Emperor of Russia that he was no longer able to maintain his neutrality.

Although the arrival of Her Majesty's Minister at this Court, Mr. Magenis, may be expected here on the 27th instant, I think it right to lay before your Lordship the substance of what I have been able to learn from M. Lobstein and M. Blanchard.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. GREY.

No. 381.

Mr. Grey to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 192. Secret and Confidential.)

Stockholm, July 26, 1854.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 189 of the 24th instant, I reported to your Lordship the result of the first interview between M. Blanchard and the King, and also that His Majesty had promised to draw up a statement of his views with regard to an Offensive and Defensive Treaty between England, France and Sweden, before the departure of the steamer to-morrow for Lübeck.

On the 24th and the 25th instants Baron Manderström was sent by the King to the French Minister, with a draft of a Treaty drawn up by His Majesty himself; this draft was copied by M. Lobstein from the dictation of Baron Manderström, and he was at the same time desired to consider it carefully, and to be prepared to state his opinion to the King, by whom he would be received this day at 1 o'clock.

At the appointed time M. Lobstein and M. Blanchard proceeded to Haga, and had a long interview with His Majesty. The result of this interview I can only state very summarily to your Lordship, having only been able to speak to the French Minister for a quarter of an hour alone since his return.

M. Blanchard proceeds to Paris to-morrow morning, with the authority of the King to say that a Treaty of the following nature would be accepted:

"England and France should declare that they have engaged in a war against Russia, with a view of restraining her within limits less threatening for the future welfare of Europe (dans le but de restreindre la Russie dans des proportions moins menaçantes pour l'avenir de l'Europe).

"With this view they would be glad to see Finland detached from Russia and united to Sweden (détachée de la Russie et unie à la Suède).

"They should engage to send the forces necessary by land and sea to accomplish the object in view.

"Austria should give her adhesion to the Treaty to be signed between England, France and Sweden.

"Peace should not be made with Russia without the common consent of the Contracting Powers.

"The details regarding the number of the troops, vessels, &c., to be furnished by Sweden are to be specified in Separate Articles."

The above is, I believe, a correct summary of the King's proposals, which, however, I venture to remind your Lordship are written from memory and after a very hurried interview with the French Minister, but I have no hesitation in

stating that the King expressed his desire that the draft of the Treaty between England, France and Sweden might be drawn up and presented to him with as little loss of time as possible; and, as soon as the adhesion (adhésion) of Austria (not as a Contracting Party) is secured, His Majesty will not, I believe, hesitate to sign the Treaty at once. The conditions regarding the number of troops to be furnished by Sweden, and the subsidies to be granted by England and France, are correctly stated in my despatch No. 189.

As soon as it was agreed between the King and Messrs. Lobstein and Blanchard that the proposals specified above should be carried to Paris without delay, His Majesty proceeded to discuss the whole plan of a winter campaign, as if he had already declared himself against Russia. He expressed his opinion that the Aland Islands might be held during the winter in spite of any opposition, and, as I am informed, explained his views on the subject. They will, doubtless, reach your Lordship from other sources, and I can only regret that the shortness of the time did not allow the French Minister to inform me of their nature.

I have only to add that the King repeated his promise to make every preparation that was possible till the negotiations were concluded. In the meantime His Majesty begged that the greatest secrecy might be observed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. GREY.

No. 382.

Sir John Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 51.)

Munich, July 29, 1854.

My Lord,

THE uncertainty which has, until lately, prevailed at all the smaller Courts, and the reserve maintained towards them by the two great German Cabinets, relative to the answer returned by that of St. Petersburgh to the summons to evacuate the Danubian Principalities, addressed to it by Austria on the 3rd of June, has occasioned a tolerable amount of dissatisfaction, and has given rise, I understand, to many complaints of the intentional slight thus put upon them. This silence, however, seems to me to be completely justified by motives of prudence, and, in fact, to have been the natural consequence of the insight afforded into the views and designs of all those States which were represented at the Bamberg Conferences; even without any reference to the part which I still believe them to be capable of playing in the present political crisis, if they think they can do so with safety to themselves; whilst, on the other hand, the unnecessary delays which they have thought proper to interpose in signifying their accession to the Treaty of Berlin could scarcely fail to weaken, to a great extent, that confidence of which their ready acquiescence in the policy of the two great Federal Powers was one of the first conditions. That object is now happily attained, and protestations of their devotion to the common cause of German interests are not wanting; but yet an attentive observer can scarcely avoid remarking certain lurking Russian tendencies among the many petty Sovereigns of Germany, which indicate that, in spite of the reverses inflicted on the Emperor, their faith in his omnipotence is as yet but little shaken.

Towards fostering this blind reliance on the Conservative power of their Imperial Master are directed all the efforts of Russian diplomacy, which is unremitting in its endeavours to produce, on their part, a coolness and suspicion towards their more powerful neighbours, with the ill-concealed design of creating disunion and embarrassment between them, sufficient to incapacitate Austria from taking any effective steps for curbing the aggressive inclinations of Russia in the direction of the East.

The Bamberg Conferences went far to enlighten Europe on these points, but they were inopportune, inasmuch as they exhibited to the world the want of unanimity subsisting within the bosom of the Confederation, which each Government feels, but which they are all so unwilling to admit; and, in this respect, the result of that meeting may not be altogether without importance, when the great question at issue shall have further developed itself. The

submission of the smaller Governments to the will of their two more powerful confederates, has, for the moment, saved them from the danger to which their own imprudence had exposed them; but should they hereafter give any indications of too great a readiness to listen to the attractive suggestions of Russia, and attempt to commit any fresh act of folly likely to thwart or compromise the united action of Germany, they would then, in all probability, meet with that reward which they would then so richly merit, and for which they would not have long to wait, if a sincere and cordial understanding were once established between Austria and Prussia.

The knowledge, however, that this is next to unattainable, even as regards what are commonly termed German interests, forms the basis of the hopes and operations of the Russian Cabinet, and it is remarkable that the smaller Courts owe the first communication of the Emperor's reply to the summons of the Austrian Government of the 3rd of June to the Russian Agents accredited to them. Such, at any rate, was the course adopted here, and the delivery of the copy of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Prince Gortchakoff to the Bavarian Minister for Foreign Affairs was, I am told, accompanied by a most urgent appeal to the Government to join with Prussia in counteracting the projects bearing a character so hostile to Russia, which the Austrian Cabinet is supposed to be about to pursue. The tone of this despatch, which M. von der Pfordten read to me at a late interview, and with which your Lordship is of course acquainted, presents a singular contrast to the haughty language hitherto held towards the European Powers, and almost supplicates for permission to withdraw, without further sacrifice, from the embarrassing position in which the Emperor has contrived to place himself by his arrogant attack upon the integrity and independence of the Sultan. The effect produced at Vienna, by the mission of Prince Gortchakoff, is now publicly known, and its probable results leave but little room for conjecture, since the determination of Austria to insist upon her demands for the speedy evacuation of the Principalities, is, to all appearance, daily becoming more fixed, and her preparations for the approaching crisis more matured.

The Russian Cabinet, however, amidst the host of untoward events which have accumulated upon it of late, seems averse to throw away even a chance, and encouraged no doubt by the sentiments exhibited at Bamberg, which unquestionably predominate in the higher regions here, recently made a last effort to detach the Bavarian Government from the policy of Austria.

Your Lordship is aware that a similar course was pursued in respect to most of the other small Courts of Germany which took part in the Conferences; and that autograph letters from the Emperor to the respective Sovereigns were dispatched in all directions.

Colonel Isakoff, one of His Imperial Majesty's aides-de-camp, was the bearer of that addressed to the King of Bavaria, and his arrival here some three weeks ago, and his reception at the Royal country residence at Hohenschwangau, where the King was then residing, created no small sensation in the capital. Every one was naturally anxious to ascertain what was going on, and what could have occasioned a mission of this description; and my Austrian colleague in particular appeared desirous to get at the bottom of what bore every mark of a new intrigue against the policy pursued by his Cabinet.

For some time nothing upon which any reliance could be placed transpired; but trusting to information derived from two different sources, both usually well acquainted with what is passing within the precincts of the Court, I think I may venture to state, that the journey of Colonel Isakoff, who after a short absence at Stuttgardt reappeared here a few days ago, and received a Bavarian decoration, had for its object to express to the King the great gratification experienced by the Emperor at the friendly dispositions manifested at the Bamberg meeting, and to sound the Bavarian Cabinet in respect to its future policy, with a view to discovering whether there was any chance of persuading it to act with Prussia in arresting the course about to be entered upon by Austria.

Colonel Isakoff was, I am told, also charged to convey to the King the strongest assurances of the sympathy felt by the Emperor for the humiliation and sufferings of the King of Greece, and to express His Imperial Majesty's sincere regret at his inability to assist him at the present moment.

Now, notwithstanding the exposure of the Emperor's intentions in regard to the restriction of the Kingdom of Greece within its actual limits, made in the

secret and confidential correspondence laid before Parliament, I can scarcely hesitate to own an apprehension that these shallow attempts at cajolery may produce some effect in quarters so predisposed in favour of the Court from whence they come.

M. von der Pfordten had several interviews with Colonel Isakoff, sometimes in the presence of my Russian colleague, and sometimes alone, and I have no doubt that at them all these matters were thoroughly canvassed. I am unable to state what passed in reference to the interests of the Bavarian dynasty in Greece, but I have reason to believe that on the other point, M. von der Pfordten, whilst avowing his entire disapproval of the policy of the Cabinet of Vienna on the Eastern question, added that Bavaria would, whatever happened, be compelled to follow Austria. He was at some pains, I understand, to impress upon the mind of Colonel Isakoff the prodigious weight which 70,000,000 United Germans would be able to throw into the scale on either side, and he is not altogether without hope that this consideration may have some influence on the further conduct of the Emperor.

His Excellency is completely satisfied with the moderate language in which the Russian reply to the Vienna summons is drawn up, and he considers that the readiness to subscribe to the Protocol of Vienna announced in it, is evidence of pacific intentions on the part of Russia, and offers a fair basis for the renewal of negotiations, and particularly for the immediate conclusion of an armistice.

Without wishing to commence any discussion on the merits or demerits of the composition before us, I replied that I viewed it in somewhat a different light. It insinuated, I said, throughout, that Russia was the aggrieved party, and that the others were the aggressors. It sought to justify the protracted occupation of a large portion of the Turkish territory on the ground of the necessity for keeping a military position. Why, I asked, if the Emperor were so pacifically disposed, did he not take up his military positions within his own dominions? Then, I observed, if I understood the concluding paragraph rightly, Count Nesselrode affected to consider that the Vienna Protocol established the principle of an European Protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, which he perfectly well knew was never contemplated in the Russian sense.

I was unwilling, I said, to prejudge the answer which would be returned to the communication of this despatch by Her Majesty's Government, but I thought I might safely hazard a conjecture that it would not meet with the approbation that he seemed to consider due to it.

Now the practical consequences of all these divergencies of opinions and views, may, I conceive, be summed up in a very few words. If Austria and Prussia are really of one mind, and determined to act with energy, of which I may be permitted to entertain doubts, the smaller States must necessarily march march with them. Should Prussia refuse to participate in any hostile demonstration against Russia, and in general evince a desire to hold back, the latter will redouble her efforts to secure the support of the smaller Governments, in the hope of thus being able to cripple the action of the disposable forces of Austria, in which, notwithstanding M. von der Pfordten's asseverations, she is even here not unlikely to be partially successful. But this pressure will, in my opinion, be the more stringently applied at the moment when the Russian forces shall have either voluntarily withdrawn or been driven from the Principalities; the evacuation of which most of the German Governments regard as the sole object of the war, in as far, at least, as they are called upon to take part in it in defence of German interests.

In the event, however, of a reluctance to advance on the part of Prussia, or more properly speaking on the part of the King, another question of no small importance to the internal welfare of Germany would be at once raised, with all its concomitant dangers; for I cannot for a moment suppose that public opinion would suffer Austria to support single-handed the chances of a war, avowedly undertaken for the protection of German interests, with the sanction of the Sovereign who appears now so anxious to escape from the responsibility he incurred by the signature of the Protocols of Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 383.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 969.)

Paris, August 3, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS having desired M. de Bourqueney to transmit by telegraph the alterations which Count Buol wished to introduce into the note to be given in exchange for that addressed to him by the English and French Representatives, they were sent to him this morning.

I have the honour to state them to your Lordship.

In the first of the four points Servia is left out, and after the words "ne sont pas" the paragraph runs thus: "placés sous la garantie collective des Puissances en vertu d'un arrangement à conclure avec la Sublime Porte, et dont les dispositions régleraient en même temps toutes les garanties de détail."

In the last paragraph, after the word "Gouvernement," the text is proposed as follows: "prend note de la détermination de la France et de l'Angleterre à n'entrer avec la Cour Impériale de Russie, &c."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys does not understand why Servia is omitted from the first condition; otherwise he has no objection to this alteration. The other he considers an amelioration. At all events he is most anxious that this exchange of notes should be made, even if there were slight objections to the alterations; as, if difficulties are made and the Principalities should be evacuated, Austria might refuse to continue the negotiations.

Your Lordship will have been informed by M. Baudin, that the alterations introduced by Her Majesty's Government into the proposed Treaty are likely to be objected to by the Austrian Government; but the objections M. Drouyn de Lhuys conceives may be met by a reconstruction of the text of the Treaty without abandoning any of the points contended for, and he hopes that as time is precious, your Lordship will authorize Lord Westmorland to make the best terms he can on the knowledge which he now possesses of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government, and sign the Treaty at once. He is very apprehensive of the dangers which may result from delay.

M. de Bourqueney's full powers will be transmitted to him this evening.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 384.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)

Vienne, le 4 Août, 1854.

(Télégraphique.)

MR. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest le 31 Juillet:—

"Les Russes retirent; le commencement a été fait à Frateschti le 27. Depuis hier le gros du quartier-général est à Gilava, une heure de Bucharest; l'arrière-garde était aujourd'hui à Kalugereni. Les ponts de Kalugereni, ainsi que ceux de Pargis près Copatchin, sont détruits. Les bâtiments d'Oltenitzu ainsi que les ponts ont été brûlés par les Russes. Les Russes restent deux jours à Gilava et vont à Fokschani chercher à Bucharest. Il n'y avait pas de Turcs aujourd'hui à Oltenitzu.

"Ils sont en dessus de Frateschti au nombre de 60,000 entre Podina et Bilult, à trois postes de Bucharest, où on les attend cette semaine."

No. 385.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 5, 1854.

COUNT BUOL having received the orders of the Emperor, made to the French Ambassador and myself the following communication:

The exchange of notes with the two modifications proposed by Austria is accepted. The original text of the Treaty is likewise accepted. Count Buol wishes Article I to remain unaltered, and also to consider the stipulation with respect to the common deliberations before concluding an armistice, as part of the arrangement to be hereafter made for regulating the military operations, as indicated in Article III. Article III is accepted with that clause which renders the offensive and defensive alliance reciprocal. Prussia is already invited to adhere to the four points mentioned in the notes to be exchanged. Upon receipt of her answer, whether negative or affirmative, the Austrian courier will start for St. Petersburgh.

If the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should not accept the terms suggested, and order the evacuation of the Principalities within eight days, Count Esterhazy will demand his passports, and the Emperor of Austria thinks that the moment for signing the Convention will be that in which the refusal of Russia is made known. To the signature at that moment His Majesty's word is pledged.

The French Ambassador and myself objected most strongly to this delay, and the French Ambassador refused to sign the notes. Having your Lordship's instructions to act with the French Ambassador, I did the same. From my conversation with Count Buol, I entertain a hope that his decision is not irrevocable.

A communication on the subject has been made to Paris by telegraph.

No. 386.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 287.)

Vienna, August 1, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD expected to receive yesterday the communications which were to correspond with those received by M. de Bourqueney from his Government dated the 27th ultimo, and which were to have left London on Thursday, but they are not arrived; I have, therefore, only to report to your Lordship what took place yesterday at the meeting called by Count Buol, with Baron Bourqueney and myself.

Count Buol stated that he had received despatches from M. de Hübner inclosing the communications which had been placed in his hands by the French Government, and which he, Count Buol, was ready generally to approve of, and he asked Baron Bourqueney and myself if we had received the copies of those documents. I replied by reading to Count Buol your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 29th ultimo, which directed me to act on M. de Bourqueney's instructions, and I therefore stated that I was ready to give my support to his proposals, both as to the exchange of notes with the Austrian Government and the project of Treaty.

Baron Bourqueney then produced those documents, with which Count Buol was already acquainted through M. de Hübner, and with which he signified his concurrence, desiring only that two modifications should be adopted; the first is in the note to be exchanged with the Austrian Government, and in reference to the first guarantee. Count Buol would wish the end of the sentence to run thus, as respecting the Principalities, "Seront placées sous la garantie collective des Puissances en vertu d'un arrangement à conclure avec la Sublime Porte, et dont les dispositions régleraient en même temps toutes les questions de détail." The other alteration which Count Buol desired was in the last paragraph of the proposed Austrian note, in which he would wish to state, "que son Gouverne-

ment prend acte de la détermination de l'Angleterre et de la France de n'entrer avec la Cour Impériale de Russie dans aucun arrangement," &c., to the end of the sentence.

As I have already stated to your Lordship in my telegraphic despatch of yesterday, these documents will, to-morrow, be submitted to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor upon his return from Ischl, and Count Buol entertains no doubt that His Majesty will confirm the sanction he has given to them.

With respect to the form of the communication of these documents to St. Petersburgh, Count Buol would desire, if the sanction of the Prussian Government should be obtained (an expectation which can only be founded upon the effect which may have been produced by the strong representations made by the three Governments), that the substance of the proposed notes might be embodied in a Protocol of the four Powers, or Prussia might be made a party to the communications by an exchange of notes with the English and French Governments, in the same way in which it will have taken place with the Imperial Government.

Count Buol, however, only throws out these suggestions, being perfectly willing to adopt the form which the three Governments upon consultation should consider most advisable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 387.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 5, 12·20 A.M.)

Berlin, August 5, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Austrian Minister has communicated to Baron Manteuffel the project of the French-English note. His Excellency has answered, that he should instruct the Prussian Minister at Vienna to announce [the] readiness of the Cabinet of Berlin to support it at St. Petersburgh.

Some uniform [or unimportant] modifications are said to be wished for by the King of Prussia. The Prussian Government are vexed not to have had this communication directly from the Western Powers.

No. 388.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 7.)

(No. 395.)

Therapia, July 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I CALLED in person on Reshid Pasha to communicate your Lordship's instruction, relating to the condition and prospects of the Sultan's army at Kars. I explained its contents to him, and again, for the third time, put forward the name of General Guyon, as an officer recommended by Her Majesty's Government to the responsible post of Commander-in-chief of that army, not as an object of their peculiar predilection, but as one who might well be preferred in the absence of any General better qualified for so high a trust.

It is but fair to state that his Highness evinced no personal disinclination to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government; but it was natural for him, as an individual member of the Cabinet, destitute himself of military experience or professional knowledge, to defer to the opinions of his colleagues, who are known to be decidedly unfavourable to General Guyon's appointment, not from any distrust of his zeal or unwillingness to recognize his merits, but from a general persuasion that he has hitherto, it may be from want of opportunity, given no proof of the experience or ability required for the chief command of a considerable army.

It is by no means impossible that a downright requisition on the part of Her Majesty's Government, in favour of General Guyon, might be attended with the desired success; but there is no denying that the responsibility would be

great, and such indeed, that an individual, not acting upon the unqualified orders of his Government, might well shrink from incurring it. While the merits of General Guyon in zealously pointing out the defects of the army and its officers, in sympathizing with the wants of the soldiers, and, most especially, in sparing no exertions for the redress of those defects and the supply of those wants, is generally admitted; it must be allowed that his claim to the chief command, rests either on the warm eulogies of Mr. Brant, who is not a military man, or on a comparison with the known deficiencies of the Turkish commanders. It requires no practice in war to know that bravery, zeal, and energy, however meritorious in character and remarkable in degree, are not only insufficient to qualify an officer for the highest places of trust, but capable of compromising the most important interests, when not accompanied with more comprehensive capacities and a genuine talent for command. General Guyon may possibly be endowed with all that constitutes a man of genius; but the Turkish Ministers are naturally inclined to look for some earnest of the fact, when the first consequence of their acting upon the presumption of it, would be the disqualification of their own countrymen, and the second an exposure of the army to perilous reverses on their responsibility.

Your Lordship may, perhaps, think it prudent to take into consideration the apparently ardent desire of General Guyon to engage, even with feeble means, in offensive operations; and the danger which, if the Porte were pressed against its convictions, might arise from such consideration in a country where it is easier to ride over adverse opinions than to conciliate goodwill or to secure a hearty concurrence.

It results from my conversation with Reshid Pasha, that there would be less difficulty and perhaps more eventual satisfaction, in either appointing a British or a French General to the command-in-chief of the army at Kars, or in placing the army under the command of Ismail Pasha, who distinguished himself at Csetate, with Generals of Division selected from Europe. His Highness even wished me to write at once to England for the nomination of an English General, with the assurance that he would be accepted by the Porte.

I thought I could not do better than refer these ideas to Lord Raglan, but his Lordship's answer does not encourage me to expect that any British officer of high standing would accept the proposed command, and I therefore see no resource but to rely on the substitution of a more tried and approved Turkish General for the one now commanding at Kars, and to found on a fresh inspection and report, free from all suspicion of local views and preconceived impressions, a remedial plan calculated to redress the grievances of the soldiers, and to render the officers; and together with them the whole army, as efficient as circumstances admit of. According to the latest accounts, there is already a considerable improvement. Supplies of sundry important articles are still, indeed, required in greater abundance. But there is no longer a scarcity of provisions; the army is in considerable force in point of numbers; the health of the soldiers is generally good; the new reinforcements from Arabistan are highly spoken of; and the artillery amounts to upwards of sixty field-pieces equipped for active service. The military incapacity of the Commander-in-chief, the ignorance of almost all the Turkish officers above the rank of Captain, their jealousy of General Guyon, and the intrigues of his foreign rivals, are pointed out to me as the more immediate subjects of complaint and sources of weakness.

The military experience, personal qualities, and high reputation of General Klapka, have recommended him, in the absence of any British or French competitor, as the officer best qualified, on the whole, to undertake the task of inspection at Kars and Batoom. The Turkish Government appear to be of this opinion, and although I cannot but lament the hesitations which have retarded their decision, I look with hope to his speedy departure for the scene of his inquiries, properly accompanied, and furnished with instructions adequate to the occasion.

I stop here with the intention of resuming the subject as soon as I am able to announce its final arrangement, and to add such particulars as may serve to complete your Lordship's information respecting the character and objects of General Klapka's mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 389.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 396.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 24, 1854.

THE Prussian Envoy at Constantinople, whether by order of his Court or not I am ignorant, intimated lately, in confidence, to Reshid Pasha that the Porte would, in his opinion, act wisely in not allowing the Austrians to effect an exclusive occupation of the Principalities, and advised, as the better course, that a portion of the Turkish army, even in conjunction with British and French troops, should be sent into Wallachia at the same time. His impression, according to the message conveyed secretly to me, appeared to be that the object of the Court of Vienna was to take the place of the Russians, and to assume, in some degree, the character of protectors.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 390.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 432.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 4, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of an Austrian circular, dated Vienna, July 28th, which has been addressed to the German Courts, moving them to instruct their Representatives at the Diet of Frankfort to support a communication which will be made conjointly by Austria and Prussia, to prepare, in virtue of the Treaty of the 20th of April, to place one half of their federal contingent on the war footing.

I understand that the Prussian Government were completely unprepared for this step of the Imperial Cabinet, and were taken by surprise when a copy of this circular was made known to them. They have not yet decided what course they will adopt in this matter; but some of the Representatives of the small German Courts with whom I have conversed feel convinced that Prussia must follow in the track of Austria, but that like everything which is done here and elsewhere in Germany, much valuable time will inevitably be lost.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 390.

Circular to Austrian Representatives at German Courts.

(Translation.) *Vienna, July* 28, 1854.

BY Article III of the offensive and defensive alliance, which is adhered to now by the whole Germanic Confederation, the Contracting Parties have bound themselves, for the purpose of giving due security and force to the conditions of the Treaty, to keep, if necessary, at periods and at points which are to be determined among themselves, a part of their military force in complete readiness for war; and a special decision will be come to as to the time, extent and manner of placing these forces.

The Courts of Austria and Prussia, in the firm hope that their efforts in the cause of unity will include the whole of Germany, have already agreed upon the proposals to be made to the Diet respecting the execution of these conditions of the Treaty, and Baron Prokesch has been accordingly authorized to propose, in conjunction with the Prussian Minister at the Diet, a military arrangement corresponding to said Article III of the Treaty of Alliance; and, according to his instructions, he will consider it his duty to bring about a decision on this point

with the greatest possible dispatch, and a rapid, energetic and judicious execution of the decisions thus taken.

The most essential point of the proposal intended to be made by the two Courts is, that Austria is to place 150,000 to 250,000 men, Prussia 100,000 to 200,000 men, and the rest of the German States one-half of their federal contingent, on a war footing. Should this proposition be assented to, two federal corps will be formed, the one consisting of the contingents of the 7th and 8th, the other of those of the 9th and 10th army corps, which could be placed in the most eligible positions in conjunction with the forces of Austria and Prussia.

That the case of necessity for such military preparations, foreseen in the Treaty of the 20th April, has already really occurred, surely requires no more special proofs in the face of the attitude of Russia and the preparations of that Power. Austria has prepared two of her armies for immediate action, and in Prussia the necessary orders have been given for the mobilisation of the military force which she is bound to raise according to the agreement. An advance of the Austrian troops, and a rencontre between them and the forces of Russia in the Danubian Principalities, will possibly take place in a very short time, and, under such circumstances, it is surely of great importance for the whole of Germany to prove, by its acts, that the united power of the Germanic Confederation is opposed to an attack on the frontiers of Austria. Even for the sake of the moral effect alone, we must consider it as most desirable that the military decision of the Diet, for the maintenance of the offensive and defensive alliance, should be taken without delay, and be executed with active zeal at the same moment when the Courts of Vienna and Berlin will be called upon to take their last decisive steps in St. Petersburgh.

You will use your best efforts with the Government to which you have the honour of being accredited, that their Representative at Frankfort be provided with the fullest powers to move the Diet to come to a decision on the above-mentioned basis, and to take part in all subsequent resolutions which may become necessary for the well-timed and well-conducted execution of the military measures of the Confederation. All our allies will certainly concur with us in the conviction that the development of an imposing activity from the centre of the Germanic Confederation is proved to be a vital question to the Confederation. But an essential condition of such an activity appears to us to be, that the clearly urgent necessity of alleviating and simplifying, as far as possible, the proceedings of the Diet, should be taken into consideration by all parties, and that for sake of the great cause the different Governments of the Confederation should give the fullest powers to the Members of the Diet.

No. 391.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 434.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 4, 1854.

IN conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I have read to Baron Manteuffel your Lordship's despatch No. 201 of the 29th ultimo, and delivered to his Excellency a copy of it.

He seemed to have been prepared for a communication of the kind: he showed no symptoms of surprise at its contents, or at the request for an explanation of the reasons which led to the absence of the Prussian Minister from the Vienna Conference, and the policy which the Prussian Government intended to follow in the further progress of the Eastern question.

Baron Manteuffel made an attempt to answer the observations that a change of policy had come over the Cabinet of Berlin, by urging the difference in the position of Austria and Prussia, but he assured me that the King would not depart from his engagements; that his object was peace, and that as long as His Majesty saw a possibility of keeping his country out of war, he would endeavour to do so.

His Excellency added, that he should take the King's orders as to the answer to be returned to the despatch I had just read, and that he hoped to send it to Count Bernstorff in a few days, but he said nothing which indicated what that answer would be.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 392.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 435.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 4, 1854.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 421 of the 28th ultimo, in which I informed your Lordship of my having, in the absence of Baron Manteuffel, communicated to the Acting Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the substance of your Lordship's despatches to the Earl of Westmorland, Nos. 247, 248, and 249 of the 22nd ultimo, on the policy of the Western Powers towards Russia, I have thought it advisable to refer to this communication at an interview which I have had with the Minister President, since his return from the country.

I recapitulated, shortly, the four points upon which Her Majesty's Government were agreed with Austria, as the bases upon which a peace with Russia might be negotiated:

1. A new organization of the Principalities calculated to substitute the protectorate of Europe for the influence so long abused in these provinces.

2. A revision of the Treaty of 1841, and the limitation of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea.

3. Freedom of the navigation of the Danube under the guarantee of the Great Powers of Europe.

4. The abolition of Protectorate claimed by Russia over Greek subjects of the Porte, and placing the different Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire under the safeguard of the Christian Powers, with due respect to the independence and sovereign rights of the Sultan; and I told his Excellency that he would at once comprehend that with these opinions Her Majesty's Government must consider the Russian answer addressed to Prince Gortchakoff as unworthy of serious consideration.

Baron Manteuffel replied that he nevertheless thought there were points upon which Her Majesty's Government might have consented to negotiate, and that it was not advisable to throw over the Russian propositions altogether. I then said that your Lordship's answer was already at Vienna; and that, in the present temper of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, it was useless to think of negotiating with it; and that Her Majesty's Government would not be parties to any more negotiation, direct or indirect, with the Imperial Government; that our answer was in Count Buol's hands, who might, on his own responsibility, do what he pleased with it, but that he was not authorized to communicate it to St. Petersburgh.

Baron Manteuffel appeared deeply to regret these decisions of Her Majesty's Government, feeling, probably, that an end would thus be put to the efforts of mediation which the King of Prussia was so desirous to continue, and that His Majesty's policy would soon be forced into another direction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 393.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 436.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 4, 1854.

I CALLED to-day on Baron Manteuffel, and asked him if he had received from Count Bernstoff the reports of two interviews which he had lately had with your Lordship.

His Excellency replied that they had reached him, but as he showed no disposition to converse respecting these reports, I read to him the latter part of your Lordship's despatch No. 205 of the 31st ultimo, and the whole of your No. 208 of the 1st instant, in the hope of extracting some remarks from him.

His Excellency attempted to defend the King from Russian predilections, and endeavoured to show that though Prussia was disposed to go with us to a certain extent, we expected more from her than she was at present disposed to give, and that she wished, and had all along wished, to keep out of war; that we desired her to unite her policy with ours, which she hesitated doing, because we wished to push matters further than she was prepared for.

Baron Manteuffel spoke upon the subject of the Vienna Conference, and of Count Alvensleben being authorised to attend it, and evidently seemed desirous that the Prussian Plenipotentiary should be a party to any meetings that might take place at Vienna; upon which I drew his Excellency's attention to the latter part of your Lordship's despatch No. 208, in which you state that it was now too late, and that it would be casting ridicule on the British Government to attend a Conference for the purpose of communicating to it a Russian despatch which we considered unworthy of our consideration, and which, in fact, was already replied to by a communication to the Cabinet of Vienna. That we did not want a Conference, but an explanation of the future intentions of Prussia, in order that we might make our arrangements accordingly, for we could no longer submit to render our plans subordinate to the vacillation of other countries.

Baron Manteuffel was silent, and evidently felt unable to give any opinion of the King's intentions at this moment.

I understand that Count Esterhazy has made communications of importance to Baron Manteuffel, and has pressed the Prussian Government to arm without loss of time, and that the more decided language of the Austrian Legation since Count Esterhazy's arrival at Berlin, has taken them by surprise, and may be productive of good results.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 394.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August .)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August* 8, 1854.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF announced that the Emperor of Russia had ordered the complete evacuation of the two Principalities.

Count Buol answered, that acknowledging the receipt of this resolution, he begged to state that nothing was altered by this declaration in the engagements which Austria had contracted with the belligerent Powers; for in confirmation of this statement Count Buol announced that he was ready to proceed immediately with the French Ambassador and myself to the exchange of the notes containing the guarantees. With respect to the Convention, he represented that it would not be signed in its present form, as it was founded upon the resolve of the Emperor [not ?] to evacuate the Principalities, a measure which he had now himself ordered to be carried out; but, he added, that circumstances might very soon occur which might render necessary an act of a similar nature.

The Austrian Government will immediately order the occupation of the Principalities, evacuated by Russia, in pursuance of the Convention with Turkey of the 14th June.

Under these circumstances it appears to the French Ambassador, and I partake of his opinion, that we ought to proceed without delay to the exchange of the notes, and thus carry with us the adherence of the Cabinet of Vienna to the guarantees mentioned in those documents.

I shall act in concert with the French Ambassador.

No. 395.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 980.)

Paris, August 7, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have been informed by the Earl of Westmorland that the Austrian Government is willing to proceed at once to exchange the notes proposed by the French Government and alluded to in my despatch No. 937 of the 27th ultimo, but that the Emperor objects to signing the Treaty alluded to in the same despatch, until another overture has been made to St. Petersburgh. In M. de Bourqueney's statement it is said that if after eight days the Russian Government does not accept the Austrian proposals, Count Esterhazy is to leave St. Petersburgh, and that the Emperor of Austria then engages to sanction the signature of the Treaty. In the communication, however, which M. de Hübner made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on this matter, he only went so far as to say that his Imperial Master reserved to himself to order the signature when the refusal of Russia should be announced. Your Lordship will have learnt, likewise, that M. de Bourqueney refused to accept the exchange of notes only, and that his example was followed by Lord Westmorland.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys approved the proceedings of M. de Bourqueney, who hoped by this refusal to induce the Austrian Government to sign the two instruments at the same time, and he stated as much to M. de Hübner, observing on the inconsistency of three Powers specifying the terms on which peace could be made, before any engagement was signed which made them joint belligerents. Nevertheless, his Excellency is so much alive to the advantages to the alliances which he conceives must result from the exchange of notes, that, having ascertained that Lord Westmorland was to follow the instructions sent to the French Minister in this matter, he has authorised M. de Bourqueney to exchange the notes without signing the Treaty. Indeed, he observes that the signature of the Treaty is for the moment impossible, as Her Majesty's Government have raised objections, which are yet under discussion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 396.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 985.)

Paris, August 8, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Prussian Chargé d'Affaires made this morning to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a communication in answer to the inquiries of the French Government at Berlin, as to the reasons which had induced the Prussian Plenipotentiary to decline assisting at the Conference lately proposed by Count Buol. As it is evident that Count Bernstorff will have made or will make a similar communication to your Lordship, I confine myself to stating that M. de Manteuffel denies that the Prussian Plenipotentiary refused to assist at the Conference. All that the Prussian Government desired was to come to some understanding with Austria before the Conference assembled: that object having been obtained, and the adhesion of the Germanic Diet to the Treaty signed between Prussia and Austria having been obtained, Prussia had declared her readiness to meet the other Powers in conference; and the Prussian Cabinet was ready now, as soon as the conditions on which the belligerent Powers would make peace, were made known to them in writing, to take them into their consideration.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied at once to Count Brandenburgh, that when a Conference had been summoned by Count Buol, the day and hour fixed, and when the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and France, on presenting themselves, were informed that the Conference could not take place, because the Prussian Plenipotentiary would not attend it, he must consider that to be a refusal on

the part of Prussis to continue the Conferences, particularly as eight days elapsed without any change in the intentions of her Representative being announced; that to say the least of it, there was a want of courtesy in this proceeding to which the French Government would not again expose their Representative, and that finding that a union of the four Powers had been thus rendered impossible, they had endeavoured by other means to keep the three remaining Powers together—means which they hoped were about to be crowned with success; that if these means were brought to the knowledge of the Prussian Government, it must be by some other agent, for he declined making any further communication whatsoever to the Prussian Cabinet of the proceedings of the French Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that he had made this answer to M. de Brandenburgh because he perceived in Baron Manteuffel's despatch a great apprehension lest the Prussian Government should be isolated from the other Powers, and he added that Count Brandenburgh showed considerable chagrin at the attitude which he had assumed.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys will consign this conversation to a despatch to M. de Moustier, a copy of which will be communicated to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.